



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
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CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE IN INTERNAL CONFLICT

Volume III
THE EXPERIENCE IN
AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA




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CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE IN INTERNAL CONFLICT.
VOLUME III. THE EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA AND LATIN
AMERICA

D. M. Condit, et al

American University
Washington, D. C.

April 1968

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CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE IN INTERNAL CONFLICT

**Volume III
THE EXPERIENCE IN
AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA**

**by
D. M. Condit
Bert H. Cooper, Jr.
and Others**

April 1968


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ABSTRACT

The present study is one of three volumes in a series entitled Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict. The series contains descriptive and analytical accounts covering a total of 57 cases of insurgency and counterinsurgency occurring in the 20th century. The three volumes are individually entitled The Experience in Asia, The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, and The Experience in Africa and Latin America.

The purpose of the project was to enlarge the body of knowledge about insurgency and especially counterinsurgency by empirical study of actual historical cases. From a sample of about 150 cases, 57 were selected according to criteria governing time, definition, occurrence of military operations, analogy, and feasibility. Persons of academic and professional background were then selected to study individual cases according to a standardized methodology (described in the Technical Appendix).

The individual studies were written in a format covering background, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and outcome and conclusions, followed by notes and bibliographic material. The studies have been grouped geographically in three volumes to form casebooks on the subject of internal conflict. In addition, the cases now published plus some further materials collected during their preparation form a data bank for the further analysis of insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Research and writing were
completed in November 1965.

FOREWORD

In the period since World War II, U. S. policy makers and private citizens alike have become increasingly aware of the serious threat to world peace that has been posed by insurgency. This is a complex threat that is imperfectly comprehended. CRESS is making a continuing effort to address itself to this subject in a number of ways; and the study that follows represents one approach to gaining an understanding of the threat.

The present volume is one of three representing 57 separate case studies of internal conflict situations occurring in the 20th century. Of the total cases studied, 17 experiences predated World War II, 11 occurred during World War II, and 29 took place between 1945 and 1965. The locale for 19 of the cases was Asia; for 12, Europe; for 6, the Middle East; for 11, Africa; and for 9, Latin America. The governmental force involved in containing or combating the insurgency also varied: In 16 cases an indigenous government composed of local people fought the insurgents; in 21 cases, it was a foreign authority operating in a colonial role; and in 20 cases, it was a foreign authority operating in an occupying or intervening role.

The large number and variety of cases of internal conflict were each analyzed according to a common methodology. The methodology was framed so as to emphasize the important relationships between military, political, economic, and sociological factors. Thus, these cases are not merely studies of military strategies or tactics in and of themselves, but of strategies and tactics assumed and implemented within the living and untidy complexity of their situational environments.

The importance of these data, from a research point of view, is considerable and obvious. The findings in these casebooks and additional information will now enable us to perform comparative analyses. We thus hope to identify, refine, and present for further research attention some principles that will make possible improved ways of dealing with internal conflict.

It is our belief that the cases will introduce the reader to the wide variety of guises that internal conflict assumes, the broad range of responses that it provokes, and its extensive and pervasive ramifications.



A.



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In a project as large as this, many persons have played important roles. Although it is impossible to acknowledge the contributions of everyone, certain major efforts should be cited.

The research design was reviewed by both in-house and outside experts. Their comments and suggestions were of considerable assistance in detecting and overcoming methodological problems. Foremost among these was Dr. Theodore R. Vallance, who was Director of the Center for Research in Social Systems until November 1966 and who also acted as division chairman for this project during most of its life. Valuable advice and comments were also supplied by Dr. Earl DeLong, Dr. Ritchie P. Lowry, Dr. William A. Lybrand, Dr. Philip Sperling, Dr. Herbert H. Vreeland, and Dr. Charles Windle.

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University. Professor Bernard B. Fall was one of the original testers of the methodology and made a number of helpful suggestions. Professor Alphonso Castagno of Boston University, Professor Ralph Powell of The American University, Mrs. Helen Kitchen, editor of Africa Report, and Professor Frank Trager of New York University were especially helpful in suggesting names of persons who might be able to undertake work on the cases in this series. In this connection, we must also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of our authors, who almost without exception helped by suggesting other possible contributors. Many others, too numerous to mention, gave the same kind of aid and assistance.

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INTRODUCTION

The publication of this three-volume series, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, marks the conclusion of work on the first phase of a study exploring the response of governments to the challenge of insurgent violence. Volume I contains studies of 19 cases reflecting The Experience in Asia; Volume II comprises 18 cases concerning The Experience in Europe and the Middle East; and Volume III, with 20 cases, describes The Experience in Africa and Latin America. Although the 57 cases occurred over a wide range of geographic areas and under a variety of social, economic, and political systems, in every instance the threat to the existence of the government in power was such that military forces were involved in maintaining or restoring order within the area.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY

The purpose of this study, performed under U. S. army aegis, was, in the broadest sense, to learn and profit from the past. Although the army in the early 1960's was directly or indirectly engaged in checking insurgency in various countries, notably in South Viet-Nam, there was no institutional memory bank upon which it could call to review either its own experience or that of other armies. The experience of experts was available, but even here there were difficulties. Not only did time tend to blur memories, but even when precise data were available, they could not always be correctly extrapolated to fit another case. When this study was begun in early 1963, comparative analysis of counterinsurgency was impossible on a broad scale: There were neither a sufficient number of studies nor a sufficient degree of analogy between those that had been done. Furthermore, earlier work had focused mainly on underground and insurgent operations* rather than on the counteractivities of government. Three specific purposes thus emerged: to focus on governmental response or counterinsurgency, to enlarge the number of cases under study, and to provide for comparability of data so as to broaden the base for future analysis.

* See, for example, such studies as Case Study in Guerrilla War—Greece During World War II (published in 1961), Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts (1962), Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria 1954-1962 (1963), Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953-1959 (1963), Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941-1954 (1964), Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944-1954 (1964), and Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (1963). All these studies were published by the Special Operations Research Office, predecessor of the present Center.

The project was planned as a three-phase study. The aim of the first phase of the work, which culminated in publication of the three volumes in the present series, was to identify counterinsurgency campaigns, to select from the total body of known cases those most useful for study, to analyze individually each selected case according to a standardized methodology, and to prepare case studies. In the second phase of the work, the data will be utilized to analyze on a comparative basis the strategic factors that operated in insurgency-counterinsurgency situations and to identify those tactical factors that were critical to the outcome of each case. The third phase of the work will be to study and analyze those specific tactical factors identified as critical—such possible tactics as resettlement, border control, jungle fighting, or treatment of captured and surrendered guerrillas.

The 57 case studies that constitute the first phase of this work are intended to present the reader with a broad overview of the major strategic and tactical factors bearing on each specific situation and to indicate some of the complexity of interplay between, for example, economic and sociological, political and military factors. There has been no attempt to probe intensively and in depth any specific component of a given campaign. Rather, the purpose has been to provide a point of first contact in the study of internal conflict situations.

The casebooks as presented bring together in ordered and coherent form a mass of formerly uncoordinated and fragmented data. From the research viewpoint, the series provides a data base for further study and analysis. From the military viewpoint, the studies should prove useful in instruction and orientation, as background for policy papers and contingency plans, and as a basis for the development of doctrine. From a still larger and less specifically utilitarian viewpoint, these volumes may also help in the continuing work of comprehending and assessing the role of the military in the critical area of governmental response to the challenge of internal conflict.

A MEANING OF "COUNTERINSURGENCY"

The initial research problem was to define the elements involved in the governmental response, or counterinsurgency, in terms that would have validity from both operational and research viewpoints. The problem was partly semantic in nature. Webster defined neither "governmental response" nor "counterinsurgency," but the meaning of the latter could presumably be derived by juxtaposing "counter," meaning "against," and "insurgency," meaning in international law "a revolt against a government not reaching the proportions of an organized revolution, and not recognized as belligerency." This definition left much to be desired insofar as the research project was concerned.

The word "counterinsurgency" was, indeed, fairly new in U. S. military usage, having been coined some time after 1958* to give coherence and meaning to actions in which U. S. military forces were becoming increasingly involved. In the February 1962 edition of military definitions published by The Joint Chiefs of Staff, counterinsurgency was defined as "the entire scope of actions (military, police, political, economic, psychological, etc.) taken by or in conjunction with the existing government of a nation to counteract, contain, or defeat an insurgency."† This definition was in effect when work on this project started.

This broad definition still left some questions unresolved. For example, what constituted an "insurgency"? What was a counterinsurgent government? On what particular actions within the "entire scope of actions" should the study be focused? To clarify these difficulties, it may be well to explain some of the research interpretations that were placed upon the official definition.

What Constituted "Insurgency"?

Concerning the matter of insurgency, it was difficult to define the criteria that distinguished it. In the view of some students, insurgents had to possess an organization, use illegal methods, and advocate a political program; lacking such characteristics, practitioners of violence remained simply badmen, terrorists, or bandits. But since the first two criteria, organization and use of illegal methods, were not limited to insurgents and indeed were common among bandits and terrorists, they did not distinguish insurgency. In the case of the third criterion, possession of a political program, the study planners believed that this was irrelevant from the point of view of the counterinsurgent government.

Did it really matter to a government whether it would be overthrown by violent persons with a political program or by violent persons without a political program? In the latter event, would not the result be political anarchy, or, in the functional sense, another type of political system? More usually, of course, any so-called nonpolitical insurgents who approached victory suddenly discovered or found thrust upon them a political program. In any event, from the point of view of the government, what counted was not the political change that would result after its downfall so much as the immediate threat to its existence.

* The word did not appear in the March 1958 edition of the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.

† U. S. JCS, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (JCS Pub 1; Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1962), p. 58. Newer terms currently replace the word "counterinsurgency" in military usage—for example, "stability operations," which in turn was replaced by "internal defense/development." Once work on this study started, there was no attempt to keep up with the latest semantic developments since the study is concerned with probing the concepts and operations of the past rather than making policy for the future.

In this study, therefore, it was assumed that governmental reaction to internal violence, whether the latter was politically or nonpolitically motivated and programmed, was counterinsurgent in nature. Thus the critical element in an insurgency was defined as the threat that it presented to the viability of the government—i. e., its credibility, its legitimacy, its ability to function.

What Was a Counterinsurgent Government?

Since, by the JCS definition, counterinsurgency included all actions "taken by or in conjunction with the existing government," a counterinsurgent government might be either an indigenous regime or a foreign power in an occupying, colonial, or supporting role. Although questions of legality might color the definition of a counterinsurgent government, for the researcher the test had to be that of function.

For example, the question of legality was important in those cases which occurred during World War II. In these instances, the legally constituted prewar governments of the Nazi-invaded and -occupied nations of Europe existed in exile, recognized by the Allied Powers, while puppet governments were formed within the occupied nations to carry on the administration of the country under the Axis occupation. But since the puppet governments actually performed the role of governing, they were regarded, for purposes of this study, as counterinsurgents when acting against resistance forces organized within their countries. Furthermore, the occupying powers within such countries, acting against resistance forces either alone or in conjunction with the puppet governments, also functioned as counterinsurgents.

For the purposes of this research project both the legal problems inherent in the concurrent existence of governments-in-exile and the dubious legality of foreign aggression were thus disregarded. The institutions and forces that functioned as the de facto government of a country were held to qualify as counterinsurgent, both by definition and by role.

What Was the Study Focus?

A third consideration involved the matter of emphasis within a study whose subject by definition embraced "the entire scope of actions (military, police, political, economic, psychological, etc.)" The occurrence of insurgency within a state indeed suggested a society in turmoil, in which a significant number of the people were in revolt, and in which every counterinsurgent action might operate to influence and to be influenced by every part of the society, in a continuous circle of interaction. Measures taken on the economic level could affect political decisions which then influenced military actions. Conversely, military actions affected other spheres. Even the bearing and discipline of troops, let alone the orders of the troop commander, produced important changes in the climate of acceptance or non-acceptance of the governmental response. Life for the military counterinsurgent became a series of interfaces between the many overlapping

phases of the total endeavor, in which it was difficult to determine cause and effect or to separate the purely military from the purely political or purely economic.

In research, as in life, it was difficult, if not impossible, to divide the counterinsurgency effort into entirely separate spheres. Despite this, it was the intent and endeavor of this project to emphasize the military aspect of counterinsurgency even while attempting to indicate its relationship to political, economic, and social causes and effects. Thus, whatever the implied equality of emphasis in the JCS definition, the stress in this study was upon military aspects of "the entire scope of actions."

SOME ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE STUDY

Any definition or concept of insurgency and counterinsurgency presupposes a certain philosophical point of view about the role of government and governmental opposition and about the role of internal violence in a state. Some of the assumptions implicit and explicit within the terms of reference of this study should therefore be examined. Assumptions bearing on at least three important aspects of the subject need some clarification: the matter of morality, the matter of role reversal, and the matter of preventive counterinsurgency.

A Research View of the Morality of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

When this study began, there were persons for whom the word "counterinsurgency" had (and may still have) moral overtones. To some, counterinsurgency seemed a "good" thing, done by "good" governments, with the "good" objectives of alleviating grievances and implementing desirable change while obviating undue violence and the chance of undesirable political results. They were able to hold this view, it should be noted, only by semantic juggling: The same actions, when taken by a "bad" government, became something other than counterinsurgency.

To others who considered the subject, counterinsurgency had an image ranging from "unwise" to "bad." Implicitly, these persons appeared to accept all insurgency as basically "good."

From the research viewpoint, danger seemed to lurk in both views. The view that counterinsurgency is "good"—and the concomitant refusal to call a function by its name when it is performed by a disliked institution or government—certainly seemed to circumscribe and distort one's perception of reality. On the other hand, the view that counterinsurgency is "bad" per se seemed to imply a roseate and unrealistic view of insurgency and to deny to government the pragmatic and functional requisite of self-preservation. Further, to view counterinsurgency as either totally "good" or totally "bad" seemed to preclude the possibility that "good" governments might use "bad" measures, or that "bad" governments might sometimes use "good" ones. To speculate along a scale of "good" and "bad" appeared fruitless.

The position taken in this study was that counterinsurgency might be undertaken by either "good" or "bad" governments in an assorted mix of "good" and "bad" ways, and that—whatever

political or moral approval or opprobrium might accrue to the government in question—counterinsurgency, as a function of government, remained a proper subject for inquiry and study. The terms "insurgency" and "counterinsurgency" were therefore accepted in their operational and nonmoralistic sense—as descriptive words used to name a type of violent opposition to government and a generic function of government, with no implications of morality or immorality. In this view, counterinsurgent governments might be either good or bad, they might be of any political persuasion, and the insurgents they combat might or might not have just cause for rebellion.

Role Reversal: Semantics vs. Function

It would not be necessary to mention the matter of role reversal but for the fact that the public image of a successful rebel has so often become stereotyped that, even after an insurgent has assumed the reins of government, he is still viewed as an insurgent. The semantic problem involved in the failure to recognize the reversal of role from insurgent to counterinsurgent is complicated by Communist practice and doctrine, which have been loathe to give up the "population snatching" appeals of the insurgent line even after governmental power has been attained.*

Thus, for example, one could find references to Fidel Castro as a "revolutionary" long after his ascension to power in Cuba. Indeed, Prime Minister Castro speaks of himself as a revolutionist and of his government as revolutionary. Let no one think, however, that any further insurgency against the insurgents-turned-government will be tolerated; when Castro appeals to Cubans to follow his "revolution," this is no call to insurgency, but exactly the opposite. Nonetheless, Castro's image was to many still that of an insurgent leader long after his function within Cuba became that of counterinsurgent.

Not only do the insurgents-turned-government attempt to maintain the appeal of their "insurgent" status, but their enemies, the legitimists, often maintain the same fiction. Furthermore, international recognition of the new government often lags behind the reality of its existence. As a result, there is a tacit conspiracy of propaganda in which both the new government and its enemies attempt to maintain the idea that it is still the aspiring insurgent-revolutionist.

Whatever the values of such a position, it is, for the purposes of research, unreal and unrealistic. In the present study, the view has been taken that function is the test of insurgent and of counterinsurgent: When the insurgent has taken over the powers of government and is the only government functioning within the area of the country, he is no longer regarded as insurgent, but as counterinsurgent.

* For a description of this, see Vol. II, Chapter Four, "The U.S.S.R. (1917-1921)."

"Preventive" Counterinsurgency Not Studied

During the period of conceptualizing the study plan, note was taken of an early working definition of counterinsurgency which had included all "... activities directed toward preventing or suppressing..." insurgency against "a duly established government."*

The crucial word was "preventing," and the definition thus raised the specter of including "preventive" counterinsurgency in the study. The concept had had wide acceptance among many persons involved in the field. Indeed, in certain circles it was practically dogma that the insurgency most effectively controlled was that which was never allowed to occur. One could hardly argue the point. On the other hand, it left the problem of how to identify those cases so successfully managed that they never existed.

In its broadest sense, "preventive" counterinsurgency might well be viewed as all those steps taken to ensure institution and maintenance of good and popular government. But if every tax cut, to use a possible example, might be viewed as a "preventive" counterinsurgent measure, the result would be an almost infinite number of cases. Furthermore, how could it be established that an insurgency would inevitably have occurred if a given step, e.g., the tax cut, had not been taken? To identify cases of "preventive" counterinsurgency implied both judgmental infallibility and historical inevitability—to the first of which, the study planners could not lay claim; to the second of which, they did not subscribe.

As a result, no attempt has been made within this study to try to outguess history. In every case that was studied, insurgency did occur and military preparations to deal with it were made and carried out.

SELECTION OF CASES

Given the JCS definition, the study interpretations, and certain assumptions as an indispensable starting point, work began on the selection of cases to be studied. The first and most obvious task was to list possible cases so as to get an idea of the size of the work. But listing cases was not quite so simple as it appeared. By definition, of course, wars between sovereign states were automatically excluded. On the other hand, the JCS definition had not set a minimum or maximum for the scope of internal conflict in insurgency or counterinsurgency.

A Rough "Minimax" Scale of Violence

In creating a list of counterinsurgency cases, the study planners were forced to set a rough working scale for the minimum and maximum of governmental reaction that would be considered "counterinsurgency." Below the minimum, the governmental response was considered too weak

* Incl., "Terminology Relating to Cold War Activities," w/ltr, Secy of the Genl Staff, subj.: Terminology Relative to Cold War Activities, 19 Feb 62 (CS 312.7 (19 Feb 62)).

or short-lived to be studied fruitfully; above the maximum, the governmental response took on the characteristics of conventional warfare. Only those cases were considered in which the government clearly recognized the threat to its existence or in which the outbreak of armed conflict clearly demonstrated the threat, with or without governmental recognition. In this connection, the coup d'état was regarded as a case to be excluded from a study of counterinsurgency, since governmental response in this situation was usually minimal or even nonexistent. At the other extreme, counterinsurgency in which conventional warfare tactics predominated, as in the Spanish Civil War of the 1930's, seemed inappropriate for this study. Thus a kind of rough "minimax" scale was developed for deciding which cases to list.

Only 20th Century Cases Considered

For several reasons, the list was further confined to cases occurring in the 20th century. First, there already existed a number of studies on the 19th century experience. Moreover, the conditions underlying the earlier experiences were so remote from present-day terms of reference that it was felt little good could be derived from their study. The number of cases occurring between 1900 and 1939 was undoubtedly sufficient to clarify any significant differences imposed by the technological revolution that has taken place since the start of World War II.

Within the guidelines sketched above, the research planners therefore set about listing cases that might be studied. This was accomplished through in-house brainstorming, consultation with area experts, and some library research. At the time, when counterinsurgency was still being talked about in terms of eight or so cases, it seemed mildly surprising, and then somewhat amazing, that the list grew to 25, 50, then 100 and more cases, with the end nowhere in sight.

Emphasis on Military Operations

The large number of cases in the original list indicated a strong need for a further selection process. Four additional criteria were used to select from the unwieldy list those counterinsurgency cases that would yield the most useful results from a research standpoint.

The first criterion was based upon the assumption that the U. S. army's greatest interest lay in those instances where another army had been called upon to perform a major counterinsurgent role. Here the experience of the past certainly had the greatest analogy and pertinence to future campaigns in which the U. S. army might have to function. The first cases chosen from the list were therefore those in which military operations had lasted one year or more. About 87 percent of the cases finally selected fell within this category.

A second selection criterion was to take those cases in which major powers were involved, specifically where troops of the United States or the Soviet Union had been used in external counterinsurgency situations, as in the U. S. role in Lebanon and the U. S. S. R. role in Hungary. A third criterion was to take cases of particular interest to the army or of special value for research purposes. The second and third criteria accounted for about 13 percent of the cases.

A final and overriding criterion was to accept for study only those cases for which data were available in unclassified sources and for which qualified persons would agree to undertake the work. These requirements disqualified a number of otherwise acceptable cases.

In essence, the JCS definition, its interpretation, and certain assumptions underlying a specific concept of counterinsurgency determined the cases to be included in the long list of situations suitable for study. In turn, this list was narrowed by the imposition of additional criteria to determine those counterinsurgency cases that would yield the most useful research results. In the final process, 57 cases were selected for study.*

Alphabetical List of the 57 Cases

The cases included Algeria (1954-1962), Angola (1961 until 1965), Arabia (1916-1918), Burma (1942-1945), Burma (1948-1960), Cameroon (1955-1962), China (1898-1901), China (1927-1937), China (1937-1945), Columbia (1948 until 1958), Cuba (1906-1909), Cuba (1953-1959), Cyprus (1954-1958), Dominican Republic (1916-1924), East Germany (June 1953), Ethiopia (1937-1941), France (1940-1944), Greece (1942-1944), Greece (1946-1949), Haiti (1918-1920), Haiti (1958-1964), Hungary (October-November 1956), Indochina (1946-1954), Indonesia (1946-1949), Indonesia (1958-1961), Iraq (1961-1964), Ireland (1916-1921), Israel (1945-1948), Italy (1943-1945), Jammu and Kashmir (1947-1949), Kenya (1952-1960), Laos (1959-1962), Lebanon (1958), Madagascar (1947-1948), Malaya (1942-1945), Malaya (1948-1960), Mexico (1918-1917), Morocco (1921-1926), Nicaragua (1927-1933), Norway (1940-1945), Outer Mongolia (1919-1921), Palestine (1933-1939), Philippines (1899-1902), Philippines (1942-1945), Philippines (1946-1954), Poland (1939-1944), Portuguese Guinea (1959 until 1965), South Africa (1899-1902), South Africa (1961 until 1964), South Korea (1948-1954), South Viet-Nam (1956 to November 1963), South-West Africa (1904-1907), Tibet (1951-1960), U. S. S. R. (1917-1921), U. S. S. R. (1941-1944), Venezuela (1958 until 1963), and Yugoslavia (1941-1944).

D. M. Condit
Bert H. Cooper

* For a description of the research methodology used in this study, see the Technical Appendix.

Part One
EARLY CENTURY EXPERIENCE
IN AFRICA

ETHIOPIA (1937-1941)


MOROCCO (1921-1926)

SOUTH AFRICA (1899-1902)

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (1904-1907)

Chapter One

**ETHIOPIA
1937-1941**



Chapter One

ETHIOPIA (1937-1941)

by Harold G. Marcus

After defeating Emperor Haile Selassie's small regular army and annexing Ethiopia to Mussolini's Fascist empire, the Italians had to fight Ethiopian guerrilla bands for five years, before being forced out of the country by the British early in World War II.

BACKGROUND¹

On October 3, 1935, troops of the Italian Fascist dictator, Benito Mussolini, invaded Ethiopia in a bid to merge that country with Eritrea and Italian Somaliland* into Italian East Africa. An Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1895-96 had been defeated, and the country—often, but never officially, known as Abyssinia—had been recognized by the world powers as an independent state. In 1935 the Ethiopians were not so successful, and by 1936 the Italians had added Ethiopia to their East African empire. Before the end of the brief Italo-Ethiopian war,² however, the Ethiopians had developed the strategy and tactics that were to become characteristic of the insurgency that grew out of and followed the conventional war.

Both the war against the invading armies and the later insurgency against the Italian colonial authorities centered in the northern and central highlands† of Ethiopia, essentially a large, high plateau varying in altitude from 7,500 to 14,000 feet. These highlands account for about one-third of the estimated 455,000 square miles of present-day Ethiopia, an area larger than California and Texas combined. The plateau is severely intersected by a number of rivers. Communication from one valley to another is difficult even during the dry season from October to June and is often impossible during the season of the long rains, which begin in July and last well into September.

*In 1960 Italian Somaliland, together with the former British Somaliland Protectorate, became the independent Republic of Somalia.

†"Northern" is used throughout this paper to refer to both the northern and central highlands, since this area is northern in relation to the rest of Ethiopia.

Ethnic and Religious Factors Underlying the Insurgency

The population of the highlands is predominantly a Christian, Afro-Asian, Semitic-speaking people, divided into two major linguistic groups, the Amharic and the Tigré. Historically, these two closely related groups have played a significant and fundamental role in the development of Ethiopia. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the Amhara and Tigré used the highlands as a base from which to conquer and incorporate into an Ethiopian empire a large area of the surrounding lands, which were semitropical, tropical, semiarid, and arid. These territories, which form a kind of buffer zone around the northern highlands, border on the Sudan in the west, Somalia in the east, and Kenya in the south. Living there are mainly Cushitic-speaking Galla, Somali, and Dankali; Semitic-speaking Adari and Gurage; and various Nilotic Bantu tribes. All of these groups are either Muslim or pagan and culturally distinct from the northern Semites.

Of Ethiopia's total estimated population of more than 20 million, probably 35 percent are of the Tigré, Amhara, and related groups; another 35 percent are Galla; 15 percent are Gurage, Somali, Adari, and Dankali; and 15 percent are Bantu and others. Probably 40 percent are Christian, another 40 percent Muslim, and 20 percent pagan. Over half of the population lives in the temperate, well-watered highlands. Similar demographic conditions prevailed in the insurgent period, when the Italians estimated the total population at some 7 million. This estimate was probably a gross understatement, as the Italians were attempting to show that the country's population had declined as a result of slavery and exploitation by the ruling elite.

The Christian church was an important sociopolitical force in Ethiopia. An ancient Monophysitic branch of Christendom connected with the Coptic (Eastern Orthodox) Church at Alexandria in Egypt, the Orthodox Church of Ethiopia was the established denomination adhered to by the Amhara, Tigré, and several other ethnic groups of the northern highlands. The abuna, or metropolitan, stood at the apex of a priestly hierarchy that was generally conservative and tended to resist change. The Orthodox Church of Ethiopia was, therefore, one of the natural focal points of resistance to changes imposed by the Italians.

Although insurgents were drawn from all ethnic and religious groups in the empire, most of them, and especially their leaders, came from the traditional northern ruling classes, whose members had hitherto acted primarily as the imperial government's military and civil officials. With a common cultural, religious, historical, and political tradition, these northerners had a sense of nationality and mission. They considered themselves distinct from and better than the peoples they had conquered and indeed often regarded the latter much as European colonialists viewed subject Africans. The Italians exploited the resulting enmities between Ethiopia's ruling groups and the ruled by attempting to diminish the importance of the northern Christian peoples in favor of other ethnic and religious groups in the Ethiopian empire.

The Emperor Plans To Modernize

At the start of the 1935-36 war, Ethiopia was a traditional, monarchical state, ruled by the Emperor Haile Selassie I,* who could not, however, always act as an absolute monarch because of the power of some of his chiefs and the church. The country was divided into provinces ruled by these important chiefs, and into subprovinces and local units usually governed by the appointees of the chiefs. In the comparative simplicity of the pre-1935 Ethiopian state, the head of the provincial government was not merely a civil administrator but also a high military officer. Most of Ethiopia's men of affairs wore the two hats of civil and military authority.

With administrators doubling as officers, the Ethiopian armed forces were not usually well led or disciplined. Peasants were expected to act as soldiers with adequate training. After attaining primacy in 1928-30, Haile Selassie, aware of the inadequacies of his army, embarked upon a long-term program of modernizing and arming his forces along European lines. By the outbreak of the war, however, only the 25,000 men of the Emperor's Guard could be called a modern army, with trained soldiers commanded by adequate officers. Furthermore, although there were hundreds of thousands of rifles in the country, most were old fashioned, and by 1935 the emperor had managed to obtain for his forces only about 60,000 modern rifles, 68 up-to-date artillery pieces, about 1,500 light machineguns, 12 British tanks, and a few obsolete aircraft.

Also incomplete in 1935 were the emperor's plans to reform the Ethiopian economy and to educate a Western-style elite to act as a cadre for future progress. At the outbreak of the war, more than 95 percent of the economy was on a subsistence level, and the small educated Ethiopian elite of about 300 persons was mainly involved in the emergent institutions of the central government, which was being reorganized by foreign advisers.

The elite shared the emperor's belief in modernization and progress and supported him unequivocally, knowing that the success of his plans meant careers of greater importance and power. As the difficulties with Italy grew, the various Ethiopian chiefs, with few important exceptions, all rallied to the emperor. The subchieftains usually followed the lead of their overlords, and the populace tended to support its immediate leaders. Among the northern Semitic peoples a definite sense of community and nationality supported their morale during the war and led them naturally and directly toward resistance. On the other hand, the recently incorporated peoples fought for the emperor and his government, not out of great emotional conviction but because it was politic to do so. Thus, when it became evident that Haile Selassie was going to be defeated, some of his subject peoples turned on their overlords, much to the advantage of the Italians.

* "Selassie" is the official Ethiopian spelling in English of the emperor's name, although "Sellassie" with the double "l" would be in accord with Amharic orthography.

The Emperor Is Driven Out

Haile Selassie probably never expected to win the war forced upon Ethiopia by Italian fascism, but hoped rather to fight well enough to gain time until the League of Nations could protect his empire through the mechanisms of collective security. Disappointed in this hope, he had to flee his country on May 2, 1936. He left behind him a government which survived in western Ethiopia until late that year. Also remaining in Ethiopia were several still-intact army units, hundreds of thousands of armed civilians, and, most important, battle-trying officers and men who, although defeated in direct confrontation with Italian troops, had regrouped in the inaccessible mountain regions.

On May 5, 1936, at 4:00 p.m., Italian forces entered the capital city of Addis Ababa; and on May 9 the Italian Ethiopian empire was proclaimed in both Rome and Addis Ababa. The first viceroy, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, was replaced on June 11 by Marshal Rodolfo Graziani.³ The Italians had defeated the poorly led, badly equipped, and ill-trained Ethiopian armies, but they had not yet conquered or disarmed the Ethiopian who viewed the possession of a rifle as a mark of his manhood. His pride in himself as a member of a warrior nation had been pricked, but surely not seriously diminished.

Elements of Ethiopian Forces Continue To Resist

When Haile Selassie fled Addis Ababa, the remnants of the Ethiopian government gathered at Gore, near Ethiopia's western border with the Sudan, then a British territory; here the government was led first by Bitwoded* Wolde Tsadik, the President of the Ethiopian Senate, then by Ras Imru. The protection of this government was taken on by the remnants of the defeated armies of the north and the relatively large forces of Ras Desta Deltu, the emperor's son-in-law. These forces were deployed in western Ethiopia.⁴

Because the rainy season had commenced, the Italian command did not immediately authorize a new campaign, but proceeded instead to retain and strengthen the positions it had already won. The Ethiopian army, which knew the terrain and had greater mobility than the Italians, took advantage of the situation to launch a series of local attacks that foretold the type of tactics that would be more fully developed during the course of the insurgency. The Ethiopians surprised and killed the high-ranking Italian crews (including an aviation general) of three airplanes which landed in Lekempti, trapped and destroyed a tank column by cutting the road from Addis Ababa

*Ras, meaning "head," is equivalent to grand duke or general of the army. One rank below ras, bitwoded, meaning "most trusted," is equivalent to duke or full general. Other Ethiopian civil-military titles are dejaz (or dejazmatch), meaning "soldier at the door," an earl or corps commander; situarari, "leader of the advance guard," a divisional commander; gerazmatch, "leader of the right flank," and kenyazmatch, "leader of the left flank," brigade commander; balambaras, a baron or colonel; and shambul, a squire or captain.

to Addis Alem, blew up railway bridges and looted trains, and made several hit-and-run attacks on Addis Ababa.⁵

So successful were these tactics that, according to a British observer, "there was a general sense of insecurity [in Addis Ababa]—unreasonable but infectious." He noted that the raids on the town were futile and the Italians were never in serious danger, "but all the time there was an illusion of being besieged."⁶ Here again a characteristic of the later insurgency was foreshadowed. Although the Italians were not in a critical strategic position until the very last, local insurgent attacks played havoc with their morale. An Italian worker wrote that there was always "the danger of being killed by the Ethiopians, who are continually attacking us."⁷

At the end of the rainy season in September 1936, nearly two-thirds of Ethiopia was still administered by Ethiopian officials; but the Italians had consolidated their rule over the highlands and, like the northerners before them, were using them as a base from which to press their further conquest. The Italians were faced by the sizable, though poorly equipped, armies of Ras Desta Demtu in Sidamo, Fekri Sellasie in Arrussi, Dejaz Beyenne Merid in Bali, and Dejaz Aberra Kassa in Sellali,⁸ but these could not long withstand the renewed Italian pressure.

In October, certain Ethiopian military groups were ordered to fight only at night, when the Italians would be at a severe tactical disadvantage.⁹ The Ethiopians had by now learned from experience to fight only when they had a clear tactical advantage over the Italians. Even so, by December the emperor, now in exile in Great Britain, was forced to declare that "the Italian occupation is gradually being extended by merciless . . . warfare."¹⁰ The nature of the Ethiopian struggle was clearly changing to guerrilla warfare. As one commentator reported: "There are skirmishes all the time. It appears that the Ethiopians overtake them [the Italians] more cleverly, attacking them unexpectedly and retiring before the arrival of reinforcements."¹¹

INSURGENCY

By the time all organized Ethiopian military forces were finally defeated in early 1937, the Ethiopian struggle against the Italians had become an insurgency, using tactics developed in the Italo-Ethiopian war. Taking full advantage of the inaccessible mountainous areas, the Ethiopian insurgents retained control over large parts of the countryside, while the Italians dominated the cities, towns, and major caravan routes.¹² From their mountain sanctuaries the Ethiopians emerged to cut roads and attack convoys, to overrun small or undermanned outposts, to blow up bridges and derail trains, and sometimes even to test the strength of the Italian garrisons in the larger towns, including Addis Ababa.

Ethiopian Attack on Marshal Graziani

In Addis Ababa on February 17, 1937, the insurgents tried to assassinate Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, the Italian viceroy. While Graziani was making a speech in the viceregal residence,

Haile Selassie's former palace, two bombs were thrown at him, apparently by a young Eritrean named Abraha who was employed as an interpreter on the viceroy's staff. An air force general was seriously wounded, but the viceroy and others were only superficially injured. The assassination attempt seems to have been part of an Ethiopian plan to confuse and demoralize the Italians preliminary to launching a major attack on Addis Ababa.¹³

The Italians reacted with a blood bath. Not only did they institute a massacre in Addis Ababa, but Italian intelligence had apparently learned of the plan to launch an attack on the capital, and the 3,000 Ethiopians who made the attack under Ras Desta Demtu were surrounded. Most of the troops, as well as the important Ethiopian officers, Gebie Mariam and Beyenne Merid, were killed.¹⁴ Ras Desta Demtu was able to escape, but he was captured a few days later in the Gurage Mountains and summarily shot.¹⁵ The Italians believed that the death of Ras Desta Demtu would be "the end of . . . resistance in Ethiopia."¹⁶

But the policy of terrorism which the Italians initiated following the attempt on Graziani's life only hardened the insurgents' resistance and caused them to fight harder. They fought for a number of reasons: Some believed the war could never be over while a single Italian Fascist remained on Ethiopian soil; others reacted violently to Italian racial and economic discrimination; more than a few fought because they had nothing else to do. Many joined the insurgents because of the cruelties and excesses of Marshal Graziani's regime.¹⁷

Nature of the Insurgency in 1937

The insurgents organized themselves around men of fame and name, the more successful leaders attracting large numbers of men. Although some bands numbered only 50 fighting men, others, particularly in Gojjam and Begemdir, had many thousands of followers.¹⁸ Despite evidence that some women, children, and older men fought in the insurgent ranks, it seems clear that most insurgents were young men. One observer, indeed, mentioned that "in the native villages only women, children, and old men were about."¹⁹ It is impossible, on the basis of available evidence, to give any accurate figures on the total number of insurgents or of their casualties.

The "bandits" and "robbers"—as the Italians classified the insurgents—attacked wherever and whenever they could. Italians building a strategic road system had "to be constantly on the alert, ready to drop pickaxe and shovel and take up the arms stacked for immediate use against Ethiopian attackers."²⁰ In late May 1937, 1,500 Ethiopians raided Addis Ababa.²¹ In late June, Abebe Arregai, who was to become the most famous of the insurgent generals, lured some Italian units into a trap north of Addis Ababa, killing many Italians.²² Soon afterwards Dejaz Fikre Mariam, another famous patriot leader, attacked a train at Hadama and massacred all Italians on it.²³

The rainy season of July-October 1937 confined the Italians to a small radius around the cities, towns, and strategic forts and allowed the insurgents to become more active. In July the Ethiopians fought the Italians at Selale, Wareliu, Ankober, Meta, Soddo, and Shola Mekla, and cut the railway five times, at Bishoftu, Dukum, Hadama, Kora, and Afdem.²⁴ It appeared to the outside world that guerrilla warfare had become general in Ethiopia and that the Italians no longer retained control even over the Asmara-Addis Ababa road.²⁵ Conditions were so serious that the Italians could supply their encircled and embattled outposts only by air.

Despite a renewed Italian offensive when the rains stopped, the Ethiopian insurgency continued unabated. In November 1937 the Escher Tageblatt of Luxembourg reported that the Italians controlled only the cities and their immediate surroundings, that only 20 miles from Dessie the road was blocked by a powerful detachment of Ethiopian soldiers, that other roads could be traveled safely only under strong military protection, and that the insurgency had caused the breakdown of the agricultural economy of the country.²⁶ The Times of London pointed out on November 26 that internal conditions in Ethiopia had improved very little after the rains, and that, since the roads were unsafe, transport had to proceed under convoy. It was suggested that Marshal Graziani's recent removal from his position as viceroy might have great significance in moderating the insurgency: "A cautious administration along lines which might abate native hostility seems to offer the one prospect for success."²⁷

Rebellious Activities Continue in 1938

The new viceroy, the Duke of Aosta, arrived in Addis Ababa in late December 1937 to take over the government of Italian East Africa.²⁸ He was immediately confronted by continuing, intensive insurgent activity, which had reached such proportions that, for all intents and purposes, the Italians no longer ruled in Gojjam and Begemdir. Italian units on the battalion level were being fought and defeated in the countryside,²⁹ and the insurgents used the modern weapons captured in these raids to besiege and occupy various fortified Italian administrative and military posts.³⁰ News from Port Said, Egypt, of the surprisingly strong insurgent offensive was reported in the Evening Standard of February 4, 1938: "Wounded and sick Italian soldiers arriving here earlier in the week revealed that bands of Abyssinian warriors are constantly attacking military outposts throughout the country and inflicting 'mass human destruction.'"³¹

Although there was probably little official or regular communication between the various Ethiopian organizations, news of the rebellion spread rapidly through the countryside, and a series of sympathetic but seemingly uncoordinated uprisings occurred throughout the country. Reuters reported from Aden in February 1938 that there was open revolt in Beni Shangul, Magi, and Borana, as well as in Gojjam and Begemdir.³² Other news sources indicated that Ethiopian insurgents were active in Harrar Province, particularly in the Chercher mountains,³³ and that

use of the chief caravan routes between Dire Dawa and Deder and between Harrar and Deder was being denied to the Italians.³⁴

Although the Italians moved more troops into the rebellious areas and brought reinforcements from Italy,³⁵ the Ethiopians "had all the advantages of an unrestricted mountain terrain over which to operate." And although the strong Italian forces could disperse the guerrillas, they could not prevent them from regrouping in another place and attacking again where the Italians were weaker.³⁶ As a result, the insurgency in northwestern Ethiopia was never put down entirely, even though the Italians ultimately reestablished their strategic and military posts and reimposed their authority over the towns. Italians could move safely in the countryside only when traveling in strength; at all other times northwestern Ethiopia belonged to the Ethiopians.

Ethiopian and Italian Views of the Insurgency

In May 1938, the Ethiopian Legation in London issued a white paper in which the position was taken "that Ethiopia is far from having been conquered by the army of invasion; that [Italian] efforts to occupy the whole country are meeting with the heroic resistance of the Ethiopian people; and that finally the Ethiopian civil and military administration is actively maintained in a large part of the territory." Based upon a number of dispatches received by the emperor from Ethiopia and other countries and upon the reports of newspaper correspondents, this official document claimed that "throughout most of the north, west, and southwest, the greater part of the country is still under the authority of Ethiopian chiefs," and that even in the south, southeast, and east the Italians were under constant pressure from numerous guerrilla bands. In the white paper, the Ethiopians stressed the fact that Italian control was limited to "an area varying from roughly 10 to 30 miles radius around the larger towns. In fact, over at least half the country there is no military control, the military posts only maintaining their existence through fortifications and the troops being unable to venture to a distance or to penetrate the hilly and mountainous regions."³⁷

It is interesting to compare the emperor's official view with the official Italian view, which admitted that armed Ethiopian resistance continued, but asserted that it was "confined to some regions of Amhara and Gojjam in the west, where a few thousands of the disbanded soldiery of the Negus [the Emperor] carry on guerrilla warfare in the impervious hills." The Italians maintained that these insurgents were completely surrounded and that a military cordon was "gradually being tightened around them."³⁸

Ethiopian Strength and Morale

These few thousands of "disbanded soldiery," however, were apparently causing a great many Italian casualties. Reports from Jibuti, French Somaliland, indicated that in the summer

of 1938 the Italians were shipping home trains full of wounded officers and soldiers.³⁹ A Manchester Guardian correspondent estimated that some 700 Italian wounded and sick passed through Jibuti from July to September and that most of these casualties were the result of an Italian effort, of divisional strength, to annihilate the army of Dejaz Abebe Arregai, whose forces sat astride the Addis Ababa-Dessie road and controlled a 3,000-square-mile area coming to within 30 miles of Addis Ababa. The same correspondent also wrote that the Italians suffered a major defeat at the hands of Abebe Arregai and had to move 12,000 troops from Harrar Province to Shoa Province to protect the railway stations at Dukum, Akaki, Mojjo, Hadama, and Walankit.⁴⁰

It may thus be concluded that the Italians were not dealing with a mere "few thousands of the disbanded soldiery," but with irregular Ethiopian forces numbering many thousands, which could ward off Italian counterinsurgency units of some strength. It may also be inferred that the Ethiopian insurgents governed and taxed in the extensive areas they controlled and that they were probably supported by the bulk of the populace.

There is evidence that the Ethiopian insurgents possessed the high morale of an aroused patriotism. For example, a 15-year-old boy wrote that "every Ethiopian is sure now that he can fight single-handed with four or five Italians and kill them all by the sword." Even though three of his brothers had been killed in action against the Italians, this Ethiopian stated, "I would to God I had one hundred more brothers like them."⁴¹

The symbol of Ethiopian nationalism was the exiled Emperor, Haile Selassie I, called "The Conquering Lion of Judah," who claimed descent from King Solomon and Makeda, said to have been the Queen of Sheba. More than any other man, Haile Selassie was the emotional leader of the Ethiopian insurgency. "Your Majesty is coveted like food in the midst of famine," he was told, "and the love of your people for you will never dry up, but will spring forth unceasingly."⁴²

Insurgents Depend on Guerrilla Tactics

But the emperor was far away. To survive in the field the fighting men had to rely upon the cunning and skill of their generals, the most famous of whom was Dejaz Abebe Arregai, who operated throughout the period of Italian occupation in Shoa Province. Dejaz Abebe never concentrated his troops in any one place, and thus he avoided the danger of an Italian sneak attack which might destroy his entire force. His troops and officers were under severe discipline, and the general himself traveled from garrison to garrison on inspection tours. If he could not make a mass attack upon Italian forces, he would harass their flanks, and he was a master at ruse and ambush.⁴³

These latter tactics were the ones most often followed by the commanders of smaller units not strong enough to make frontal attacks on Italian units. One guerrilla chieftain fighting in the Danakil desert told a British correspondent:

Do they [the Italians] think we are fools? Do they think we shall throw ourselves against these modern fortified works as we did during the campaign? No. We shall wait until the Italians are hard pressed in Europe or by guerrilla warfare here. . . . We shall surround their cities and camps; we shall harass them but never attack them direct; we shall cut their communications; we shall starve them. . . . Our hour will come!⁴⁴

A Frenchman who observed a small band of insurgents in southern Ethiopia recorded that the insurgents' method of operating was "simple and sure: in small bands of fifty men they slip into the Italian-controlled zones where they destroy the harvests and carry off the cattle." Since the occupation army was supposed to live off the land, such tactics were more effective than might at first be supposed. These insurgents never took prisoners: African soldiers (askaris) were killed immediately, and European captives were tortured to death.⁴⁵

Problems in Communication, Coordination, and Logistics

Although tactical uniformity seems to have been imposed by the conditions of the insurgency, there apparently was very little coordination of effort among the various insurgent bands. There are indications, however, that various bands were in communication with each other. For example, on August 1, 1938, Dejaz Teflere Tessema wrote a letter to another insurgent leader, "so that in the future we may be in touch with one another."⁴⁶ A surviving group of the educated elite formed a Committee of Union and Collaboration to coordinate action and to secure unity of effort against the Italians. They set up a rudimentary messenger system and circulated a printed news sheet throughout the country.⁴⁷ Their efforts, however, were not very successful; in one significant instance, after the British became actively involved in the insurgency, they had to settle a longstanding dispute between two Gojjami chiefs that had hitherto effectively blocked their cooperation.⁴⁸

Although the lack of a centralized command probably weakened the Ethiopian effort, shortage of supplies was the most serious problem. A European who traveled with a guerrilla band in southern Ethiopia reported in 1938 that when the insurgents ambushed 25 askaris, they killed them with knives. In part "this was a precautionary measure in case there were reinforcements nearby—but the main reason was the wish to conserve ammunition, the lack of which is a grave problem with the Ethiopians." From the dead askaris the insurgents collected 25 magazine rifles and a like number of amply filled cartridge belts.⁴⁹ In a letter of July 12, 1938, to Haile Selassie, several Ethiopian chiefs petitioned: "For the future, what your humble servants need most of all are aero planes. Also arms, as well as ammunitions for the rifles we have captured from the enemy."⁵⁰

Morale Declines But Insurgency Survives

But the Ethiopian insurgents needed more than arms and ammunition. They had been cut off for so long from the sources of clothing, salt, and such imported goods as sugar and tea that,

when the Duke of Aosta embarked upon a policy of promising material benefits to those who surrendered, "the rebellion languished," because it was "eaten from within by the publicized generosity of the regime."⁵¹ Furthermore, there can be little doubt that the morale of the insurgents dropped when they learned that Great Britain and France had recognized Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia in April 1938 and had signed "good neighbor" agreements with Italy. Although the principal insurgent leaders did not give in and the fighting did not stop even during this period, the strength of the insurgency was sapped and the action slowed.

Time seemed to be on the side of the Italians. As long as they could hold the cities, towns, and roads, and deny arms and other supplies to the Ethiopians through international agreement and effective policing, there was the possibility that Italy might one day truly control its African empire. Nonetheless, in 1939-40 this empire was not yet a reality. A French reporter visiting at Jibuti wrote in March 1939 that "even to say that the Italian Empire exists during the day is to exaggerate a bit. . . when the sun is up. . . it is quite probable you will receive a rifle shot from somewhere."⁵² One astute observer of the Ethiopian scene wrote that by 1939-40 the Ethiopian insurgency was a permanently simmering volcano.⁵³ Although it was slowed for a time for logistic reasons, the Italians knew that there was "a state of latent rebellion." According to an Italian official, if "a detachment of English or Frenchmen were to enter. . . they would find the vast mass of Abyssinian population would unite themselves. . . to combat and eject our forces."⁵⁴

The route by which such outside assistance for the insurgency could enter Ethiopia was reconnoitered in 1939 by three intelligence experts—one Ethiopian and two Frenchmen.⁵⁵ They entered Ethiopia from the Sudan and "did not meet [in Begemdir, Gojjam, and Semein] a single Italian white or black soldier on the roads or in the villages and towns. . . . The atmosphere hardly indicated that the Italians were in the country, much less that they ruled Ethiopia."⁵⁶

Great Britain Promises To Aid the Emperor

When Italy declared war on Great Britain on June 10, 1940, the way was finally clear for the British to become actively involved in the Ethiopian insurgency. On July 12, 1940, his majesty's government recognized Emperor Haile Selassie as a full ally and promised to release Ethiopia from Italian domination. In the House of Commons, R. A. Butler, Under Secretary for the Colonies, stated that the British government "realized the importance of coordinating all activities likely to damage the enemy's military effort in north and east Africa and Abyssinia."⁵⁷ In response, the Lion of Judah stated in a message to the British nation, "I have never wavered in my belief that sooner or later the time would come when an opportunity would present itself for the avenging of my country. That time is now."⁵⁸

In accordance with previously arranged plans agreed to by the British government in London, Haile Selassie and a small entourage arrived in Alexandria on June 25, 1940. A week later they were in Khartoum, much to the consternation of the government of the Anglo-Egyptian

Sudan, which felt defenseless against the powerful Italian force across the Ethiopian border.⁶⁰ The entire Sudan was then being held by 2,500 European troops and 4,500 Sudanese soldiers, supported by only one squadron of obsolescent bombers; there was no modern artillery and no fighter support. In contrast, British authorities estimated Italian strength at 160,000 well-armed infantry and 200 war planes.* Furthermore, Great Britain now faced the greatest threat to its own existence, with its cities under constant air attack.

When the emperor was apprised of the situation, he was deeply distressed: "I was promised full air support in England . . . and now I am to have not a single aircraft and not a single A. A. [antiaircraft] gun." Later the Negus pointed out, "My people as soon as they know that I am in Ethiopia will leave their homes to get arms against the common enemy. If they see me with empty hands they may well lose the faith that has sustained them during the last five years. . . . Surely you see that my people may believe the Italian propaganda that Britain and France are feeble."⁶¹

Sandford Reconnoiters and Prepares Way for British Intervention

Despite the lack of men and supplies, however, various preparations had been made in the Sudan. Col. (later Brigadier) Daniel Arthur Sandford, a long-time British resident of Ethiopia, had set up an Ethiopian Intelligence Bureau in Khartoum under Robert Ernst Cheesman, a man with considerable Ethiopian experience. A Sudan frontier battalion had been created under the command of Maj. Hugh Boustead, whose special job it was to protect seven supply depots near the frontier, where arms and munitions would be stored for the coming struggle. Sandford had toured the Ethiopian frontiers in British Somaliland and Kenya and had made tenuous contacts with insurgent leaders in the interior; and Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum had been indexed in terms of future use as soldiers.⁶²

Next, Sandford organized an expedition into western Ethiopia to survey the area, to publicize Haile Selassie's presence in Khartoum and Great Britain's active commitment, and to organize the various insurgency forces so that they could operate more efficiently and effectively. A mission composed of both Ethiopian and European officers and personnel entered Ethiopia on August 12, 1940. As a result, Sandford decided that the insurgents would be strengthened and Italian desertions would increase if the British demonstrated their air power and Haile Selassie entered Ethiopia.⁶³ Under existing conditions, he found that, although the Ethiopian guerrillas harassed the enemy and collected some rifles during raids on the Italians, they were "quite incapable of interfering effectively with their [the Italians'] strategic distribution and with the movement of reserves."⁶⁴ Sandford quickly realized that active British military intervention would be necessary to defeat the Italians in western Ethiopia.

*In fact, Italian strength was considerably greater.

The Emperor Wins Some Concessions

While plans were being made in Khartoum to send several divisions from Kenya into Borana-Sidamo and from the Sudan into Eritrea, Haile Selassie was chafing at his own inactivity and frustrated by the lack of assistance being supplied to the patriot movement in northwestern Ethiopia. He complained that very few rifles were being sent to the insurgents and those sent were of poor quality, that no bodyguard was being trained for him, that plans for Ethiopia were being made without his concurrence, and that Ethiopians then flocking to Khartoum were not being trained to fight. Finally, he demanded the status of an independent sovereign and a treaty of alliance with Great Britain.

His criticisms and demands finally caused the Sudan administration to request a ministerial conference, which began on October 28, 1940, in Khartoum. The British government was represented by Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for War, who was accompanied and advised by Field Marshal Jan Smuts, Gen. A. P. Wavell, Michael Wright, and Lieutenant Generals Dickinson and Cunningham. After a stormy, three-day meeting, Haile Selassie's right to rebellion was affirmed and the Sudan government was persuaded to look on the existing insurgency as part of the war for the liberation of Ethiopia. Although no treaty was made, the emperor won four specific concessions: A battalion of trained Eritrean troops which had mutinied against their Italian officers and sought asylum in Kenya, where they had been interned for the duration of the war, was to be released for use in Ethiopia; the Ethiopian insurgents, or Patriots as they were termed by Haile Selassie, were to be issued Springfield rifles and Bren guns; a British mission to train Ethiopians was to be set up in Khartoum; and the two British officers heading this mission were to act as liaison between the British high command and the emperor and to keep Headquarters, Middle East Command, informed of Ethiopian requirements.⁶⁴

Maj. Orde Wingate Creates Gideon Force

Maj. (Lt. Col.) Orde Wingate, who was appointed chief officer for rebel activities and assumed charge of the training mission, agreed with Sandford on the basic strategy for an irregular campaign in western Ethiopia. Following training, a few battalions of Ethiopians would be reinforced by some regular Sudanese forces. These units, with Haile Selassie, would cross into Ethiopia by a route which the Italians did not control. Once in Ethiopia, it was hoped that the emperor's presence would act as a catalytic force, causing the insurgents to step up their attacks on the enemy, thus leading the Italian soldiers to desert. To accomplish these aims, some men under the emperor's command were to be organized as a propaganda section charged with winning Ethiopians to the patriot cause, while the units under Wingate, totaling 1,670 men and officers and known as Gideon Force, were to act as shock troops to spearhead the patriot effort. Wingate's efforts were to be directed toward tying up as many Italian units as possible in western Ethiopia, so that regular British forces moving into Eritrea and Sidamo-Borano

would not have to face the full strength of the Italian army. It was hoped that the Italian soldiers would be confused, demoralized, and quickly defeated.⁶⁵

In these aims, Gideon Force succeeded beyond its wildest dreams: Between February and May 1941, the Italian army in western Ethiopia was defeated by this small, though well organized, allied unit. The reasons for the spectacular disintegration of the Italian effort must, however, be examined in the context of Italy's earlier counterinsurgency effort.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

The origins of the Italian counterinsurgency, like those of the insurgency, may be traced to the last stages of the Italo-Ethiopian war. In attempting to consolidate their conquest, the Italians planted many of the seeds of the insurgency that continued to plague them throughout their occupation. To begin with, they made a concerted effort to disarm the countryside.⁶⁶ Although normal procedure for an occupying force, this Italian measure particularly offended the Ethiopians, who traditionally regarded possession of a weapon as signifying the difference between "manhood and slavery."⁶⁷ In addition, when Ethiopian soldiers learned that Marshal Graziani classified them as brigands, "to be shot immediately, not combatants to be treated as prisoners of war," it seemed preferable to fight to the death than to surrender. This reaction was reinforced when the viceroy, then Marshal Pietro Badoglio, announced that all "elements which are politically suspect" would soon be eliminated.⁶⁸

No Ethiopian warrior, furthermore, was prepared to accept the racial policy that the Italians planned to follow: "The relation[ship] between white and black people is exclusively one of domination. The white directs and the black obeys. . . ."⁶⁹ Even the currency reform which the Italians instituted soon after the occupation began, including the introduction of Italy's lira, alienated many Ethiopians because it was disadvantageous to them in terms of real value.⁷⁰

The result was that when the Italians mounted their final major offensive of the regular war after the rainy season of 1936, fighting was fierce, with neither side granting quarter. Italy's best weapon was air power; this, more than any other one weapon, won the Italo-Ethiopian war and later constrained the insurgents, particularly during daylight. The Italians had over a hundred planes in Ethiopia during this period, and more were sent later. Italian bombings and gas attacks against army units and villages threw the Ethiopians into panic and turned retreat into rout. The Italians made wide use of poison gas in Ethiopia, not only to kill and maim insurgents but to destroy vegetation and crops.⁷¹

The Italians successfully coordinated ground attacks with their air assaults, and by December 1936 the vitality of Ethiopian resistance was weakening. Ras Imru was captured and exiled to the Italian penal island of Ponza,⁷² three sons of Ras Kassa were captured and publicly executed as an object lesson of Italian justice,⁷³ and Dejaz Hapte Mariam, the Governor of

Wollega, submitted to the Italians in the face of their superior force.⁷⁴ By mid-January 1937, a pro-Ethiopian observer was forced to admit that the Italians had won control of all the major caravan routes and could easily move through the country in large units.⁷⁵ In early February The New York Times reported that the Italian government believed that the first phase of its rule in Ethiopia—that of effective occupation and garrisoning—was rapidly drawing to a close and that the viceroy was beginning to prepare the way for European colonists.⁷⁶

Italians Retaliate Against Assassination Attempt With Blood Bath

In the same month the incident occurred that, as already noted, resulted in the Italian⁷⁷ instituting a policy of terrorism and destruction. Ironically, the incident took place at an official function designed to win Ethiopian support for Italian rule. On February 17, 1937, the viceroy, Marshal Graziani, entertained Ethiopian nobles, notables of the church, and the poor at a ceremony of thanksgiving for the birth of a son to the Prince and Princess of Piedmont. When Graziani and some of his officers appeared on the palace balcony, a young nationalist threw two bombs, severely injuring an air force general named Liota.⁷⁸

The Italians immediately fired into the crowd of Ethiopians and soon there were more than 300 dead. Shortly thereafter Blackshirts, * carabinieri, and soldiers were running all over the town, ordering every shopkeeper to close his doors and everyone else to return home. Within an hour the streets were empty, and postal and telegraphic communications were suspended indefinitely. During the afternoon, members of the Fascist party met to decide what retaliation should be made.⁷⁹ They apparently received permission from both the viceroy and Mussolini to resort not only to general terrorism and destruction but also to annihilation of the surviving Ethiopian ruling class.⁸⁰

The slaughter began that night and lasted until February 20. Ethiopians were burnt alive in their huts or shot as they tried to leave them. Italian truck drivers chased people down and then ran over them, or tied their feet to the tailgate of the truck and dragged them behind. People were beaten and stoned to death. Women were scourged, men were emasculated, and children were crushed under heavy boots. Throats were cut and people disemboweled and left to die. How many Ethiopians were killed during this terrible three-day period is difficult to say, but estimates range from 10,000 to 30,000.⁸⁰

A relatively large percentage of the victims came from the traditional ruling class and from the young Western-educated elite, despite the fact that many of these had already formally submitted to Italian authority. Among those killed in the massacres were Brwodded Wolde

*The Blackshirts were members of the Fascist party's paramilitary organization, like the Storm Troopers of Nazi Germany.

Tsedik, ex-president of the Ethiopian Senate and head of the government at Gore for a time; Blatta Ayela, President of the Special Mixed Court; Tafari Tagagne, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Basha Warad, Director of Finance; George Herouey, the son of the minister of foreign affairs; Bahru Koba, a young captain of aviation; Kenyazmach Wolde Yohannes, steward in the imperial household; Balachew Yajele, former chief controller of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway; Tadesse Meshasha, former director of service on the Jimma road; and the famous Ethiopian intellectual, Kantiba Gebru. This list, though incomplete, serves to point out the extent to which the Italians succeeded in their policy of destroying the Ethiopian leadership in order to bring the nation to complete submission.

The reprisals for the attempt on the viceroy's life were not limited to Addis Ababa. Massacres occurred wherever there were large concentrations of Italians; Fascist party members seem to have played a particularly active role in the terrorism. There were incidents in most of the provincial centers, especially in Lekenapti, where it was reported that 600 Ethiopians died.⁸¹ After the February massacres, terrorism continued to be used periodically to subdue the Ethiopians. On May 20, 1937, a shudder of horror went through Ethiopia when the Italians, using Muslim Somali troops, massacred communicants and monks at Debre Libanos and destroyed the monastery.⁸² Throughout the remaining months of Graziani's rule, terrorism and reprisals seem to have been the most important elements of the Italian effort to crush the Ethiopians.

Italian Terror Brings Increased Insurgent Activity

The Ethiopians reacted to the Italian cruelty by fighting more actively. One Ethiopian leader wrote the Italians that at first many Ethiopians had believed that they "would protect the weak and would maintain justice. But we have since learnt that your intention is to destroy us and that you know no mercy." As a result, "we the people of Ethiopia have decided to rise against you. . . . A goat and a leopard, . . . an infidel and a Christian, an Italian and an Ethiopian, can never be reconciled."⁸³

Denying that there was any general uprising, the Italians compared their difficulties to those experienced by the United States during the first few years of its colonial administration in the Philippines.⁸⁴ Nonetheless, the Italians suffered unusually high casualties from October 3-31, 1937, when they moved to pacify the country after the rains ended.⁸⁵ Although there are no easily available figures covering losses, the Italians were constantly sending hospital trains full of wounded to Jibuti for transfer to Italy.⁸⁶

Italian forces were severely taxed by the increased insurgent activity. In view of the size and topography of Ethiopia, the Italians were always undermanned. They could mount large enough expeditions into the countryside to achieve local control during a campaign or troop movement, but the insurgents returned as soon as the main Italian force had moved on. The only

areas the Italians effectively garrisoned and held were the towns and other centers of administration and their immediate environs, strategic forts and villages, the road systems and caravan routes, and the railway line and its appurtenances. Even these areas, which represented the loci of permanent Italian power, were not immune to insurgent attacks.

Italian Strength and Organization of Forces

Italy had originally committed 350,000 troops to the conquest of Ethiopia in 1935-36. This invasion force, made up largely of indigenous troops from the Italian colonies of Somalia, Eritrea, and Libya, was soon replaced by an occupation force of about 150,000. Plans called for a further reduction in occupation forces to about 67,000 men, composed of "African detachments" of Italian soldiers and "colonial detachments" of Ethiopian soldiers officered by Italians. After 1937, however, Italian forces had to be steadily increased to cope with the insurgency. The colonial detachments reached a strength of around 250,000 by 1940-41, and the number of Italian troops in the African detachments climbed to 75,000 by 1941. The strength ratio of colonial to African detachments remained relatively stable throughout. In April 1940 the Italians introduced conscription and forcibly recruited Ethiopians to pad out some 200 battalions of colonial troops, "whose core was long-service Eritrean and trusted Amhara non-commissioned officers, bound by an elaborate system of pay, allowances, gorgeous stripes, prizes, and pensions to Italy."⁸⁷

The basic unit of military organization was the battalion; it contained three rifle companies, one machinegun company, and some components of support organizations such as artillery, engineering, hospital, supply, or transport groups. The colonial detachments, made up of indigenous troops, were supposed to do most of the counterinsurgent fighting, while the African detachments, composed of Europeans, were used as a strategic reserve. The African detachments consisted of one regular Italian army division, "The Savoy Grenadiers," plus various "Blackshirts of Africa" units and support units.

Supporting these regular forces were paramilitary and self-defense forces organized by Italian colonists and workers in Ethiopia and the irregulars, or bande, led by chiefs who had submitted to the Italians for political or personal reasons. The most notable of these was Ras Hailu, who had joined the Italians to foster his dynastic ambitions. The bande were supposed to police the pacified areas for the Italians. By late 1939 the use of the bande had been very successful in northern Ethiopia.⁸⁸

The Italian counterinsurgency forces operated from the provincial and district centers and were supplied via the strategic road network in the dry season and by air during the long rains. At Asmara, Addis Ababa, Keren, Dire Dawa, and Jimma, the Italians set up central supply depots, where they kept large stocks of munitions and supplies in case they should be isolated by a major European war.

Coordination Between Military and Civil Administration

Military policy was set by a general staff in Addis Ababa, headed by the chief of staff, and including his assistant, the inspector of artillery, the inspector of engineers, the inspector of the Blackshirts, and the head of the supply services. Attached to each provincial government was a command of the armed forces, which acted in close cooperation with the civil authority, headed in Addis Ababa by the viceroy, who was appointed by Rome.

Directly subordinate to the viceroy were the governors of Italian East Africa's five provinces. The provinces were divided into commissionerships, which were in turn composed of residencies and vice-residencies. Generally speaking, Ethiopians played a subsidiary role in the Italian colonial government, acting as minor civil servants, in advisory capacities, and only occasionally in actual administrative or policy-making positions.²⁰

The New Viceroy Takes a New Approach

The policies of terrorism and repression which the colonial government under Marshal Graziani followed succeeded only in strengthening Ethiopian hostility. By the middle of 1937 it was becoming increasingly clear that a new approach was necessary. In November 1937 Marshal Graziani was relieved of his viceregal duties, and the civilian Duke of Aosta, of the ruling house of Savoy, was appointed to the post.

While Aosta continued the policy of attacking the insurgents whenever possible, he also instituted a conciliatory policy which offered the insurgents armistice, parole, and material benefits if they surrendered. He wrote letters to important insurgent leaders,²¹ and Italian military aircraft dropped leaflets throughout the country, promising freedom of religion for all, support for the Coptic faith and its priests, and pardon and restitution for "all rebels in the bush and the mountains . . . they submit and give up their arms."²²

In non-Semitic and Muslim areas, Italian propaganda attempted to create dissent between the local population and the predominantly Christian and Amharic insurgents. A leaflet dropped in Galla areas read: "The Italian army will not retreat from the territory it occupies without having destroyed, unto the last man, the rebels who seek to corrupt you and steal your goods."²³ One of the constant features of the new Italian colonial policy was this attempt to debase the position of the ruling Amhara and elevate the status of their former subjects, the non-Semitic and non-Christian peoples.²⁴

Italian propaganda asserted that the emperor had died in exile, and after 1938 stressed that the insurgents could expect no help from the British and the French because these powers had both recognized Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia. After the outbreak of war in 1940, the Italians underlined British weakness in the Sudan and pointed to the rapid defeat of France by Germany, Italy's ally.²⁵

Italian Morale Suffers Despite Lull in Insurgency

The new policies of conciliation, the continued use of direct confrontation, and the organization of the bande, together with increasing shortages of supplies experienced by the insurgents, resulted in a lull in the insurgency during 1939-40. Nonetheless, the occasional attacks that the Ethiopians continued to mount sustained a feeling of insecurity among the Italians. This seems to have undermined the morale of the Italian administration and military forces and acted as a cancer within the body of the Italian colonial effort. An Italian lieutenant of the 30th Colonial Battalion wrote to a friend, describing his duty near the Blue Nile in Gojjam: "We are completely isolated and cannot move because we are on guard, day and night, against groups that are not on our side. . . . Here, to our faces, the people appear to submit, but directly they get behind our backs they shoot at us." In another letter, the same officer complained of "this mob of rotters who don't seem to understand that we are the most powerful." In a third letter, he pointed out that on very dark nights the garrison had to keep a good watch, "because these people are experts in the art of surprise and unexpected attack."⁹⁵

The Italians were isolated from their homeland, and their efforts to make Ethiopia a secure possession seemed futile. They believed that the average Ethiopian blamed the Italian soldiers for the cruelty and terrorism of the Fascist regime, and they knew that the insurgents usually tortured their white prisoners to death.

Italian Reaction to British and Insurgent Activity

When the Italians learned that the insurgents were receiving active outside support, they seem to have become hypnotized and conjured up in their minds "a sort of phantom which eventually materialized to fulfill their worst expectations and which meanwhile influenced all their processes of thought."⁹⁶

The preliminary British intervention in the latter half of 1940 led directly to a great increase in insurgent activity and to the destruction of Italian air power by units of the South African and Southern Rhodesian air forces. The reappearance of Haile Selassie in Khartoum gave the lie to Italian propaganda that the emperor had died in exile and resulted in the desertion of many of the Shoa and Tigréan troops who had been forcibly recruited into the Italian forces in 1940. Harried by the insurgents and tormented by their own fears, the Italians tended to exaggerate the strength of the British effort in Ethiopia and retired into the strategic forts which they had built. This phenomenon was as marked in Eritrea and southern Ethiopia as it was in the northwest, where the British threat was most real.

This psychological factor gave the war certain peculiar qualities in 1941. The Italians fled into their fortresses where they were besieged. Often there was the absurdity of several hundred men besieging several thousand—in the Debre Markos incident, 300 besieged 14,000. In due course and in some cases after hard fighting, the Italians surrendered with great dignity and

ceremony and were usually allowed the honors of war. They marched out of their forts in good order, stacked their rifles, and almost happily became the prisoners of war of the merciful and protective British. The most famous names of the war—Keren, Debre Markos, Mega, Dembi Dolo, and Amba Alaji—represent not battlefields, but forts; these defined the character of the end of the Italian effort.

A detailed recounting of the events of the conventional Italo-Allied war is not relevant to this paper. The emperor re-entered Addis Ababa on May 5, 1941, five years to the day after Italian troops first entered that capital. Whatever Italian resistance remained was overcome after the rainy season of that year. In several cases the insurgents fought with the combined Ethiopian-British forces, but their real achievement was to force the Italians to use over 60 army battalions to maintain internal security during the allied invasion of the country. The insecurity and fear which the insurgents' tactics had instilled in the Italian army and civil administration during the five years preceding the invasion made possible the ease with which Ethiopia regained its independence.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

Hostilities ceased in Ethiopia in late 1941, with the surrender of Italian forces. The Ethiopian-British armies were in full control of the country, but the political situation was very confused. European intervention had brought the emperor back into Ethiopia, but it was not then clear whether Great Britain would restore Haile Selassie to full power or provide him with the means of re-establishing his authority.

The emperor declared that since he had never recognized the Italian conquest, once he was back on Ethiopian soil and the Italians were defeated, he became, ipso facto, emperor again. The British government, however, could not admit the emperor's full sovereignty, since it felt that it had a special military role in the country as long as there was no effective Ethiopian administration in large areas. The British also feared that, if they did not retain police and other powers for the time being, there would be an Ethiopian massacre of the many thousands of Italian citizens remaining in the country.²⁷

These differences were negotiated in a series of discussions carried on between the emperor and Sir Philip Mitchel from June 10, 1941, to January 31, 1942, on which date an Anglo-Ethiopian agreement was signed. In this document, Great Britain formally recognized Ethiopian independence under Haile Selassie, and Ethiopia in turn granted the United Kingdom a special position in Ethiopia until an effective Ethiopian administration could be rebuilt. To promote this end, Great Britain pledged to provide Ethiopia with financial, military, and technical assistance.²⁸

The Emperor did not have an easy time constructing his new administration, since the small educated elite which normally would have formed its nucleus had been almost totally annihilated

by the Italians. His administration thus had to be composed mainly of educated Ethiopians who had worked for the Italian administration, of illiterate insurgent leaders, and of traditional chiefs. This disparate group had to impose government over a country in which insurgent bands were quickly becoming shifita (bandit-robbers); over a people which had fought the Italian administration of their country for five years, with considerable loss of life and capital; and over an economy in which even normal subsistence agricultural patterns had been largely disrupted.

The Italian occupation had left behind certain constructive achievements: a pattern of roads and other public works which provided an infrastructure within which to modernise the nation, and a population which, in reaction to the Italian occupation, was probably more united than it had ever been. Ethiopia eventually gained in territory and people as a result of the Italian capitulation. The Italian colony of Eritrea was placed under British administration until September 1952, when it became an autonomous state federated with Ethiopia under the terms of a federal act and constitution approved by the United Nations. Thus Ethiopia simultaneously gained a seacoast, an advanced Muslim population, and an increasingly discontented complex to the north.²⁰ And the war, which had served to bring Ethiopia to world attention, also brought valuable economic and military assistance over the ensuing years.

The Italian occupation of Ethiopia is significant in that it was the last episode of European colonial expansion in Africa. The Italians failed to pacify the indigenous population completely, but the insurgents were equally unsuccessful in regaining possession of their country. In time, the Italians might have suppressed the Ethiopian guerrillas, who by the late 1930's were completely isolated from sources of outside support. Only when British arms were combined with indigenous forces was Emperor Haile Selassie easily restored to his ancient throne. The course of world events would in any event ultimately have doomed to failure Italian efforts in Ethiopia.

NOTES

Author's Note: The author made almost no use of Italian sources for the following reasons. The research has been limited to sources available in the Library of Congress and other libraries in the metropolitan Washington area; these repositories are woefully lacking in Italian books and articles concerning the Italian period in Ethiopia, 1935-1941. Of the available materials, those written during the Fascist period are so biased and so full of distortions and misinformation as to be almost useless. There has been very little recent Italian work on the period; it is almost as if the Italians were ashamed of their colonial role in Ethiopia, or wished to forget the story of their final days there. Thus, this history of the counterinsurgency has been reconstructed primarily from English language sources which are readily available.

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
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Chapter Two

MOROCCO
1921-1926



MOROCCO (1921-1926)

Chapter Two **MOROCCO (1921-1926)**

by Douglas E. Ashford

Despite superiority in numbers and weaponry, Spanish forces were unable for four years to subdue Abdel Krim and his tribal allies; only when French troops joined the Spanish were the Berber insurgents of the Rif finally overcome after a fifth year of fighting.

BACKGROUND

The careers of the great colonial empire builders are paralleled by the lives of native leaders whose exploits are often poorly documented or forgotten. A few of these leaders managed to create strong military forces and political organizations that anticipated the nationalist movements of more recent years. Such a leader was the Rifian tribal chieftain, Abdel Krim. Though eventually defeated, he was able to channel the vague unrest and uncoordinated dissidence of tribal groups into a political and military force capable of carrying on a five-year campaign against Spanish and, later, French armies with far superior resources—a campaign that has been characterized as "surely one of the most amazing in history."¹

Morocco occupies the northwestern tip of Africa. It lies directly across the Strait of Gibraltar from Spain and borders on both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The country is roughly the size of Oregon and Washington combined, covering some 170,000 square miles. Its topography varies from the rugged mountains of the Rif in the north and the Atlas range in the center to the rich plains and forests in the Atlantic coastal regions. In the south, barren and arid steppes gradually shade into the desert wilderness of the Sahara. Morocco has about 200 miles of precipitous Mediterranean coastline, and only the most rudimentary communications and transportation system links the Rif with the rest of Morocco. To this day, much of the terrain remains inadequately mapped.

The Rif Mountains are generally described as consisting of three parts. The western sector has smaller mountains, and is known to Moroccans as the Jbala. The central portion, the Rif proper, where the insurgency began, is directly north of Fez and is dominated by the Beni Uraighel tribe (sometimes referred to as the Ait Waryaghar tribe). And toward the eastern tip of the Rif, the mountains descend toward the Muluya valley. Rising to 7,000 feet in places, the Rif Mountains form a crescent touching the Mediterranean coast near Tangier, dipping southward

toward Fez, and then returning to the coast in the vicinity of Melilla. They are largely barren, with some scrub growth, although small, rich, alluvial plots are to be found in valleys. The steep and rocky slopes make passage by means other than mule, donkey, or on foot nearly impossible.

The climate of Morocco has been compared to that of Portugal, though the weather varies greatly from east to west and from north to south, tending to become more extreme as one moves inland. Winters can be bitter and summers blistering.

The Berbers of the Rif

The population of Morocco at the close of World War I is not known precisely, but it was estimated as about six million people divided among Arab and Berber stock. In the area of the Rif uprising there were roughly 250,000 people, the vast majority speaking Berber.² The Rifian Berbers have all been absorbed into orthodox Sunni Islam; the religious brotherhoods on the fringes of the Rif, particularly in the Wazzan region, represent a religious variation that is firmly rejected by orthodox Muslims. Like the rest of the Berber strongholds in Morocco, the Rif has been increasingly Arabized since the invasions starting in the 8th century, but in 1920 it was still remote from most Arab centers, except Fez and Tetuan.

The Berbers of North Africa are of prehistoric origin, sometimes traced to early Asian invaders coming from the Middle East about 10,000 B.C. They speak a Hamitic language, and sometimes have blue eyes and red hair. Unlike some of the Berber tribes of other parts of Morocco, the Rifian Berbers are sedentary, living off small plots of tillable soil, small orchards, and goat herds. The tribesmen have long been engaged in contraband, and smuggling is an important additional source of income. Most students of the area agree that it is only the strong family and tribal bonds that keep so large a population in such an inhospitable and precarious environment.

The Rifian Berbers have long been regarded as one of the most warlike and hostile Berber groups in North Africa.³ Loyalty descends from a large entity such as the tribe, through the clan, and by patrilineage down to the extended family. Blood feuds are common and may continue for generations. It is not unusual for a tribesman to disappear into the mountains to revenge a death that occurred a generation ago. Reportedly, unsuspecting guests have been slaughtered during an extended truce entered into so that the tribes might recover their strength after bitter and widespread feuds.

Foreign Influence and Power in Morocco

The presence of the Spanish and French in Morocco in 1921 was in accord with pre-existing European arrangements for the partition of Africa into colonies and spheres of influence. In the early years of the 20th century, France was able to make her presence in Morocco dominant;

and only Spain, whose presence on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast dated from the 15th century, was to remain in Morocco after 1912 as a second foreign power. In 1901, France had removed Italian influence from the Moroccan scene by giving the Italians freedom of action in Tripoli in exchange for the same privilege in Morocco. In 1904, Great Britain and France had resolved their differences in a treaty by which France yielded to Great Britain in the Sudan and Egypt and in return received a free hand in the Maghreb.* Both countries agreed to maintain the independence and integrity of Morocco, and France declared its support of the Moroccan sultanate. By another treaty later in 1904, France and Spain established their respective spheres of influence in Morocco; and by secret convention the two European countries set themselves up as the sole arbiters of Morocco's future.⁴

The question was not to be settled so easily, however. A short time after the Anglo-French and French-Spanish agreements, friction between France and Germany over Morocco appeared likely to provoke a general European war. At the resulting Conference of Algeiras in 1906, representatives of the major world powers, including the United States, worked out a settlement. The Act of Algeiras, drawn up in April, constituted the charter of Morocco for almost 50 years. It pledged the support of the great powers for Morocco's territorial integrity, economic liberty, and the sovereignty and independence of her Sultan.⁵

In 1911, the French ceded over 100,000 square miles of Congo territory to Germany, in return for which Germany yielded in Morocco. France was then able to establish a legal protectorate over Morocco by the terms of the Treaty of Fez, signed with the Sultan on March 30, 1912. This treaty did not reverse the guarantees given at Algeiras, but it did give France the right to exercise certain sovereign powers in the name and on behalf of Morocco.⁶

Convention of Madrid Sets Up French and Spanish Spheres

Late in 1912, France and Spain regularized their Moroccan arrangements in the Convention of Madrid. Spain gained complete control of the northern shores of Morocco, including the Rif—a protectorate† over an area approximately one-fifth the size of the French zone.⁷

In each protectorate, administration was carried out nominally by two men, one a representative of the Moroccan sultan and the other a representative of the European power—the sultan and the resident general in the French zone, and the khalifa and the high commissioner in the Spanish zone. The resident general and the high commissioner, the two most powerful men in Morocco, were usually military men—a necessity, since the protectorate arrangements were extremely unpopular and had to be vigorously fought for when European control was extended

*The Maghreb is the region in North Africa made up of the old Barbary states—the present Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

†There was, however, no agreement between Spain and Morocco to establish the Spanish zone. The Moroccans thus later claimed that if the French were thrown out the Spanish "sub-tenants" must go.

over the mountains. No tribe submitted without resistance," wrote a young French officer who took part in the French pacification campaigns. "and some did not submit until they had exhausted their last means of resistance. No tribe ever came over to us without having first been defeated by arms."⁹

Spanish Colonial Policy and Practice

In the Spanish zone, a generally more relaxed attitude prevailed at first, since the Spanish tended to stay in the towns and made only half-hearted attempts to consolidate their position. On the Mediterranean coast they remained generally in their traditional presidios of Melilla, Alhucemas, and Ceuta; from Melilla they built a short railroad inland for about 30 miles. Although their zone was overcrowded and lacked agricultural land, the Spanish had no particular economic program.¹⁰

Since the Spanish occupation had taken place slowly and had been marked by incompetence and corruption, there was no effective administration in the Rif prior to the 1921 uprising. During World War I, the Spanish had allowed German agents, who sought to sell arms to the Moroccan tribes and inflame them against the French, to operate virtually unchecked. The Spanish had trained some officers as tribal experts, but Spanish influence rapidly diminished as one moved away from the presidios. The tribesmen's initial indifference to the regime changed to strong resistance whenever the Spanish sought to extend their occupation. The 1921 Rifian insurgency broke out in the Spanish protectorate as a result of Spanish attempts to broaden the area of their authority. It was first regarded as a wholly Spanish affair and took on larger proportions only when Rifian activities threatened the French protectorate.

At the time of the outbreak, the Spanish high commissioner was Gen. Damasco Berenguer, who was just completing the pacification of the western portion of the protectorate around Larache. In this area, the Spanish depended heavily on the unscrupulous and brutal Moulay Ahmed el Raisuli, a native Moroccan chieftain who feigned cooperation while indulging in kidnapping and plundering.*¹¹ Unlike the French in southern Morocco, however, the Spanish never followed a clearly defined policy of using tribal leaders to subdue portions of their zone; and Spanish rule alternated between severity and laxity. Personal relations between the Spanish and Moroccans were generally good, and certainly there was no racism on the part of the Spanish. On the other hand taxes were excessive in areas under Spanish control. And it was not uncommon for a tribesman to be imprisoned for failing to salute a Spanish officer.

*Raisuli had precipitated an international incident and incurred the wrath of President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904, when he kidnapped Ion Perdicaris, presumed to be a naturalized American citizen. Shortly before the outbreak of World War I he provoked an uprising against the Spanish in which he inflicted heavy casualties on the occupiers.

Tribal Uprisings Endemic in Morocco

A proper perspective on the Rifian war demands some notice of the widespread tribal violence that had prevailed in Morocco even after European intervention in the late 19th century. Prior to the establishment of the protectorates, tribal uprisings had taken place in many parts of the country, which was only weakly held by the Moroccan government. One of the most serious had been that of Bu Hamara, the *de facto* ruler of eastern Morocco, who was subdued by the sultan only after French aid had been received. Raisuli, the Spanish "ally" mentioned earlier, had also taken advantage of the confusion of the period to establish his claim in the northwest, and French help was again necessary before the sultan could reestablish his rule.

Continual tribal agitation by German agents throughout World War I included support for a pretender in the south. In eastern Morocco, closer to the Rif, Abdel Malek, a grandson of Abdel Kader, the famous 19th century Algerian Berber leader, led uprisings with German assistance and encouragement. Nor was agitation centered in the Rif proper a novelty in 1921. In 1909, the Spanish had had to send a force of 50,000 men to subdue tribes around Melilla.¹² Thus, the Rifian uprising followed a long series of tribal disorders in Morocco.

Abdel Krim, Leader of the Anti-Spanish Revolt

Mohammed ben Abdel Krim el Khattabi—the leader of the Rifian rebellion and the man who was to become a symbol of the revolt of Islam against Western domination—was a member of the major Rifian tribe, the Beni Uraighel, which was divided into five clans. His father was an influential, respected, and progressive official (*qadi*) of the tribe, and in 1920 the family was ostensibly on good terms with the Spanish. Abdel Krim's brother was an engineering student in Madrid, returning only when he learned that his family was in trouble. Abdel Krim himself had studied law at Qarawiyn University in Fez; at one time he had been employed to teach the Berber language to Spanish officials; he had also helped edit a local Arabic newspaper. He had been an emissary to the Moroccan government and later became an official in the native affairs office in Melilla, where he had ample opportunity to become familiar with the surrounding tribes and their grievances. In 1921 a quarrel with a Spanish officer led to his imprisonment; upon escaping later that year, he organized his military campaign.

Abdel Krim was a man of immense personal dignity and remarkable qualities of leadership. One of his major accomplishments was to persuade the clans, villages, and families of the Beni Uraighel to put aside their feuds during the five years that they took up arms against the Spanish and the French. It was a tribute to Abdel Krim that, at various times, other tribes joined the Beni Uraighel. The respect accorded him was almost universal. The story is told that, when Abdel Krim was on his way to surrender after all was lost, French soldiers bathing in a stream hailed and saluted him as he made his way past them.¹³

After World War I, Abdel Krim's family was known to have been in close contact with German mining officials in the Rif, where wartime agents had been supplanted by representatives of German business.¹¹ It has been suggested that reassertion of Spanish interest in the Rif following the war meant that the family would be unable to profit from connections with German firms, and that this inspired their enmity for the Spanish. Others believe, however, that the underlying factor in the uprising was opposition to the existence of the Spanish zone and to the existence of the regime.¹²

INSURGENCY


The Rif rebellion sprang from a series of events rather than from any explicit political planning and organization among the tribesmen. Indeed, there was no political organization until Abdel Krim set up the semblance of a state after he had gained control of the Rif. The Spanish authorities were caught unaware, and their preparations were wholly inadequate. There is no evidence that the Beni Uralghel had made advance preparation for the uprising. Once the movement began to gain momentum, however, it was difficult to confine, and it eventually spread from Shenhuan to Melilla. At one time the Rifians were within artillery range of Tetuan, and in the later phases of the war they were within 20 miles of Fez.

Early Success of the Berbers

When the insurgency began in May 1921, Abdel Krim had only some 2,000 men with whom he was to oppose the 63,000 troops at the disposal of the Spanish commander.¹³ Nonetheless, the Rifians achieved a spectacular series of successes. The Berber forces, frenzied by their success, were able to overrun Spanish posts and massacre their garrisons, while eluding the troops that had been sent to reinforce the Spanish positions. At Anwal, Abdel Krim scored a major victory. While native troops deserted the Spanish, Abdel Krim's forces rose to 5,000 armed men.

The importance of these victories of the first two months of the war cannot be measured wholly in terms of the 10,000 casualties Abdel Krim inflicted on the Spanish. Although the Spanish managed to regain Nador before the winter and enlarged their defenses around Melilla, the Rif had been lost and Abdel Krim's fame spread throughout the tribes of the north and the south, bringing him support and recruits. In addition, he had captured 50 cannon, 25,000 rifles, 10 million cartridges, and huge amounts of clothing, food, and equipment—most important for a military commander lacking outside sources of supply.

The revelation of Spanish weakness and the material gains of the early months of the war enabled Abdel Krim to extend his influence over most of the northern Rifian tribes from the Jhala to the Muluya valley. The initial success of the insurgency made it possible for him to



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exploit the tribal system and extend hostilities; otherwise there might have been only localized fighting. The blood feuds of the Berber tribes were submerged in the glory of the struggle against the Spaniards.

Abdel Krim Proclaims the "Rif Republic"

Until the Anwal victory Abdel Krim had been known simply as amir, or leader, but the new surge of support made it possible for him to begin creating a rudimentary political organization. He established a capital at Ajdir and proclaimed himself president of the "Rif Republic." A cabinet of six men was formed, and 80 elected tribal delegates were assembled. There was a high court of 15 judges, some of them trained in Paris and Moroccan law schools. Opinions differ as to how serious Abdel Krim was about creating a republic, as this effort ran counter to his own avowed allegiance to the sultan. His attempt to form his own government later proved an obstacle in negotiations with the Spanish and French, who were committed to defend the sultan. It appears that toward the end of the war, when it was too late to bargain, he might have been willing to see a zone of influence set up under the control of his family, similar to those created in the French zone under various tribal dignitaries. The French, however, feared that if he were victorious he would proclaim himself sultan.

His closest collaborators throughout the war were members of his immediate family. He himself was president of the cabinet, and his brother was secretary to the cabinet and in charge of the army.¹⁷ His brother-in-law was in charge of "foreign affairs," though Abdel Krim also took an active part in preventing the eruption of tribal rivalries. Abdel Krim was acutely aware of the threat to his campaign posed by tribal feuds, and in order to balance hatreds and forestall jealousies he seldom held meetings without representatives of more than one clan or village present. Toward the end of the war, room was found in the cabinet for representatives of nearby loyal tribes, but the Beni Uraighel dominated the government, and Abdel Krim relied heavily on his family. Since the government was always on a wartime footing, it is difficult to estimate how well it might have functioned under peaceful circumstances. The military and civilian organizations frequently overlapped.

Insurgent Military Organization, Training, and Casualties

The military organization was well suited to tribal conditions, and it benefited from the fact that most Rifians were crack marksmen, experienced in guerrilla warfare. Its backbone was the "regulars," who reportedly never exceeded 2,500 men, of whom 150 were a personal body-guard at Ajdir and about 350 were in artillery units usually concentrated around Alhucemas Bay to prevent landings. The trained infantry was never used as a unit, but was combined in groups of 25 to 30 with tribal auxiliaries, who were called up as needed. Most of the supporting troops came from the Beni Uraighel, but there were also large numbers from the Tamsamani,

Beni Tozine, Bocooya, Beni Itsuf, and Beni Bu Frah tribes. A pasha led each tribe, and his troops were divided into groups of 100 (mias), which were, in turn, subdivided into units of 50 and 25, each with its commander. Military service was obligatory for all men over 15 years of age.¹⁸

Abdel Krim also had regional commanders (kebir mehallas) on the major fighting fronts, with whom he was in telephone contact, thanks to his brother's engineering training in Madrid and to captured Spanish equipment. When regional commanders called up troops, each man arrived with a rifle, ammunition, and food for eight days; in battle, each was issued 400 cartridges and 20 grenades a day. Normally unpaid, they received 2 pesetas a day when on duty, though surrounding tribes provided most of their needs. Most of the officers had received some European training, and all were excellent guerrilla fighters. Although the auxiliary troops were already merciless fighters, good shots, and intimately familiar with mountain warfare, some were given a week or so of training. There were no medicines, hospitals, or surgical treatment for the wounded; and it has been estimated that Rifian casualties for the entire five-year period may have numbered about 30,000 men.

Arms, Supplies, and Strengths

When the fighting began, the tribesmen were armed with outmoded Spanish "1886" rifles, but captured and smuggled supplies later enabled Abdel Krim to equip about 50,000 men.¹⁹ At the peak of his strength, in 1924, he was able to mobilize an estimated 120,000 tribesmen. These gross figures have to be qualified, of course, by limitations on the number of men who could be armed. Though Abdel Krim never used infantry in standard units, he probably could have armed half the loyal tribesmen.²⁰ Supply depots were established at Sheshuan, Targuist, and Ajdir. It is estimated that when Abdel Krim surrendered he had 240 machine guns, 135 cannon of various sizes, and more than 40,000 rifles.²¹

Although Abdel Krim was not without funds, he received about 200 million francs in ransoms, annual receipts from taxes, and other support of about 600 million francs—after 1922 the insurgents had no dependable sources of funds or supplies. Several aircraft were purchased in Algiers, but only one reached the Rif, and it was so badly damaged on landing that it was never used. Despite these unfavorable conditions, Abdel Krim waged an intensive and often successful war for five years. He was so skillful that the French suspected that large numbers of foreign officers were assisting him. They learned later, however, that only a few adventurers and some deserters from the French Foreign Legion were fighting with the tribesmen.

Abdel Krim Challenges the French

By the end of 1924, Abdel Krim, flushed with his success against the Spanish, was pressing on toward the boundary of the French protectorate. In January 1925, he again defeated Spanish

forces, and more tribes rallied to his side. Captured Spanish arms provided a windfall of equipment.

In April of 1925 Abdel Krim concentrated his forces near the French border. In extending hostilities to the French zone, however, Abdel Krim blundered seriously. Had he confined his operations to the Spanish zone, he might have changed the history of Morocco. By engaging the French he locked horns with the greatest colonial power of continental Europe—an opponent whose own interests committed her to his defeat.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

When the conflict came into the open on May 30, 1921, the Spanish quickly withdrew from exposed positions in Zeluan and Nador. At this time Spanish commanders in the field had about 63,000 troops at their disposal and the insurgents only about 2,000, according to one estimate. Despite this favorable strength ratio, General Silvestre, who was in command in the Melilla region, found his forces unprepared; and he was quickly abandoned by his native troops. His weak defenses melted before tribal attacks.

Spanish Forces Suffer Large Initial Losses

A month and a half later a Spanish column trying to relieve a besieged post at Igerriben arrived too late, and had to retreat to the major fortification at Anwal. With some 24,000 troops in the region, the Spanish were nonetheless helpless, and the Anwal garrison was wiped out completely.²² In the face of the ruthless onslaught of the Rifians, General Silvestre and many of his officers committed suicide. A few weeks later a garrison of 3,000 men at Arruit under Gen. Soler Diego Navarro was massacred, and the general was held for ransom. The Spanish are estimated to have suffered losses of over 10,000 men—dead, mutilated, or taken prisoner—in the first two months of the uprising.²³

Military Incompetence Despite Adequate Strength and Funds

The condition of the Spanish counterinsurgency forces has been described as "defective in every particular." Officers were undisciplined, and their men were poorly trained and technically deficient. Widespread incompetence and corruption in the Spanish army were to remain its scourges for the next two years. When confronted by the insurgents, "The whole Spanish army, in a state of panic, fled. . . . Artillery, transport, entire camps, stores of arms and ammunition, were abandoned, and the Spanish soldiers, young, mostly untrained, underfed and ill-clothed, fled to seek a place of safety."²⁴

The Spanish never lacked in numbers, having over 60,000 men in Morocco at the outbreak of the fighting and over 150,000 by the end of the war. Their military failures of the first years

may be traced to a disastrously corrupt military organization resting on a feeble political base. From 1921 to 1923, the prosecution of the war was sporadic and indecisive; Spain was able to hold little more than her northern coastal outposts and Sheshuan in the west. In 1922, General Berenguer, later cashiered for incompetence, was replaced by a General Burguete, who spent nearly half a million pesetas while accomplishing very little. For the two years, the cost of this ineffective Spanish effort was set at over 43 million pounds.²⁵

In Spain, rising Fascist elements used the Moroccan debacle to undermine the monarchy and parliament. Meanwhile, the central problem in Morocco was that no military commander felt sure enough of home support to order a withdrawal from the scattered outposts which were so vulnerable to surprise attack and so useless for mounting an offensive against the tribesmen.

The Spanish Withdraw from Outposts to an Enclave

In 1923, Gen. Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja seized control of the government in Spain, following serious rebellions in Barcelona. The next year he tacitly acknowledged, for the time being, the insurgent victory in Morocco. At his command, the Spanish withdrew from 180 scattered posts and prepared a fortified zone from which a new offensive could be launched. Possibly the most costly single episode of the war was this 1924 withdrawal operation, when some 450 demoralized troops were lost in the removal from Sheshuan.

Commenting on the Spanish debacle, General de Rivera noted that "the soldiers march in close order, half asleep, their ears covered with the collars of their cloaks, and their rifles unprepared." He ordered patrols to advance "in open order with their flanks covered and protected." He instituted a system of inquiry to follow every guerrilla action, to find out "whether the troop that has suffered attack has been properly instructed . . . accustomed to mounting guard; . . . has been daily inspected . . . and . . . was properly supported."²⁶

Spanish Troops Face Grave Problems and Heavy Losses

General de Rivera was aware of the miserable condition of his troops and knew how ill trained they were for antiguerrilla warfare. Spanish troops were often sent into combat directly from the recruiting barracks at home; they were frequently plagued with defective equipment; when wounded, they sometimes lay on the field for days; they suffered from a brutal and capricious discipline. All of these factors played a role in the heavy Spanish losses. Indeed, losses from the early attacks numbered 16,000, those from the withdrawal through hostile territory were estimated at 17,000 dead and wounded, and another 30,000 casualties were yet to be suffered in re-establishing Spain's control of the Rif.²⁷

Not surprisingly, Spanish troops reacted to Rifian atrocities in an eye-for-an-eye manner. Not until late in the war did Spanish commanders take steps to prevent the bloodcurdling reprisals that their enraged troops often exacted on prisoners in retaliation for tribal mutilations and

acts of abuse that sometimes resulted from sheer hatred of the prolonged and futile war. General de Rivera finally outlawed atrocities after a parade in which Spanish troops passed in review with Berber heads on their bayonets. 28

The Spanish Retrench and Coordinate Operations with the French

Freed from the burdensome commitment to the extended outposts, General de Rivera was able to concentrate on establishing contact with the French and on consolidating the Spanish position in the Jbala region. He also began to train special units (some of which served under the then Maj. Francisco Franco) as shock troops to lead landings at Alhucemas Bay and attack Beni Uraighel headquarters at Ajdir. The landings took place with unexpected ease in September 1925, and some 15,000 Spanish troops entrenched themselves on the northern flank of the Beni Uraighel.

By September 1925, the Spanish were coordinating their military efforts with the French. On September 9 they began a combined campaign against Abdel Krim, and on September 15, the French opened a large-scale offensive.

Marshal Lyautey, French Resident General

France's entry into the Rifian conflict, which had occurred earlier in 1925, cannot be properly examined without considering the policies of Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, Marshal of France and Resident General in the French protectorate. Lyautey was one of the last of a vanishing species of colonizers, whose greatest regret on retirement was that he could "build no more towns." Aristocratic, imaginative, and daring, he often offended officials in Paris, especially after World War I. If he did not belong to the parliamentary world of the French metropole, he blended with Moroccan culture and was esteemed by Muslims for his courage, dignity, and sensitivity. Deeply respectful of Moroccan customs and institutions, he tried to reconstruct the Moroccan government (Maghzen) to meet modern needs and designed ambitious projects to unite the country. Deprived of two-thirds of his troops during World War I, he continued to pacify the rebellious tribes of the Middle Atlas and the south, despite opposition from Paris.

Lyautey had carefully watched the Spanish campaign of 1918-20 in the Jbala. He had noted as early as 1919 that conditions along the Spanish frontier were "precarious" and he had felt that the region must be strengthened by French occupation of the Wad Wargha, a rich valley running from west to east along the border above Fez. Lyautey was anxious to forestall trouble, for he realized that a tribal attack in the region of either Fez or Taza would disrupt current French campaigns to pacify tribes just south of these cities.

Lyautey Watches the Revolt But Delays Direct Involvement

To Lyautey, the Abdel Krim revolt of 1921 was much more than a tribal disorder, because it threatened to topple the work of a lifetime if it spread to the recently pacified areas of the south. To prevent this spread, the resident general was careful not to antagonize the tribes along the border between the Spanish and French zones. There was a considerable "no man's land," where both regimes had agreed not to establish outposts or organize the tribes.²⁹

Drawing on his talent for manipulating traditional institutions, Lyautey sought to establish good relations with one of the largest tribes in the region, the Beni Zerual, and thus to form a buffer zone against infiltration by Abdel Krim. An interesting aspect of Lyautey's manipulation of the tribes was his use of the religious brotherhoods in the area, especially the Derkawi, to extend French influence. The leaders of the brotherhoods feared that their influence would be diminished if the more orthodox Abdel Krim established a firm regime, and they were therefore susceptible to French arguments.

Lyautey also moved cautiously in taking over critical areas. His forces occupied Wazzan in 1920, but he refrained from occupying the northern banks of the Wad Wargha until 1923.³⁰ Although Lyautey's move deprived Abdel Krim of substantial grain supplies from the valley, the Rif leader was occupied at the time with countering the moves of General de Rivera and planning a new offensive in the Tetuan region. He did not, therefore, move against the French. No doubt the marshal was relieved that he could postpone hostilities against the Rifian Berbers. He was heavily committed to opening up communications between Fez and Oujda by pacifying fierce tribal resistance around Taza. Until this was done, Lyautey was cut off from Algeria and handicapped in his campaign to occupy the interior between Taza and Midelt.

French-Spanish Relations in Morocco

Another important element in the French reaction was the tenuous nature of their relationship with the Spanish. Lyautey resented the fact that the Spanish had provided access to the Germans during World War I, when major uprisings had been fomented in the south, as well as along the Spanish frontier, with arms brought in by German agents. Lyautey also regarded the Spanish connivance with the tribal leaders Abdel Malek and Raisuli as ill advised, and he was especially alarmed over Spanish toleration of Raisuli's claims to the Moroccan throne, in direct violation of international agreement. The fact that both German and British representatives made frequent contact with Abdel Krim after the insurrection began, and that the Spanish frequently discussed peace terms, led French officials to suspect that there might be a scheme afoot to deprive France of her rights in Morocco.³¹

Until fairly late in the rebellion, French relations with the Spanish were ambiguous. There was no regular liaison between the French and Spanish commanders in Morocco until 1925, and only minor joint operations took place.³² Lyautey confessed that as long as Abdel Krim's

operations were confined to the Spanish zone, it would be right to regard the French as serving only their own interests.

Lyautey Not Favored in Paris

Marshal Lyautey's steadily deteriorating relations with Paris further complicated the situation. The fact that the marshal was 72 years old when fighting broke out between Abdel Krim and the French in the spring of 1925 was not inconsequential. Lyautey's prestige as a colonial administrator dated from a time when most members of the French parliament were schoolboys, and he resented parliamentary criticism of his regime in Morocco. Such criticism was partly due to Lyautey's own indiscreet comments about politicians. Though there is no evidence that Abdel Krim ever had direct contact with any Communists, they supported his struggle, and he was defended by Communist deputies in the French National Assembly. Conditions did not improve when a Radical Socialist government was formed in Paris in 1924.³³ In March 1925, Lyautey wrote to a friend in Paris that "there has not been a cabinet in twelve years that constantly and solidly supported me."³⁴ On the other hand, Lyautey's authoritarian attitude and support of feudalism in Morocco hardly gained him the support of French progressives.

By the 1920's, France was also feeling the inflationary effects of her postwar reconstruction, and drastic cuts were being made in military budgets. Lyautey's repeated requests for reinforcements in the early 1920's fell on unsympathetic ears. He sent many long dispatches to Paris explaining how the successive reduction of his strength from 95,000 French and native troops in 1921, to 86,000 in 1922, and then to 73,000 by mid-1923 had reduced his effective combat force to only 22,000 men.³⁵

French Strength, Equipment, Casualties, and Cost

When the fighting broke out in the French zone in the spring of 1925, about 60,000 French and native troops were distributed along the frontier, and by the end of the summer the French had increased these forces to 158,000.³⁶ The number of effective combat troops is probably a more accurate index of the rapid build-up: When the first attacks came, the marshal had a striking force of about 35,000 men at his disposal, but by the time the fall offensive began, an estimated 85,000 men were committed to battle. French equipment included tanks and aircraft, and at least one expert has credited these as being the critical elements in the counterinsurgency campaign.³⁷

Though of much shorter duration than the Spanish-Rifian hostilities, the fighting along the French frontier was concentrated and often bitter. In casualty lists issued at the end of 1925, French and auxiliary losses were placed at over 2,500 dead, including 140 French officers and about 800 French troops, and 8,500 were wounded or missing. In October 1925, the ministry of war announced that up to that time the hostilities had cost France \$50 million francs.³⁸

French Problems in Command and Tactics

Soon after the French entered the war, conflicts developed between field commanders and the strategists in Rabat, which was several hundred miles from the front. It is estimated that, initially, Lyautey's past experience in the tribal uprisings of the previous century on carefully supervising details hindered the French defense. Like the Spaniards, Lyautey had used a system of scattered, fortified outposts with 25 to 30 men to occupy pacified areas, and this had worked well enough where local tribal leaders had submitted to the occupying force. This system was not suitable, however, for the kind of organized warfare Abdel Krim was capable of sustaining. Furthermore, French supply and communications lines were overextended and inflexible, partly because the fighting did not radiate from the cities and towns as it had previously. By choice of Abdel Krim, the fighting took place along a front stretching from Wazzan to Taza and beyond, where there were few urban centers.

Abdel Krim's first offensive against the French came in May 1925 in the direction of Fez; he quickly destroyed French outposts along the Wad Wargha and advanced to within 20 miles of the ancient city. It is thought by some that, if the Rifian chieftain had not decided to stop and consolidate his advances, he might even have taken Fez.³⁹ Meeting fierce hand-to-hand fighting on the road to Fez, however, Abdel Krim turned toward Wazzan. In July 1925, key outposts protecting Wazzan were recaptured by the French at great cost, and the fighting in the western sector diminished.

Lyautey quickly saw the inadequacy of the outposts in the fighting of May 1925, and tried to set up a two-pronged defense to the northwest of Fez in the Beni Zerual region, extending toward Wazzan, and to the north of Fez centering on Tawnat. But supreme command in the field was often undefined, and the regional commanders had difficulty in coordinating their offensives. The marshal acknowledged this in dispatches to Paris throughout the summer of 1925.

Meanwhile, Abdel Krim opened a new offensive, in the vicinity of Tawnat, aimed at Taza. The new campaign, in the direction of Branes and Tsoul, threatened to create new tribal uprisings in eastern Morocco. This agitation might easily have spread along the Middle Atlas Mountains to areas where the French were still fighting in their own zone, and also to the south where they had only recently defeated the tribal insurgents of World War I. If the attack had succeeded, Lyautey would almost certainly have seen his entire handiwork in Morocco destroyed, and France would have been pressed back into defensive positions comparable to those of 1912. Advised by the regional French commander, Gen. Jacques-Adelbert de Chambrun, to withdraw from Taza and abandon the route to Oujda, Marshal Lyautey made his most fateful decision of the war. He decided instead to fight north of Taza, and by so doing probably saved the French protectorate.⁴⁰

Marshal Pétain Replaces Lyautey

The bitter sequel to this decision was the arrival of Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, Inspector General of the French Armies, who was sent by the ministry of war to survey the front and to make recommendations. The "hero of Verdun" arrived on July 17, 1925, and was graciously received by the aging resident general, but the blow to Marshal Lyautey's dignity was irreparable. On August 18, Lyautey was ordered to turn over to Pétain command of the troops and military services in Morocco; indignant, he also resigned his political post as resident general a few weeks later.⁴¹

On his way back to France, Pétain stopped in Madrid to lay plans for a final joint offensive against Abdel Krim, then taking shape under General de Rivera in Spain. Actually, the French had been in contact with the Spanish since June 1925, when it was agreed that neither should independently enter into negotiations with the Rif leader and that the international treaty obligations affecting Morocco, most notably that recognizing the sovereignty of the sultan, would not be violated.⁴²

Joint Spanish-French Offensives End Insurgent Threat

In September 1925, Marshal Pétain, who had returned to Morocco, mounted a fall offensive; his troops occupied the Wargha valley as the Spanish troops were landing at Alhucemas. Fighting then stopped for the winter, but the outcome of the struggle had been decided in the double operation. Abdel Krim realized that he could not repulse two armies, and the tribesmen more loosely allied with him began to abandon the Rifian cause.

Abdel Krim had explored the terms of surrender several times before his imminent defeat in the fall of 1925. With British assistance, his brother had visited Paris, and his representatives had had talks with Spanish officials in 1923. Joint Spanish-French peace terms were first communicated to Abdel Krim in the summer of 1925. They included restoration of full autonomy to the Rif and Jbala tribes, release of all prisoners, an amnesty retroactive to 1921, establishment of a local police force to keep order, and strict control of arms movements. These early probings failed to produce an acceptable agreement, and there are some indications that the Rifian leader became more intransigent as he saw the end nearing.

In April 1926, Abdel Krim, faced with the probability of a new joint offensive by the French and the Spanish, sent a delegation to Oujda for negotiations with representatives of both European governments.⁴³ However, agreement could not be reached on two questions: the occupation of Rif strongpoints and the release of prisoners prior to further discussion. By this time the Rif leader had retreated to his final stronghold at Targuist. French forces advanced up the Wad Kart valley, where they made contact with Spanish troops. The Spanish then advanced on Targuist and took it on May 23, 1926. Abdel Krim, realizing that he would very likely get far less generous treatment from the Spanish, eluded their forces and surrendered to the French.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

The political significance of the Rif war should not be underestimated. On the Spanish side, it contributed substantially to the rise of the Fascists. The first strongly Fascist government, under Gen. Primo de Rivera, was formed under the pressure caused by the revelation of extensive corruption and military inadequacy revealed during the Rifian war. Also, a commander of Spanish shock troops, (then) Maj. Francisco Franco, later to become dictator of Spain, gained valuable experience.

If the war marked the rise of the military in Spain, it was associated with its decline in France as the Third Republic sought to reduce military commitments under the inflationary pressures brought on by post-World War I rebuilding. Marshal Lyautey represented a vanishing tradition of the aristocratic officer, but his imprint on Morocco was made more firm by his remarkable defense of the French protectorate.

After the war, relations between the victors and the Moroccans improved. Deprived of their leaders and trained for nothing except fighting, many Rifians entered the military service of Spain.

A Foreshadowing of Later Nationalism

The Moroccans felt the first twinge of national consciousness. Abdel Krim was fully aware of the Syrian revolts, the rise of Kemal Ataturk, and the transformation taking place in Egypt. The implicit challenge that he presented to the Moroccan sultan was soon forgotten as his insurgency took on a new symbolism of Islamic protest against the West. Abdel Krim was truly a progenitor of the later Moroccan nationalist movement.

With his immediate family, Abdel Krim was exiled to Réunion Island in the Indian Ocean, but his exile did not mark the end of his political activity. In 1918 when he was 70 years old, the French decided to bring him back to France, thinking perhaps that he might be useful as a counterforce to the Moroccan sultan, Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef, a strong nationalist. However, when the ship carrying him to France docked at Port Said, Abdel Krim went ashore and took refuge with the Egyptians. For several years he served as the chairman of the Liberation Committee for North Africa, organized under the auspices of the Arab League.⁴⁴ The committee served as a rallying point for the new generation of North African nationalists, then preparing for the conflicts that were to erupt in the 1950's.

Abdel Krim played only a symbolic role in the North African uprisings beginning in 1954. The new generation of nationalist leaders from Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria represented a new revolutionary epoch in that the instruments at their disposal were more varied and diplomacy was possible. Certainly the memory of Abdel Krim stirred the new nationalists, and emissaries from his family reportedly played a part in rallying the Rifian tribesmen to the Moroccan

liberation army in 1955. However, this army was soon disbanded and its members absorbed into the new royal Moroccan army.

As the North African countries followed separate courses to achieve independence, differences arose within the Committee for the Liberation of North Africa, especially after the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. Like Nasser, Abdel Krim favored continued hostilities across the Maghreb until France was prepared to give all three countries—Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco—their independence. When Morocco negotiated for independence in the fall of 1955, Abdel Krim publicly dissented.

Though promised a comfortable retirement, he declined repeated offers from Mohammed V to return to independent Morocco, preferring to remain in Cairo until all of North Africa was liberated. Abdel Krim died on February 6, 1963, on the eve of Algerian independence.⁴⁵

NOTES

¹Rom Landau, Moroccan Drama, 1900-1955 (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1956), p. 121.

²Walter Burton Harris, France, Spain and the Rif (London: E. Arnold, 1927), p. 22. This figure is only an informed estimate. In the 1945 Spanish census, the Rif population was 478,000. In the most recent census (1960), the population in this area (Alhucemas and Nador) was 559,000.

³There has been very little systematic study of the Rif. Some of the earliest work was done by Carleton S. Coon, Tribes of the Rif (Harvard African Studies, Vol. 9; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931); and Caravan: The Story of the Middle East (2d ed.; New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1958). More recently, some careful anthropological studies have been done by David M. Hart, "An Ethnographic Survey of the Rifian Tribes of Aith Waryaghar," Tamuda, II (1954), pp. 51-86; "Emilio Blanco Izaga and the Berbers of the Central Rif," Tamuda, IV (1948), pp. 171-237; "Tribal and Place Names among the Arabo-Berbers of North-western Africa," Hesperis Tamuda, I (1960); and also a review article in the Middle East Journal, XVI, No. 4, pp. 541-43. See also Ernest Gellner, "The Far West of Islam," British Journal of Sociology, IX, No. 1, pp. 73-82, and Roger Le Tourneau, "North Africa: Rigorism and Bewilderment," Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization, ed. Gustave Edmund von Grunebaum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 231-60, for more background on Islam in North Africa. The social structure of the Rif tribes is roughly comparable to that of the Algerian Kabylie, who are well described by Pierre Bourdieu in The Algerians (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), pp. 1-24.

⁴Landau, Moroccan Drama, pp. 70-72, 389.

⁵Ibid., 78-79.

⁶Ibid., 80-82, 350-51, 392-93.

⁷Ibid., 103-104, 166.

⁸Ibid., 103-105.

⁹Gen. A. Guillaume, quoted in Landau, Moroccan Drama, p. 90.

¹⁰Landau, Moroccan Drama, pp. 164-65.

¹¹For a good account of Raisuli's rise and fall, see Harris, France, Spain and the Rif, pp. 84-115. Raisuli first regarded Abdel Krim as an upstart, but ended as his captive in January 1925 at Tazrut; Raisuli was suffering from dropsy and died shortly afterwards. For an account of Raisuli's life (much better than anything available in English on Abdel Krim), see Rosita Forbes, The Sultan of the Mountains (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1924).

¹²Pierre Fontaine, Abdel Krim: Origine de la Rébellion (Paris: Sept Couleurs, 1958). Though very conspiratorial in tone, this study provides more information on both German and English interests in the Rif than any other. Naturally, the French saw all these relationships as a plot.

¹³Landau, Moroccan Drama, p. 128.

¹⁴Fontaine, Abdel Krim, p. 74.

¹⁵Landau, Moroccan Drama, p. 122.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 165.

¹⁷There are two available lists of his cabinet members. For 1921, see Harris, France, Spain and the Rif, p. 38. For 1924, and a longer elaboration of the central officialdom, see Léon Gabrielli, Abdel Krim et les Événements du Rif (1924-1926) (Casablanca: Atlantides, 1953), p. 42. It is interesting that the most authoritative spokesman for the Moroccan nationalists, Al-Fassi, did not regard the Rif Republic as a threat. See his discussion of the Republic's organization in Allal Al-Fassi, The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa, trans. Hazem Nuseibeh (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1954), pp. 103-105.

¹⁸Gabrielli, Abdel Krim, pp. 47-49. Gabrielli was the French official at Tawrirt, mid-way between Taza and Oujda. He visited Abdel Krim and frequently entertained his emissaries, so that his evaluations may be regarded as among the more accurate.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 52.

²⁰Fontaine, Abdel Krim, p. 100.

²¹Harris, France, Spain and the Rif, pp. 321-22.

²²Ibid., pp. 68-69.

²³Harris, on p. 72, puts the figure at 15,000. Fontaine, in Abdel Krim, p. 31, gives the figure of 12,000.

²⁴Harris, France, Spain and the Rif, pp. 69-71.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 68 and 132; Landau, Moroccan Drama, p. 165.

²⁶Harris, France, Spain and the Rif, pp. 47-48.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 72-103.

²⁸Ibid., p. 165. See also the photograph opposite p. 64 in Fontaine, Abdel Krim.

²⁹Pierre Lyautey (ed.), Lyautey l'Africain: Textes et Lettres, IV (Paris: Plon, 1957), pp. 146-47.

³⁰Harris, France, Spain and the Rif, p. 198. Lyautey had occupied the entire valley in 1918, but withdrew in order to use his forces in the south. He was disturbed again in 1924 when information reached him that Abdel Krim was recruiting tribesmen in the region. Lyautey (ed.), Lyautey l'Africain, IV, pp. 246-47.

³¹For Lyautey's own suspicions, see Lyautey (ed.), Lyautey l'Africain, IV, p. 288; see also Fontaine, Abdel Krim, p. 111.

³²Brief mention of these is made in General Georges Catroux, Lyautey le Marocain (Paris: Hachette, 1952), p. 265, and in Harris, France, Spain and the Rif, pp. 259-64.

³³Lyautey had submitted his resignation several times since the war. Lyautey (ed.), Lyautey l'Africain, IV, p. 290. See other comments on pp. 308 and 322-23, and in Catroux, Lyautey, pp. 162-66 and 183. The account of the Communist views is in Fontaine, Abdel Krim, p. 147. Fontaine is inclined to exaggerate opposition to the French, but does not see the Communists as a serious factor.

³⁴Quoted in Landau, Moroccan Drama, pp. 92-93.

³⁵The dispatches asking for reinforcements are important in view of the charges that Lyautey was poorly prepared for hostilities. Lyautey (ed.), Lyautey l'Africain, IV, pp. 83 and 226-30.

³⁶The figures on the build-up of forces over the summer of 1925 are taken from Harris, France, Spain and the Rif, p. 246, and Catroux, Lyautey, pp. 167 and 272.

³⁷Landau, Moroccan Drama, pp. 17-28.

³⁸ Quoted in Harris, France, Spain and the Rif, pp. 246-47.

³⁹ This opinion is given by Fontaine, Abdel Krim, p. 131.

⁴⁰ Catroux was present during the consultations at the front. See Catroux, Lyautey, p. 207. For Lyautey's evaluation, see Lyautey (ed.), Lyautey l'Africain, IV, pp. 342-56.

⁴¹ Pétain represented a very different military mind, and Lyautey's protégés were outspoken in later writings in the criticism of Pétain's "purely military thinking." See Catroux, Lyautey, pp. 252-59. Lyautey favored a thrust through Beni Zerual territory, where the offensive could benefit from tribal sympathies and exploit tribal feelings.

⁴² For the details of the agreement between France and Spain, see Harris, France, Spain and the Rif, pp. 259-64.

⁴³ The final negotiations are described in Gabrielli, Abdel Krim, pp. 277-97, and also in Harris, France, Spain and the Rif, pp. 279-87.

⁴⁴ Abdel Krim's activities in Cairo are described by Fassi, Independence Movements in Arab North Africa, pp. 301-314.


⁴⁵ Abdel Krim remained active until his death. In August 1962 he announced plans to participate directly in the Algerian revolution, The New York Times, August 5, 1962; his obituary appeared in The New York Times on February 7, 1963. The most complete obituary appeared in The Times (London), on February 7, 1963.

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- Gabrielli, Léon. Abdel Krim et les Événements du Rif. Casablanca: Atlantides, 1953. Gabrielli was contrôleur at Tawrirt and a major source of intelligence for Lyautey. Negotiations in 1925 and 1926 took place through him.
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Chapter Three

**SOUTH AFRICA
1899-1902**



SOUTH AFRICA (1899-1902)

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SOUTH AFRICA (1899-1902)

by Martin Blumensohn

Defeated by the British under Lord Kitchener in conventional warfare, the South African Boers turned to guerrilla tactics, with the result that British troops then had to fight a second, more difficult, and more costly campaign to subdue the insurgents.

BACKGROUND

The Boer war, lasting from October 1899 to May 1902, was marked in its final phase by widespread guerrilla tactics. Although sporadic guerrilla activity occurred early in 1900, full-scale guerrilla warfare did not begin until nearly a year later, after British forces had defeated and dispersed the Boer (Afrikaner) forces and were occupying the Boer countries, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Then the Boers, "casting off the trammels of formal warfare, and disintegrating into a thousand bands," as a British historian has written, "agitated the whole vast theater of war. . . . If the enemy appeared few and dispirited on one day, they were numerous and aggressive on the next; the clearance of one area did but embroil its neighbour; defeats and victories of columns and commandos followed one another with [such] a regularity [that]. . . it could never be said precisely how matters stood. . . ."¹

The war climaxed many years of friction between two cultures, with different and opposing institutions, existing in close association. Deep-seated estrangement sustained the determination necessary to both insurgent and counterinsurgent during the long period of antagonism—for the one to reject the reality of a military and political defeat, for the other to insist on the validity of victory. A proper understanding of the struggle requires a brief excursion through several centuries of history.²

Coming of the Europeans as Settlers

The cape discovered in 1486 by Bartolomeo Diaz and later named Good Hope was first a stopping place for Portuguese and later for Dutch and English ships bound for the Indies. Dutch merchantmen began to stop regularly in 1616, English ships four years later. The Dutch East India Company sent about 75 men to the Cape in 1652. Not long afterwards, a group of

discharged Dutch sailors and soldiers who were granted lands in South Africa brought their families to the Cape. They were followed by a few German colonists, approximately 300 French Protestants, and several hundred Dutch emigrants and female orphans. By the beginning of the 18th century, after 50 years of desultory settlement, some 2,500 Europeans lived in South Africa. Approximately half were Dutch and they gradually absorbed the others into a new culture with a predominantly Dutch strain. The settlers began to enslave native Africans and import Malayan slaves.

Differences arising between the colonists and the Dutch East India Company, which regulated prices, dispensed justice, and expected the settlers to repel native raids, prompted some colonists to trek northward and occupy new lands. They came into contact first with Bushmen, who hunted the tame cattle of the farmers; then with Hottentots,* who were expert cattle thieves; and finally with the Bantu, a more civilized people who temporarily barred further expansion. By about 1770, European settlers had pushed more than 400 miles into the interior. Although troubles with settlers and difficulties with natives had led the Dutch in 1707 to prohibit emigration to South Africa for 100 years, by the end of the century the original European settlers had multiplied into more than 20,000 persons who controlled over 17,000 slaves and an uncertain number of Bushmen and Hottentots.

The European in South Africa was by then known as a "Boer," a Dutch word similar to the German Bauer, meaning farmer. More a herdsman and hunter than a farmer, the typical Boer had great herds of cattle for which he needed thousands of acres of grazing land. With servants and slaves to raise his grain and vegetables, he was absolute ruler over his dependents and domains. Of profound religious conviction, he held strongly to the tenets of the Dutch Reformed Church.³

Great Britain Conquers the Colony

A century of British-Boer conflict opened in 1795. The decline of the Dutch East India Company had impelled the Boers to set up a short-lived republic, but the British dissolved it that year after invading the Cape in order to safeguard the sea route to India. A 1799 Boer revolt against British control was quickly suppressed. As a result of the situation created by the Napoleonic wars, however, the Treaty of Amiens in 1802 gave responsibility for governing South Africa to Holland under French protection. In 1806 the British again seized the Cape, and the Treaty of Vienna in 1814 confirmed the conquest.

Regarding the Cape Colony as nothing more than a stopping place on the way to India, British officials at first interfered little with the Afrikaners. But in 1820, Great Britain sent 5,000 settlers to the Cape to anglicize the colony, later made English the official language, and

*For later German counterinsurgency against the Hottentots, see Chapter Four, "South-West Africa (1904-1907)."

abolished the judicial function exercised by local Dutch administrative officials, called field cornets. British policy toward the Africans increased Boer misgiving and discontent. The abolition of slavery by the British Parliament in 1833 (with what the Boers regarded as inadequate compensation that had to be claimed and collected through agents in London) provoked many Boers to make the Grand Trek northward between 1835 and 1837 into a largely unexplored continent that was a welter of tribal disturbance.

British Annex Natal and Challenge Other Boer Republics

Although the Boers established three republics in South Africa—the Orange Free State, the Transvaal, and Natal—trouble persisted with the British. For example, the British felt that Boer treatment of the Africans brought on the Kaffir wars, which were endemic during the first half of the century. When the British annexed Natal in 1845, many Boers moved further into the interior. Three years later, at the request of some Boers who felt that their own government was unable to restrain lawlessness, manage state finances in the public interest, and keep peace among the local tribes, Great Britain annexed the Orange Free State. In 1852, the British recognized the sovereignty of the Transvaal, and in 1854 they acknowledged the sovereignty of the Orange Free State.

The discovery of diamond fields in 1867 and subsequent unruliness among the miners, many of them British subjects, led England to place the Transvaal under martial law in 1871. Boer troubles with the Africans and financial difficulties in the Transvaal prompted Great Britain to annex the Transvaal in 1877. These were the years of British expansion in southern Africa, a period marked by the annexation of West Brikaland in 1874; Basutoland in 1881; Bechuanaland in 1885; and, under the aegis of Cecil Rhodes, Mashonaland, Matabeleland, and Barotseland.

Boer resentment against the spread of British influence flared in 1881 into open revolt, sometimes called the first Boer war. At the battles of Laing's Nek and Majuba Hill, Boer forces defeated British regulars. The British suffered 520 casualties, the Boers 55. Although the British government was ready to send 10,000 troops to suppress the rebellion, it decided instead to make peace. In 1882 Great Britain again acknowledged the sovereignty of the Transvaal, but added the vague proviso that the republic remain under British "suzerainty."

Dissatisfaction with Boer Rule in the Transvaal

The discovery of gold in 1886 near Johannesburg brought a great influx of Europeans, many of them British, into the Transvaal. The foreign population in Johannesburg alone soon rose to 80,000, four times the number of Boer inhabitants. Despite their superior numbers, the non-Boers received no privileges or rights to participate in national or municipal affairs. When the Transvaal government tried to force military service on foreigners, yet barred them from citizenship and the franchise, some newcomers looked to influential Englishmen for assistance.

Cecil Rhodes, a self-made millionaire anxious to promote an Anglo-Dutch union in South Africa with the British in the ascendancy, encouraged and financed a revolution in Johannesburg, which was climaxed in December 1895 by the abortive Jameson raid into the Transvaal. Jameson surrendered to Boer troops, and world opinion condemned Rhodes, who resigned as prime minister of the Cape Colony. The grievances of 180,000 foreigners in the Transvaal, who owned 63 percent of the land and 90 percent of the personal property, remained undressed.

In much the same way that Rhodes represented British expansion and imperialism, Stephanus Johannes Paulus, "Oom Paul," Kruger, President of the Transvaal, personified the dream of Dutch supremacy in South Africa. Trying to free the Boer republics from British economic domination, Kruger built a railroad from Pretoria eastward to Portuguese Mozambique. The railway was unable to compete with British lines running south to Natal and the Cape. Kruger then raised all railroad rates and gave Boer citizens monopolies in furnishing the miners with such vital supplies as dynamite, coal, and liquor.

In April 1899, 11,000 British subjects living in Johannesburg petitioned the British high commissioner at the Cape for relief from disfranchisement and the high prices charged by the Boer dynamite monopoly. Representations by the commissioner to Kruger had little effect. The foreigners continued to complain about police brutality, the fact that only the Afrikaans language was taught in the schools, the closed franchise, and the monopolies. Claiming suzerainty over both Boer republics, Great Britain insisted on a liberalized franchise, a promise of specific legislative seats for foreigners' representatives, and a guarantee of legal equality for Boers and non-Boers.

Contrasting British and Boer Colonial Policies

The British were speaking from a position of power. At the peak of their glory and achievement, with cultured and sophisticated leaders, they had conquered much of Africa and had established a world-wide empire which required economic and political peace for continued commercial prosperity.⁵ Carrying "the white man's burden" and leading various social and political reform movements to abolish slavery, extend the franchise, secure equality under the law, and promote free trade, the British saw themselves as crusaders and protectors of the weak.

In contrast, the Boer was incensed over what he viewed as an infringement of his sovereignty. Independent and self-confident, he had put his stamp on much of South Africa. He had fled from the "godless," busy life of cities and had penetrated the northern wilds in small groups, "each man of which was wrapped in a dream of solitude." Having wrested vast areas of land from the Africans, he looked upon himself as a member of a chosen people on a new pilgrimage. His farmhouse was a fortress, usually in a state of siege. The wilderness in

which he lived required supreme individuality and great self-reliance. Proud and jealous, he was also tough and obdurate.⁶

The Boer constitutions expressly declared an inequality of white and nonwhite in both church and state. Membership in the Boer legislatures was confined to Europeans who belonged to the Dutch Reformed Church, and although there was no slavery as such, the apprentice system was in effect a form of servitude. The Boer resented the British for their attempts to regulate the diamond and gold fields, their attitudes toward the Africans, and their business success. He wanted to be rid of what he considered to be high-handed British interference, and he remembered that he had defeated British regular forces in 1881.

INSURGENCY

At the end of September 1899, because serious trouble seemed imminent in South Africa, some 5,000 British troops sailed from India for Natal, and the Boer states began to prepare for war. On October 9, Kruger sent an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of British troops from Boer territory and the return of the reinforcements arriving from India. The British government refused to comply and declared that the existing situation precluded further discussion. On October 11, the Transvaal declared war and moved troops southward against Natal and westward against the diamond lands of Kimberley and Mafeking. The Orange Free State, bound by a treaty of alliance, joined the Transvaal. The Boer war had begun.

Boer Preparation and Organisation for War

Preparing for war since 1881, the Boer republics had imported large stocks of guns, small arms, and ammunition. They had purchased Maxim machine guns, 40,000 Mauser rifles with 25 million smokeless powder cartridges employed in clips of five rounds each, a large quantity of Martini-Henry rifles with black powder cartridges, and more than 100 artillery pieces manufactured by Creusot and Krupp, with a supply of more than 500 rounds per artillery piece. In addition, an arsenal at Pretoria was in constant operation.

Police and artillery forces were organized on a permanent basis, the latter trained mainly by former German officers. In the Transvaal, the mounted police force numbered 1,400 men, the artillery force 600; in the Orange Free State, the artillery and police each numbered 400 men.

The civil organizations of both Boer republics, which were divided into territorial districts or counties, provided a basic structure for managing military affairs. Each district was led by a field cornet, who was both a mayor and a military commander. Each district furnished a company of about 200 soldiers, though the number of troops differed according to the population. Consolidated companies were formed into commandos, each under a commandant elected by the field cornets.

The Boer as Soldier

Military service was compulsory for the entire Boer male population between the ages of 16 and 60, and all were mobilized for the war. The irregular mounted sharpshooter who characterized the Boer military forces was an extraordinarily competent rifleman. Each soldier brought his own horses, equipment, clothes, and food for two days (usually dried meat or mutton). The veldt grass gave excellent forage. The state provided arms.

The Boers initially put about 40,000 men in the field. Sympathetic Boers from the Cape Colony and Natal, and Dutch, French, German, Swedish, and American volunteers who came into the Transvaal through Portuguese East Africa augmented these forces. In the early stages of the war the Boers outnumbered the British and had other advantages as well—their knowledge of the great plateaus of the continent, the hardy stamina of their horses, their own physical conditioning, their excellent marksmanship, and their first-rate weapons, which were superior to British arms. Operating in friendly territory where the resources of each farm were at their disposal, the Boers were highly mobile.

They had, furthermore, absorbed lessons in primitive warfare from the Zulus, having learned how to lie motionless for hours in ambush and to attack in "impi" formation, a wide crescent designed to outflank and envelop the enemy. Perhaps most important, the Boers had exceptional natural leaders, who turned untrained natural soldiers into effective combat troops.⁷ But although the Boer was an ardent patriot capable of tenacious endurance, his discipline was lax, and his subordination in field operations depended on his good will toward his commanders and on the prospect of victory. When he was tired of fighting, he was likely to go home.

Boers Defeated in Regular Warfare

At the outbreak of hostilities, the British had about 20,000 soldiers in South Africa. By mid-1900, more than 200,000 men had been brought from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, Malta, Crete, and Egypt. Although they enjoyed preponderance in men, artillery, and baggage trains, the British troops lacked training and experience. Handicapped by the shorter ranges of their weapons and a lack of stamina in their horses, they were careless of security and overconfident of their ability. They underestimated their opponents, who were poorly uniformed and unmilitary in appearance.

The war went badly for the British until January 1900, when Gen. Frederick Sleigh Roberts arrived in South Africa to take over as commander in chief, with Gen. Horatio Herbert Kitchener as his chief of staff. Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener organized a field army from new troop arrivals and took the offensive in February. Marching north, the British army systematically defeated the Boer forces. British troops seized Bloemfontein, capital of the Orange Free State, in March, and Pretoria, the Transvaal capital, in June. The last pitched battle of the Boer war took place in the northeastern Transvaal on August 27, 1900, when British troops dispersed a

Boer force of 8,000 men, who split into three groups, each going its separate way. On September 24, British forces reached the border of Portuguese East Africa at Komati Port, and the formal or regular war came to an end. The Boer armies seemed to have disappeared.

British forces were occupying the Boer republics when Roberts turned his command over to Kitchener in November 1900 and departed. As early as September, Roberts had felt that police action was sufficient to mop up the few dissident rebels. Neither he nor anyone else seemed to have noticed that, after a full year's fighting across the vast area of the Boer republics, a major part of the Boer army remained unimpaired as a fighting force.⁸

Boers Continue War, Using Guerrilla Tactics

Although the Boer leaders formally decided to wage guerrilla warfare only in the autumn of 1900, guerrilla action was probably implicit almost from the beginning of the war. Conditions became increasingly favorable for guerrilla action as the conflict persisted. Hatred of the British unified the population, which provided support for the guerrillas. The theater of operations was large and primitive enough for irregular action. Guerrilla tactics—which stressed individual hardihood and marksmanship, use of the familiar countryside for cover and concealment, and the employment of ambush, surprise, and flank and rear attacks—were peculiarly suited to the Boers, but unfamiliar to the British. The relatively immobile British, tied to bases and to the small, isolated outposts and garrisons they used to protect their railroad communications, presented vulnerable targets. Continuation of the resistance was financed with gold bars and coins from the state mint and national bank and other government funds removed from Pretoria before the entry of British troops. A substantial segment of world opinion, motivated largely by anti-British sentiment, was pro-Boer.

The Boer decision to continue the struggle through guerrilla warfare was based largely on die-hard determination and the hope that foreign intervention in their support or internal political upheaval in Britain would force the British to come to terms. The Boer leadership was unanimous in opting for a total war engaging every human and material resource.

Boer Governments Operate in Support of Guerrillas

President Kruger of the Transvaal, too old for guerrilla warfare, crossed the frontier into Portuguese East Africa on September 11, 1900, and boarded a Dutch warship which took him to Holland. There he tried to rally European support, particularly in Holland, France, and Germany, where anti-British sentiment flourished. In the British-occupied Transvaal, Schalk Burger became acting head of the government, but Commandant-General Louis Botha, who directed the guerrilla warfare, was the de facto chief.

In the Orange Free State, President Martinus Theunis Steyn remained to implement his decision that "the Free State had nothing more to lose and everything to gain, and hence it was

time to fight."⁹ Steyn remained one of the most resolute of the "bitter-enders."¹⁰ When the Transvaal government showed signs of weakening in May 1901 and talked of an armistice, he refused to listen. A telegram dispatched to Kruger in Holland brought a reply that bolstered Steyn's position. Kruger wished the Boers to go on fighting.

Moving around constantly to avoid the British, the Boer governments were remarkably successful in carrying out their functions under duress—issuing paper money, maintaining postal service, appointing magistrates, corresponding with Europe, and keeping in touch with the commandos. The governments divided their countries into regions, each under a commandant-general; and subdivided each region into districts, under commandants who collected taxes and paid the salaries of public officials.¹¹

Guerrilla Strength and Operations

Having decided to undertake guerrilla warfare, the Boer leaders dispersed their field army into separate smaller groups and used coercion as well as persuasion to recruit soldiers. Of those who preferred to remain at home, Louis Botha said: "I will be compelled, if they do not listen. . . to confiscate everything movable or immovable and also to burn their houses."¹²

Numbering at most 25,000 armed troops, the Boers operated without a set base.¹³ Since each soldier had two or three horses, a Boer unit could keep well ahead of pursuers. Friendly householders provided food, shelter, and intelligence. Moving at high speed, the Boers usually marched and foraged widely dispersed over a front 15 to 20 miles wide. At the end of the morning or afternoon, they would converge on a given point to receive new orders.¹⁴

Under Louis Botha, Jacobus Hercules De La Rey, and Ben Viljoen in the Transvaal and under Christiaan De Wet in the Orange Free State, Boer guerrillas concentrated their attacks against British lines of communication—supply—damaging railroads, surprising isolated posts and garrisons, and capturing guns and convoys—all the while escaping British pursuit columns. The railroad, more than 1,300 miles long, presented an excellent target to the Boers; between June 1900 and June 1901, Boer raiders cut these lines more than 250 times.

The Boers inflicted many personnel casualties through the use of guerrilla ambush tactics. In September 1901, for example, while Botha was active in southeastern Transvaal along the Natal border, his relatively small force ambushed three companies of mounted infantry. Botha was making a forced march to reinforce local commandos when he accidentally caught up with 280 British soldiers; in the ensuing battle, 76 British were killed, 165 wounded, and the rest taken prisoner. Kitchener commented that these were the usual tactics: The Boers would observe a column from a considerable distance, showing only a few of their own force; then they would wait until terrain, weather, or other tactical conditions favored their bold charge. "The result," Kitchener complained, "is a serious casualty list."¹⁵

Boers Attempt To Sow Rebellion in British South Africa

An even more effective weapon against the British was the constant threat of rebellion in the British territories of the Cape Colony and Natal. As early as January 1900, Boer agents had been active in the northern portion of the Cape Colony, and in March Boer sympathizers annexed several townships and set up a military administration. This threat to British lines of communication forced Kitchener to lead a military expedition to regain the area, an operation that required two weeks. Another rebellious outbreak had to be suppressed in June.¹⁶ In December 1900, two Boer leaders, James B. M. Hertzog with 1,200 men and Kritzingers with 700 men, invaded the Cape Colony. These small parties were hardly formidable military forces, but wherever they went they stirred up rebellion and revolt against British rule. In August 1901, Jan Smuts set out from the Transvaal for the Cape Colony with 360 picked men. They threaded their way across the occupied Orange Free State in two parties, dodging British troops, who were hampered by cold and rainy weather. Though Smuts failed to arouse serious revolt in the Cape Colony, he found recruits wherever he appeared, and his raids exasperated the British. The failure of the Boers to implement with vigor this policy of subversion and incitement to rebellion in the Cape Colony and Natal and thus to strike at the roots of the British supply lines has been viewed by at least one historian as a major strategic blunder.¹⁷

So long as Boer forces continued to resist, all of South Africa remained a theater of operations requiring military occupation. The accompanying turmoil and disturbance prevented the British from consolidating, politically and economically, their victory in the war. The guerrilla raids that defied an enormous British army were remarkably successful, and the final Boer surrender resulted from war weariness rather than defeat.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

The British had fought the Boer war in the expectation that scattering the enemy forces would mean victory. On the contrary, the dispersal of the Boers only increased the difficulty of subduing them. The thousands of fresh British troops introduced into so large a theater of operations had to be thinly spread. Since the Boers held the initiative, they could concentrate quickly at specific points to attain local superiority. If defensive warfare by the British was difficult, effective offensive operations were almost impossible.¹⁸

British Attempts To Stop Boer Recruitment of Guerrillas

Many Boer burghers returned to their homes after the fall of the capital cities, and Lord Roberts encouraged them to do so, facilitating their travel and even releasing prisoners on condition that they would take no further part in the war. When successful raids by Christiaan and Pieter De Wet against British lines of communication prompted burghers to rejoin

their commands, Roberts abandoned his permissive policy for one of repression. In mid-1900, though the Boer forces still retained a semblance of conventional organization and though the British had not yet overrun the republics completely, Roberts proclaimed all Boer territory a British possession by virtue of conquest, occupation, and annexation; therefore, all inhabitants bearing arms were no longer enemies but rebels liable to severe punishment. Roberts extended this policy in mid-August, when he warned Boers against harboring rebels; he announced that all buildings in which fighting burghers were found would be burned.

With Boer raids continuing, Roberts in September ordered British troops to confiscate the livestock and supplies of those men who were absent from their farms on commando duty, and to burn houses owned by the leaders of what Roberts contemptuously termed bands of snipers. He hoped not only to intimidate the die-hards into surrender but to weaken the power of guerilla resistance by depriving the Boers of supplies and recuperation centers. British troops burned farms and destroyed crops, sometimes indiscriminately. Despite attempts to control farm burnings, punishment often turned into pillage. As a result, Boer resistance hardened, news of the burnings had an unfavorable impact on world opinion, and even some British began to have doubts about the necessity of this cruelty.¹⁹

A major aim of British operations during the summer of 1900 was to capture Boer leaders, for Lord Roberts recognized that the struggle turned on the survival of a few outstanding men.²⁰ While clearing the Transvaal, Roberts made every effort to destroy the Boer leadership. Had he succeeded in this early period, Boer resistance would probably have ended. Instead, the Boer leaders remained in the field and continued to fight.

British Treatment of Noncombatants

The British military authorities set up refugee camps for noncombatant Boers—to save women and children whose homes were burned from almost certain death on the open veldt; to protect peaceable Boers, who were called "hand-uppers," from reprisal at the hands of roving commandos; to guard Boers who had surrendered voluntarily and taken an oath of neutrality; and to take care of displaced Bantu farm workers. The first camps were established near Bloemfontein and Pretoria in August and September 1900, and within a year 40 camps known as concentration camps, sheltered 85,000 persons. By the early months of 1902, the camp population numbered some 120,000 Boers and 80,000 natives.²¹

When Kitchener took over direction of the British forces in late 1900, he continued the operation of concentration camps but made several significant changes.²² Instead of moving Boers to camps outside their districts, Kitchener posted notices inviting Boers to join protected laagers (camps) in their own districts until it was safe for them to return to their farms. In April 1901, because of the Boers' coercive recruiting measures, Kitchener decided to bring all women and children into the refugee camps. In addition to those who surrendered voluntarily,

he had families brought in forcibly—those who had been passing intelligence to the commandos or had permitted their farms to be used as Boer shelters and depots.

At first the camps had buildings to shelter the Boers, but the growing populations soon compelled the use of tents. The British provided utensils and bedding; gave clothes to the destitute; constructed baths and washhouses; paid those who were able to perform useful work; established shops where groceries, clothing, and a few luxuries could be purchased; provided free education for children and adults; and built hospitals.

As the refugees increased in number, conditions in the camps deteriorated.²³ Drinking water was foul because there was insufficient fuel for boiling liquids. Adequate clothing was lacking. Because of a shortage of beds and mattresses, many persons slept on the ground. Food was frequently short because the camp superintendent who provided rations might find several hundred persons suddenly added to his camp population. The overcrowded refugees suffered epidemics of enteric fever and measles which resulted in a high death rate, especially among children. In October 1901, deaths among children were 629 per 1,000 in the Orange Free State camps, 585 per 1,000 in those of the Transvaal. Between July 1901 and the following February, 17,627 persons died, out of a fluctuating camp population of about 110,000. Concern in Britain compelled the military authorities to improve the conditions in the camps at the end of 1901.²⁴

The British policy of destroying the Boer support base by concentrating the population in camps was only partially successful. It diverted increasing British resources in men and materiel to the camps while relieving Boer fighters of responsibility for caring for their families.²⁵

Kitchener Institutes Martial Law and Requests More Troops

To the counterinsurgency measures instituted in 1900—farm burnings, pursuit of Boer leaders, and refugee camps—Kitchener added still another by proclaiming a state of martial law in December 1900. Despite the absence of formal military opposition, he thus acknowledged the actual or potential disorder that existed everywhere in South Africa. Placing the entire area, except for the ports and the large native areas, under military jurisdiction enabled him to employ military measures to combat stubborn Afrikaner sympathy for the Boer cause, particularly in the Cape Colony and Natal. In January and February of 1901, through arrests and military expeditions in what normally would be rear areas of operation, he subdued Boer sympathizers.²⁶

Yet the problem of coping with active guerrilla bands remained, and despite the large number of troops at his disposal—164,000 at the beginning of 1901—Kitchener's offensive capability was limited.²⁷ So many men were needed for administrative duties and for guarding lines of communication that only about 64,000 were available for active campaigning.

Considering his forces too weak to hunt guerrilla bands estimated at a maximum of 60,000 men, Kitchener requested and received more troops.

Kitchener Evolves a New Strategy

Meanwhile, Kitchener worked out new methods for fighting the war. His predecessor, Lord Roberts, had thought it would suffice to institute some kind of police action, and to that end he had divided South Africa into areas of command, with garrisons stationed in towns and villages to furnish what he termed "flying columns" to pursue insurgent bands. Encumbered with artillery, hospital vehicles, and overloaded ox wagons, the "flying columns" hardly glimpsed Boer raiders. Even when they did, their heavily laden columns were too slow for pursuit. The only way to catch the Boers, Kitchener decided, was to fence off large areas of the country and restrict the Boers to specific areas, then conduct huge, cross-country drives by solid masses of troops to sweep them into a net.

Starting in January 1901, Kitchener constructed long chains of blockhouses linked by barbed-wire entanglements to prevent the Boers from moving freely. Raiders could not cross blockhouse lines without being seen and without coming into range of fire from a garrison. Kitchener introduced the system first in the areas of Bloemfontein and Johannesburg-Pretoria, encircling these communities with chains of forts to create protected zones 25 miles in diameter. Then he placed blockhouses along the railroads to secure the lines of communication. In June 1901, he started the first cross-country blockhouse line to connect one railroad to another. With infantry battalions acting as escort and furnishing labor, the blockhouse lines gradually extended cross-country and along rivers, cutting the immense theater of operations into small segments vulnerable to sweeps by mounted troops. In the end, the two Boer republics and the northern part of the Cape Colony were subdivided into a number of fenced sections; altogether, 10,000 blockhouses covered lines of over 5,000 miles.²⁸

Kitchener's 1901 blockhouse policy was actually an elaboration of a policy instituted by Roberts the previous year.²⁹ To protect his long and undefended lines of communication, Roberts had ordered the fortification of all railroad stations. By July 1, 1900, trenches and stone sangars (individual shelters), each occupied by a handful of troops, guarded most stations and yards. As Boer attacks on the railroads became more frequent, the British increased the number and strength of their defensive posts. As railroad wrecking reached a climax toward the end of 1900, it became obvious to Lord Kitchener that more elaborate defenses were required. His first reaction was to erect masonry blockhouses near the large bridges that were particularly attractive targets. These blockhouses were usually two stories high, with a machinegun on the roof and loopholes for rifles in the lower part. They were effective defensive works, but they used expensive building materials, took three months to build, and required troop garrisons of 30 men. Something more economical was needed.

The Blockhouse: Its Construction, Placement, and Garrison

After experimentation, an engineer officer designed an inexpensive and practical blockhouse. Assuming that cover against artillery fire would rarely be required since the Boers no longer had artillery pieces, he designed a 15-foot octagonal building enclosed by corrugated iron inner and outer walls six inches apart, the intervening space filled with hard shingle. The iron skins were affixed to wooden uprights placed at each angle of the octagon. In time this blockhouse became circular, with two iron cylinders of different diameters forming a protected space 13.5 feet in diameter and 4 feet high. All woodwork was thus eliminated, and the blockhouse became portable. Cost, construction time, and labor were drastically reduced. A working party of five engineers and ten natives could erect a blockhouse in four or five hours. An overhanging roof was usually added to the structure.

The typical blockhouse had a small door protected by a bulletproof shield. The door usually led to a fire trench dug around the blockhouse to protect the sentry. Ten to twenty yards from the trench and completely encircling the blockhouse was a high wire entanglement usually constructed of parallel fences with crisscrossed wires between.

To hasten construction, Kitchener transformed every engineer company in South Africa into a factory and set up additional production centers in all the coastal cities. By the end of March 1901, work was in full progress.

The first blockhouses were placed at intervals of about one and a half miles. When Boers still crossed the lines at night, the British reduced the interval and erected blockhouses one-half to three-quarters of a mile apart. Fixed batteries of four or six rifles that could be fired by a single man were rigged in the blockhouses. To prevent the men in the blockhouses from shooting each other, the fences between them were built zigzag. The original barbed-wire fences were strengthened by adding aprons on each side, by twisting several strands of wire into a thick rope, and by using thick unannealed steel wire which was difficult to sever. The fences were anchored in buried stones and sandbags. Then trenches were dug between the blockhouses to prevent wagons from crossing the line should the fence be cut or overturned. Along the fences the troops placed automatic alarms and flares.

The usual blockhouse garrison consisted of one noncommissioned officer and five or six men, plus local scouts who patrolled during the night. Each blockhouse had its own water, food, and ammunition. Each was eventually connected with its neighbor by telephone, so that when a blockhouse came under attack a message could be swiftly relayed to a local troop concentration in a nearby fortified post. These were larger entrenched forts, with 50 men in each, that supplemented the blockhouses. In addition, each town and village had its British garrison. Reinforcements arrived by railroad or, in the case of blockhouse chains across the open veldt, by fast horses.³⁰

Kitchener Drives Against De Wet and Botha

Lord Kitchener himself directed the might of the British army in South Africa, guiding the building of blockhouses, supervising the concentration camps, overseeing railroad operations, and coordinating the movements of columns both as single units and in great, combined multi-column drives. He retained central responsibility for the maneuvers designed to trap the Boers, keeping tight control and command over the entire area. Paying meticulous attention to detail, he studied daily telegrams from his 30 or 40 column commanders, and he sent them fresh instructions every morning.

Kitchener initiated his first drive in January 1901, planning three campaigns to subdue an area half the size of Europe. Against De La Rey, who was quiet in the western Transvaal, Kitchener withheld his troops for the moment, while he moved against De Wet in the Orange Free State and Botha in the eastern Transvaal.

Against De Wet he massed 15 columns, totaling about 15,000 men, along 160 miles of railroad. While one column stayed in direct pursuit, the others struck crosscountry to bar De Wet's movements. Using the railroads for troop distribution and the telegraph for communication, Kitchener employed what was then called "the most scientific approach" yet tried in military counterinsurgency.³¹ British columns closed in and caught De Wet's Boers in a quadrilateral about 50 by 70 miles in size, an area bounded by the flooded Orange River on one side and by railroads on the other three. While no less than 13 British columns converged on their quarry, De Wet escaped across the river, rode 800 miles in 43 days, and exhausted his pursuers.

Against Botha in the eastern Transvaal, Kitchener concentrated about 21,000 troops, of whom approximately 7,000 were administrative. Two columns pushed out along the edges of an area of 10,000 square miles, while five columns at intervals pushed eastward to Mozambique, keeping in contact with each other by heliograph. The columns visited every farm: They sent all women, children, and native workers to the nearest railroad depot for internment; seized or burned all crops, stocks, and wagons; and destroyed all bakeries and mills in the area. The British did not catch Botha, but they devastated the country and left it incapable of sustaining guerrillas.³²

Kitchener's first campaign, lasting through much of January and February, was "more bruising to the Boers than fatal." His second campaign, producing devastation and displacement in the Transvaal, had profound effects and prompted Botha to request a parley.³³

Peace Parleys Fail

Kitchener and Botha met at the end of February 1901 to see whether peace was possible. The basic condition for peace, Botha made clear, was restoration of independence to the Boer republics. By virtue of his instructions from his government, Kitchener had to refuse. But he

indicated that the British terms would be lenient: The former republics would become crown colonies with representative governments; each Boer would be allowed to keep his rifle; British and Boer inhabitants of South Africa would be treated as equals; no decision would be made on the enfranchisement of natives; financial aid would be given Boer farmers; and generous treatment would be accorded the insurgents.

Discussing these talks later with Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner, Kitchener found that the civil head of British South Africa held views somewhat different from his own.³⁴ As a result, the joint letter Kitchener and Milner sent to the Colonial Office in London recommended somewhat more stringent terms than Kitchener had indicated to Botha. Under the circumstances, the reply from London was generous. Although the British government refused to bind the Cape Colony and Natal to a policy of pardoning rebel citizens, it promised immediate amnesty in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State for all genuine acts of war; it favored native enfranchisement, but not at the expense of overturning white dominance; and it promised postwar loans to farmers as well as compensation for property destroyed.

Dissatisfied, Botha broke off peace negotiations. "What is the use of examining all the points," De Wet asked, "as the only object for which we are fighting is the independence of our republics...?"³⁵ Schalk Burger also insisted that no conditions that compromised the independence and national existence of the Boer republics or the interests of fellow Boers in British colonies would be acceptable.³⁶

Renewed Military and Psychological Operations in 1901

At this point Kitchener began a large and well-planned drive into the eastern Transvaal. Executed by 21,000 mounted troops in lines sometimes 50 miles long, the sweep lasted ten weeks. Four hundred Boers were killed or wounded; another 1,000 were captured; and many guns, wagons, cattle, and sheep, as well as 8,000 mules and horses, were taken. Hundreds of families were sent to camps for internment.

In August 1901, Kitchener applied additional psychological pressure. He proclaimed that all guerrilla officers and members of the former republican governments would be permanently exiled from South Africa if they did not surrender by September 15. This attempt to end the war by intimidation failed. Early in 1902, however, Kitchener's troops caught the major Boer leader Viljoen and sent him to an overseas prisoner-of-war camp from which escape and re-entry into South Africa were virtually impossible.

By September 1901, Kitchener's system was in full operation. He had extended the protected zone around Johannesburg to an area 120 miles by 60 miles. Every railway was in British hands. British garrisons were bivouacked in all the blockhouses, guarded by mazes of barbed wire and often by chained watch dogs; the soldiers slept fully armed in expectation of

night attacks. The theater of war thus resolved itself into a series of fortified angles within which every Boer force still in the field was compelled to operate.³⁷

Kitchener's Tactics in 1902: "A Pack of Columns"

Kitchener, it has been said, hunted the Boers with "a pack of columns," using the railways to concentrate forces quickly in order to cope with the superior mobility of his adversary. By late 1901, he had a striking force of 30,000 well-mounted, well-equipped, and experienced troops in the field hunting Boer guerrillas. Early in 1902, he had more than 60 columns in the field pushing out from the blockhouse lines. In one drive, 15,000 men, divided into 14 columns and posted around an area 175 miles by 100 miles, converged on a central point. In another, British forces enclosed a rectangular area 65 miles by 140 miles in size.

In February 1902, Kitchener used 9,000 men in a cordon 54 miles long, with one man every 12 yards. With a screen of scouts preceding the main body, transport, and guns, the cordon moved 20 miles per day for two days and three nights, while 8,000 additional men stood along the blockhouse lines and seven armored trains patrolled the railroads. Though this sweep captured 300 of Christiaan De Wet's men, De Wet himself escaped. Again Kitchener swept the area, this time with a cordon 60 miles long, while 3,000 men guarded the enveloped area, and drove 800 Boers into captivity. Although De Wet's breakthrough showed that neither drives nor blockhouses could always restrain determined guerrillas, Kitchener's grim and implacable determination was clear.³⁸

Some Boers Fight for British, Others Discuss Terms

By then, the British were being assisted by former Boer soldiers who wished to see an end to the hostilities. They were organized into units called National Scouts and Orange River Colony Volunteers. About 2,000 in number, including a former prominent Boer leader, Pieter De Wet, they fought against the "bitter-enders."

When Holland offered its services to mediate the war in January 1902, the British government suggested that a peace be arranged by the military leaders in South Africa. The following month Kitchener invited the Boers to parley. Constantly dwindling forces dimmed Boer prospects for success, and their only hope was that war weariness might induce the British to grant independence. In March, Burger of the Transvaal asked Kitchener for a safe-conduct pass to allow him to discuss peace proposals with Steyn of the Orange Free State.

Safe conduct given, Burger and Steyn met with their military leaders—Botha, Christiaan De Wet, De La Rey, Hertzog, and others. After three days of discussion, the Boers met with Kitchener in Pretoria. They offered to grant the reforms that Kruger had refused before the

war—reasonable franchise terms for foreigners and complete equality of the English and Afrikaans languages—but they held out for national independence. Kitchener replied that any thought of independence was unrealistic. To persuade them to come to terms, he showed them a telegram he had received from his chief of staff, Sir Ian Hamilton, who had just crushed a Boer force in the western Transvaal.

Boers Surrender in May 1902

With Kitchener's permission, the Boer leaders decided to consult with the commandos. They held a large meeting at Vereeniging attended by 30 delegates from the Transvaal and an equal number from the Orange Free State. Elaborate organization was required to permit representatives from Boer commandos scattered over South Africa to cross and recross British lines protected by white flags and safe-conduct passes. Assembled in May, the Boer representatives finally agreed to accept a British protectorate over their own two states.

A commission of five traveled to Pretoria to present their views to Kitchener and Milner, who turned them down and insisted upon surrender. Kitchener privately assured Smuts that he would try to secure the most lenient possible terms. Returning to the representatives at Vereeniging, the Boer commissioners, after much argument, convinced the die-hards that further resistance was unwarranted. Although their leadership was still intact, although they had 20,000 troops in the field in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and although they had the support of about 3,000 sympathizers in the Cape Colony, the Boers surrendered on May 31, 1902, when they signed the Treaty of Vereeniging.³⁹

Combatant Strengths and Casualties Compared

A total of almost 450,000 British troops had fought in the war—more than 250,000 regulars, about 110,000 volunteers, over 30,000 men from the colonies, and more than 50,000 men raised in South Africa. Almost 8,000 men had died in combat, another 13,000 had died of disease, more than 20,000 had been wounded in action, and nearly 64,000 had been invalided home for nonbattle causes—a total of 105,000 casualties, of which about two-thirds were incurred after guerrilla operations began in September 1900.⁴⁰

Close to 90,000 Boers had fought in the war, including more than 2,000 foreign volunteers and 13,000 who had come from the Cape and Natal. Nearly 4,000 had been killed. Prisoners in British hands at the end of the war numbered around 40,000.

Regarding themselves as the sole arbiters of South Africa's future, the two white races had fought a war in which the majority of black Africans had been mere spectators.⁴¹ Africans acted as laborers, wagoners, grooms, cooks' helpers, and servants for the Boers, who never armed them. The British armed some Africans in predominantly tribal districts for police work or for self-defense against Boer raiders; they armed others for use as scouts, spies, and night watchmen at fortified posts. Otherwise, Africans played no overt part in the conflict.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

In surrendering, the Boers acknowledged British sovereignty. The British in turn guaranteed that there would be no judicial proceedings against returning burghers, that the Afrikaans language would be taught in the schools, and that rifles could be retained by persons requiring them for protection. The British insisted on representative civil governments in the former Boer states. They made no decision on whether to enfranchise black Africans. They agreed to spend three million pounds sterling to rehabilitate the conquered states, and they promised to make loans to Boer farmers.

The hatred and bitterness between Boers and British soon lessened as moderate leaders on both sides took hold. Botha and Smuts were among those who as early as 1902 looked ahead to the union of the four South African states within the British empire. The British treated the conquered Boers as fellow-citizens and instituted a large-scale program to rehabilitate the war-torn countries. Eight years after the Treaty of Vereeniging, Botha became the first prime minister of the new Union of South Africa.

Some tension between the two strains, Boer and British, continued in the new and predominantly Afrikaner state. There were cultural differences as well as divergent attitudes about the treatment of black Africans. There was also a self-conscious and ultra-patriotic nationalism on the part of Boers led by Hertzog and De Wet; and these leaders clashed with Botha and Smuts, who wished to remain tied to Britain through the Commonwealth of Nations. After Botha's death, Hertzog shared leadership of South Africa with Smuts; both men held the office of prime minister during successive periods into the 1930's. The 1931 Statute of Westminster loosened Anglo-South African ties. Yet British influence persisted and remained strong during World War II, when South Africa joined Britain as an ally; during these years the two civilizations within South Africa were united in a common effort.

In more recent times, an increasingly wide gulf over the race question, with respect both to black Africans and Asians, has come to separate the Boers from the South African British. The present policy of apartheid, which puts into practice the traditional Boer attitude toward nonwhites, is in thoroughgoing contrast with the British view of multiracial equality in other areas of Africa.⁴² On May 31, 1961, the Union of South Africa became the completely independent Republic of South Africa, which then withdrew from the British commonwealth.⁴³

Today Boers govern South Africa. The Afrikaners lost their war and insurgency at the turn of the century, but their descendants seem to have won the struggle with the British for supremacy. At this writing in early 1964, the Boers, not the British, are in control of South Africa.

NOTES

¹ Capt. Maurice H. Grant, History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902 (Vol. IV; London: Hurst and Blackett, 1910), pp. v-vi.

² A helpful account may be found in M. S. Green, The Making of the Union of South Africa: A Brief History, 1487-1939 (London: Longmans, Green, 1948). See also Maj. S. L. Norris, The South African War, 1899-1900 (London: Murray, 1900); John P. Wisser, The Second Boer War, 1899-1900 (Kansas City: 1901); and various pertinent encyclopedia articles, in particular, "South Africa, Union of," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1952), XXI, 44ff.

³ Norris, South African War, p. 2.

⁴ W. K. Hancock, Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870-1919 (Cambridge: University Press, 1962), p. 77.

⁵ Green, The Making, p. 134.

⁶ Maj. Gen. Sir Frederick Maurice, History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902, (Vol. I; London: Hurst and Blackett, 1906), pp. 68-69; Arthur Conan Doyle, The Great Boer War (New York: McClure, Phillips, 1902), pp. 1-25.

⁷ Grant, History, p. 24.

⁸ Rayne Kruger, Good-bye Dolly Gray (London: Cassell, 1959), p. 377.

⁹ Extracts from the "Report of Capt. Carl Reichmann, Seventeenth Infantry, on the Operations of the Boer Army," in U.S. Army, Adjutant General's Office, Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 239; Edgar Holt, The Boer War (London: Putnam, 1958), pp. 242-43, 263.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 274.

¹¹ Kruger, Good-bye, p. 385.

¹² Ibid., p. 381.

¹³ Grant, History, p. 100.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 64, 68, 125; Alan R. I. Hiley and John A. Hassell, The Mobile Boer (New York: Grafton Press, 1902), pp. 252-60.

¹⁵ Quoted in Holt, The Boer War, p. 278.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 218-19.

¹⁷ Hancock, Smuts, pp. 108-112 and 133-45.

¹⁸ Grant, History, pp. 128-29.

¹⁹ Holt, The Boer War, pp. 233, 243-44.

²⁰ Kruger, Good-bye, p. 383.

²¹ Green, The Making, p. 136.

²² See Grant, History, Appendix 12, "Notes on R fuguee Concentration Camps in South Africa."

²³ Holt, The Boer War, p. 271.

²⁴ Green, The Making, pp. 136, 268; Kruger, Good-bye, pp. 424-26.


- ²⁵ See "South African War, 1899-1902," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1952), XXI, 63-66.
- ²⁶ Kruger, Good-bye, p. 419.
- ²⁷ Holt, The Boer War, p. 255; Kruger, in Good-bye, p. 386, states that Kitchener had 210,000 troops, of whom only half were available for field operations.
- ²⁸ Holt, The Boer War, pp. 257-58.
- ²⁹ Grant, History, Appendix 2, "The Evolution of the Blockhouse System in South Africa."
- ³⁰ Kruger, Good-bye, p. 458.
- ³¹ Ibid., p. 403.
- ³² Hiley and Hassell, The Mobile Boer, p. 277.
- ³³ Kruger, Good-bye, pp. 408, 411.
- ³⁴ Ibid., pp. 390, 412-13; Holt, The Boer War, p. 261.
- ³⁵ Kruger, Good-bye, p. 413.
- ³⁶ Quoted in Holt, The Boer War, p. 263.
- ³⁷ Grant, History, pp. 35, 43, 63.
- ³⁸ Kruger, Good-bye, pp. 471ff.
- ³⁹ Ibid., pp. 390, 412-13, 499.
- ⁴⁰ "Brief Summary of Military Operations in South Africa," Reports, p. 319.
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Chapter Four

**SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
1904-1907**



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SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (1904-1907)

by Dieter Mahncke

When the Herero and Hottentot tribes rose against German colonial rule in South-West Africa, the Germans undertook a prolonged and relentless military campaign which effectively destroyed the insurgent potential of these African tribes.

BACKGROUND

German rule was first proclaimed in South-West Africa in 1884-85 through a series of treaties concluded with indigenous tribes and their chieftains. The borders of German South-West Africa, enclosing an area of 317,525 square miles, about twice the size of California, were definitively settled with Portugal (which controlled Angola to the north) in 1886 and with Great Britain (which controlled the Cape Colony to the south and Bechuanaland and Rhodesia to the east) in 1890. In 1892 the entire territory was formally proclaimed a German protectorate.

The country has two distinct geographic regions: the Namib Desert, which stretches along the Atlantic coast and varies in width from 50 to 60 miles; and the central plateau, which extends eastward to the Kalahari Desert in Bechuanaland and rises to 8,000 feet around Windhoek, the capital. The central plateau, running from north to south between the two deserts, consists largely of open plains which become more mountainous toward the Brandberg and Waterberg Mountains in the center. The southernmost part of the country is mostly dry tablelands, occasionally intersected by mountain ranges such as the Karas.

South-West Africa is an arid country, with rainfall occurring generally between December and April. Rainfall in the coastal desert belt is less than 1 inch per year and amounts to only about 12 inches in the central plateau around Windhoek. There is even less rainfall in the extreme south than in the central plateau, but in the north annual rainfall sometimes reaches 22 inches.

Except for the Orange River in the south, the Kunene and Okavango Rivers in the north, and the Zambezi and Linyanti Rivers in the northeast, there are no perennial streams, and fresh water is generally obtained from shallow wells dug in the beds of intermittent streams. Potable water has always been in short supply, and this circumstance significantly influenced

the type of warfare and the nature of the campaigns conducted during the insurgency. Owing to the scarcity of water, vegetation is sparse on the plateau. In the south, semidesert conditions prevail, and low shrubs and some grass are the only plant life. Northward, as far as Rehoboth, are dry tablelands leading up to a parklike grassland studded with thorn trees. Almost as arid and lacking in vegetation as the coastal desert strip, the Kalahari Desert to the east is distinguished by the existence of a type of melon (*tschamas*) that provides liquid during the dry season. Because of this fact, insurgent tribes viewed the Kalahari Desert as a sanctuary.

The Peoples of South-West Africa

In view of these harsh environmental factors, the country was understandably very thinly populated. At the outbreak of the insurgency, the total indigenous population was estimated at 200,000, of whom approximately half were Ovambos who lived in the northernmost region and were not involved in the insurgency. The remaining population was very widely distributed, the density for the whole territory being about 0.6 per square mile. Names on maps usually indicated the locations of waterholes rather than towns; large settlements with permanent buildings were extremely rare.

Besides the Ovambos, the two most important tribes were the Hereros and the Hottentots, both of whom rose against the government during the 1904-1907 period. Estimates of the size of the Herero tribe, which was concentrated in the general vicinity of Okahandja, varied from 60,000 to 80,000 previous to 1904. The Hereros were a cattle- and sheep-raising people; their herds were their main source of livelihood and wealth. The Herero character was described by the Germans as a mixture of fierceness, pitilessness, cunning, and conceit. This last characteristic displayed itself in their great scorn and contempt for everything foreign—black or white. Physical strength, a warlike spirit, and the experience gained in decades of war with his Hottentot neighbors to the south made the Herero fighting man a formidable warrior. Particularly significant was his ability to live for weeks on a small amount of water and a few roots and wild berries.¹

The Hottentots numbered only about 20,000 to 30,000 at the outbreak of the insurgency. Unlike the Hereros, they were subdivided into several independent tribes: the Witloois, Bondelzwarts, Bethaniens, and others.² As a result, they did not achieve the same unity of action as the Hereros. In spite of their smaller numbers, however, the Germans considered the Hottentots by far the more dangerous enemy. Theodor Leutwein, the German governor from 1894 to 1905 and commander of the German troops until 1904, stated that the Hottentot warrior, had he been amenable to military discipline, would have been considerably superior to the German soldier.³ Not a careful herdsman like the Herero, the Hottentot was reckless and adventurous, and lived mostly on booty. Although the Herero sometimes raided, the Hottentot made raiding a way of life. His perseverance, his endurance and agility, his accurate marksmanship and superb

horsemanship, as well as his great skill in utilizing the natural advantages offered by the terrain, made the Hottentot an opponent not to be underestimated.

Other ethnic groups which played a role in the insurgency were the very primitive Bergdamara, scattered throughout the northern parts of the territory, and mixed population known as the Bastards, or Basters, living around Rehoboth. Descendants of Dutch and Hottentot parents, the Basters tended to identify more with the whites and hence were extremely loyal to the Germans, who used them as soldiers and scouts. The Bergdamara served both the Hereros and the Germans as servants, cattle drivers, and scouts.

Effect of White Settlement on African Life

The census of 1903 listed only 4,682 white men, women, and children, including about 750 troops. Apart from the soldiers, most of the men were farmers, artisans, traders, and innkeepers.⁴ It is interesting to note that the farms had been distributed by the government with due consideration for the necessities of defense against future tribal uprisings.⁵ Uprisings were a constant danger, and the Germans had had to suppress several small disturbances before the general uprising of 1904. Indeed, it was only through the classic "divide and rule" method that such a small body of troops was able to control such a large number of tribesmen.⁶

The arrival of the whites in South-West Africa drastically affected the lives of the tribesmen. The Hereros and the Hottentots were proud and independent peoples, typical nomads who for generations had been accustomed to coming and going as they wished, stealing cattle from whomever they could, and grazing their cattle wherever they wanted. Skilled in warfare, they were not inclined to accept German rule and white hegemony without a fight. Many sources consider this clash of cultures the primary reason for the uprising.⁷

The major issue was the pattern of racial discrimination and economic exploitation of the African by European traders and settlers which German rule introduced in the country. From the beginning, the tribesmen were suspicious of the white colonists' persistent desire to acquire tribal lands as private property over which the African could no longer graze his cattle and wander at will. These suspicions and fears were accentuated when German authorities confiscated the lands of rebellious tribes and gave them to European commercial companies as concessions. Moreover, although according to Hottentot and Herero custom all lands were communal, the German overlords permitted African chiefs to treat tribal land as their private property, and even to sell it. The chiefs usually sold land to pay debts contracted with white traders.

The traders naturally took advantage of the Africans' desire for some of the white man's luxuries and goods, particularly alcohol, tobacco, and clothing. Actively promoting the sale of these wares, they extended liberal credit to the tribesmen, only to return later with exorbitant but legal claims against the chiefs. The African lacked any legal protection against this form

of economic exploitation. According to the 1884-85 treaties, the tribes were under German law, and in cases involving whites and nonwhites, the latter were definitely less favored. For the tribesmen, the result was the loss of both cattle and land.

Government Attempts to Ameliorate European Exploitation Are Misunderstood

Recognizing the danger inherent in this exploitation of the indigenous population, Governor Leutwein recommended reforms. In 1903 the German colonial office passed a credit ordinance intended to stop abuses of the African population by preventing traders from extending such liberal credit to their African customers. Ironically, this decree led to a worsening of relations between traders and tribesmen, since by limiting the period for collecting debts to one year it made the traders press their claims even more ruthlessly than before.⁸

With tribesmen restive over the continuing loss of their lands, Governor Leutwein initiated plans for the creation of reservations—land that could not be acquired by settlers. Reservations were to be established within existing tribal lands, and any land declared a reservation could not be sold. If tribesmen wished, however, they could still sell the land they possessed outside of the inalienable reservations. Unfortunately, these plans were gravely misunderstood by the tribesmen, despite all the efforts Governor Leutwein and the German missionaries made to explain them. The tribesmen saw themselves deprived of their traditional freedom to wander over the whole country. The younger men were particularly restive and came to believe that all their rights were to be forfeited, rather than protected, by the reservation system.⁹

The Hottentots and the Hereros thus believed that both their way of life and their means of livelihood were threatened. They had traditionally lived off their cattle—the only measure of wealth and prestige—and their traditional method of exchange had been by raids on other tribes. Now the Germans had come, bringing a new order and stability; the man who wanted to enrich himself could no longer raid, but was expected to work for wages.

Moreover, in order to pacify the area, the Germans tried to control the distribution of armaments and to limit smuggling of arms and ammunition. The warlike tribes feared and resented this arms control. German attempts at controlling arms, such as periodically requiring registration of all weapons, instituting a government monopoly of armament sales, and trying to control smuggling, were ineffective. Smuggling across the borders of British-controlled territories continued practically unhindered throughout the period of insurgency.¹⁰

Role of Missions

The German mission stations tried unsuccessfully to temper the uneasy situation. These mission stations, established in the first half of the 19th century, had produced a considerable minority of African Christians. Eight to ten percent of both Hereros and Hottentots were baptized.¹¹ Most conversions were quite superficial, however, and traditional African beliefs

continued to have great influence. Perhaps for this reason, there was apparently no conflict between Christian and non-Christian tribesmen when the uprising broke out.¹²

The missions were responsible for the education of the Africans and maintained a large number of schools. A fairly large number of tribesmen, particularly the leaders, knew how to read and write. This knowledge enabled them to learn of, if only to misconstrue, German intentions as expressed in newspaper articles and editorials, particularly with regard to the question of reservations. The attempts that both the Hereros and the Hottentots made to protect women and children have been attributed to the influence of Christianity. For example, the paramount chief of the Hereros issued a decree ordering the protection of women and children, though it was often disregarded in practice. The missionaries also performed useful services as mediators. On the whole, the tribesmen trusted them, and mission stations were not attacked during the insurgency period.¹³

INSURGENCY

The insurgency of 1904-1907 falls into two parts: the general uprising of the Hereros, which was crushed within a few months, and the longer-lived insurrection of the Hottentots.

The Hereros Rebel and Are Successful at First

The occasion for the general Herero uprising was a minor revolt in October 1903 by the Bondelzwarts, a Hottentot tribe around Warmbad. The revolt drew three of the four German companies away to the south and out of Herero territory. Before the Bondelzwarts were fully subdued, the Hereros revolted in the north, murdering over a hundred settlers on the night of January 12, 1904.

In spite of a few warning signs, such as several heavily armed bands seen roving through various parts of the territory, the uprising caught the settlers almost completely by surprise. There must have been some coordination and planning, but it is not clear to what extent and in what manner the revolt was planned, or even who its early leaders were. The unity and timing of the initial attacks may, in fact, have been largely coincidental. It is possible that the decision to revolt was made by a small group of younger chiefs and sons of the elders: the Herero tribesmen could hardly have known about and discussed the plans beforehand. As the flames of revolt spread, however, the fear of indiscriminate punishment for the deeds done by a few probably united the entire Herero tribe behind the insurgent leaders.¹⁴

No accurate figures exist for the total military strength of the Hereros, but Governor Leutwein estimated that there were 7,000 to 8,000 Hereros capable of bearing arms and that they had about 2,500 rifles.¹⁵

Their most important leader was Samuel Maharero. Hardly noticed at first by the other chiefs, Maharero had seemed to be mainly concerned with his material well-being—his tobacco, wine, and women—but he later developed into a determined and relentless military leader whose orders were obeyed without question.¹⁶

Hereros Strategy and Operations

The strategy of the Herero rebels was apparently to accept battle with the Germans in a simple contest of strength. They had little concept of tactical requirements, and rarely used harassing tactics, which might have enabled them to do great harm to the German supply lines. For example, although a railroad which was the main supply line of the Germans ran through his territory, Maharero made no attempt to destroy it before the Germans were able to institute security measures. The Germans were in constant fear of ambush, but in fact ambushes seldom occurred.¹⁷

In the early stages of the conflict, the Hereros laid siege to the towns of Okahandja and Omaruru, and maintained these sieges even in the face of vigorous counterattacks. Only after the Hereros were attacked from both sides and caught between the towns and the relief troops did their losses compel them to retreat. After heavy fighting, they gave up the siege of Okahandja on January 28, 1904, and that of Omaruru on February 4. On February 25, the Hereros engaged the Germans at Otjihina Maparero, where they again sustained great losses. On April 9, at the battle of Onganja, 3,000 Hereros under Maharero were defeated. Four days later, however, at Onilumbo, the Hereros again engaged the Germans and this time forced them to retreat. But Herero losses at Onilumbo were such that it was a Pyrrhic victory.¹⁸

The Hereros Are Defeated by Disease and Military Disaster

By the summer of 1904, the Hereros were faced not only with an enemy growing in numerical superiority, but with the ravages of a typhoid epidemic in their own ranks. The effects of the epidemic were increased by the fact that, in their usual manner, the Hereros had taken all their women, children, and elderly people, as well as their property, along with them into their fighting camp.¹⁹

In August, Maharero, with 6,000 men, engaged 2,000 German troops at Waterberg in what proved to be the decisive engagement of the Herero uprising. The Hereros were defeated and nearly encircled; those who escaped were pursued by the Germans into the Omaheke Desert. Their military power now broken and relentlessly pursued by the Germans, many thousands of the Hereros died of thirst in the desert. The Germans put a cordon around all escape routes and systematically combed the area outside the desert for any small guerrilla bands that might have escaped through the lines at Waterberg.²⁰ By September, 810 Hereros had been captured and 250 killed. By October 1904, Hereros who had managed to survive were confined to the area of Sandfeld, where they were kept until the following June.²¹

Herero Casualties

Casualties among the Herero insurgents were difficult to estimate, since they kept no records and usually took their dead with them after battle. Their combat losses appear to have been high, however, judging from reports of prisoners and from the blood that the Germans observed on the battlefield. The greatest number of Hereros died not of combat but of thirst in the Omaheke Desert. Although the Hereros had numbered from 60,000 to 80,000 before the war, only 15,000 free Hereros remained in South-West Africa two years later. Perhaps 10,000 more were prisoners, and about 1,200 had escaped to British Bechuanaland.²²

The Hottentot Rebellion; Strength and Leadership

Just as the Hereros' insurrection was defeated, the general revolt of the Hottentots began in the south, presenting the Germans with a more difficult task. It was to take more than two years of small-scale warfare before the campaign against the less numerous but more skillful Hottentots could be brought to a successful conclusion.

There were 2,100 to 2,500 Hottentot warriors, two-thirds to three-fourths of whom were armed with modern rifles, usually of English, but sometimes of German, manufacture. The Hottentots were later able to add to their supply by capturing new weapons in surprise attacks on farmers and on the smaller military posts.²³

One of the most important insurgent leaders was Morenga, a Hottentot-Herero with great influence among the Hottentots. Employing highly successful guerrilla tactics, Morenga confronted the Germans with intricate military problems in spite of the relatively small size of his band. In fact, he was known as the "Napoleon of the Blacks." Energetic, imaginative, honorable in his conduct—he never murdered any settlers, always left them enough to live on when he raided a farm, and freed wounded soldiers he captured—Morenga was fluent in Dutch and English and could understand German. One German officer called him "the African leader of the future."²⁴

A more important political leader was 80-year-old Hendrik Witbooi, a Hottentot whose influence went far beyond the confines of his own tribal groups. Relatively well educated, Witbooi, like many of the other Hottentot leaders, had been trained as a teacher at a missionary school. He had been involved in a tribal revolt a decade before, but since 1894 had remained a faithful ally of the Germans and had won the absolute respect and trust of Governor Leutwein, who was completely surprised by Witbooi's decision to join the 1904 revolt. Witbooi was apparently influenced by the "Ethiopian School," a *fin de siècle* movement to free Africa from white occupation under the "daring" slogan of "Africa for the Africans."²⁵

Hottentot Problems of Coordination and Unity

Despite Witbool's influence among the Hottentots, there was a general lack of unity and coordination among the tribesmen during the insurgency—a fact which proved to be decisive in the German military victory. The Hottentots were themselves divided into several independent tribes, each with its own captain. Great distances separated the tribes from one another. Witbool's age and, to some extent, his hesitant attitude prevented him from playing the unifying role he might have taken. Even more important was the lack of any coordination between the Hottentots and their northern neighbors and fellow insurgents, the Hereros. In fact, Witbool sent some 80 of his men to support the Germans against the Hereros, who were traditional enemies of the Hottentots.

The 'Hottentots' Considerable Military Ability

That the insurgents were able to fight for so long against the Germans derived from the fact that the Hottentots were not a band of wild fanatics armed with spears, but a fairly well-armed and experienced fighting force, able to replenish its supplies by raids and by smuggling across poorly patrolled borders.²⁶ During the Hottentot campaign, the insurgents frequently drove their cattle across the southern border and bartered with British traders for arms, ammunition, and other necessities.

The terrain provided certain natural advantages to the insurgents, who knew the country intimately—the places of refuge in the mountains and the location of the vital water supplies. For sustenance, they could always find some roots, tschamas, or wild berries in the arid countryside.²⁷ Familiar with the terrain, and skillful scouts as well, they were in an excellent position to observe the movement of the German regular troops. Although they had no organized intelligence, no regular corps of spies, and no telegraph, the tribesmen usually knew what was going on.

Most of the insurgents in both the Hottentot and the earlier Herero campaigns had had considerable experience in small-warfare tactics, acquired from frequent intertribal skirmishes. Some of the insurgents apparently even tried to maintain a semblance of military organization, attempting to copy the German system of combat units, with platoons and companies.²⁸ Much of the fighting, however, was on an "every man for himself" basis, and the tendency of the insurgents to fight in small bands contributed greatly to their elusiveness.

Insurgent mobility was enhanced, to a certain degree, by the lack of settlements of great value to them. The tribesmen lived in small, easily built huts, and could conveniently carry their few possessions with them. Thus they were not forced to defend any given area and were able to move as the situation required. On the other hand, the transportation of their families and property encumbered the insurgents and made it easier for German troops to overtake them. The Hottentots solved this problem by sending their families into British territory in 1905. After this, they were much more aggressive and elusive fighters.²⁹

The Hottentots as Masters of Ambush and Hit-and-Run Tactics

Both insurgent tribes sought to make use of their superior knowledge of the terrain to maneuver the Germans into positions in which they could be defeated. Thus, when the Germans divided their forces to attempt an encirclement, the Africans ferociously attacked the smaller enemy groups, one by one. The tactic the Hereros employed most frequently was to entrench themselves in a strong position in the bush or mountains, well hidden and thinly dispersed to neutralize the effect of German artillery. There they would lie in wait for the Germans, usually in semicircular formation with a great deal of open ground all around.³⁰ In the beginning, the Hottentots did not hesitate to engage the enemy whenever their leaders thought the moment opportune, but in the later stages of the campaign the Hottentot rebels, now on the defensive, became more elusive and the Germans had difficulty in bringing them to action.

The Hottentots were much more skillful than the Hereros in the use of guerrilla tactics: hit-and-run raids, short skirmishes and quick dispersals, and ambushes. The Hereros had relied more on positional warfare tactics, and this reliance led them to tactical errors such as the sieges of Omaruru and Okahandja. The Hottentots, on the other hand, were described by the Germans as masters of small warfare, who excelled in quick, opportunistic attacks on small groups such as supply trains and patrols, encircling them in concentric fire. Unlike the Hereros, they refused to fight pitched battles from fortified positions. Instead, they would attack, inflict casualties, and withdraw, often immediately after sighting a superior force. Indeed, Hendrik Witbooi once retreated from his headquarters at Reitmont, refusing to give battle when the Germans advanced with strong forces.³¹

Hottentot Fortunes Decline After Witbooi's Death

The turning point in the Hottentot campaign came in October 1905, when Witbooi was mortally wounded. Soon after the old chieftain's death, many prominent Hottentot elders and captains surrendered to the Germans, among them Witbooi's son Isaak in February 1906 and another important captain known as Cornelius, in March. In May, Morenga surrendered to British authorities in Cape Colony, leaving in the field only Johannes Christiaan and his Bondelzwart guerrillas, along with one other Hottentot guerrilla leader, Simon Kopper, who had taken his band into the Kalahari Desert in early 1906. Christiaan and Kopper continued to harass the Germans throughout 1906, but by the end of that year Christiaan was forced to sue for peace.

Hottentot battle casualties cannot be estimated with any accuracy, but it is known that about 6,000 were taken prisoner. The Hottentot civilian population was spared the fate of the Hereros, and most noncombatants were evacuated across the border into the Cape Colony in 1905.

British Neutrality Aids Hottentots

Although the insurgents received no official foreign support, they were able to use British territory for sanctuary in which to rest and to gather new strength, to purchase new munitions

and supplies from traders, and to obtain support from related tribes across the border.³² It was estimated that 20,000 to 30,000 rifles found their way into South-West Africa between 1882 and 1907, despite all German efforts to control arms smuggling.³³

British authorities in the Cape Colony and Bechuanaland, though fearing that the uprising might spread throughout southern Africa, observed what the London Times called "the strictest rules of neutrality."³⁴ The Cape government disarmed all belligerents who were caught by the police after crossing its borders and tried to prevent them from returning to the scene of hostilities. These measures were relatively ineffective, however, since few insurgents were caught, and many of those who were escaped again. For example, Morenga escaped from British detention and returned to the field. He was finally killed by British police in September of 1907, after the Germans had officially declared the insurgency to be over. Simon Kopper eluded capture until the following year.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

The Herero uprising caught the Germans almost completely by surprise. Roving bands of heavily armed tribesmen had been observed the day before the attack, but there was not enough time to warn the widely scattered white settlers, over a hundred of whom lost their lives on the night of January 12, 1904. After a decade of relatively unchallenged rule over South-West Africa, the Germans were suddenly faced with a tribal revolt of major proportions at a time when, as noted earlier, most of their forces were still committed against the Bondelzwart dissidents in the south.

German Position in January 1904

At the outbreak of the Herero insurgency, Germany had in South-West Africa some 750 regular troops, known as Schutztruppe (protection troops). These were divided into four companies, which were stationed at Windhoek, Omaruru, Keetmanshoop, and Outjo, with a battery of artillery at Okahandja; thus they were spread along a distance of 600 miles. Moreover, only half of each company was normally located at headquarters, the remainder being deployed in surrounding outposts, where the troops performed both military and civil administrative duties. At the time of the Herero attack three of these companies were under strength, owing to the recent diversion of troops to the south. Consequently, the insurgents greatly outnumbered the Germans at the outset of the revolt.

During the first several weeks of the insurgency the German position in the north was maintained only through their strongly fortified military garrisons. Constructed of stone, well stocked with rations, and commanding a well or waterhole, these outposts could be defended by even a small detachment of soldiers for long periods of time; it was only by ruse or complete

surprise that the Hereros were able to capture a few German posts. Before any serious counterattack could be launched against the African rebels, large-scale troop reinforcements were required.³⁵

German Troop Buildup and Training

The government in Windhoek had already ordered immediate mobilization of the reserves, a force almost as large as the Schutztruppe and made up for the most part of former members, whom the government encouraged to settle in South-West Africa after their tour of duty there. These men were thus experienced soldiers who had as well some familiarity with the country. Some 138 older men from the Landsturm (home guard or local militia) were also called into service, and some 239 volunteers, mostly German, British, and Boer settlers, were added to the counterinsurgent force, bringing its total military strength to about 1,800.

German troops from outside the colony soon began arriving, and by the end of February 1904, counterinsurgent forces numbered about 3,500. By April there were 4,700 officers and men, including several artillery batteries. The troop buildup continued steadily. There were 7,000 by July and 11,500 by early 1905. The peak strength was reached in 1906, when there were 15,000 German troops in South-West Africa.³⁶

Drawn from various branches of the Imperial German army, these new troops, who had been trained for conventional warfare in a European setting and had no experience applicable to colonial wars, found conditions in South-West Africa strange and frequently difficult to cope with. Although the Germans at first made strenuous efforts to orient and retrain newly arrived troops before committing them to battle, it became necessary as early as April 1904 to send fresh troops, and even raw recruits from Germany, immediately into action. To overcome the lack of training time, experienced veterans were attached to newly arrived outfits; whenever possible, between engagements with the enemy, field exercises were held. The experience gained in counterinsurgency operations was put to good use in 1908, after the insurgency was officially over, when a special detachment of 400 men and 700 camels pursued and finally destroyed Simon Kopper's guerrilla band, which had continued to operate from the Kalahari Desert for a year after the government declared the insurgency at an end.³⁷

One of the special military problems which newly arriving soldiers encountered was that of judging the distance of their targets. The clear, dry, hot air of the desert makes objects appear much closer than they actually are, and new troops had to learn to make allowances for this condition. Moreover, the European soldier, who was used to richer and more varied landscapes, found that the uniform terrain of South-West Africa offered few points of reference, and since maps were largely inadequate, he had to depend almost entirely on native guides.

Germans Use Some African Troops

The Germans made good use of the 120 Basters who were attached to the counterinsurgent force, using them both as scouts and as combat soldiers. Most Basters had some previous military experience. Approximately 290 other tribesmen of various ethnic groups were used as scouts and drivers in the initial stage of the insurgency, but as the revolt spread it became more difficult to obtain the services of the indigenous population in the areas affected by the insurgency. All in all, intelligence left much to be desired, but this failure was overcome, in the long run, by the superiority of German arms and logistics.³⁸

Germans Find Logistics of Paramount Importance

The German troops were divided into two main branches: the field force and the supply corps. The latter force, which was responsible for the elaborate logistical operations that were necessary to support the combatants, increased steadily in strength and importance. The German soldier, unlike his African counterpart, could not "live off the land," eating roots and wild berries in the desert. Thus, logistics affected almost every move of the Schutztruppe, which traveled at the speed of their ox-drawn wagons, plying the desert in heavily armed supply trains.

Logistical problems became particularly acute during the long Hottentot campaign in the south, where there was no railroad beyond Windhoek and roads were bad. German troops and civilians to the south of Windhoek could be supplied only through the harbor of Luederitzbucht, by purchases across the Orange River in the Cape Colony, or by overland route from the rail-head at Windhoek. None of these routes was entirely satisfactory. For example, owing to poor road conditions, the route from Luederitzbucht to Keetmanshoop could provide for only about 500 men, though in 1905 there were 5,000 men and 6,000 horses active in the south against the Hottentots.

On the other hand, the Germans did not wish to buy from the Cape Colony, as this would have meant giving up foreign exchange to the British, whose strict neutrality measures annoyed the Germans. Therefore, the Schutztruppe chose to rely on the route from Windhoek to Keetmanshoop—a distance of 350 miles, mostly through enemy territory. At the end of 1905 the logistical support forces on the Windhoek-Keetmanshoop route and the Luederitzbucht-Keetmanshoop route required 61 officers, 1,360 troops, 2,535 drivers, and 12,350 draft animals (including 5,700 mules and 3,740 oxen), together with 430 private vehicles with 9,600 animals. The monthly death rate for the animals was about ten percent. All this effort supplied only about 3,000 men and 3,000 horses. No civilians could be supplied and no reserves could be built up. Therefore, supplies had to be bought from the Cape Colony after all and, in fact, the Germans spent as much as 100 million reichsmarks—one-fourth of the total expenditures for the insurgency—in the Cape.³⁹

Water Becomes a Major Logistical and Tactical Problem

Provision of sufficient potable water proved to be a mammoth undertaking. The available water, which was often brackish and unhealthy, frequently brought on severe epidemics among both the German troops and the African insurgents. Thus the Germans sometimes had to use their severely limited transport to carry water for men and horses. Supplies were often insufficient during the heat of the day and in battle, and thus added further hardship to the soldiers' life. When no transportation was available for carrying water, troop movements had to be curtailed.

Since most of the fighting took place in the drier southern and the central parts of the country, control of the waterholes became vital to military operations. Overcoming the "thirst distances" was a principal problem for both the African insurgents and the German counterinsurgent troops. Indeed, it was this factor which eventually determined the outcome of both the Herero and the Hottentot campaigns.

German Strategy and Tactics

The German strategy was to destroy completely not only the military power of the insurgents, but also their military potential. The killing of colonists at the beginning of the revolt had aroused the Germans, and they wanted to punish the insurgents severely. The tribesmen realized this, and their resistance accordingly became more determined, for they felt they were fighting for their very existence.

The constant objective of the Schutztruppe in the Herero and Hottentot campaigns was to engage the elusive tribesmen in battle; for, while strategic factors favored the insurgents, superior arms and better training and discipline gave a tactical advantage to the counterinsurgents.

In the summer of 1904, German troops went on the offensive, forcing their way into insurgent territory and seeking out the enemy. Encirclement of the enemy was their constant objective, though the tactic had disadvantages as well as advantages. The Hottentots quickly learned to retaliate by attacking the encircling parties separately, and it was often only with the greatest difficulty and at the cost of many lives that the Germans could maintain their position or escape.⁴⁰

German Advantages: Firepower and Morale

The superiority of German firepower was decisive in most battles, however, and a small defense force was often able to beat off storming attacks by superior numbers of Africans. German commanders frequently ordered their troops to fire more slowly and accurately, so as to inflict greater casualties among the tribal irregulars. With superior armament, which included a total of five machineguns at the outset of the insurgency, the counterinsurgents had a

decided advantage over the tribesmen, who regarded artillery with almost superstitious fear. By early 1905, the Schutztruppe had received 16 machineguns and 54 field cannons.⁴¹

The military skill and élan of the German officer corps was an important factor in counter-insurgent success. In the spirit of the time, most German officers confidently believed that victory could be achieved in almost any situation by the vigor and dash of a few good men, without recourse to superior numbers of troops. Therefore, the idea of being outnumbered in battle by as many as five or six to one held no terror for the Germans, whose confidence in their ultimate victory was enormous. They often made daring attacks and counterattacks, usually with fixed bayonets, which the Africans feared almost as much as artillery, sometimes fleeing at the sight of a bayonet charge.⁴²

The high caliber of the German officer had a positive effect on the morale of the troops, who bore the hardships of the campaign remarkably well. Despite hunger, thirst, fatigue, and heat, German troops endured almost constant activity and strenuous forced marches in close pursuit of the insurgents. German patrols relentlessly tracked the tribesmen across the desert and harassed them day and night. Raining blow after blow on the Africans and allowing them no time to pause for rest, the Schutztruppe finally paralyzed and destroyed first the Hereros and then the less numerous but more agile Hottentots.⁴³

German Civil and Military Leaders

During the three years of operations against the Herero and Hottentot insurgents, several changes in the leadership of the German forces occurred. Col. Theodor Leutwein, who was governor of South-West Africa from 1894 to 1905, also served as commander in chief of the Schutztruppe. Colonel Leutwein participated personally in many of the early campaigns, often in the front lines. As a result, administrative matters were sometimes neglected, until the imperial German government ordered Leutwein to concentrate on his duties as colonial governor and to hand over military command to Lt. Gen. Lothar von Trotha in June 1904.

Von Trotha was an able military commander, but extremely harsh toward the indigenous population. For example, when an opportunity to end the hostilities through negotiations was presented, von Trotha set such stringent terms that the tribesmen decided to continue the fight. Von Trotha's proclamation to the Hottentots soon after they joined the revolt guaranteed life and liberty to all but the ringleaders of the insurgency; however, it ordered the tribe to surrender all arms and ammunition and all cattle, although the last requirement was later changed to all "stolen cattle." The only apparent effect of von Trotha's demand was to unite the tribesmen more firmly against the Germans, who had threatened their traditional elite and the symbols of their power and prestige as a free people.⁴⁴

General von Trotha's stern and frequently brutal countermeasures did not meet with the approval of his superiors. In late 1905, he was replaced by a Colonel Dame, who served as

commander of the Schutztruppe until July 1906, when a Colonel von Deimling took command until the end of the insurgency. Von Deimling had served as commander of German forces in the south against the Hottentots in 1904-1905.

Leutwein was succeeded as governor in 1905 by Friedrich von Lindequist of the Imperial German foreign office. One of the first acts by the new governor in September 1905 was to offer amnesty to the Hereros, whose military power had been completely destroyed by this time. In the days to follow, some 15,000 Hereros assembled at German missionary centers throughout the north to accept this amnesty, thus ending for all practical purposes the Herero phase of the insurgency. The fight against the Hottentots continued until late 1906, and then in a desultory fashion for about a year after peace had been officially declared, ending finally in 1908 with the defeat of Simon Kopper's small guerrilla band.

German Casualties and Costs

With a declaration by Kaiser Wilhelm II, on March 31, 1907, announcing the end of the three years' bitter warfare, the Germans were officially acknowledged the victors. But their victory had been costly: 2,348 dead, wounded, and missing soldiers and officers of which total 1,491 were dead and missing.⁴⁵ Also, 211 European farmers had been murdered (one out of every six), 800 farms plundered, and 178 farms completely destroyed.⁴⁶ The total cost of the Herero-Hottentot campaign amounted to some 405 million reichsmarks.⁴⁷

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

A major factor in the success of German counterinsurgency was the lack of coordination between the Herero and Hottentot tribes. It is safe to conclude that the few German troops in South-West Africa in early 1904 would not have been able to cope with a united uprising by both groups.⁴⁸ As it was, however, the Germans were able to defeat the two groups in turn, crushing the Hereros first and thus gaining time to mount a large-scale, relentless offensive against the Hottentots, whose considerable military skills proved inadequate before the German soldiers' superior technology and professional training. At great cost, the Germans were eventually able to overcome the special difficulties of terrain and climate to defeat the African rebels in their native environment.

And their defeat was complete. Indeed, the number of their tribesmen was now greatly reduced. In the final settlement, the Germans guaranteed life and liberty to all tribesmen, but demanded complete subjugation to German rule, as well as the surrender of their arms. Although cattle thefts continued in some areas, the thieves were now usually unarmed and offered little resistance. Some 16,000 prisoners of war were not immediately released, but were detained for a period of time after 1907.⁴⁹ A stabilizing factor was the Germans' strict adherence

to the peace treaty, which restored some measure of confidence among the tribesmen. Many of the Hottentot refugees in British territory soon returned to South-West Africa.⁵⁰

With the defeat of the Hereros and Hottentots, the Germans had far less to fear from tribal uprisings—only the well-armed Bersebers and a few smaller tribes were still restless. The Bondelzwart tribe, put down at the time of the Herero uprising, was not to rebel again until 1922. Nonetheless, the strength of the Schutztruppe, reduced to 7,400 men by the end of the insurgency, was set at 4,000 men for the future, or over four times its size before the insurgency. These colonial troops were organized into several military districts, and regular expeditions were undertaken to capture remaining small bands, such as Simon Kopper's, and to disarm all the other tribes.

Economically, the territory had suffered severely. Leutwein stated in 1906 that "of the three commercial assets of the protectorate—mining, farming, and native labor—[the conflict had] destroyed the second entirely and two-thirds of the last."⁵¹ What had ruined the Herero and the Hottentot tribes benefited the white settlers. Land taken from rebel tribes was now used for European settlement and the colony slowly began to prosper. The economy showed a steady improvement until the outbreak of World War I in 1914.

Conquered by South African forces in 1915, South-West Africa became a mandate of the Union of South Africa by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Through the years, the relationship of the two countries has become increasingly close. In 1946 the General Assembly of the United Nations rejected South Africa's application to incorporate the territory of South-West Africa into the union. Although South-West Africa thus remains technically a League of Nations mandate, it has had representation in the Parliament of the Union of South Africa since 1949.

NOTES

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²Theodor Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (Berlin: Ernst Mittler und Sohn, 1907), pp. 531-32.

³Rudolf Fitzner, Deutsches Kolonial-Handbuch (Berlin: H. Paetel, 1896), p. 27.

⁴Carl Schmidt, Geographie der Europaersiedlungen im deutschen Südwestafrika (Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1922), pp. 3-70.

⁵T. Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur, pp. 432-33.

⁶Georg Hartmann, Die Zukunft Deutsch-Südwestafrikas (Berlin: Ernst Mittler und Sohn, 1904), p. 20.

⁷General Staff, Vol. I, pp. 3-4; Capt. Maximilian Bayer, Der Krieg in Südwestafrika und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Kolonie (Leipzig: Friedrich Engelmann, 1907), pp. 5-6; Hartmann, Die Zukunft Deutsch-Südwestafrikas, p. 20; Hendrik Witbooi, Die Dagboek van Hendrik Witbooi (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1929), pp. 228, 232; Oscar Hintrager, Südwestafrika in der deutschen Zeit (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1955), p. 48.

⁸Bayer, pp. 5-8; Paul Leutwein, Afrikaner Schicksal—Gouverneur Leutwein und seine Zeit (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1929), pp. 92, 182. The actions of the traders are specifically cited by the paramount chief of the Hereros, Samuel Maharero, in a letter to Governor Leutwein, cited in Hintrager, Südwestafrika, p. 48. See also Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, South-West Africa (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920), pp. 60-65; T. Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur, pp. 245-49, 266-78. See also Hintrager, Südwestafrika, pp. 46-47.

⁹T. Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur, pp. 266-78; P. Leutwein, Afrikaner Schicksal, p. 182; Great Britain, South-West Africa, pp. 14-15; and German General Staff, Department of Military History, Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika: Der Hottentotten Krieg (Berlin: Königliche Hofbuchhandlung Ernst Mittler und Sohn, 1906), II, p. 8. (Hereafter cited as General Staff, Vol. II.)

¹⁰T. Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur, pp. 249-54.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 276-98.

¹²Ibid., p. 290; and Great Britain, South-West Africa, p. 17.

¹³Great Britain, South-West Africa, p. 18; and T. Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur, pp. 291, 316-17, 467.

¹⁴General Staff, Vol. I, p. 24.

¹⁵T. Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur, pp. 436-37.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 309-310.

¹⁷Bayer, Der Krieg in Südwestafrika, pp. 14-15; General Staff, Vol. I, p. 80.

¹⁸General Staff, Vol. I, pp. 52-53, 110.

¹⁹Bayer, Der Krieg in Südwestafrika, p. 14.

- ²⁰General Staff, Vol. I, pp. 160-96.
- ²¹Ibid., p. 217.
- ²²Ibid., pp. 87, 217.
- ²³T. Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur, pp. 436-37.
- ²⁴Bayer, Der Krieg in Südwestafrika, p. 13.
- ²⁵Ibid., pp. 12-13; General Staff, Vol. II, pp. 8, 64-65; Hintrager, Südwestafrika, p. 67.
- ²⁶Bayer, Der Krieg in Südwestafrika, p. 13; General Staff, Vol. II, p. 17.
- ²⁷General Staff, Vol. II, p. 17.
- ²⁸Hanemann, Wirtschaftliche und politische Verhältnisse in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (Berlin: Deutscher Kolonial-Verlag, G. Meineck, 1905), p. 42.
- ²⁹Bayer, Der Krieg in Südwestafrika, p. 14.
- ³⁰General Staff, Vol. II, pp. 237-42.
- ³¹Bayer, Der Krieg in Südwestafrika, pp. 14-15; General Staff, Vol. I, pp. 52-53; and General Staff, Vol. II, pp. 22-24.
- ³²General Staff, Vol. II, p. 248.
- ³³General Staff, Vol. I, p. 18.
- ³⁴The Times (London), January 5, 1905, p. 4.
- ³⁵General Staff, Vol. I, pp. 13-15.
- ³⁶The Times (London), January 14, 1905, p. 5; Bayer, Der Krieg in Südwestafrika, p. 65; and T. Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur, p. 299.
- ³⁷General Staff, Vol. II, pp. 363-68.
- ³⁸General Staff, Vol. I, pp. 7, 12, 16.
- ³⁹General Staff, Vol. II, pp. 33-35, 248-49.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 38-61, 72-85.
- ⁴¹General Staff, Vol. I, p. 13; The Times (London), January 14, 1905, p. 5.
- ⁴²General Staff, Vol. II, pp. 55-56; General Staff, Vol. I, pp. 77-78.
- ⁴³General Staff, Vol. II, pp. 55-56, 62, 301.
- ⁴⁴General Staff, Vol. II, pp. 135-36.
- ⁴⁵General Staff, Vol. II, p. 333.
- ⁴⁶Schmidt, Geographie, p. 81.
- ⁴⁷Reichstagsdrucksache Nr. 299 1909/10, cited in Hintrager, Südwestafrika, p. 73.
- ⁴⁸T. Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur, pp. 467-69.
- ⁴⁹General Staff, Vol. II, p. 297.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., p. 298.
- ⁵¹T. Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur, p. 542.

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Part Two
EARLY CENTURY EXPERIENCE
IN LATIN AMERICA


CUBA (1906-1909)

MEXICO (1916-1917)

NICARAGUA (1927-1933)

Chapter Five

**CUBA
1906-1909**



CUBA (1906-1909)

Chapter Five
CUBA (1906-1909)

by Mildred Vreeland

When President Tomás Estrada Palma of Cuba was unable to contain a Liberal revolt in the summer of 1906, he appealed to the United States to intervene under the provisions of the Platt Amendment; U.S. intervention was successful in its palliative aspect of stopping military operations and restoring constitutional processes but failed to prevent future insurgency.

BACKGROUND

In 1959 the course of Cuban history was changed when the revolution spearheaded by Fidel Castro successfully dislodged the incumbent Cuban government, but the pattern of political violence that came to its full fruition at that time had been more than 50 years in forming. The first instance of insurgency against a modern Cuban government came in the "August revolution" of 1906, which this study concerns.

This early episode is remarkable for many of the foreshadowings that it casts upon later and more spectacular events. In 1906, the insurgency represented a contest between members of the same political elite, and indeed this was the case in the 1950's. In 1906, social and economic problems provided a background upon which the political insurgency could operate, but by the 1950's these problems had become acutely serious, providing a thrust and impetus of their own. In 1906, the United States reacted to the request of the Cuban government and intervened to restore stable and orderly government. Although there was no direct U.S. intervention in Cuba in the 1950's, the experience of 1906 suggests both the limitations and advantages of such a course. With or without intervention, the United States provided the whipping boy image that has saved Cubans from psychologically facing the consequences of their own actions.

Cuba, with an area of some 44,000 square miles, or about the size of Pennsylvania, is the largest of the Caribbean islands and lies only 98 miles off the Florida Keys—a location which makes the problems of the country of obvious concern to the U.S. government and public. Long and narrow, the island is divided into six administrative provinces. From west to east, these are Pinar del Río, Havana, Matanzas, Las Villas (known in 1906 as Santa Clara), Camagüey, and Oriente. The flat or gently undulating plains which cover over half the island are set off by

three general mountain groups in the extreme west, the extreme east, and the province of Las Villas. These mountains were traditionally a haven for insurgents against the Spanish colonial government, and many of the principal Cuban insurgent leaders of 1906 were intimately acquainted with their advantages.

The Climate and the Population

The climate is pleasant and equable all year long, although in the fall months the island is threatened by tropical hurricanes. Two seasons are fairly distinct, with some variation depending on the region. The rainy season lasts from May to October and the dry season from November to April. During the fall months, the principal crops, sugar and tobacco, ripen. Had the insurgency of the summer of 1906 extended into the winter months, it would have prevented the harvesting of these important crops and might have cost the economy several million dollars.

According to the 1907 census, the population numbered a little over 2 million, the three most heavily populated provinces being Havana, Las Villas, and Oriente. Each of these provinces had important urban concentrations in its capital city; but, except for the national capital, Havana, no city exceeded 100,000 in population. In rural areas the population was generally distributed in small towns or villages, sugar estates, or scattered farms.¹

Effects of Spanish Rule Linger After Independence

In 1906, Cuba still bore the imprint of several centuries of Spanish colonial rule, although it had been officially freed by the Spanish-American War of 1898 and had been under U.S. military governorship from 1899 to 1902. First under U.S. Gen. John R. Brooke and then under Gen. Leonard Wood as military governor, a civil government was organized and a Cuban administration established. Educational and public health measures were instituted. In 1900, a Cuban constituent assembly was elected, and in February 1901 this body adopted a constitution for the country. The following year the U.S. military administration was succeeded by a Cuban government with an elected Cuban president.

Certain characteristics of the people which can be traced to the Spanish colonial years explain in great part the cause and form of the insurgency. Although the existence of a large Negro or colored minority was of general significance, the most important ethnic distinction was that made between the Spaniards and the criollos. The Spaniards were those, whether born in Spain or Cuba, who considered themselves to be Spanish and were self-consciously "white." The criollos were those who were born in Cuba and considered themselves Cuban; this group contained a large mestizo element, usually of mixed Negro and Spanish parentage.

This division had important implications for the insurgency. Under Spanish rule the criollos had been discriminated against in government appointments and commercial privileges. After independence, however, this group dominated everyday politics. The relative political neutrality

of the wealthy Spaniards and other foreigners removed a conservative and moderate influence from political events. Their property, often in the form of highly inflammable sugar estates, was vulnerable to insurgent incendiary threats. As the 1906 revolt progressed, this group added to the pressure for a quick settlement and especially for U.S. intervention. Fearing for their property, they ostensibly withdrew support from the central government and in some cases may even have paid protection money to the rebels.

Similarly, the church could play no moderating role. Roman Catholicism was the dominant, if nominal, religion. But it was an urban institution, and the church's close relationship to the Spanish colonial government had discredited it in the eyes of many nationalist Cubans. There was often bitter hostility to it on the part of criollo Cubans, and the 1901 Constitution denied the church several of its former privileges.

Cuban Politics Dominated by an Aggressive Middle Class

The roots of the 1906 insurgency lay in the interplay of the social system and politics. Traditionally, the entire system was based on the exchange of loyalty, political support, and rewards between patrons and clients. In 1906, the political arena was centered within what may be called a middle class, composed mainly of government employees and salaried or professional persons, with only a token commercial group. Small in size, this class was an aggregate of competing, self-seeking factions, which provided most of the politicians of all parties. It saw politics as the only route to success.

The goal was control of the government, whereby, in the Spanish tradition, benefits were expected to accrue to the officeholder as patron. Such benefits not only enriched the individual personally but also gave him the means to ensure continued political support from his clients, at the expense of his opponents. The long denial felt by the largely criollo middle class under colonial rule reinforced its political aspirations following independence. And among the middle class revolution was regarded as a valid means of achieving political change and gaining admission to the ranks of the wealthy and the privileged.

Personalism and Legalism as Competing Values

Within this social system much value was placed on powerful personal leadership. Trust in impersonal legal and political institutions was almost entirely lacking and seldom survived appeals made on the basis of personal strength, loyalty, or friendship. Party affiliation could be assumed or discarded with facility, rendering parties almost meaningless. Politicians grouped around known leaders. The provisions of the constitution, observed and admired on the surface, were in fact circumvented by recourse to older colonial ways more amenable to personal control. The experience in democratic government from 1902 to 1905 was too brief to overcome Cuba's preference for action based on personal relations, intense competition, and resort to violence.

However, Cubans did greatly respect law and justice as abstract ideals expressed in the 1901 Constitution, and arbitrary infringement of these ideals gave rise to resentment—the more acutely felt because it represented a slight to the dignity and honor of the individual. It is therefore not too surprising that a gross infringement of constitutional guarantees provided the immediate cause of the revolt.

The Elections of 1905 Provide the Issue

The specific issue around which the revolt turned was the widespread and overt manipulation of election machinery by the government during the 1905 elections. Few expected the elections to be honest. But the measures taken were too obvious to escape public criticism, even by the government party newspaper. The issue was a fairly narrow one; the antagonists were drawn from the same small sociopolitical group; and the deep social issues of poverty and oppression which emerged more clearly later in Cuban history had virtually no bearing on this "August revolution." Nevertheless, it is not likely that the insurgency could have made such an impact nor spread so rapidly had not a large cross section of the people felt that their political rights and future were endangered. Public sentiment in favor of the insurgents overwhelmed every province except the ruling party's stronghold.

The form of government of the Republic of Cuba was a constitutional democracy providing for a presidential system, a bicameral legislature, and an adult male franchise. The constitutional framework, however, was not supported by laws providing for municipal (roughly equivalent to U.S. county) elections, an independent judiciary, or a civil service—earlier Spanish methods continued to give the executive extensive control over these areas. Although popular and greatly respected, the first President, Tomás Estrada Palma, nevertheless found his efforts to implement the constitution, including passage of laws for the election of municipal officers, frustrated by an indifferent Congress. As a result, in the spring of 1905, he chose to forego his independent position and to ally himself with one of the two major Cuban political parties, hoping for a degree of party discipline to push through his program.

Palma Runs as Moderate Party Candidate

Of the two parties, the Moderates and the Liberals, President Palma chose the former, which he felt to be more dependable, and staffed a new cabinet. While differences between the two parties were based more on personalities than issues, the Moderates represented a more conservative viewpoint than the Liberals. Moderate strength lay in the province of Matanzas, Liberal strength in Pinar del Río and Havana.

When the Moderates endorsed Palma for a second term, José Miguel Gómez, originally a leader in the Moderate group, found his presidential ambitions rebuffed. He therefore switched over to the Liberals and carried the province of Las Villas with him. The political associations of the provinces were to be maintained during the insurgency.

The 1905 elections were to elect the president and vice president, all provincial governors, and half the Senate and House of Representatives. With Palma running for president on the Moderate ticket and Gómez on the Liberal ticket, the leaders of each party contended for the office of vice president. Opinion is unanimous that Palma would have won easily under normal conditions. However, the Moderate party would take no chances.

Moderates Manipulate Political Machinery

As usual, the line between political ambitions and laudable goals was hard to draw. Many Moderate leaders sincerely felt that every effort should be made to maintain a period of conservative tutelage and consolidation before allowing a largely uneducated and unpropertied electorate full political opportunity.² At any rate, the secretary of government in Palma's cabinet—responsible for supervision of the municipalities, the police, the rural guards, and the election procedures—made full use of his executive powers in these areas. Neither side was above employing extralegal tactics, but the Moderates were better equipped to do so.

Election machinery placed special powers in the hands of municipal officials, who, on the basis of preliminary elections, designated registration boards to draw up voter lists for the national elections. During the summer of 1905, the new cabinet, through a series of investigations into unlawful practices, replaced several municipal officials. Although the charges were well-founded, it was, in every case, Liberal officials who were removed and replaced by Moderates, and no similar investigations were conducted in municipalities where Moderates were already in office. The effect of these moves not only evoked Liberal protests but also profoundly affected the customary political life of much of the population. Municipal officials were, for most Cubans, the most important government agents. These particular officials had been elected in 1900 during the U.S. military governorship, and their arbitrary removal from office was the source of bitter complaint.

Liberals Withdraw From Elections

Preliminary elections were held on September 23; shortly before noon, the Liberals withdrew from the elections in protest. On the basis of the election, voter registration lists were drawn up by Moderate-dominated boards; in the ensuing list of 423,313 voters, some 150,000 names were illegally entered. By this time, election results were a foregone conclusion, and the Liberals boycotted the national election on December 1. The Moderates swept every office in every province, and Estrada Palma was inaugurated for a second term on May 20, 1906. Palma himself probably did not know the full extent of the Moderate party's interference in the elections and may have discounted much of the protest as Liberal propaganda.³

Those who were familiar with Cuban political life and customs saw in the Liberal withdrawal from the preliminary elections in September an intention to seek redress through revolutionary

methods. In November 1905 and February 1906, minor uprisings occurred in Havana and Pinar del Río. They were halfhearted attempts, and, although supported by several prominent Liberals, the moves were premature and lacked central coordination. Thus, the government was able to suppress the outbreaks with a show of force and an offer of amnesty.⁴ There was a legal recourse for the Liberals who, on the basis of the earlier elections, still had representatives in the Congress. Congress was required to approve the elections. But in April 1906, when Congress met, Liberal protests against the validity of the elections came to nothing.

Economic Factors Add Fuel to Insurgency

Economic conditions also played some part in the insurgency. The economy had generally recovered from the ravages of the war for independence, prospering under U.S. military government and the first term of Estrada Palma. Indeed, the substantial budgetary surplus accumulated during Palma's first term—later to be exhausted by the expenses of countering the insurgency—was a tempting target to the insurgents seeking control of the government. The reciprocity treaty signed with the United States in 1893 had also had a benign effect.

Over half the population, however, depended directly or indirectly on sugar and tobacco production. In the summer of 1906, the tobacco crop was plagued by a prolonged drought. Moreover, the summer months are the idle months in the highly seasonal sugar industry. Rural workers were, therefore, available for recruitment into the ranks of the insurgents.

Role of the United States Under the Platt Amendment

Although the sources and causes of the insurgency were Cuban in origin, the special U.S. relationship with Cuba played an important, even dominant, role. This relationship was based on the Platt Amendment, which Cubans had been required to adopt as an appendix to their constitution as the price of independence. The amendment provided that Cuba might not make any treaty that would impair her sovereignty and that she might not contract excessive foreign debts. Most significantly, Article III of the amendment gave the United States the right to intervene to protect Cuban independence and to maintain a government adequate for the "protection of life, property and individual liberty." At least some Moderate leaders apparently felt that the amendment and U.S. intervention would supply the force necessary to suppress any insurgency, regardless of what the government might have done to provoke an uprising.⁵ The insurgents, too, weighed the possibility of intervention, and some leaned in favor of it.⁶

INSURGENCY⁷

The organization of the "August revolution" can be dated from Palma's inauguration in May 1906. Immediately thereafter, the principal Liberal leaders met and formed a revolutionary committee, including, in addition to José Miguel Gómez, Alfredo Zayas (leader of the Liberal

party and candidate for vice president), Gen. José Monteagudo, Gen. Loinaz del Castillo, Gen. Carlos García Vélez, and Manuel Lazo. A manifesto of the revolution was published on July 28.

Liberals Plot in Capital, But Insurgency Starts in Provinces

The first plan was for a quick coup in Havana, in which Palma would be kidnaped, to be accompanied by action in Pinar del Río, Las Villas, and Oriente provinces designed to consolidate the insurgents' position in the capital. The plan required strong leadership to ensure speed and coordination, funds for arms, and complete secrecy. The insurgents possessed none of these requirements. From the very beginning, rumors flew around the capital. Moderate leaders, with the possible exception of Palma, were well aware of the potential for trouble and were able to keep close watch on members of the revolutionary committee. The committee itself, most of whose members had independent provincial power bases, was unable to agree on and adhere to a single course of action. Conspiracy dragged on through July and the early part of August without result, and the principal plotters remained in Havana.

Then, on August 16, the revolution suddenly began in earnest when Gen. Faustino "Pino" Guerra, of Pinar del Río, who had been drawn into the conspiracy, raised the standard of revolt in his province. His motives are not entirely clear. It is likely that, disgusted with the indecision in Havana, he acted on his own initiative; he may have taken orders from Vélez, but apparently not from Lazo, who had been designated to direct activities in Pinar del Río.⁸ Familiar with the terrain, and especially the mountains from which he had directed forays during the war for independence, "Pino" moved rapidly out of the Vuelta Abajo region toward Havana, there to join Castillo's forces.

Strength, Training, Arms, and Leadership of Rebel Forces

The insurgent forces grew very rapidly. There are no estimates of their original size, but within two weeks they numbered close to 15,000. The official estimate of their number at the end of the insurgency was almost 25,000, spread over five provinces, with the largest concentrations in the three Liberal provinces. They were poorly armed and disciplined. Recruits received little indoctrination or training. According to one estimate, about one man in eight had shoulder arms;⁹ it is probably more accurate that half the forces had shoulder arms and the rest machetes and revolvers.¹⁰ The forces in Havana and Pinar del Río had a slight advantage over the other groups. The arms themselves, however, were in poor condition, being mostly old Remington carbines or sawed-off rifles and shotguns. The men used either their own arms or those obtained during the course of the insurgency. Some were left over from the war of independence or obtained from abandoned Spanish and U.S. troops supplies.¹¹ Ammunition was in

short supply. The rebels received no assistance from outside Cuba, but funds were obtained from wealthy Cubans who hoped thereby to protect their property.¹²

Except for the preliminary planning phase of the insurgency, there was no organized underground activity, and the movement progressed at once to a military phase. "Pino's" action in Pinar del Río was followed almost immediately by similar moves in Havana and Las Villas. Operations were organized on a provincial basis with no central coordination; the provincial leaders had gained their military experience and in many cases their rank in the war of independence. The major military figures were Gen. "Pino" Guerra in Pinar del Río, Gens. Ernesto Asbert and Loinaz del Castillo in Havana, and Gen. Eduardo Guzmán and Dr. Orestes Ferrara in Las Villas.

Rebel Operations Benefit From Lack of Resistance

There were few pitched battles and, although there are no adequate estimates available of casualties and prisoners, there was scant loss of life. Mutually beneficial agreements were often concluded with contingents of the rural guard and militia before or after battles. In many cases, government forces simply joined the insurgents, bringing their rations and arms with them. The rebels were generally poorly nourished; operating from the countryside, they obtained some food as well as horses for mounts from rural farms and estates.

Accounts of property losses reaching the capital were greatly exaggerated. The insurgents added to the confusion by transmitting bulletins describing the burning of estates, few of which were in fact damaged, and then severing telegraph communications. Rebel leaders made some effort to avoid harming the areas through which they passed. Some damage to engines and bridges of the British-owned railroads was inflicted with the intent of encouraging the British government to urge the United States to intervene.¹³ Arrangements for payment for commandeered food and mounts varied greatly, but few owners expected to be compensated, even when military scrip was offered. As the insurgency progressed, however, the leaders found it increasingly difficult to control their men, not a few of whom wished to make the most of the adventure.

The tactics employed were those of guerrilla warfare, which had been successful against the Spanish, and consisted largely of quick skirmishes. The poor organization of the insurgents was compensated for by the fact that they encountered little resistance. By September, they controlled the greater part of the island, except for Matanzas, where no insurgent forces attempted to operate. There was little activity in Camagüey and Oriente. In Camagüey, a small insurgent band was organized only at the end of August; but, had the insurgency lasted beyond mid-September, the sizable force which developed in Oriente would undoubtedly have caused considerable trouble. By mid-September 1906, the insurgents had surrounded the capital city of Havana, and the government retained a precarious control only in the provincial capitals and principal coastal towns.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Although the Cuban government had been able to cope with the small and isolated outbreaks in November 1905 and February 1906 by rapid police action, it did not have the means to suppress the next summer's military rebellions—formidable and simultaneous, if relatively poorly organized—in Pinar del Río and Havana provinces.

In spite of ample warning, the government was militarily unprepared to confront the insurgents in the summer of 1906.¹⁴ When the insurgency began, it had only 600 artillerymen and 3,000 rural guards, scattered in small posts throughout the islands and incapable of countering large bands of insurgents. Steps were taken to raise an emergency militia and, on August 20, Palma ordered the rural guard increased to 5,000, of which 3,000 were stationed in Havana, as was most of the artillery. The militia and rural guards were augmented only by offering very large wages, thus draining the treasury without adding trustworthy elements to the government forces. As for the Havana police force, the government itself estimated that half would desert in the event of an insurgent attack on the city.¹⁵

Government Captures Rebel Leaders and Makes Large-Scale Arrests

The government was successful, however, in seizing and jailing almost all the members of the incautious revolutionary committee, which had remained in the capital. On August 19, Monteagudo, Vélez, and Castillo (who escaped while being conducted to jail) were arrested; two committee members who had gone to Oriente to organize the revolt in that province were seized and returned to Havana; and on August 20, José Miguel Gómez was jailed in Santa Clara. The prisoners, who blamed each other for their misfortune, were kept in relative isolation from one another and from the outside. Zayas succeeded in hiding in Havana. Orestes Ferrara, returning from New York, escaped ship, hid in Havana, and then made his way to Santa Clara and Guzmán's forces, where he helped fill the void in political leadership. On August 27, Palma extended a pardon to any rebels who would accept it, but few did.¹⁶ The capture of the rebel leaders was the only significant government victory.

As it became clear that the government could not maintain itself in the field with its outnumbered and incompetent forces, it resorted to political violence in the urban areas where it still retained some authority. There were waves of arrests, particularly after constitutional guarantees were suspended on September 10. The arrests solved nothing. With only the small rural guard and makeshift militia to enforce it, government policy vacillated with each setback or superficial victory. Uncommitted Cubans, respected military leaders and ordinary citizens alike, were pushed into the insurgent camp.¹⁷ As the insurgents approached the outskirts of Havana—with commerce in collapse throughout the island and supply for the capital already becoming a problem—the pressure on the government for a settlement grew.

The President Delays a Settlement and Calls for U.S. Aid

President Palma's immediate alternatives were to plunge the capital into a bloody and ruinous civil war or to negotiate a settlement with the rebels. But he wavered. He saw the issue as one of upholding the principle of constitutional authority; he would not make a choice which would appear to recognize the rebels' right to seek redress through revolutionary methods even if that meant the resignation of his government and the collapse of the republic. On September 1, 1906, several prominent veterans of the war of independence met in Oriente Province and decided to send a delegation to Palma urging him to agree to a settlement. Three efforts were made on September 1, 4, and 10. A limited truce was maintained during discussions. In the first two instances, it seemed that the veterans might succeed, but each time Palma changed his mind. By the third meeting, Palma had escaped his dilemma.

Since September 8, the president had been repeatedly and secretly requesting U.S. intervention and troops. By the 10th, he knew that two U.S. battleships were on the way. Moreover, word came of an apparent government victory in Pinar del Río. Palma entertained no further thought of compromise with the rebels. The truce was ended and the insurgents renewed their march on the capital. On September 12, just as events were reaching an untenable stage for the government, the U.S.S. Denver sailed into Havana harbor and the Marietta into Cienfuegos.

U.S. Troops Land, But Roosevelt Is Reluctant To Intervene

The turning point in the insurgency came in the next few days. On September 13, President Palma indicated his intention and that of his government to resign, with no provision for a successor. On the same day, a U.S. Embassy official ordered 125 U.S. troops to land from the Denver to guard the Presidential Palace. Although they were immediately withdrawn on direct order of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, they contributed to dissuading the rebels from attacking the city.

The U.S. presence in Cuba did not mean intervention. Indeed, President Roosevelt clearly resisted intervention. Both foreign policy and domestic factors contributed to his reluctance to intervene. With Panama Canal construction under way, the United States was in the midst of formulating a national Caribbean policy—a policy which was challenged by the August revolt. Secretary of State Elihu Root was himself on a goodwill tour of Latin America, and Roosevelt undoubtedly hesitated to take any action that might imperil his mission. Domestically, congressional elections were to be held in November 1906; political as well as humane considerations urged a course of compromise rather than potential bloodshed.¹⁸ Insurgent generals later said that they would not have fought U.S. troops, but this may have represented only hindsight.¹⁹

Nevertheless, a predominant U.S. role in the course of affairs could be dated from the arrival of the ships and especially from September 14. On that day President Roosevelt trans-

mitted and published a letter calling on the Cuban people to settle their differences and to cease hostilities—warning them of his duty to intervene in the event that insurgency continued. Roosevelt stated he was sending Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Under-Secretary of State Robert Bacon to Cuba to assist in a settlement.

On the basis of Roosevelt's September 14 letter, Palma declared a truce in field operations for the 17th, and the rebels followed suit. Havana was thus saved from an attack by the rebels, who by that time had succeeded in closing off almost all roads to and from the city.

Taft and Bacon Try To Find Basis for an Agreement

On the 19th, Taft and Bacon arrived in Havana. Setting up their headquarters in a strategic spot on the outskirts, they immediately proceeded to interview practically everyone of importance in Cuba, beginning with Palma and including Zayas and several politicians who had been released from jail under the truce. On the 21st, Taft extended the truce and, in a spectacular operation on the 23rd, met with all the rebel generals, who appointed Zayas as their spokesman.

Once Taft had learned of the election frauds, he felt that armed intervention in support of the Palma government was out of the question. On the other hand, he recoiled from the thought of turning over the government to the now almost victorious rebel generals, a cure he felt to be worse than the illness. And, although he was sure that the United States could win in the event of intervention, he estimated that the conflict would be long and costly. Having grasped the main outlines of the problem and many of its details as well, Taft concluded that the compromise suggested earlier by the veterans was a fair one and should serve as the basis for an agreement. The essence of the compromise was Palma's continuation in office, the resignation of all officials elected in the 1905 elections, and the holding of new elections.

There ensued a frustrating series of complicated negotiations during which, as one Cuban remarked, even Taft lost his smile—and his patience. By the 23rd, Taft had persuaded both the Moderates and the Liberals to agree to U.S. arbitration, but the Moderates set a prior condition of rebel disarmament to maintain the dignity of their government. On the 24th, a compromise was officially proposed and tentatively accepted by Zayas. The compromise was rejected by the Moderates as unworkable, and again they demanded that the rebels lay down their arms. Taft appealed to President Palma and also requested Zayas to seek a Liberal agreement on the question of prior disarmament.

Palma continued to reject the compromise as inconsistent with his dignity and honor, as well as being unworkable. On the 25th, he made known his irrevocable decision to resign with his government when Congress was convened. The Moderates having rejected the compromise, the Liberals immediately accepted it. Between the 26th and the 28th, various last-minute and stopgap plans foundered in the ebb and flow of personalities, while the Moderates proffered tantalizing but vague statements of their willingness to negotiate.

Palma's Resignation Forces U.S. Intervention

Taft no longer controlled the course of events. In spite of U.S. intentions and efforts not to interfere directly, the Platt Amendment itself enabled the Cuban government to force the issue. Any settlement based on a compromise was bound to recognize at least some of the rebels' demands, and the government of Cuba could, simply by finding the settlement unacceptable, eventually force the United States to intervene. Pressure for intervention was increased by diplomats of other nations with property in Cuba, who were now threatening action by their own governments.

On September 28, Palma convened Congress to offer his resignation, as well as that of his government. Congress formally asked him to reconsider, but he would not. On the 29th, according to plan, the Moderate members withdrew, breaking the quorum. Without a quorum, no constitutional successor to Palma could be chosen, and Cuba was without a government.

On September 29, 1906, therefore, the United States proclaimed its intervention in Cuba, and Taft was appointed provisional governor. As expected, the insurgents saw a rebel victory in the wording of the proclamation, as indeed they had in the entire history of Taft's previous efforts to secure a peaceful compromise. On the day of the proclamation, they offered to surrender their arms to the provisional government, noting that their principal aims had been recognized and requesting a meeting to draw up specific procedures for disarmament. The military phase of the insurgency was at an end.²⁰

Setting Up the Provisional Government

According to the U.S. proclamation, the provisional government was to be maintained "only long enough to restore order and peace and public confidence, and then to hold such elections as may be necessary to determine those persons upon whom the permanent Government of the Republic should be devolved." Regular constitutional forms were maintained as far as possible; the Cuban flag continued to fly; and regular Cuban diplomatic and consular relationships were continued, even with the United States.²¹ It was initially expected that the life of the provisional government would be short, that elections would be held in 1907, and that the government could then be restored to Cuban hands. The provisional government did not end, however, until January 1909, since it was faced with unforeseen difficulties and had underestimated its task.

The provisional government, which was largely Cuban in personnel although directed by a U.S. executive, had two major responsibilities. The first was the disarming and dispersal of insurgent forces and the militia. The second was the restoration of economic and social order and preparation for the transfer of government back into Cuban hands. The first task, although sensitive and difficult, was a procedural one. The second task was more complex and more significant both for the political future of Cuba and for subsequent United States-Cuban relations.

Strength of U.S. Troops

Initially, the United States committed several thousand troops to Cuba. Within a short time after Taft's arrival, the United States had an immediate capability of disembarking 6,000 sailors and marines onto Cuban soil. A total expeditionary force of 18,000 was in readiness, although transport for it was held in abeyance in order not to encourage the Moderates in their demands for U.S. military intervention and so jeopardize Taft's early efforts at compromise. In addition to the 125 men who had been landed to surround the president's home for a brief period, others were landed later in Cienfuegos to protect foreign property.

Taft's ability to draw on this force was as important as his refusal to deploy it on a large scale during the negotiations for a compromise. This power represented a necessary capability in dealing with the insurgents, especially in tightening the terms of the truce. On the night of September 28, at Palma's request, a small force was posted to protect the treasury during the transfer of government. Upon the establishment of the provisional government, 2,000 U.S. marines were garrisoned at Camp Colombia, the national military post just outside Havana. Of these, 500 were sent to Cienfuegos, in Las Villas Province; 200 to Pinar del Río; and 100 to Camagüey. Between October 6 and 13, 5,600 more marines were landed; but by December 11 half the original contingent of 2,000 marines was withdrawn. The marines were stationed throughout the island in major urban centers. Altogether some 6,000 troops were in Cuba from 1908 to 1909.

Disarming the Rebels

The principal mission of U.S. troops was the establishment of a U.S. military presence in order to promote security. U.S. officers supervised the ticklish business of disarming the rebels and dumping the collected arms into Havana harbor, although most of the actual work was done by the rural guard. By October 8, Havana, Pinar del Río, and Camagüey were cleared. Bitter political rivalry between the insurgents and pro-Moderate officials somewhat postponed disarmament in Las Villas, but in Oriente all insurgents save those in and around Manzanillo were disbanded. In general, the militia did not want to surrender arms, and the entire procedure was complicated by insurgent demands to parade under arms through home areas. Numerous small predatory bands broke away from the already limited control of the insurgent commanders, but these were dispersed by the rural guard. Inevitably, a great number of the better arms were not surrendered, but this was a problem which U.S. military supervisors considered irremediable. Disarmament and dispersal of the insurgents took the better part of two weeks and were accomplished without major incident. The entire operation was completed by October 1906.

The major problem that arose from disbanding the insurgents concerned the questions of ownership of, and compensation for, the horses that had been confiscated by the insurgents. The

furor that this issue aroused was still in progress long after U.S. authorities had settled the question to their own satisfaction; Cubans were never really completely satisfied with the settlements.

Other Tasks of U.S. Forces

Although U.S. army troops remained in Cuba during the entire period of the provisional government, they were never called upon to do any fighting. The suppression of lawlessness was left to the rural guard. U.S. troops were engaged in topographical surveys and a project to revise the map of Cuba. Unarmed and in civilian clothes, contingents of the U.S. Army Engineers surveyed railroad bridges as vulnerable points in case of a future outbreak of insurgency. The U.S. Army Medical Corps assisted in controlling an outbreak of yellow fever in October 1906. Some U.S. troops remained in Cuba following the end of the provisional government to ensure a smooth changeover, at the request of the incoming Cuban president.²²

Cuban Forces Used To Suppress Revolts and a Plot

Although the provisional government had to cope with several uprisings, the rural guard proved capable of suppressing the movements and restoring public order. Revolts in Las Villas late in 1906 and again in early 1907 and in Oriente in October 1907 were all quickly suppressed. These revolts were motivated mainly by a spirit of banditry mixed perhaps with some disaffection at not receiving the expected fruits of the earlier insurgency.

More serious was a plot, in September 1907, to overthrow the provisional government.²³ Aimed primarily against foreign property and U.S. citizens, the attempt was organized by Masó Parra, who had been allowed to return to Cuba from a long exile in July 1907. On September 26, the day before the attempted coup, the government, which had maintained a close watch over the movement, arrested all the leaders; they were subsequently convicted and imprisoned. Parra himself was a notorious revolutionary who had been previously engaged in several similar attempts in the Caribbean. He could best be described as a wavering, rather than a resolute, rebel.²⁴ Parra's attempted coup, as well as other insurgent and bandit activity, were all suppressed, and such incidents ceased to be a problem by 1908. Nevertheless, the incidents, much publicized by the press, raised new doubts about the Cuban capacity for self-government and clouded the future of Cuban politics.²⁵

Political and Economic Reconstruction; U.S. Aims Are Limited

The greatest burden in carrying out the second task--political and economic reconstruction--fell on Charles E. Magoon, who succeeded Taft as provisional governor in October 1906. Taft left Cuba but, as U.S. secretary of war, remained Magoon's superior throughout most of the

period of the intervention. Before leaving, Taft made several important decisions that would affect the policies of the next years. It is important to note that U.S. policy aims and followed by Magoon were extremely limited ones. U.S. policy was mild and ingenuitous; essentially it was one of "keeping things quiet in Cuba." Had the United States realized how prolonged the intervention was to be, it might have pursued more long-range objectives. In defense of the limited objectives sought, it must be said that this policy kept the peace and enabled the United States to turn over to the Cubans a government in good working order.

The provisional government was beset with many economic and social problems. In addition to the outbreak of yellow fever in October 1906, unusually heavy rains that month, followed by a hurricane, caused severe crop damage. The following year was marked by poor credit conditions stemming from the insurgency, a world financial panic, drought and a second poor agricultural year, and rampant strikes by workers taking advantage of the U.S. administration. Nevertheless, the fruits of Magoon's work and a productive year in 1908 enabled him to leave Cuba in fairly good shape in early 1909. Although Magoon left the new Cuban government with a budgetary deficit, it compared rather favorably with the one he had inherited from the Palma administration. Among the other social and economic achievements of the provisional government era were a public works program to relieve unemployment during the rainy season and improvement in the quality and prestige of the rural guard.

Problems in Political Appointments

Political problems also pursued Magoon throughout the two-year period he was in Cuba. On October 10, 1906, Taft had proclaimed a general amnesty for political prisoners associated with the insurgency, a step implied in the original U.S. efforts to seek a compromise. More important, shortly after the proclamation of U.S. intervention, Taft was approached by Liberals with demands that Moderate officials in the administration be replaced by Liberals.

Appreciating immediately the implications of such demands, Taft unequivocally denied them; but he added that, as positions were vacated through normal attrition, Liberals would be appointed until a balance was secured. His policy influenced Magoon, who thereafter relied upon the advice of a committee representing the parties, which pressed for appointment of their choices regardless of qualification or even government need. Such practices over a two-year period served to continue traditional political evils. Cubans afterward blamed Magoon for the origin of the botella (bottle), a name describing government sinecures, although the practice was rooted deep in colonial history.

The Advisory Law Commission Creates a Legal Code

The principal aim of the intervention was envisioned as the enactment of laws to prevent future occurrences of the kind that had sparked the insurgency.²⁶ For this purpose, Magoon,

with his background in comparative Spanish legal systems, was eminently suited. He established an advisory law commission, which turned its attention—with admirable success—to the monumental task of drawing up needed laws on the municipalities, provinces, elections, judiciary, and civil service. Having vacated Congress in December 1906, Magoon assumed legislative responsibility himself. He issued the new laws by decree, after publishing the documents and making some revisions in the light of suggestions and criticism from the public.

The Law of the Armed Forces, promulgated in April 1908, was the first product of the law commission. A sizable armed force was provided for in the hope of preventing such outbreaks as the "August revolution."²⁷ "Pino" Guerra was appointed commander in chief of the Cuban army and in May was sent abroad for military training.

Unfortunately, not only did the lawmaking require time, but the new election law called for careful voter registration, which in turn required a new census. The election date—upon which the end of intervention depended—was continually postponed. Although the census was finally completed in February 1908, local elections were not held until August 1. National elections were held on November 14, 1908, at which time José Miguel Gómez was chosen president. The appropriate date of January 28, 1909, anniversary of the birth of the national hero José Martí, was then chosen for the end of U.S. intervention.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

Thus ended the first and fullest involvement of the United States in Cuban affairs under the Platt Amendment. This is one of the few episodes in the course of Cuban-American relations in which the United States in effect supported the insurgents against the legally constituted government. The immediate results of intervention were considered to be good. The insurgency was stopped before widespread loss of life and property had occurred, and the framework for an ordered political life was re-established. This success, limited though it was, had occurred because both the insurgents and the government had found U.S. intervention acceptable. The Moderates had sought it, while the Liberals welcomed it as a partial satisfaction of their demands—though neither side wished to be held responsible for it.

In the long run, however, the intervention was largely unsuccessful, whether from the standpoint of internal Cuban affairs or of Cuban-American relations. The basic legal achievements of the U.S. administration were largely wasted through the continuance of oldtime Cuban political habits. Even Magoon's public works were allowed to fall into disrepair by Cuban politicians who were eager to initiate new ones to claim as achievements of their own regimes.

The broad U.S. aim of avoiding further insurgency by the creation of viable institutions and a stable political climate was not achieved: Intervention did not foster Cuban political responsibility, and political instability and the use of violence to produce political change continued. Within three years of the end of intervention, in 1912, an uprising of serious proportions

occurred—to be repeated again in 1917 and 1919. In 1917, for example, the insurgents hoped for U.S. intervention to force the holding of honest elections, as had been done under Magoon. By that time, however, the U.S. interpretation and use of the Platt Amendment had changed toward a policy of supporting whatever government was in power and protecting U.S. investments. U.S. involvement in Cuban affairs was continued periodically until the Platt Amendment, actually more useful to certain Cuban politicians than to U.S. policy, was finally abrogated in May 1934. Until its abrogation, the Platt Amendment offered to both Cuban governments and their opponents an escape from the full responsibility for their acts which few nations have ever possessed.

The U.S. intervention in 1906-1909 had also fostered the growth of anti-Americanism. Magoon had barely left Cuba when he was subjected to a growing Cuban criticism, almost entirely unwarranted. This criticism, which did not extend to Taft or Roosevelt, concentrated mainly on money matters, and the accusations ranged from favoritism toward U.S. contractors to the use of his position for personal enrichment. Magoon was charged with patronage in government appointments, granting an excessive number of pardons to criminals, and wasting public funds. Faults that would have been expected and excused in a Cuban were enlarged into crimes in the case of an American. Cubans also resented the implication of U.S. superiority that arose from the power to intervene, and eventually the United States would find itself "castigated for intervention and non-intervention alike."²⁰ Such Cuban scorn, fed by Cuban historians, later merged into a broad pattern of anti-Americanism.

NOTES

¹ The 1907 census is used as the most pertinent estimate; the insurgency led to no substantial changes in population characteristics. See Victor H. Olmsted and Henry Gannet, Cuba: Population, History and Resources, 1907 (Washington: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1909).

² An opinion which many writers on the subject of the "August revolution" shared. See Willis Fletcher Johnson, The History of Cuba (New York: B. F. Buck, 1920), p. IV; D. A. Lockmiller, Magoon in Cuba (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1938); and Charles E. Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic: A Study in Hispanic American Diplomacy (New York: Macmillan, 1927).

³ On the night of September 24, 1906, Palma said to Taft that the elections had been fair. The view that Palma was not fully aware of the events surrounding the election is supported by Chapman, History of the Cuban Republic, and Rafael Martinez Ortiz, Cuba: Los Primeros Años de Independencia (3d ed.; Paris: Editorial "Le Libre," 1929), p. II.

⁴ Chapman, History of the Cuban Republic, p. 189.

⁵ U.S. Secretary of War, "Cuban Pacification," App. E of Report of the Secretary of War, in U.S. Congress, House, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1906, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., 1906-1907 (Doc. 2, Vol. I, Serial 5105; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), p. 455.

⁶ Chapman, History of the Cuban Republic, p. 192.

⁷ This and the following section are based mainly on Martinez Ortiz, Cuba (the most detailed source but lacking chronological milestones), and on the Report of the Secretary of War.

⁸ Chapman, History of the Cuban Republic, p. 193.

⁹ Report of the Secretary of War, p. 531.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Because of persistent rumors that the rebels received support from the United States, an investigation was conducted on orders from President Roosevelt. No evidence of support was found.

¹² Lockmiller, Magoon, p. 36.

¹³ Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁴ Palma, however, was not fully informed; see Chapman, History of the Cuban Republic, p. 193.

¹⁵ Report of the Secretary of War, p. 457.

¹⁶ Lockmiller, Magoon, p. 37.

¹⁷ Martinez Ortiz, Cuba, p. 238.

¹⁸ Lockmiller, Magoon, pp. 50, 52.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 60.

²⁰ The discussion of U.S. military deployment and rebel disarmament is based on the Report of the Secretary of War, especially p. 459 and pp. 525-32. For a full account of the Magoon administration, see Lockmiller, Magoon.

²¹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1958 ed., Vol. VI, p. 837.

²² Lockmiller, Magoon, pp. 84, 188.

²³ Ibid., p. 143.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 143-44.

²⁶ Chapman, History of the Cuban Republic, p. 236.

²⁷ Lockmiller, Magoon, p. 167.

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
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Chapter Six

**MEXICO
1916-1917**



MEXICO (1916-1917)

Chapter Six
MEXICO (1916-1917)

by Harold E. Davis

When President Wilson sent a punitive expedition under Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing to suppress the border-crossing Mexican irregulars under Pancho Villa, the Mexican government under Carranza stood to gain from the suppression of the Villa insurgency, but could not afford politically to support the U.S. effort; in fact, Mexican opposition raised the incident to an international dispute and, with the dispersal (but not dissolution) of the Villista bands and the imminent involvement of U.S. forces in Europe, President Wilson recalled Pershing's forces.

BACKGROUND

"If God had set out to mold a country as a stage for a cavalry campaign, he would have made the plains, the ranches and mountains of Chihuahua." Such was a romantic description of Chihuahua, the scene of Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing's 1916 Mexican campaign.¹

The Mexican state of Chihuahua borders New Mexico and Texas to the north and northeast and the Mexican states of Coahuila to the east, Durango to the south, and Sinaloa and Sonora to the west. Along Chihuahua's western border the Sierra Madre Occidental thrusts rugged peaks 3,000 to 10,000 feet above sea level. This is a region of swift mountain streams that carry off a rainfall averaging 15 to 20 inches per year. East of the mountains lies a dry plateau, 3,000 to 6,000 feet in elevation, surrounded by barren hills and marred by depressions where the sparse rainfall collects. The principal river in the plateau region is the Rio Conchos, but this stream lies too far south to hamper any invasion force entering Chihuahua from the north.² The largest towns in Chihuahua are the state capital of the same name and Juárez, just across the border from El Paso, Texas.

Communications in Chihuahua were crude in 1916. A single railroad, the Mexico Northwestern, ran through the state in a loop that encircled the western part of the high plateau. This line ran from Juárez to Chihuahua, then swung back to the north in a sweeping curve that almost touched the Sierra Madre range. A branch ran southwestward toward Durango. That part of the plateau circumscribed by the railroad was crossed by trails and occasional roads; the easternmost part of the state, the arid region, was all but trackless.³

Chihuahua was then, as now, Mexico's largest producer of lead, gold, silver, and zinc, and the state also yielded a large share of the nation's copper. Cattle ranches and vast haciendas, many of them owned by foreigners, lent a feudal touch, for the peasants living on these tracts were little better than serfs, in perpetual debt to their landlords. Small communities located on the haciendas owed allegiance to the landlord and his agents and had no political status as far as the government at Mexico City was concerned.⁴

Life of the People of Chihuahua

Living in Chihuahua in 1916 were some 300,000 persons, most of them inhabitants of communities with populations of less than 4,000 persons. The majority of these people were mestizos of mixed Indian and Spanish ancestry who owned no land of their own.⁵ The Roman Catholic religion was predominant, but priests were few, and there was scant comprehension of either the international scope of the church or the canons of its theology. Throughout rural Mexico, Roman Catholicism was a village religion, largely unaffected by the continuing struggle in the capital between church and state.⁶

Whether they toiled in the mines, on ranches, or on haciendas, the men of Chihuahua, like most of Mexico's Indians and mestizos, were accustomed to violence. Quarrels between landlords resembled wars between sovereign states. Rebellion, assassination, and murder were usual features of political life. Armed bands, either the partisans of some politician or out-and-out bandits, roamed the countryside killing and pillaging. Indicative of the cheapness of human life was the so-called law of flight, which excused the widespread practice of executing prisoners on the pretext that the captives had attempted to escape.⁷

Provincialism was strong in rural Mexico. The nationalism and patriotism that were then spreading rapidly throughout Mexico were particularly new to Chihuahua, where a man's first loyalty was to his local chief. This chief in turn owed a similar loyalty to a regional chief, and so on up the pyramid. At the top was a political general, usually a man who aspired to high office in the Mexican central government.⁸

Madero Overthrows Díaz, Bui Conflict Continues

Rural Mexico's tradition of violence and its enduring provincialism fed the civil war which beset the country after 1910. In 1910-11, the pyramid of regional and local chieftaincies which had been painstakingly assembled and held together for 35 years by Porfirio Díaz quickly crumbled into ruin. The extent of the turbulence that ensued was reflected in the number of generals and caudillos that suddenly appeared in the field. The most prominent of these were Francisco I. Madero, Victoriano Huerta, Emiliano Zapata, Venustiano Carranza, and Doroteo Arango, better known as Francisco, or "Pancho," Villa.

Madero, more a political idealist than a practical leader, had called upon the people to overthrow the Díaz dictatorship during late November and early December 1910. The aged Díaz and his elderly advisers tried to snuff out the rebellion, but the flames spread, and on May 25, 1911, Díaz resigned to live out his life in exile.

The dramatic success of the revolution led by Madero against the regime of Porfirio Díaz concealed for a time, but only on the surface, serious conflicts and tensions within his movement. These internal divisions found expression, on the one hand, in the demands of labor and agrarian leaders for general reform and, on the other hand, in the demands of those groups who felt that only political changes were needed. When Madero chose to concentrate on strengthening popular suffrage and political rights, the supporters of social reform were infuriated. Internal conflicts also grew out of power rivalries among revolutionary caudillos who felt that their contribution to the triumph of the movement entitled them to political power.

During the short presidency of Madero, from 1911 to 1913, these divisions found early expression. Two rebellions were led by former supporters of the revolution. Against the uprising of Pascual Orozco, centering in Chihuahua, Madero employed the army and engaged the support of the northern state governors in successfully defeating him. Madero was less successful in dealing with the radical agrarian movement of Emiliano Zapata in Morelos; he neither subdued it nor brought its leader into active collaboration. Zapata was a poorly educated Indian whose sole desire was for land reform. He had initially rebelled against Díaz' campaign to eliminate the ancient Indian villages by allowing the large haciendas to appropriate their lands. When Madero, who chose to right political rather than social inequities, offered only token reform, Zapata resumed his fight, a battle that continued after Madero was overthrown.⁹

General Huerta Seizes Control, But Loses to Carranza

Other uprisings against Madero were led by followers of Porfirio Díaz, and in this crisis period Madero turned to the army he had inherited from Díaz. His trust was misplaced, however, for Victoriano Huerta, his most prominent general, betrayed him and seized the reins of government. In February 1913, General Huerta arrested President Madero and, in spite of a pledge of safe conduct, had him shot, allegedly while trying to escape.¹⁰

Huerta, who now tried his hand at ruling Mexico, soon discovered that he had created a martyr whose memory served to inspire rebellion. Huerta's domestic rivals—among them Zapata, Carranza, and Villa—profited from the diplomatic pressure maintained against the new Mexican government by the United States under President Woodrow Wilson. Convinced that Huerta was a usurper and an assassin, Wilson directed U.S. naval forces to seize and occupy Vera Cruz in order to prevent a German merchant ship from landing weapons intended for Huerta's armed forces. The United States retained control of customs at this port and deprived

Huerta of the revenue he needed to pay and provision his troops. He resigned in August 1914, went into exile, and abandoned Mexico's destiny to Carranza. ¹¹

Carranza in Turn Is Challenged by Zapata and Villa

Carranza, a landowner and governor of Coahuila, had launched his revolt against Huerta with about 750 troops. Among the first to rally to Carranza's cause was Alvaro Obregón, a onetime schoolteacher, who possessed a flair for military planning and leadership. Villa and Zapata also supported Carranza, but no sooner had this coalition defeated Huerta than the erstwhile allies fell to quarreling. Villa and Zapata went their separate ways, but Obregón remained loyal to Carranza. Thanks to Obregón's military prowess, Carranza emerged as ruler of Mexico; Villa was restricted to Chihuahua, and Zapata was confined to the south central states of Morelos and Guerrero. ¹²

The Carranza regime was plagued by continuous insurgent movements headed by caudillos, of which Pancho Villa was only one. But it was Villa's insurgent band, operating along the country's northern border, that threatened to turn Mexico's civil war into international strife and brought U.S. troops onto the scene in the spring of 1916.

INSURGENCY

Pancho Villa had for years dominated Chihuahua. Although in the past he had been linked to the Madero family, Villa's career prior to the revolution of 1910 was in general a product of the violence of his environment. In the latter years of the Díaz regime, he was an outlaw, involved in murder, robbery, and cattle smuggling along the Mexican-United States border. Among the first to take up arms in support of Madero against Díaz, Villa's vaqueros (cowboys) had helped the rebels capture Juárez in 1910. After Madero's assassination in 1913, Villa and his 400 men sided with Carranza, clearing Huerta's forces from Chihuahua, seizing Juárez, and securing for the Carranza rebels a supply route to the United States.

It was during this period that Villa consolidated his power in Chihuahua. Lesser chieftains flocked to the standard of this ex-smuggler, and he soon commanded a force of about 10,000 men. The rapid growth of Villa's army gave rise to charges by liberal commentators in the United States that Villa had sold out to the landowners and in particular to American firms with interests in Mexico. Carranza, too, later expressed doubts concerning Villa's revolutionary fervor, but this was not until after the two men had become enemies. Proof linking Villa with foreign interests was far from conclusive, and many Mexicans continued to regard him as a genuine revolutionary. ¹³

To many Mexicans, indeed, Villa appeared as a kind of Robin Hood, and they accepted his executions of persons, especially of the rich and powerful, as a matter of course. Much of his

violence seems to have been shrewdly calculated. There is evidence, moreover, that his men were generally kept under strict discipline, resorting to pillage, rape, and murder only when authorized to do so.

Villa's Role in a Triangular Conflict

The quarrel between Carranza and Villa arose shortly after August 1914, when General Huerta fled before the combined might of Villa, Zapata, and Carranza. The balance of power among the three remaining Mexican chiefs was so delicate at this time that Carranza was afraid to risk alienating either of his fellow generals. Hence Carranza called a conference at which he hoped the trio would agree on a civilian government that would institute a program of gradual but thorough social reform. Although the conference site was supposed to be neutral, Villa packed the town with his followers: they elected their leader secretary of war and chose Eulalio Gutiérrez, an apparently honest but powerless general, as president. Villa and Zapata then combined to force Carranza to retreat to Vera Cruz. There Carranza proclaimed himself ruler of Mexico and announced labor and agrarian reforms intended to win urban as well as rural support for his rival regime.

At this point, Villa and Zapata overthrew Gutiérrez, but the two caudillos could not agree on how to govern the country. Obregón, who continued to support Carranza, took advantage of this lack of unity, attacking first one and then the other. Soon Zapata was bottled up in Guerrero, and Villa was being driven northward from Mexico City.¹⁴ Carranza then regained control of the federal capital, and gradually in 1915 the Carranzistas extended their control to the seaports, railroads, and urban centers of the country.

Villa's Forces Attack Carranza, But Are Defeated

Toppled from federal power, Villa fell back toward his home state of Chihuahua, where he could commandeer the railroad to transport his men, seize supplies from the ranches, and smuggle materials across the U.S. border. During the retreat from Mexico City, some of Villa's subchieftains deserted; but once back in Chihuahua, Villa was able to rally and regroup his forces until they numbered 10,000 to 15,000 men. The human and material resources of the region served Villa well, but he soon discovered that access to the border would profit him not at all.¹⁵

Late in October 1915, Villa took his revitalized army into Sonora to attack the federal outpost at Agua Prieta, just south of the border. Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles, the Carranzista commander of the garrison, was ready for the attack when it came: Trenches had been dug, barbed wire strung, and machineguns and field artillery sited. When the Villistas launched a night attack, as was their custom, the dismounted riflemen surged forward, only to be met by searchlights floodlighting the battlefield. The federal forces of Calles triumphed. The electric

power for these searchlights could have come only from the United States—the battle took place within sight of Douglas, Arizona—and rumor had it that the U.S. government had specifically sanctioned this assistance to Carranza. An aura of credibility surrounded these speculations, for in mid-October the United States had recognized the Carranza regime as Mexico's de facto government.¹⁶

Villa's defeat at Agua Prieta strengthened Carranza's position in northern Mexico. Except for Chihuahua, where Villa remained in control, Carranza's generals were now masters of the railroads and other lines of communications. Most of the ports and customs houses routed supplies and revenues to Carranza, who also was able to levy taxes on foreign-owned industries. Moreover, Carranza's efforts to obtain support from urban laborers and rural peasants were beginning to pay off. Battalions raised by Mexico's labor unions were serving in his army. Finally, U.S. recognition meant that arms could openly be supplied to Carranza, now Mexico's legitimate ruler, but not to Villa, who was considered a rebel.¹⁷

Villa Is Confined to Chihuahua

Following his defeat at Agua Prieta, Villa's fortunes plummeted. In order to find money to pay those of his troops who remained loyal, he attacked first Hermosillo, but was not successful, and then began pillaging his way toward Nogales. En route the Villista army all but disintegrated. By March 1916, Villa's forces had declined to between 500 and 1,000 men, who kept themselves going by banditry and smuggling. Villa was too strong for Carranza's lieutenants in Chihuahua but not strong enough to challenge Carranza outside of Chihuahua. In short, Villa was back where he had been in 1910-11.¹⁸

Villa was thus near the nadir of his power when he provoked the wrath of the United States. Even before the Agua Prieta disaster, Villa's men had menaced the property of the American Smelting and Refining Company. After that battle, his followers killed several American citizens at Santa Ysabel, and Villa demanded forced loans of \$25,000 from each of four American companies doing business in Chihuahua. He also threatened to drive off herds belonging to the Cananea Cattle Company and to seize a soap company at Torreón, both firms in which Americans had invested.¹⁹ These depredations, however, were at worst the desperate measures of a Mexican general down on his luck. Villa's attack on Columbus, New Mexico, was a different matter.

Villa Attacks U.S. Forces on U.S. Soil

The U.S. contingent at Columbus, 300 officers and troopers of the 13th Cavalry under Col. Herbert J. Slocum, was aware that Villa, with some 300 to 500 irregular cavalrymen, was riding toward the border. One of Carranza's officers sent word by an American journalist that Villa was planning an escapade that would force the United States to intervene in Mexico. Slocum, who had no systematic intelligence network south of the border, ignored the warning, however,

dismissing the report as just another of the many rumors then percolating northward. It seemed far more likely that Villa would either attack Carranza's garrison at Las Palomas, just across the border from Columbus, or cross peacefully into the United States to plead for a change in U.S. policy regarding the Carranza regime. Slocum did not feel justified in depriving his men of their rest in order to maintain an alert against the vague threat posed by Villa's band.²⁰

On the night of March 8-9, 1916, Villa executed a well-planned attack that took the American cavalrymen completely by surprise. The Mexican raiders advanced along a gully, concealing their approach so well that the first warning was the sound, at four o'clock in the morning, of a rifle shot killing an American sentry. The officer of the day, Lt. James P. Castleman, bolted out of the orderly room, felled a Villista rifleman in the doorway, and aroused the sleeping soldiers. The first rush of the Mexicans into the camp was met by startled sentries and the cooks and kitchen patrols who were preparing breakfast. Some raiders were driven off with scalding water, kitchen knives, meat cleavers, and bare fists before the garrison rallied to throw off the numerically superior Villista force. After about an hour's fighting, the Villistas decided to break off the action. They disappeared as quickly as they had come, retreating along the same gully and passing across the border through a gate guarded by Mexican border guards, who did not challenge the raiders. The raid netted Villa some 50 horses and a quantity of supplies.

The Americans reacted immediately and without formality. Maj. Frank Tompkins, with 32 men, cut the barbed-wire fence that marked the frontier and scattered a rear guard that Villa had posted on a nearby hill. Here another cavalry detachment under Lieutenant Castleman joined Tompkins' force, raising his total strength to 60 officers and men. Tompkins' troopers rode farther into Mexico, clashing with three other hostile outposts, wearing out their own mounts, and using up most of their ammunition. At noon, the Americans broke off the pursuit. Tompkins claimed that his men had killed about 100 Villistas and had recovered several machineguns and other loot. Another 67 of Villa's men were reported killed during the fighting in and near Columbus. American casualties were seven military and eight civilians killed, eight troopers and five civilians wounded.²¹

Why had Villa chosen to extend his operations to American territory? The insurgent leader subsequently claimed that his raid was in revenge for having been cheated in a smuggling venture, but it seems more likely that he was trying to embarrass Carranza and Wilson, both of whom he hated. To Villa, Carranza was "an old woman," and Wilson was little better, since he had chosen to treat Carranza as Mexico's de facto ruler. Villa apparently hoped to force the United States to intervene in the Mexican civil war, thus compelling Carranza to choose between opposing the Americans, which would probably result in his defeat, and cooperating with the North American invaders, which would certainly tarnish his reputation as a national leader and cost him much of his popular support throughout Mexico.²²

COUNTERINSURGENCY

The Columbus raid touched off an angry uproar in the U.S. press. President Wilson promptly announced that he would send troops to suppress banditry along the border and prevent any repetition of the outrage. Apparently confident that Carranza would cooperate with this move against his rival, Pancho Villa, Wilson sought permission for U.S. forces to enter Mexico. Such an expedition, U.S. diplomats assured Mexican officials, would be for the sole purpose of dealing with Villa and would not threaten Mexican sovereignty.²³

Carranza Hesitates To Grant U.S. Forces Permission To Enter Mexico

Whatever personal sympathy Carranza may have felt for Wilson's proposal, he reacted slowly and cautiously, carefully weighing the possible effects U.S. intervention might have on both Mexican sovereignty and his own political future. He could not afford to bow abjectly before the United States, for this would alienate many of his supporters, but neither could he expect his forces in Chihuahua to hold their own against an American expedition.

In early 1916, Carranza's control over the state of Chihuahua was very tenuous. His forces, numbering some 1,730 in February, had occupied the capital city and manned garrisons in other localities, but federal authority in Chihuahua was nominal at best. Carranza's revolutionary army consisted of irregularly trained officers and men, many of them conscripted. Some federal officers were of dubious loyalty, and many were notoriously sympathetic to Villa.²⁴

Possibly to gain time, Carranza suggested on March 10 that the United States and Mexico renew and expand an old agreement allowing each country to pursue marauders across the international border, an agreement which had originated in the 1880's during the Apache Indian raids across the border. Under Carranza's proposal the United States would permit Mexican troops to cross into the United States in pursuit of raiders in exchange for Mexico's permitting U.S. forces to cross into Mexico, but only if another raid such as that at Columbus should "be repeated at any other point on the border."²⁵ This seemed to rule out a punitive expedition such as the United States proposed.

A Mexican note read to Secretary of State Robert Lansing two days later, on March 12, was even more explicit, stating that the Carranza government would regard any American army operating on Mexican soil "as an invasion of national territory."²⁶ To back up this position, Carranza ordered his commanders in Sonora to resist any American invasion through that state by destroying the railroads. At the same time, the Mexican president issued a proclamation calling on his countrymen to be ready for any emergency, declaring that his government could not permit an affront to Mexico's national dignity.²⁷

United States and Mexican Views Vary on Rights of Pursuit

The United States took a different position. It held that the legal basis of the projected punitive expedition was sound, since Mexico had an equal right to send troops across the border in pursuit of lawless bands. Furthermore, the United States held that "this reciprocal arrangement proposed by the *de facto* Government" of Mexico was "now complete and in force," and on March 13 observed that "reciprocal privileges thereunder may accordingly be exercised by either Government without further interchange of views."²⁸ Alvaro Obregón, newly appointed minister of war and navy, apparently accepted this interpretation when he informed the governors of the Mexican border states on March 13 of an arrangement "providing that the troops of either government may cross the border in pursuit of bandits who are committing depredations along our frontier. . . ."²⁹

But Carranza was not so easily satisfied as his minister of war and marine. The Carranza government continued to insist, through its Washington representative, Eliseo Arredondo, that the agreement applied only to future occurrences and that the Mexican government could not approve a U.S. punitive expedition until after the terms of a mutual agreement had been fixed.³⁰

Carranza's steadfast refusal to grant official permission for foreign military operations on Mexican soil left him free to react, when the time came for action, in the manner that would best strengthen his authority. Although undoubtedly shrewd in a political sense, Carranza's tactics had a detrimental effect on military operations and prevented a systematic counterinsurgency campaign against Villa. Once U.S. troops entered Mexico, the best they could hope for was a benevolent indifference on the part of Mexican federal officials.

The Pershing Expedition: Its Strength and Mission

On March 16, 1916, a week after the attack on Columbus, a U.S. force under the command of Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing moved south. The Pershing expedition, eventually reinforced to a strength of 15,000, originally consisted of 192 officers, 4,800 men, and 4,175 animals. The mission assigned to Pershing's force was carefully circumscribed, reflecting political as well as purely military considerations. Although the declared purpose of the expedition was to capture Villa, the U.S. army chief of staff, Gen. Hugh Scott, instructed Pershing's immediate superior that the objective of the expedition was to scatter Villa's band, thus putting an end to the danger of further raids. No mention was made of capturing Villa.³¹

The first U.S. contingents to cross into Mexico were regular army elements which had been serving along the border for some time. These soldiers, though they had received no special training for the expedition, were thus familiar with the climate and terrain that they would encounter. The U.S. army, moreover, had spent the better part of the last 50 years fighting

irregulars of one sort or another, from Plains Indians to Filipino insurgents.* The most troublesome weakness of the Pershing force was not its training or tradition, but its military intelligence; the expedition seldom acquired either accurate or timely information on Villa's strength and movements.

U.S. Forces Pick Up Villa's Trail in Mexico


The Pershing expedition entered Mexico in two columns, the western detachment moving into western Chihuahua from Hachita, New Mexico, and the second, or main, contingent crossing from Columbus. The western detachment, which included the 7th Cavalry and the bulk of the 10th Cavalry, sought to prevent Villa from escaping into Sonora, while the main column tried to overtake the insurgents or at least to divert them into a trap between the two forces. The main column consisted of the 11th and 13th Cavalry, the 6th and 16th Infantry Brigades, and field artillery and quartermaster elements, as well as signal units that included the Army's first aviation squadron. The two columns were to join at La Ascención, some 50 miles south of the border, unless they had cornered Villa before reaching that point.³²

Upon hearing that Villa had already passed Casas Grandes on his retreat south, Pershing recalled the western column. While the forces were regrouping near Casas Grandes, news arrived that Villa was no more than 50 miles away to the south near San Miguel de Babicora. Pershing immediately sent three fast-moving cavalry columns in pursuit, hoping to prevent Villa from either escaping into the western mountains or moving eastward by rail. Between March 17 and 19, these three columns broke camp, traveling as far as possible by railroad before striking out across open country.³³

The three columns, which had been unsuccessful while operating separately, soon joined forces at Pershing's order, for rumor now had it that Villa was near Santa Ana de Babicora in west central Chihuahua, near the mountain barrier. Although this information proved false, the expedition picked up a trail leading westward. After crossing the Continental Divide, the cavalrymen attacked some of Villa's followers encamped near Guerrero. Although the Mexican guide who led the way delayed the Americans long enough to allow most of the Villistas to escape, some 30 were killed and the remainder were driven back toward Santa Ana. Some of the insurgents reportedly escaped by unfurling the Mexican flag and thereby causing the Americans, who were under orders to avoid clashes with federal troops, to withhold their fire. Villa, who had been wounded a few days before in an engagement with Carranza's forces, was not involved in the skirmish at Guerrero.³⁴

Pershing continued the pursuit, this time sending out four parallel columns. A squadron of the 10th Cavalry scattered a Villista contingent encountered at Agua Caliente, a village midway

*See Vol. I, Chapter Four, "The Philippines (1899-1902)."



AREA OF OPERATIONS, PERSHING EXPEDITION

between Ciudad Guerrero and Chihuahua. Other clashes at Agua Zarca and La Joya had similar results, but the Americans failed to intercept Villa, who with some of his followers was headed south toward Torreón, in neighboring Durango.³⁵

U.S. Forces Find Mexican Resentment Growing

At this point, with Villa seemingly on the run, Mexican resistance to the expedition intensified. On April 12, Major Tompkins, a veteran of the fight at Columbus, led a column of cavalry into Parral and was confronted by a hostile mob of civilians and federal soldiers. Tompkins withdrew from the town, only to be fired upon by an estimated 500 to 600 men who had occupied a nearby hill. The cavalymen returned fire, and before this action ended 40 Mexicans and 2 Americans were dead or mortally wounded.³⁶

The clash at Parral, though apparently not initiated at Carranza's specific order, pointed up the growing Mexican resentment at the presence of the American expedition. When he first entered Chihuahua, Pershing had reported that the inhabitants seemed friendly. As the column moved deeper into Mexico, however, this friendliness diminished steadily, and the general later advised his superiors that the populace was becoming hostile, giving misleading reports, and otherwise aiding Villa, who remained a popular hero in Chihuahua. Carranzista officials told the Americans that Villa was dead, a rumor probably started by the Villistas.³⁷

From the outset of the campaign, Carranza's position had been ambiguous. He had denounced the Pershing expedition as an invasion, called upon the people to resist, and issued a general call to arms. Federal forces were not specifically ordered to fight, however, and until the episode at Parral their opposition had been desultory at best. Carranza had also officially refused to place the railroads at the disposal of the Americans. Still, ostensibly "private" shipments of forage and other supplies passed over the Chihuahua railway with the tacit assent of federal officials. Nevertheless, as the expedition continued southward and Mexican resentment mounted, Carranza realized that more than public gestures and denunciations were called for if he was to get the Americans out of Mexico. Otherwise Villa, as the only Mexican leader who had dared to oppose the United States with force of arms, would emerge a national hero.³⁸

President Wilson's Quandary: Political Versus Practical Problems

In the meantime, President Wilson was receiving contradictory advice concerning the Mexican expedition. Secretary of State Lansing and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker warned the President that the United States might soon be drawn into the European war, which was in its second year. If this should happen, all of America's armed strength would be needed in that decisive theater; none could then be spared for a secondary campaign in Mexico.³⁹ On the other hand, Col. E. M. House, Wilson's personal friend and closest adviser, counseled the President not to recall Pershing. To do so, Colonel House declared, might convince the Germans that the

United States was incapable of maintaining a small force in Mexico, let alone of effectively fighting elsewhere in the world.⁴⁰

Before the fight took place at Parral in April 1916, Wilson was apparently inclining toward recall of the expedition. His mood reflected the military realities of the situation, for Pershing's command relied, except for forage and fresh produce, on rations transported over a long and vulnerable supply line. Roads were rough and almost impassable in rainy weather, and trucks, being used for the first time on a large scale, were so fragile that all supplies had to be moved at least part of the way by mule-drawn wagons. As one observer wryly noted, "While the mechanical equipment was playing hell with the nerves of the service, the mule was delivering the goods in his customary manner."⁴¹

Communication, as well as transportation, was a problem. Radio sets, another innovation in the Mexican campaign, were unreliable; Mexican telegraph lines were often in disrepair; and the crude Curtis biplanes proved ineffective in the thin air of the Chihuahua plateau. As a result, routine communications and reconnaissance usually fell to mounted patrols. Also, authorities in the United States were unable to maintain regular contact with General Pershing, who was frequently far from the nearest telegraph lines and beyond the range of field operating sets. He found it necessary, in fact, to maintain contact with his various units by moving on horseback, with a small escort, from one site to another, and leaving his chief of staff in command back at field headquarters. If war had broken out between the United States and Mexico in 1916, Pershing might well have been cut off hundreds of miles inside hostile territory.⁴²

On the other hand, the incident at Parral left Wilson no choice but to keep Pershing in Mexico until he and Carranza could devise some formula that would satisfy the honor of both nations. To withdraw the force at once, as Carranza demanded, would not only damage American prestige in Mexico, but would also infuriate those segments of the American public and their spokesmen in Congress who were demanding revenge for the Americans killed at Parral. Preoccupied with European developments and facing a campaign for re-election as well, Wilson could not afford a divided nation.⁴³

Pershing Regroups and Harries Villa

Immediately after Parral, Pershing moved his forces northward to avoid further brushes with Mexican federal troops, regrouping around Casas Grandes and continuing to send out patrols in order to obtain as much current information as possible about both government and insurgent forces in the area. This gathering of military intelligence was but one aspect of a general consolidation that saw the establishment in north central Chihuahua of a system of districts within which specific U.S. forces were responsible for maintaining security. This change, Pershing declared, was necessary because Villa's army had now been broken into small, swift-moving segments that could be brought to bay only by forces capable of reacting instantly to Villa's every move.⁴⁴

While this retrenchment around Casas Grandes and Colonia Dublán was taking place, Pershing sent a column to intercept a band of about 100 Villistas whose presence had been reported by officials of the town of Cusi. The cavalrymen, led by Apache scouts, tracked the insurgents to Ojes Azules Ranch and attacked on the morning of May 5, routing the enemy. The attacking cavalrymen killed an estimated 44 Villistas at no loss to themselves.⁴⁵

Political Impasse Remains

In the meantime, Carranza's Secretary of War, General Obregón, had agreed to confer with representatives of the U.S. war department at El Paso. Obregón returned to Mexico bearing a secret agreement for the gradual withdrawal of the Pershing expedition, but Carranza promptly repudiated the scheme and renewed his demand for immediate evacuation, a course of action that Wilson felt he could not adopt.

The war department was now convinced that Carranza's intransigence was due in part to the weakness of the U.S. forces. To impress the Mexican government—while at the same time preparing for the worst—the army sent Pershing reinforcements from regular units stationed near the border, bringing the expedition's strength up to 15,000, and President Wilson mobilized national guard units from Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona to patrol the American side of the border. Wilson also placed an embargo on the shipment of arms, food, and horses to the Mexican government, a ban which Carranza evaded by levying forced loans on Mexican banks and using the money to buy weapons in Japan.

In June 1916 the Democratic party renominated Wilson and announced a political platform that opposed intervention, which Wilson defined as the establishment of a protectorate. But even as the Democrats made this announcement, relations between the United States and Mexico deteriorated. On June 19, an American sailor was killed at Mazatlán, when federal troops fired upon a small boat. This incident was the prelude for a tragedy that occurred two days later.⁴⁶

Carrizal Incident Embarrasses United States

In spite of warnings by Carranza soon after the Parral incident that the expedition would be fired upon if it moved in any direction except north, Pershing continued to reconnoiter. Among the patrols that were operating out of the Colonia Dublán base was one destined for Villa Ahumada. Orders issued to the patrol commander indicated that he was to proceed by way of Carrizal, but the federal garrison there refused to let the patrol pass. Instead of going around Carrizal, the officer adhered to the letter of his orders and in doing so violated their spirit, for he triggered a pitched battle of the sort that Wilson and Pershing were trying to avoid. In an attack as gallant as it was ill-advised, he tried to overwhelm a strong and well-entrenched enemy. His failure resulted in the loss of his own life and the lives of 11 other Americans, while 23 were wounded and taken prisoner. Carrizal was a severe American defeat.⁴⁷

It had been possible to view the Parral incident as an accidental encounter, in which Carranzista officers had temporarily lost control of their men. But Carranza's subsequent instructions to the federal commander in Chihuahua, General Treviño, to resist any American movements to the south, east, or west, made it clear that the fight at Carrizal was no accident. The U.S. punitive expedition could no longer be regarded as a more or less cooperative move against Villa's guerrillas. On the contrary, it was obvious that any further moves against Villa were likely to encounter the all-out opposition of the Carranza government.

By late June, Mexican troops were gathering along the railroads both east and west of Pershing's troops. Some 10,000 Mexican soldiers were reported in the vicinity of Villa Ahumada, while approximately 22,000 had moved up from the south to the city of Chihuahua. It was difficult to tell whether this concentration of federal forces was directed against the Villistas or against the Pershing expedition. From Carranza's viewpoint the two objectives were not inconsistent.

The United States thus faced the difficult choice of terminating the expedition before it had accomplished its objective or increasing the scale of operations and thus risking a prolonged and embarrassing war. The importance of the Mexican crisis also had to be weighed against the steady decline of U.S. relations with Germany. The war in Europe continued unabated, and it appeared increasingly probable that the United States might soon become directly involved. It was clearly no time for the United States to commit its relatively small armed forces in a war with Mexico, in which the advantages to be gained were dubious, to say the least.

Wilson and Carranza Find a Political Solution After Protracted Negotiations

But the Carrizal defeat, coming so soon after the Mazatlán incident, had stirred up a wave of public outrage in the United States which Wilson could not ignore. He sought to resolve the Mexican crisis by a firm but carefully measured response to Carranza's latest moves. Accordingly, he demanded the release of American troops captured at Carrizal and backed up this demand by federalizing the remainder of the national guard.⁴⁸

This move apparently worked, for by the end of June Carranza's determination began to weaken. He released the Carrizal prisoners, and on July 4 he put aside his habitual anti-Americanism to inquire whether the United States would prefer direct negotiations toward withdrawal of the Pershing expedition or arbitration of the question by a committee of Latin American powers. Secretary of State Lansing indicated a preference for negotiations, and discussions began at New London, Connecticut, on September 6. Not until January 1917 did Luis Cabrera, Mexico's negotiator, agree to a formula for the withdrawal of the American troops. Carranza, however, was to find the formula unacceptable.⁴⁹

While the statesmen argued in secret sessions, the Pershing expedition, beset by vile weather and annoying insects, remained encamped near Colonia Dublán. To obtain relief from

the elements, the troops built crude shelters. The only available antidotes to boredom were those prescribed in army lore and administered by Pershing's officers—drills, maneuvers, and marches.⁵⁰

Nonetheless, the drawn-out conference at New London proved a political godsend to both Wilson and Carranza. Throughout his successful campaign for re-election, the American President was able to hail the conference as proof of progress toward a settlement. Carranza, in the meantime, used the respite afforded by the negotiations to develop a domestic program that contributed to his own election in May 1917. The New London talks, though they accomplished nothing concrete, did enable the adversaries to back away gracefully from the chasm of war. When Wilson's advisers suggested that he ignore Carranza's repudiation of the New London accord and summon Pershing home unilaterally, the President agreed. The expedition started northward on January 30, 1917, and on February 5 the last U.S. troops left Mexico.⁵¹

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

In strictly military terms, the Pershing expedition was a success, at least on the tactical level. The Villista bands were put to flight and largely broken up, with heavy casualties, despite the hostility of the local population toward the Americans, who thus operated under the greatest logistical difficulties, and despite the lack of cooperation from local officials of the Carranza government. Although the expedition withdrew from southern Chihuahua to avoid combat with the Carranzistas, and again turned back after the incident at Carrizal, U.S. forces did not lose a single encounter with the Villistas, on whom they inflicted many more casualties than they suffered. The expeditionary forces demonstrated the superiority of their firepower and cavalry tactics; their swift enveloping movements either trapped the Villistas or drove them ahead of the advancing columns. In skirmishes with the Villista irregulars the superior combat discipline of the expeditionary forces was much in evidence.

On the other hand, the lack of reliable intelligence handicapped the expedition greatly, permitting the Villistas to escape on numerous occasions. Although the expedition showed that many of the tactics developed in Indian warfare could be effectively adapted for use against other irregulars, it also revealed the limitations of these tactics in the face of an uncooperative local population and an unfriendly host government, circumstances which turned intelligence and logistical difficulties into crucial vulnerabilities.

The Pershing expedition highlighted various weaknesses in the U.S. army, one of them being its lack of manpower. As the United States became more deeply involved, the President had to turn to the national guard, mobilizing first the units from Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, and later the remainder of the organization. In trying to strengthen the small U.S. army, the President was providentially forming a pool of ready manpower which soon proved essential for the war in Europe.

The Mexican campaign also disclosed inadequacies in U.S. equipment, particularly the early trucks and aircraft. As far as the trench warfare of World War I was concerned, however, the punitive expedition supplied few, if any, tactical lessons. Artillery, vital on Europe's Western Front, was scarcely used in Mexico. And though the cavalry returned from Chihuahua with an enhanced reputation, this arm had long been obsolete on the Continent. Nor did the skirmishing in Mexico indicate the value that the machinegun was soon to demonstrate in France.⁵²

Larger Implications of the Anti-Villa Campaign

Although the Pershing expedition at least succeeded in scattering Pancho Villa's forces and keeping his raiders away from the American-Mexican border, the price of this relatively minor achievement was very nearly a war with Mexico. Each mile the Americans advanced into Mexico brought them closer to the point of battle with the country's regular army. When the clash finally came, at Carrizal in June 1916, war was narrowly averted by indirect but strong military and diplomatic pressure exerted by President Wilson. Though in the end peace was preserved, relations between the United States and Mexico continued to suffer from the effects of the 1916-1917 intervention long after the expedition had been withdrawn.

The situation was complicated by the gradual involvement of the United States in the European war. The crisis leading to the United States' declaration of war against Germany in April 1917 absorbed the country's best diplomatic and military talent. Moreover, the European war aroused national instincts and sensitivities in the United States, causing Americans to be suspicious of actions on the part of the Mexicans that otherwise might have been overlooked.

At the same time, traditional Mexican distrust of the United States provided an opening south of the border for German diplomats and perhaps agents. Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had sent German advisers to Carranza's army soon after he recognized the Carranza regime, gave Mexico material and diplomatic support. In February 1917, the famous Zimmermann note came to light. In this note, written the previous month, the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Alfred Zimmermann, directed the German minister to Mexico to offer Mexico German help in regaining Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, territory lost to the United States at the end of the Mexican War in 1848—in exchange for a German-Mexican alliance, if the United States entered the European war. Carranza refused these overtures, probably because he realized that a distant and blockaded Germany would be of little practical assistance against his powerful neighbor to the north.

The principal strategic lesson demonstrated by the Mexican campaign was that a minor national interest must yield before more vital concerns. An accommodation with Mexico, a weaker and less dangerous opponent, was in this case necessary if the United States was to marshal its resources against an infinitely stronger and more dangerous enemy in Europe. Arranging Mexico's internal affairs to the satisfaction of the United States might have appeared desirable, but

victory over Germany was essential. It was in the light of this broader strategic consideration that the Pershing expedition was withdrawn from Mexico.

The Mexican expedition illustrates for the student of counterinsurgency the difficulty of conducting a military operation which lacks an adequate basis in political agreement. The expedition was not planned to strengthen the Mexican political situation but to exact retribution for an attack on U.S. territory. The campaign was not carried out on the basis of a joint plan supported by both countries, but, rather, was imposed by the United States upon the Carranza government, which never actively supported and soon came to vehemently oppose the U.S. action. General Pershing and the commanders of his fast-moving cavalry columns were thus expected to operate in an area where higher civilian authority had failed to achieve an effective working basis for collaboration with the indigenous government.

The experience is further relevant to the present in that it illustrates the difficulties peculiar to involvement in any conflict within a nation undergoing a profound social and political revolution. The weakness of the central government of such a nation—beset by conflicting demands of various groups, shifting alliances in the power structure, personal rivalries, unreliability of individual army commanders, and explosive nationalism—renders any involvement of an external power in a situation of internal conflict a difficult task at best.

NOTES

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¹Col. Henry A. Toulmin, With Pershing in Mexico (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1935), p. 17.

²Preston E. James, Latin America (New York: Odyssey Press, 1942), pp. 615-34; Nathan L. Whetten, Rural Mexico (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 4, 6, 7, 10; Robert S. Thomas and Inez V. Allen, The Mexican Punitive Expedition Under Brigadier General John J. Pershing, United States Army, 1916-1917 (Washington: War Histories Division, Department of the Army, 1954, mimeo.), chapter II, pp. 11-14, 16.

³See map in Thomas and Allen, The Mexican Punitive Expedition.

⁴Frank Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), pp. 187-97.

⁵Departamento de la Estadística Nacional, Resumen del censo general de habitantes de 30 Noviembre de 1921 (México: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928), p. 62; Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1930), app. B., tables I and IV, pp. 454, 460-64, data derived from 1921 census.

⁶Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution, pp. 61-67.

⁷Ibid., pp. 78-79, 104-105.

⁸Ibid., p. 96.

⁹Ibid., pp. 175-80.

¹⁰Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (revised and enlarged edition; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 121-32.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 135-62.

¹²Ibid., pp. 136-37; Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution, p. 125.

¹³Helen Phipps, Some Aspects of the Agrarian Question in Mexico: A Historical Study (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1925), p. 138; Miguel Alessio Robles, Historia política de la revolución (México: Ediciones Botas, 1938), pp. 116-19; Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 32-36, 42, 56, 71.

¹⁴Cline, The United States and Mexico, pp. 163-65.

¹⁵Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 207-210.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 211-12.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 193.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 44-46; Larry A. Harris, Pancho Villa (El Paso, Texas: McMath Company, 1949), p. 68; U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations of the United States for 1916 and 1917. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations. "Investigation of Mexican Affairs," 2 vols., 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., #285 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), vol. 1, pp. 1433-34; Toulmin, With Pershing in Mexico, pp. 8-9.

¹⁹Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 308-310; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (5th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 608.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 239-42.

²¹Ibid.; Thomas and Allen, The Mexican Punitive Expedition, chapter I, p. 15; Toulmin, With Pershing in Mexico, p. 41.

²²Alberto Morales Jimenez, Historia de la revolución mexicana (México: Instituto de Investigaciones Políticas, Económicas y Sociales del Partido Revolucionario Institucional, 1951), p. 184; Alessio Robles, Historia Política de la revolución, p. 255; Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 175.

²³Messages, Adjutant General to General Funston, file no. 812.00/17413; Secretary of State to all American Consular Officials in Mexico, file no. 812.00/17408; Secretary of State to Mr. Arredondo, file no. 812.00/17488A; Adjutant General to General Funston, file no. 812.00/17743, all in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, pp. 483-84, 489.

²⁴Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, p. 468; Consul Letcher to the Secretary of State (#312. 115c96/103-Feb. 9, 1916).

²⁵Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, p. 485; Special Agent Silliman to Secretary of State, transmitting note from Mexican Secretary for Foreign Affairs Acuña (#812.00/17501).

²⁶Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, p. 486; First Chief Carranza to Mr. Arredondo, read to the Secretary of State (#812.00/17458).

²⁷Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 250-53.

²⁸Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, pp. 487-88; Lansing to Special Agent Silliman March 13, 1916 (#812.00/17455).

²⁹Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, p. 255.

³⁰Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, p. 493 (#812.00/17920).

³¹Message, Secretary of State to American Consular Officers in Mexico, file no. 812.00/17408, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, p. 484; Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 251-52; Col. Frank Tompkins, Chasing Villa (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1934), p. 72.

³²Calvin W. Hines, "The Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916," unpublished Master's thesis, Trinity University, 1961, on file at the Library of Congress, pp. 75-77; Tompkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 72-74.

³³Thomas and Allen, The Mexican Punitive Expedition, chapter II, pp. 12-18, chapter III, pp. 1-2.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 8-12; Tompkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 73, 80-87.

³⁵Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 145; Toulmin, With Pershing in Mexico, p. vi; Hines, "The Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916," pp. 97-100; see also Thomas and Allen, The Mexican Punitive Expedition, *passim*.

³⁶Thomas and Allen, The Mexican Punitive Expedition, chapter IV, p. 4; Cline, The United States and Mexico, pp. 179-80.

³⁷Message, Funston to Adjutant General relaying Pershing message, file no. 812.00/17914, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, pp. 521-22; Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, p. 265; Thomas and Allen, The Mexican Punitive Expedition, chapter III, pp. 26-27; Nellie Campobello, Apuntes sobre la vida militar de Pancho Villa (México: Edición y Distribución Ibero-Americana de Publicaciones, 1940), pp. 126-32; Alberto Calzadiaz Barrera, Villa contra todo (México: Editorial Libros de Mexico, 1960), p. 140.

³⁸Message, Pershing to Funston, file no. 812.00/17914, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, p. 521; Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 250-53.

³⁹Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 179.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Toulmin, With Pershing in Mexico, pp. 120-21.

⁴²Tompkins, Chasing Villa, appendix C, pp. 246-54; Toulmin, With Pershing in Mexico, pp. 47, 117-21; Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, p. 258; Thomas and Allen, The Mexican Punitive Expedition, chapter III, p. 23, appendix D, pp. D-9, 14.

⁴³Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 180.

⁴⁴Hines, "The Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916," appendix, pp. 228-29; Thomas and Allen, The Mexican Punitive Expedition, chapter IV, pp. 18-19; Richard O'Connor, Black Jack Pershing (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 131-32.

⁴⁵Toulmin, With Pershing in Mexico, pp. 81-88.

⁴⁶Cline, The United States and Mexico, pp. 180-81; O'Connor, Black Jack Pershing, p. 130.

⁴⁷Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 278-81; Hines, "The Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916," appendix, p. 229; Toulmin, With Pershing in Mexico, pp. 69-78.

⁴⁸Cline, The United States and Mexico, pp. 181-82.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 182.

⁵⁰Toulmin, With Pershing in Mexico, pp. 115-16; O'Connor, Black Jack Pershing, p. 136.

⁵¹Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 183; O'Connor, Black Jack Pershing, pp. 136-38.


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Chapter Seven

**NICARAGUA
1927-1933**



NICARAGUA (1927-1933)

Chapter Seven

NICARAGUA (1927-1933)

by Bernard C. Nalty

U.S. marines and the marine-trained Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua faced numerous military problems in their counterinsurgency efforts against Augusto Sandino; at the same time, U.S. efforts to establish democratic political institutions in that country were largely frustrated.

BACKGROUND

Nicaragua is divided into two main geographic regions—the highlands in the west and northwest and the heavily forested coastal plain that extends inland from the nation's Caribbean coast. In the western highlands, the mountainous spine of Central America is broken by a gap containing two large lakes, Managua and Nicaragua, which together with the San Juan River serve as links in a combined land and water route across the isthmus. The highlands, suited in some regions to plantation crops such as coffee, contain valuable mineral deposits. The plain surrounding the lakes supports both farms and ranches. In spite of a rainy season that drenches most parts of the country from mid-May to mid-November, the rugged area due west of the lakes is quite arid. The malarial plain along the Caribbean coast is suitable for banana growing and timber cutting.¹

In 1927, Nicaragua, which covers an area about the size of the state of Alabama, supported a population of some 700,000 persons. About one-fourth of those who dwelt within Nicaragua's inadequately defined borders lived in the six large towns located near the lakes. Two of these population centers served as headquarters for the nation's rival political factions: Granada for the Conservatives, and León for the Liberals. The bitterness between these two parties was based upon localismo, an intense civic pride cultivated by the urban populace, and personalismo, a tendency to rally behind a leader. When hatreds, even local ones, were sufficiently inflamed by some dynamic leader, a revolution was likely to occur, for political disputes were traditionally resolved by force of arms.²

Most of the rural populace were mestizos, a Spanish-Indian admixture that predominated throughout Nicaragua. Although the Conservative leaders, unlike the Liberals, emphasized their Spanish heritage, ethnic rivalries had little impact on politics. Since the vast majority of Nicaraguans were at least nominally Roman Catholic, there was no religious conflict.

Economic conditions were usually stable, if not prosperous.³ In times of peace, there was little unemployment, but the periodic revolutions brought widespread economic dislocation. Although employment was generally available for those who wanted work, wages were low—between 15 and 50 cents a day. Agricultural implements were crude and farming methods primitive. Poor sanitation and an inadequate diet resulted in a high incidence of disease. There was no public health system, and political instability prevented the establishment of adequate public schools. The standard of living in Nicaragua was no lower, however, than that in other Central American republics.⁴

U.S. Interest in Nicaragua

The United States had become interested in Nicaragua immediately after the Mexican war, when the acquisition of California and the discovery of gold there dramatized the importance of rapid access from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific shore. Great Britain tried for a time to maintain control over the eastern end of the isthmian route across Nicaragua but settled in 1850 for an agreement whereby any isthmian canal would be a combined Anglo-American venture. The region continued to drift into an exclusively American sphere of influence, however, and in 1901 Great Britain formally surrendered its stake in the canal project.⁵

The canal eventually was built in Panama, but this did not diminish U.S. concern for the stability of Nicaragua. As Secretary of State Philander Knox declared in 1912:

The logic of political geography and of strategy, and now our tremendous national interest created by the Panama Canal, make the safety, the peace, and the prosperity of Central America and the zone of the Caribbean of paramount interest to the Government of the United States. Thus the malady of revolutions and financial collapse is most acute precisely in the region where it is most dangerous to us. It is here that we seek to apply a remedy.⁶

Application of this remedy frequently resulted in landings by U.S. forces.

In 1927, the United States intervened in Nicaragua to halt a particularly destructive revolution. The presence in that country of some 2,000 U.S. marines and sailors and the possibility that still more would be landed induced the rebellious Liberals, whose forces were commanded by José Moncada, to accept a caretaker government headed by Adolfo Díaz. Díaz, a Conservative, had in the past cooperated so enthusiastically with the United States that he was considered by some to be an American puppet. Unpopular with the Liberals, lacking any great following within his own party, and distrusted by Nicaraguan nationalists, Díaz was an interim chief executive. As part of the peace settlement negotiated by Henry L. Stimson, the United States promised to supervise the presidential election of 1928. Confident that a fair electoral count would insure their victory, the Liberals welcomed this pledge of electoral reform.⁷

The settlement also included a U.S. pledge to organize and train a single national security force that would support the lawfully elected government, whether it was Liberal or Conservative.

This force, the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, was expected in the future to prevent the "outs" from rebelling against the party in power.⁸

INSURGENCY

Although the Liberal leadership accepted Diaz, he was rejected by one of Moncada's generals, Augusto Sandino, and by a few bandit chiefs serving in the Liberal ranks. Influenced by Mexico's revolutionary nationalism, Sandino believed that Moncada and Juan B. Sacasa, the leader of the party, had betrayed the Liberal cause by yielding to the threat of large-scale American intervention. Sandino therefore chose, like many before him, to rebel against the government.⁹

Sandino's Political Aims and the Charge of Communism

Of the various individuals involved in the insurrection, only General Sandino had political ambitions. He planned to expel the U.S. forces, overthrow the government, and seize power for himself. He would then put an end to U.S. interference in Nicaraguan affairs, purge the Americanistas from Liberal ranks, and rebuild the party in the Mexican image. He also spoke of resurrecting the old dream of a Central American confederation, presumably under Mexican aegis. When his insurrection had finally ended, he actually announced a plan to form a party composed mainly of workers and students; but the project was abandoned.¹⁰

Although Sandino's Nicaraguan enemies denounced him as a Communist and U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg warned of Bolshevik influence in Nicaragua, the insurgent leader, in spite of indoctrination by a Salvadoran Communist leader, never embraced Marxism. Nonetheless, the Sandinistas were lionized by the Communist Party of the United States and by Communist-dominated organizations such as the All American Anti-Imperialist League, which sent money and medicines to Nicaragua and propagandized on Sandino's behalf.¹¹

Sandino Proclaims a Republic and Initiates Action

In May 1927, Sandino started northward with a force of some 40 men. During the following month, he occupied the American-owned Butters' mine near San Albino in Nueva Segovia, thereby obtaining a supply of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. After proclaiming the establishment of the "Republic of Nueva Segovia," he initiated hostilities on July 16 by attacking the marines and guardias stationed at Ocotal. Although the marines underestimated the seriousness of the insurrection, they reacted vigorously and drove Sandino back upon El Chipote, a mountain redoubt near the Honduran border. By January 1928, marine pressure forced Sandino to abandon this stronghold, and it appeared for the moment that the insurrection had been suppressed.¹² But although the insurgents were forced on occasion to withdraw across the Honduran border to

escape destruction, Sandino survived and became the rallying point for anti-U. S. sentiment throughout Latin America.¹³

Popular Support for Sandino

The loss of El Chipote was a grave blow to the Sandinistas, but warfare continued in the northern and northeastern parts of the country, where Sandino and his lieutenants controlled the least inhabited areas. The area in which Sandino found refuge—the northern departments of Nueva Segovia, Jinotega, Estelí, and Matagalpa—was the home of numerous bandit groups, an indication of the lack of governmental control even in peacetime. Furthermore, Sandino's opposition to the United States was not unpopular. Resentment at U.S. meddling in Nicaraguan affairs had increased over the years; and Mexican propagandists had contrasted their own government's amicable relations with Nicaragua to the de facto protectorate exercised by the United States.¹⁴

Sandino's rather crude political philosophy did not lessen his appeal to the inhabitants of Nicaragua's northern departments. It was, in fact, Sandino's personality rather than his political theories that enabled him to rally the support of the highland populace. These people, mestizos of predominantly Indian blood, had no real loyalty to the government at distant Managua; but they did come to admire Sandino, who was one of them. The insurgent leader exercised rigid discipline over his troops and thus imposed no oppressive burden on a population already accustomed to the presence of bandit groups. The war, moreover, disrupted the working of the mines and plantations in the area, thus causing unemployment which, to complete a vicious circle, encouraged the able bodied to volunteer to serve with Sandino.¹⁵

Strength and Organisation of Guerrilla Forces

From 40 men in May 1927, Sandino's ranks swelled to about 1,000 by mid-July of that year. During the winter of 1928-1929, insurgent strength declined sharply as a result of marine operations and the loss of El Chipote. Counterinsurgency operations continued to exert great pressure on the insurgents, and in June 1929 Sandino, with 25 followers, took refuge near Mérida in Yucatan, Mexico. In May 1930, however, he returned to Nicaragua and began rebuilding his force, which numbered about 1,800 when the insurrection ended.¹⁶

The entire insurgent force was not under Sandino's direct control; rather it was a loose confederation of armed groups that varied in size from 50 to 300 men. The leaders of various units generally obeyed Sandino's orders, although at least one of his lieutenants broke away to pursue a career as a bandit. Each of the loyal groups usually operated in a different area, but two or more might on occasion combine forces. All were armed with rifles and whatever other light weapons might be available. As nearly as can be determined, new recruits learned tactics by taking part in actual operations. Political indoctrination of the insurgents apparently

consisted mainly of anti-U. S. harangues. Yet Sandino's admiration of Mexican nationalism and his eventual establishment of a cooperative in the Rio Coco valley indicate that he may also have preached land reform.¹⁷

Insurgent Strategy and Tactics

Sandino's strategy and tactics both changed during the course of the insurrection. Initially, he tried to overwhelm the marines and drive them from the country. The vigorous reaction to his attack upon Ocotal, however, forced him to assume the defensive. Sandino correctly judged that U.S. forces would not remain in Nicaragua indefinitely; but he may have underestimated the potential of the marine-trained Guardia Nacional, which became proficient enough to replace the marines and dashed his hopes for a victory in the field. The insurgent leader then adopted a strategy of maintaining sufficient pressure on the government to compel it to negotiate a settlement with him.¹⁸

In the first stage of the insurrection, Sandino took the offensive by launching attacks against outposts manned by marines and guardias. These operations, usually undertaken at night, involved a few hundred Sandinistas. When the marines undertook an offensive of their own, the insurgents relied on ambushes as they fell back upon El Chipote. After the loss of this redoubt, however, Sandino avoided the large troop concentrations that were so vulnerable to aerial attack. Although the Sandinistas generally fought from ambush after that, they occasionally launched raids along the Coco valley toward the Caribbean coast or southward into the department of León in central Nicaragua. The main purpose of these raids was to exert pressure on the government, but Sandino also hoped to obtain recruits during his forays.¹⁹

Despite Good Intelligence, Casualties Are High

Throughout these operations, Sandino profited from an excellent intelligence network that included agents in almost every hamlet. Trails were watched by scouts who reported troop movements to the nearest insurgent group. Those sympathetic to Sandino often gave false information to his enemies. Under these circumstances, it was inevitable that marine and guardia units should stumble into ambushes, but even when surprised they fought well. As a result, in 510 engagements with government troops, the insurgents lost 1,115 men killed, 526 wounded, and 76 captured.²⁰

Local Supply and External Aid

Throughout the insurrection, Sandino and his followers obtained supplies both from within the four northern departments and from other Central American states. Food and clothing were provided voluntarily by those Nicaraguans who supported the movement, while weapons and

supplies were taken from mines and plantations raided by the Sandinistas. Assessments, disguised as taxes, were also levied upon various enterprises operating in northern Nicaragua.²¹

Outside aid came principally from Mexico, Costa Rica, and Honduras. Although none of these governments sent organized volunteer units, individuals and small groups did enter Nicaragua. Mexico, which as early as 1926 had begun to support the Liberal party forces, was a source of both money and medical supplies. Mexico's president extended to Sandino an invitation to visit that nation, and from June 1929 until May 1930 the insurgent leader found refuge in Yucatan. By 1931, however, Mexican enthusiasm had cooled, and Sandino could obtain from the government only a vague promise of support.

Costa Ricans sympathetic to Sandino boycotted U.S. goods and contributed approximately \$500 to the insurgent cause. Honduras, Sandino's most important source of external aid as well as his main propaganda outlet, also served as a haven for hard-pressed insurgent units. During 1932, however, the president of Honduras dispatched patrols to the border, hindering both the traffic in arms and the movement of the insurgents.²² External aid, though helpful, was never so important as the support that Sandino received from the people of northern Nicaragua.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

United States strategy in Nicaragua was based upon the assumption that enactment of a just electoral law and creation of a nonpolitical military force would enable the Nicaraguan government to operate in an orderly and stable manner. This policy led to the drafting of an electoral law, the supervision of three elections, and the training of a constabulary, the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. Furthermore, a U.S. marine expeditionary force was maintained in Nicaragua from January 10, 1927, to January 2, 1933. Both guardia and marine forces were used in active operations against Sandino.²³

Although Sandino informed Moncada on May 24, 1927, that he would not recognize Diaz as president and promptly led his followers into the northern highlands, counterinsurgency operations did not begin until July 2 when Rear Admiral Julian H. Latimer, commander of the U.S. Navy's Special Service Squadron, ordered the U.S. marines to disarm Sandino and his troops.²⁴

Strength and Deployment of U.S. Marines and Guardia Nacional

Since the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua had not yet been fully organized and trained, the brunt of the earlier fighting was borne by the marines. At its peak strength, the marine expeditionary brigade was composed of two infantry regiments and an aviation unit, but for the greater part of the insurrection the marine force consisted of one regiment, less one of its battalions, supported by aviation detachments. When necessary, additional reinforcements were drawn from the Special Service Squadron's vessels that operated off the east coast of Central America.

Placements came from recruit depots in the United States or from other posts and stations; these men are not known to have received any special training in counterinsurgency.²⁵

The total number of U.S. marines serving with the brigade and its supporting aviation detachments or attached to the guardia was 3,958 in July 1928, 1,173 in June 1929, 992 in July 1930, and 1,303 in November 1932.²⁶

The Guardia Nacional, which adhered to the marines' tactics and administrative practices, at first fought alongside elements of the expeditionary brigade; but as the Nicaraguan troops grew more proficient, they assumed a greater degree of responsibility for field operations. Throughout 1932 the marines, except for aviation units, remained in the vicinity of Managua and Corinto, leaving to the guardia the campaign in the northern departments. Marine officers and noncommissioned officers, who held temporary commissions in the guardia, trained, advised, and commanded this Nicaraguan force down to the platoon level. Along with the commanding general of the marine brigade, the marine in charge of the Guardia Nacional was principal military adviser to the president of Nicaragua.²⁷ The guardia increased in size from 82 officers and 574 men in December 1927 to 267 officers and 2,240 men by July 1932.²⁸

For administrative purposes, Nicaragua was divided into five areas, each of which was commanded by a marine officer. Both guardia and marine units were assigned to these areas according to the dictates of the tactical situation. Thus, the greatest strength was in the northern and central areas, with fewer troops in the southern, central, and eastern areas.²⁹

Antiguerrilla Tactics

The tactics pursued by both the marines and the Nicaraguan constabulary combined active patrolling with the establishment of fixed garrisons. Patrols drawn from outposts located in the embattled northern departments probed the enemy-controlled highlands, while other columns attempted to seek out and destroy known insurgent concentrations. On occasion, the counterinsurgency forces attempted pincer movements against Sandino's area of operations by making simultaneous thrusts directly to the north and westward along the Rio Coco.

The overland patrols, usually roadbound because of the difficult terrain and the need to carry their supplies on pack animals, relied heavily on Thompson submachine guns and other automatic weapons, for combat actions were generally brief, with the enemy striking from ambush. Patrols operating along the Rio Coco enjoyed somewhat greater freedom of action, since native-built boats were used to transport men and supplies; but in this region also the antagonists sought to ambush one another.

When attacked, the counterinsurgents took cover, built up a base of fire to pin down the enemy, and tried to maneuver close enough to destroy the Sandinistas with grenades, small-arms fire, and Layonets. Stokes mortars and 37mm cannon were used for fire support, but aerial bombing and strafing proved far more effective than either of these weapons.³⁰

Lack of Nicaraguan Support for the Anti-Sandino Campaign

In November 1930, President Moncada, the leader of Liberal forces in the recent revolution and winner of the U.S. -supervised election of 1928, complained to the U.S. secretary of state that the "scientific warfare" being waged by the marines was not adequate to the situation. He objected in particular to the network of outposts which, he claimed, had cost the Nicaraguan government \$1 million annually for the past two years. The secretary of state replied that marine tactics were sound, but that the marines were being frustrated by difficult terrain and unfavorable economic conditions.³¹ The marines and government forces were also handicapped by poor intelligence. Information was for the most part obtained from natives of a particular area and evaluated on the spot or reported to higher headquarters. Since local sentiment favored Sandino, all too often patrols were deceived or led into ambush.³²

Air and Naval Support and Overland Mobility

Although their ground tactics seemed conservative, the marines made imaginative use of aircraft in supporting ground troops by dive-bombing and strafing, in delivering supplies, and in conducting scouting missions. The wooded terrain, however, baffled aerial observers.³³ The counterinsurgency forces also were aided by the Special Service Squadron, which transported marine contingents along the east coast to meet threats posed by the Sandinistas.³⁴

Once supplies destined for U.S. forces in Nicaragua had been landed on the west coast, usually at Corinto, they were shipped by rail to Managua or León, and thence sent to an area supply dump such as Ocotal in the northern area. But the trip from León to Ocotal, a distance of about 160 miles, required from 11 to 13 days by bull cart. Trucks, caterpillar tractors, and aircraft also were used on this supply run. From the area supply point, deliveries were made to the various outposts by air or pack train. Some items, such as fresh meat, vegetables, forage, and pack animals, were purchased locally by the area quartermasters.³⁵

Limited Use of Paramilitary Organizations

Perhaps the most striking feature of the counterinsurgency effort was the absence of those techniques which recently have come to be associated with such operations. There were, for example, no special counterinsurgency forces, save for the voluntarios, 500 of whom were recruited by President Moncada during early 1929. This force, composed of men from the northern departments who were familiar with both Sandino's tactics and the area of operations, fought side by side with the guardia. The raising of the voluntarios was opposed by both Nicaraguan Conservatives and U.S. diplomats, for Moncada appeared to be making this new organization the military arm of the Liberal party. By July 1929, the president yielded to U.S. pressure and disbanded the voluntarios.³⁶

Civic Action and Psychological Operations

U.S. civic action in Nicaragua consisted almost entirely of the assignment of seven persons to the department of construction of roads. The Nicaraguan government paid for the road program, which lasted from August 1929 to September 1930 and resulted in the construction of 11.2 miles of roadway and 36 small bridges or culverts. During 1930, in response to Moncada's complaints regarding marine tactics, the U.S. Department of State urged an expanded program of road building as well as the adoption of an educational program. The Nicaraguan Congress, however, refused to act.³⁷

Another road construction project was undertaken in 1929 on the initiative of the marines. When the State Department judged the project to be too expensive, the marines were forced to use funds earmarked for transportation costs to finance the program. Its value was established when approximately 125 Sandinistas turned in their weapons in return for grants of amnesty and sought employment on road gangs working in the vicinity of Yalf.³⁸

Resettlement was scarcely tried. During the summer of 1930, the marine garrison commanders at Yalf, Ocotal, and Jinotega ordered those who dwelt in the general area to move into specified villages or be treated as bandits. Difficulties in feeding and housing the uprooted persons led to the prompt termination of this program.³⁹

There were otherwise no planned civic action programs. Navy medical corpsmen attached to the guardia did, however, provide free medical care to the inhabitants of villages to which they were assigned.⁴⁰

Except for the Nicaraguan government's frequent offers of amnesty to those insurgents willing to surrender, psychological operations were neglected. The most important nonmilitary psychological operation was perhaps a visit to Nicaragua by trans-Atlantic aviator Charles Lindbergh. This visit, which took place in December 1927, was intended to create good will throughout Latin America, however, and was not oriented specifically toward the Nicaraguan crisis. The marines' marked respect for the lives and property of noncombatants undoubtedly made the intervention seem less onerous to the people of Nicaragua.⁴¹

Goals and Cost in Casualties and Money of the Anti-Sandino Campaign

The goal of the counterinsurgency campaign was the military destruction of Sandino's forces. Although the United States sought, through the creation of a nonpolitical army and the drafting of an electoral law, to ensure the future stability of the country, no systematic economic, educational, or propaganda measures were undertaken in connection with military operations.

The campaign against Sandino was costly in both lives and treasure. The guardia admitted that 48 of their men had been killed and 109 wounded; while the marines suffered 136 killed, including 89 noncombat deaths, and 66 wounded. The campaign cost the United States approximately \$20 million.⁴²

External Reaction to U.S. Operations in Nicaragua

In the United States, the intervention was opposed by the liberal press and by certain political leaders. In 1932, the U.S. Congress stipulated that funds voted for naval appropriations might not be spent in Nicaragua. This domestic opposition was based for the most part on an honest conviction that Nicaragua had a right to work out its destiny without U.S. interference.⁴³

The intervention was also unpopular throughout Latin America. Although there were some statements approving the manner in which the 1928 election was supervised, the press in Central and South America voiced disappointment when the marines were kept in Nicaragua after the selection of Moncada as the new president. However, in 1932 the United States was successful in persuading the Honduran government to patrol its border with Nicaragua in order to cut off Sandino's sanctuary and supplies.⁴⁴

Sandino Seeks To Negotiate

In January of 1933, the United States withdrew the marine forces. The guardia was put under the command of Anastasio Somoza and immediately inflicted three severe defeats on the insurgents, who had been deprived of their Honduran haven. Sandino sued for peace and obtained an honorable one, not because of his military strength, but because he was needed within the Nicaraguan government as a counterweight to Somoza's growing political force.⁴⁵

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

Hostilities ended on February 2, 1933, with the signing of an agreement between Sandino and Juan B. Sacasa, the recently inaugurated president of Nicaragua. The settlement was an attempt to ensure political balance. Although Sacasa, leader of the Liberals, and Diaz, still the spokesman for the Conservatives, had pledged that the guardia would remain aloof from politics, Anastasio Somoza, the first Nicaraguan to command this organization, evidently did not consider himself bound by this agreement. President Sacasa, alarmed at Somoza's political ambitions and military power, heeded the suggestion that the Liberals and Sandinistas unite against the leader of the guardia. Sacasa considered Sandino more trustworthy than Somoza and welcomed the support of the Sandinistas. Since the United States had withdrawn its forces, thus removing both the principal justification for Sandino's defection and the main prop that shored up the legally elected government, a political rapprochement was attractive to both parties.⁴⁶

The Settlement

Sandino and his followers were granted amnesty for all acts committed since May 4, 1927, the date on which Moncada had surrendered the Liberal army. Except for a 100-man emergency force, all of Sandino's troops were to turn in their weapons within three months. With this force,

which was paid by the government, Sandino was to maintain order in the Rio Coco area of Nueva Segovia and Jinotega.⁴⁷

Although the fighting in the northern departments had caused extensive economic dislocation in that area, the settlement, like the counterinsurgency campaign, failed to provide for much in the way of economic rehabilitation. The Sacasa government promised to undertake a public works program, but this pledge seems to have been aimed at ensuring Sandino's loyalty to the Liberal regime rather than at repairing war damage. Sandino himself attempted to revive the local economy by establishing a cooperative to raise and market crops and to mine gold.⁴⁸

The Final Destruction of Sandino

The settlement was at best a truce, for power remained divided among Sacasa, Sandino, and Somoza. The key to absolute control, the guardia, remained in Somoza's hands; it was thus merely a matter of time until he eliminated his rivals. Sandino was the first to go. At a meeting of senior guardia officers held on February 21, 1934, Somoza decided to do away with the former insurgent leader. At Managua that very evening, Sandino, his brother, and two aides were seized by members of the guardia, taken to the nearby village of La Reynaga, and shot to death. Somoza next accused the Sandinistas of devising a Communist plot and on March 3, 1934, ordered the guardia to destroy the Rio Coco cooperative. The offensive against Sandino and his followers came to a successful close on March 12 with the murder of Sandino's children.

Sacasa lingered on as president until May 29, 1936, when Somoza and the guardia expelled him from office. In December of that year, Somoza staged an election that, to no one's surprise, resulted in his being chosen president. Although Anastasio Somoza was himself assassinated in 1956, the Somoza family remained dominant in Nicaraguan politics.⁴⁹

So ended the hopes entertained by the United States that it could, within a few years, persuade the Nicaraguan people of the value of democratic elections and the separation of military power from politics. On the other hand, using the guardia as his personal force, Somoza did bring stability to the country. The presence of this permanent military unit brought an end to localismo and personalismo. Liberal and Conservative armies no longer fought each other, for neither party could hope to raise troops that would be a match for the guardia. Nicaragua thus came to be ruled by a dictator backed by a trained, professional army.⁵⁰

NOTES

¹Isaac J. Cox, Nicaragua and the United States, 1909-1927 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1927), p. 704; Dana G. Munro, The Five Republics of Central America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), pp. 75-76, 92.

²Cox, Nicaragua and the United States, pp. 703-704; Munro, The Five Republics of Central America, pp. 57-60; 73-77, 186-87, 196; Harold N. Denny, Dollars for Bullets (New York: The Dial Press, 1929), p. 57.

³Cox, Nicaragua and the United States, p. 704; Munro, The Five Republics of Central America, pp. 72-73, 93-94; Denny, Dollars for Bullets, p. 13.

⁴Cox, Nicaragua and the United States, p. 704; Munro, The Five Republics of Central America, pp. 9, 11, 15, 91-95.

⁵Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (5th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), pp. 288-95, 437-38, 534-35.

⁶Quoted in ibid., p. 582.

⁷Cox, Nicaragua and the United States, pp. 783-89; L. Ethan Ellis, Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations, 1925-1929 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1961), pp. 59-75; Denny, Dollars for Bullets, pp. 286-307.

⁸Marvin Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), p. 29.

⁹Lejeune Cummins, Quijote on a Burro (Mexico City: Privately published, 1958), pp. 23-26.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 25-29, 49-50, 105-106.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 118-19, 155-56; Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 428.

¹²Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 50-64.

¹³Ibid., pp. 85-100.

¹⁴Denny, Dollars for Bullets, pp. 57-60, 308; U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, G-3, "The United States Marines in Nicaragua" (Marine Corps Historical Reference Series, No. 21), p. 17.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 23-26, 57-58; Carleton Beals, Banana Gold (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1932), pp. 260-61.

¹⁶Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 49-50, 53, 57, 76.

¹⁷Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 58, 85, 104, 121; Beals, Banana Gold, pp. 265-74.

¹⁸Denny, Dollars for Bullets, pp. 334-35; Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 23-26, 49-100, 102.

¹⁹Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 51, 56-60, 64, 85, 101.

²⁰Julian C. Smith et al., A Review of the Organization and Operations of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, n.d.), pp. 24, 42; Denny, Dollars for Bullets, p. 338.

- ²¹Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 60, 71, 121.
- ²²Ibid., pp. 37-38, 51, 57, 90, 93-94, 121, 143-50.
- ²³Harold N. Denny, Dollars for Bullets, pp. 314, 318-23, 359-70; Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 32-33, 40, 45; Edwin N. McClellan, "Supervising the Nicaraguan Elections," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LIX, No. 1 (January 1933), p. 37.
- ²⁴Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 49-50, 53; Denny, Dollars for Bullets, p. 314.
- ²⁵Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 12, 23, 70, 89; U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, G-3, "The United States Marines in Nicaragua," pp. 24, 37-38, 50. See also Dom. A. Pagano, Bluejackets (Boston: Meador, 1932), especially pp. 26-35.
- ²⁶Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1929, p. 1171; 1930, p. 1252; 1931, p. 373; Annual Report of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1933, p. 9.
- ²⁷Evans F. Carlson, "The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua," Marine Corps Gazette, XXI, No. 3 (August 1937), p. 7; Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 40, 45, 49-84, 92.
- ²⁸Smith et al., A Review, pp. 12-16.
- ²⁹Ibid., pp. 14-15.
- ³⁰For descriptions of tactical operations, see "Combat Operations in Nicaragua," Marine Corps Gazette, XIV, No. 1 (January 1929), p. 81; XIV, No. 2 (June 1929), p. 91; XIV, No. 3 (September 1929), p. 170; Merritt A. Edson, "The Coco River Patrol," Marine Corps Gazette, XX, No. 3 (August 1936), p. 18; XX, No. 4 (November 1936), p. 40; XXI, No. 1 (February 1937), p. 35; U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, G-3, "The United States Marines in Nicaragua," pp. 32-42, 45-53.
- ³¹Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 86-87.
- ³²Denny, Dollars for Bullets, p. 338.
- ³³"Annual Report of Aircraft Squadrons, 2d Brigade, USMC," Marine Corps Gazette, XIII, No. 4 (December 1928), p. 248; Charles R. Sanderson, "The Supply Service in Western Nicaragua," Marine Corps Gazette, XVII, No. 1 (May 1932), pp. 41-42; Francis P. Mulcahy, "Marine Corps Aviation in the Second Nicaraguan Campaign," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LIX, No. 8 (August 1933), p. 1121.
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- ³⁵Charles R. Sanderson, "The Supply Service in Western Nicaragua," pp. 41-44.
- ³⁶Ibid., pp. 80-81; Herman Hanneken, "A Discussion of the Voluntario Troops in Nicaragua," Marine Corps Gazette, XXVI, No. 4 (November 1942), p. 120.
- ³⁷Smith et al., A Review, pp. 100-101; Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 86-87.
- ³⁸Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, p. 82.
- ³⁹Ibid., pp. 83-84.
- ⁴⁰Denny, Dollars for Bullets, pp. 343-45.
- ⁴¹Ibid., pp. 29-30; Denny, Dollars for Bullets, pp. 340-43.
- ⁴²Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, p. 40; Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 98, 133-35.
- ⁴³Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 113-25, 129-36.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 94, 143-56.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., p. 101.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 98-103.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 102-103.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 104.

⁴⁹Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, pp. 46-50;
Cummins, Quijote on a Burro, pp. 104-109.

⁵⁰Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, pp. 42-47.

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Part Three

POSTWAR EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA

ALGERIA (1954-1962)

ANGOLA (1961 until 1965)

CAMEROON (1955-1962)

KENYA (1952-1960)


MADAGASCAR (1947-1948)

PORTUGUESE GUINEA (1959 until 1965)

SOUTH AFRICA (1961 until 1964)

Chapter Eight

**ALGERIA
1954-1962**



ALGERIA (1954-1962)

Chapter Eight
ALGERIA (1954-1962)

by James R. Price

Overwhelming French military forces—well organized and supported by intensive political and psychological warfare—maintained a military stalemate against Algerian nationalists, but political considerations finally led to a settlement in which Algeria obtained her independence.

BACKGROUND

To the student of revolutionary behavior, the Algerian rebellion is a virtual textbook, with chapters on racial and religious discrimination, economic and political inequalities, and oppression of the majority by a foreign elite, all of which led to an explosive climax. To the student of guerrilla warfare, the Algerian case is another kind of textbook. It provides the ideal setting for the comparative study of small-unit, hit-and-run tactics against conventional forces, revealing both the futility of positional warfare under such conditions and the soundness of a strategy of attrition against even an overwhelming force if that force is divorced from the people. To the student of counterinsurgency, Algeria is a rich source of material on antiguerrilla tactics, population control techniques, police and intelligence methods, and such operational concepts as psychological operations, civic action, and the like.

To provide a theoretical framework for their military counterinsurgency in Algeria, French military theorists used a doctrine of guerre révolutionnaire developed on the basis of their experience in Indochina.* In this view, all insurgency falls into one of three categories: Communist, Communist-inspired, or "irresponsibly nationalist" and hence exploitable by communism. One French officer claimed in 1957 that the Soviet Union sought to encircle Europe, with the one unfulfilled step "to wrest Algeria from France."¹ Thus the French military and their supporters could identify "the Algerian War as part of a great world struggle against Communism."² But if there is one fundamental lesson to be learned from the Algerian experience it is that textbook problems met by textbook solutions do not necessarily produce textbook results. French military counterinsurgency was deemed by many to be on the road to success—yet politically, the

* See Vol. I, Chapter Nine, "Indochina (1946-1954)."

French colonial Algeria. According to TEXT, Algeria shows a continuous commitment to the French nation. In fact, the degree to which the Algerian nationalists resisted French handovers, even during the darkest days of the rebellion surprised the intelligence and diplomatic communities of many nations. In view of all this, the Algerian revolution becomes a matter of particular interest.

The Land and Its Resources

By far the largest of the three North African Maghreb states which form the southern seaboard of the western Mediterranean, Algeria has a total land area of about 855,000 square miles—an area four times that of France and three and a half that of Texas. Climatically, Algeria is a land of sharp contrasts, ranging from the pleasant, temperate, and fairly well-watered but narrow plains of the north coast, to the rugged mountains and high plateau lands of the interior, to the vast parched deserts of the Sahara in the south.

Algeria is generally poor in natural resources (except for Saharan oil and gas reserves whose quantity was not known at the outbreak of insurgency in 1954). Fertile land was scarce then: Less than half of northern Algeria, and less than seven percent of the country as a whole was under cultivation. In spite of generally inadequate rainfall throughout the country, less than two percent of farmed areas was irrigated.

The European-Muslim Dichotomy

In 1954, Algeria was peopled by about nine million Muslims and almost one million Europeans. Of the Muslims, about 75 percent speak Arabic; most of the others are Berber-speaking tribesmen located chiefly in the Kabyle and Aurès mountains. A few Berber-speaking tribes may be found in the oases of the central Sahara.³

Most Europeans in Algeria—known generally as colons, the upper class often called gros colons and the middle class pieds noirs—were concentrated along the Mediterranean coast. More than three-fourths lived in cities of over 20,000 population; the vast majority were in Algiers and its suburbs, and in Oran, Constantine, and Bône.⁴ In contrast to the Europeans, the Muslims were primarily rural: In 1954 only some 20 percent lived in cities of over 20,000 population. About 70 percent of the Muslim population was concentrated in the Tell—the hilly maritime region of the Atlas Mountains and the band of arable land along the northern edge of the high plateau—about five percent of the total land area of Algeria.⁵

Two economies existed side by side. The majority Muslim population was rural or nomadic, continually bordering on poverty and starvation. On the other hand, even the poorest members of the European community enjoyed a living standard substantially better than that of the Muslims. As many as two million Muslims were economically dependent upon remittances from several hundred thousand kinsmen working in France. More than 75 percent of Algerian trade was tied

to France, and the French manipulated the situation to enhance metropolitan interests and discourage independent economic growth in Algeria.⁶

Under the French system, Europeans and Muslims were governed by different laws of personal status. The two groups differed markedly in their attitudes and values, but variations existed within each group as well as between them. Within the Muslim community there were marked differences between the rural and urban, the nomadic and sedentary, and the Arabic- and Berber-speakers. Since Western education was generally concentrated in urban centers and thus had its greatest impact there, change occurred most rapidly in the cities. This accentuated rural-urban differences in the entire society. Nevertheless, the European-Muslim dichotomy tended to minimize differences within each of the two groups insofar as the general political and social evolution of the country was concerned. Deriving from cultural, political, and economic factors as well as a sense of racial difference, this dichotomy overshadowed class, territorial, and ethnic differences within each of the two groups. It became the outstanding social fact in modern Algeria.⁷

The Muslim-European division was carried over into the political institutions established under the Organic Statute of 1947, the basis of French administration of Algeria when the rebellion began. This law provided that Algeria, which was considered an integral part of France, was to be governed by the French National Assembly, acting through the French Cabinet, which appointed a governor general with full executive and broad administrative powers. Judicial and educational functions were, however, controlled directly by the respective ministries in France. The statute also provided for an Algerian Assembly, a legislative body in which the two groups were to be equally represented, Europeans in a "First College" and Muslims in a "Second College." The Assembly was to be elected by the two constituencies—European and Muslim—and in turn was to elect Algerian delegates to the French Assembly.

Although the Algerian Assembly was duly constituted, it possessed very limited power; and such power as it had was vested mainly in the Europeans, who constituted about 11 percent of the population and 50 percent of the Assembly. Since a two-thirds majority was required for passage of a bill, the Europeans could veto any measure. The governor general also held veto power, subject to later confirmation by the French Assembly. And the French government reserved the right to dissolve the Algerian Assembly if in its judgment the latter exceeded its jurisdiction.⁸

Separate But Unequal

The "separate but unequal" concept extended into all areas of local government. Algeria was organized into 3 départements, 20 arrondissements, and 331 communes. These last were governed by elected municipal councils, which conformed to the two-college system and thus assured European domination. Each département was headed by a prefect appointed by the French minister of interior, but responsible to the governor general.⁹ In addition, there were

by municipal centers or Muslim communes under administrators appointed by the governor general.

The Organic Statute of 1947 exacerbated the resentment felt by both Muslims and Europeans. Years earlier, after World War I, there had begun to emerge a small but politically sophisticated group of Muslims determined to achieve political, social, and economic equality with the European population. Over a period of years, this group decided that equality could not be achieved within the French framework and gradually shifted its support to extreme nationalists who favored gaining independence by revolt. The European community, on the other hand, polarized around its own extremists, or "ultras," who refused to make any concessions to Muslims and who sabotaged any and all progressive measures, however small, attempted by the French government to improve the status of Muslims.¹⁰

Muslim moderates found the ground increasingly cut from under them by the intransigence of the European ultras, and advocates of direct action for freedom attracted more and more support among the Muslim population. Economic discrimination lent impetus to the dissatisfaction caused by political discrimination. At the same time, the accelerated urbanization of the Muslim community in the quest for jobs led to far greater exposure to Western education, more dominant roles for those who had made good in the cities, and ever-rising levels of expectation. Then, in 1940, the German victory over France forever shattered the myth of French invincibility.

Prelude to Revolution

Even before the end of World War II, events in Algeria were steadily building toward a revolutionary climax. In March 1944 the followers of Messali Ahmed ben Hadj, long-time Algerian activist and father of Algerian nationalism, organized the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) and began agitating for "direct action" in the countryside as the only means of improving the situation of the Muslims. Messali Hadj, a disillusioned former Communist, carried over into the PPA certain Communist principles of organization.

May 8, 1945—the day when Germany surrendered in World War II—marked also the first postwar attempt at armed insurrection in Algeria. Although the leadership of this uprising is obscure, Messali Hadj and his followers were probably involved. The motivation was general Muslim discontent, aggravated by food shortages. Notably at Sétif, but also in the Muslim quarters in Algiers and other large cities, this uprising was bloodily suppressed by the French government and settlers. Estimates of casualties vary markedly according to the sympathies of the estimator. A French commission of inquiry set Muslim deaths at between 1,020 and 1,340. Muslim estimates set the figure at 40,000 dead. In 1958, *Time* magazine quoted a French politician who placed the figure "closer to 20,000."¹¹

The fact is that news of Sétif was suppressed and there are no reliable statistics. The one point upon which all parties agree is that the repression was thorough and ruthless. Another point of significance—in view of subsequent French military propaganda equating Algerian nationalism with communism—was the fact that the French government that suppressed the Sétif uprising itself included two Communists—Vice Premier Maurice Thorez and Air Minister Charles Tillon. It was Tillon, in fact, who ordered the bombing of Muslim villages in Algeria.¹²


To French colons, Sétif was a horrible example of what could result from the mere suggestion of reform, let alone implementation. To Algerian Muslims, on the other hand, Sétif taught the tragic lesson that France was unwilling to stand behind what Algerians had considered wartime pledges of reform in return for Muslim support against the Germans.

Muslim Political Groups

By November 1954 there were five fairly distinct Muslim political groups, all anti-French to some degree. Although these groups represented a wide range of political opinion and generally found moral support among the Muslim population, the total active membership was small.¹³ The first group consisted of the Algerian Communist Party, which was, however, supported primarily by European workers in Algeria and was never an influential voice in the Arab nationalist movement. A prominent traditionalist group was the Association of Ulema (religious scholars), led in 1954 by Sheikh Muhammad Bashir al Ibrahimi. The Ulema favored independence, but were rather cautious in their approach. The third group, the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) was led by Ferhat Abbas of Sétif, a pharmacist by profession but a politician by inclination. The UDMA favored Algerian autonomy substantially under Muslim control, but within the framework of the French Union.

Fourth, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD) had been founded in 1946 by Messali Hadj to replace the outlawed PPA. The MTLD, which favored independence by direct action, formed in 1947 a clandestine action arm known as the OS (Organisation Spéciale or Organisation Secrète). Between 1947 and 1950, the OS organized a network of trained and armed underground fighters throughout northern Algeria. In 1950 the French smashed the organization, but by 1954 the network had been rebuilt and its leaders were in contact with OS exiles in Cairo.¹⁴ One faction of the MTLD led by Secretary General Hocine Lahouel held views more similar to those of the UDMA. Eventually the MTLD was immobilized by factionalism.

The fifth group, the Comité Révolutionnaire pour l'Unité et l'Action (CRUA)—later known as the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in its political aspects and as the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) in its military role—grew out of the factional split within the MTLD. CRUA represented the crystallization of nationalist sentiment around such men as Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohammed Khider, and Hussein Ait Ahmed. CRUA was formally organized by former OS



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leaders in July 1954 to launch the nationalist rebellion. Extremist policies had at least the tacit support of the majority of Algerian Muslims.

Political View of the French Community

The European community, on the other hand, was by 1954 controlled largely by a minority of extremely wealthy European residents. Committed to the philosophy of "Algérie française," the colons actively supported the constituted government under French law. Their influence manifested itself mainly in the Algerian Union, which gained an overwhelming predominance in the municipal councils, particularly in the département of Algiers, to a large degree in Constantine, and to a lesser extent in Oran. Their objectives were usually voiced through the French Minister of Finance, René Mayer, who held a seat in the French Assembly as deputy from Constantine.¹⁵ Although supporters of Gen. Charles de Gaulle were prominent in the union, the dominant group took an ultra-French nationalistic position. More moderate factions within the European community, such as that represented by Roman Catholic Archbishop Léon Duval of Algiers, were not able to counterbalance the ultras.

By 1956, French intransigence had so undercut even such Algerian Francophiles as Ferhat Abbas of the UDMA that all Muslim elements were to be united within the FLN.¹⁶ But even in 1954 the European-Muslim polarization was complete: There were essentially only two schools of thought, and these were now to come into open conflict.

INSURGENCY

Armed revolt broke out on November 1, 1954. It was planned by CRUA, organized only a few months earlier, which now adopted the name Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) and strove to gain support for the rebellion from all Algerians. Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohammed Khider (formerly of the MTLN central committee), Mohammed Boudiaf, and Hussein Ait Ahmed made up the political leadership, or external delegation, with headquarters in Cairo. The internal regional delegation, or military leadership in the wilayas (regions) of the Aurès, Constantine, Algiers, Oran, and the Kabylia, was composed respectively of Mustafa Ben Boulaid, Mourade Dideouche, Rabah Latat, Mohammed Larbi Ben M'Hidi, and Belkacem Krim.¹⁷

None in this group was an intellectual or politician of stature. Practically all came from the lower-middle and lower classes. All were young, veterans of previous agitational or revolutionary activity, and some, including Ben Bella, Boudiaf, and Krim, had had combat experience in European campaigns with the French army. Mohammed Khider, former deputy from Algiers to the French National Assembly, was the only one of the group who had held an official position.

The Early Years of Violence

At 1 o'clock on the morning of November 1, 1954, armed bands struck in at least 50 different places all across Algeria. Bomb explosions rocked Biskra. In Batna, the French army barracks were attacked. In downtown Algiers, two bombs were set off. Other attacks occurred at Arris and Boufarik, in the Kabylia, and near Oran. In the Tighanimine Gorge, a caid (French-appointed Muslim official) and two Europeans were pulled out of a bus and shot on the spot. From Cairo, the Voice of the Arabs announced establishment of the Front of National Liberation -- "Today . . . a powerful elite of the free children of Algeria started the insurrection of Algerian freedom against French imperialism in North Africa."¹⁸

For the next year and a half, under the direction of wilaya military commanders, both uniformed and plainclothes terrorist groups harassed the French army, police, and administration through direct military action, sabotage, assassination, and terror. They sought to destroy the economy of the European community and to neutralize opposition within both the European and Muslim communities through terror and intimidation.¹⁹

During 1955 and 1956 these tactics were highly successful. Non-uniformed resistance groups in the cities terrorized Algiers and other settled areas, where they assassinated Muslims who cooperated with the French, sabotaged French police and administrative posts, and extorted funds from Muslims and Europeans to finance the nationalist movement.²⁰ FLN terrorist activities in the Algerian cities reached a climax in late 1956, when an average of 700 acts of terror per month was recorded in Algiers alone.²¹

The insurgent army, or ALN, which in the beginning numbered only a few hundred men armed with a motley assortment of hunting rifles and other light weapons, had been developed by mid-1956 into a disciplined and well-organized force of up to 15,000 men, with substantial numbers in reserve. It was a well-armed combat force capable of launching hit-and-run attacks on the much larger French army almost at will throughout most of northern Algeria.

Nonetheless, the Algerian nationalists were unable to drive out the French. A number of the original leaders were lost during 1955 and 1956--Youssef was killed, Ben M'Hidi died after capture, Bitat was captured. Ben Bella, Khider, Ait Ahmed, and Boudiaf were kidnaped by the French in October 1956, when the pilot of their Moroccan civilian plane was persuaded to land at Algiers.*²² In 1957, FLN underground activities in the cities suffered severe setbacks when Gen. Jacques Massu, of the French 10th Paratroop Division, succeeded in virtually wiping out the FLN potential for direct action in the large coastal cities. Between early 1957 and the spring of 1958, FLN terrorist activity in the northern cities almost came to a halt.

* After Ben Bella's arrest, Omar Oumrane, a wilaya commander, took over Ben Bella's responsibility for arms procurement, setting up his headquarters in Tunis.

New Tactics and a New Organisation

Although the FLN was unable to mount a general insurrection or to occupy permanently any territory in Algeria, it was neither defeated nor dispersed. By 1958, FLN leaders changed their strategic concept, shifting from reliance on a general insurrection inside Algeria to maintenance of the military stalemate and exertion of diplomatic pressure on the French to negotiate a cease-fire on the basis of Algerian independence.²³

The years of the revolt saw several changes in the revolutionaries' organization and leadership. During the first year and a half of the revolt, military responsibilities were decentralized to commanders of wilayas. Each commander had almost total discretion to build and operate his forces as he chose. Recruitment, supply, training, and operations were self-contained in each wilaya, and there was little if any liaison or coordination among different wilaya commanders.

In August 1956 the revolutionary leadership was reorganized and expanded. At a congress of the FLN held at the Soummam Valley, the CRUA was abolished. In its place were established two new governing bodies, the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) and the Committee for Coordination and Execution (CCE). These two bodies later developed into the legislative and executive branches of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA).²⁴

At a CNRA conference in Cairo in August 1957, consideration of the establishment of a future Algerian parliament prompted the expansion of the CNRA and the CCE from 34 to 54 and from 5 to 14 members respectively. On September 18, 1958, the GPRA was established. Composed of 18 members and headed by the president of the council, the GPRA integrated within itself both political and military functions by giving representation to all factions within the FLN. This form of leadership remained in effect until after the rebellion ended in 1962.²⁵

At the 1956 Soummam Valley congress, the rebel army was formally designated as the ALN and a regular command structure created. Algeria was divided into six wilayas, identical with earlier civil divisions, and an autonomous zone of Algiers. Regular army forces (Moudjahidine), estimated at 40,000 (25,000 in bases outside of Algeria), were organized into battalions consisting of 350 men (3 companies and 20 officers), companies of 110 men (3 platoons and 5 officers), platoons of 35 men (3 groups plus a platoon leader and assistant), groups of 11 men which included a sergeant and 2 corporals, and half-groups composed of 5 men and a corporal. In 1957 the battalion was enlarged to 600 men and the company to 150 to allow for coordinated major engagements. In 1958 these engagements proved too costly to the ALN, and the large units were broken up and reorganized into light company-size (100 men), self-sufficient, and highly mobile commando units. The irregular auxiliaries (Moussabline), estimated at between 55,000 and 100,000, were not affected by this reorganization. Their prime functions continued to be those of assisting the regulars in certain limited operations, intelligence gathering, and acting as advance guards.²⁶

Underground Operations

The autonomous zone of Algiers called for special tactics. It and the other two large urban areas contained the only true underground organizations. Underground activities focused primarily on propaganda, fund raising, and terrorism, especially through the activities of a bomb network.

The basic unit of this underground was the cell. Cells were of two functional types--military and politico-financial. Each was headed by two deputies responsible to a chief in whom military and political functions were combined. In June 1957, the Algiers underground was reorganized, introducing collective responsibility at the highest level and adding another functional type of cell for liaison and intelligence. Cells of each type were grouped into districts, three districts to a sector, and three sectors to a region. Algiers was divided into three regions, supervised by the council of the autonomous zone of Algiers. The council was composed of a politico-military chief and three deputies charged respectively with military, political, and liaison-intelligence responsibilities.²⁷

The military branch of the underground in each region consisted of three groups, each of which included eleven men. Counting the regional chief and his deputy, there were thus 35 armed men per region, 105 in all of Algiers. In addition to these "military" persons charged with protecting FLN members and their activities, there were 50 to 150 hard-core terrorists who formed the bomb network. In many instances the bomb network used known gangsters or unemployed workers to carry out terrorist activities.

The political branch of the underground in each region consisted of 50 to 70 persons. These were entrusted with the distribution of tracts, delegation of assignments, and transportation. One unit, the "shock group," was charged with enforcing FLN directives by all necessary means ranging from intimidation to beatings and assassinations. Each region was supplied with a modestly equipped (typewriter and mimeograph machine) propaganda printing and distributing unit. The political branch at the regional level had a financial commission composed of businessmen well established in the region. This financial commission assessed taxes to be levied on other businessmen, kept an account of revenue thus derived, and acted as a bank by depositing the revenue in accounts of their respective establishments. In practice, the system was generally directed by one of the political or business leaders of each region.²⁸

Little is known about the organization and functioning of the intelligence-liaison branch. In urban centers the FLN instructed people to report on the daily activities of French police and armed forces. It also employed a large number of double agents to gather further information on French administrative measures, troop movements, and materiel. This information was passed to higher echelons and the CCE by courier.

Recruitment and Supply

While the underground of the cities was largely self-supporting, the armed forces of the ALN had to make special provisions for obtaining adequate supplies.

Food was no problem, as the fighters were able to live off the land with the assistance, willing or reluctant, of the civilian population. Nor was recruitment difficult. Most of the guerrillas were natives of the area in which they operated and could be counted upon to recruit the necessary manpower. The primary limitation on the size of ALN combat units was availability of arms; but, regardless of such shortages, the ALN never turned down a volunteer. He was asked first to serve as an auxiliary to prove his worth. The ALN used a large number of civilian auxiliaries in quasi-military units and as intelligence agents. When needed, the auxiliary was taken into the regular forces. After 1957, when French counterinsurgency operations became fully effective, many auxiliaries were sent to Morocco or Tunisia for training, in order to escape capture and internment in relocation camps.²⁹

Military Supplies and Cash From Abroad

The main logistical concern of the ALN during the revolt was to maintain the supply of weapons and ammunition. Arms—rifles, submachineguns, machineguns, 20mm Bofors cannon, mortars, and bazookas—were acquired through direct purchases or as gifts from countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. At least ten percent of the weapons of the ALN came from French sources, either as a result of combat losses or as booty brought by deserters. In view of the variety of calibers, makes, and models of arms acquired, it was often impossible to maintain a good supply of spare parts and ammunition. This sometimes delayed operations.

The purchase of weapons was effected by members of the external delegation of the FLN. Arms were shipped to Tunisian or Moroccan ports and then transferred to the borders. Some of the Egyptian shipments took a more direct line via Libya into southern Tunisia, and then to Algeria. Since the ALN lacked vehicles or air transport, most shipments were carried across the Tunisian and Moroccan borders by mule caravan. After 1957 the ALN's main supply depots were bases set up in Tunisia and Morocco.³⁰

It is impossible to ascertain the value or quantity of military supplies or financial aid delivered to the FLN from abroad. Trickle of aid from Egypt predated the 1954 uprising but did not assume substantial proportions until after the Israeli invasion of Suez in 1956 and the subsequent Egyptian expropriation of British military stores. Throughout the rebellion small quantities of arms from Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia entered Algeria. In 1956 Communist China sent through Libya a few Arabic-speaking anti-aircraft gun crews with their equipment.³¹ French intercepts of Yugoslav and Egyptian ships provide a rough basis for estimating in the millions of dollars the value of externally supplied arms. Saudi Arabia provided direct financial aid of about \$700,000 annually. Muhammad Natsir, leader of Indonesia's beleaguered

anti-Sukarno Masjumi Party, donated some \$400,000 in 1956, and an international relief organization of Muslims, Jami'at al Islam International, raised and delivered several million dollars in cash and goods from 1955 through 1957.³²

Financial contributions to the FLN from foreign governments and private sources were used primarily to purchase arms from any source willing to sell. Firms in Switzerland included the Zurich house of Felix and the Basel firm of Frank A. G. In West Germany, a dealer in "sporting weapons," Otto Schlüter of Hamburg, sold hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of World War II German arms, including panzerfausts and Schmeisser submachineguns, to FLN purchasing agents. Schlüter's firm was later dynamited several times and put out of business by a French terrorist organization known as La Main Rouge (The Red Hand), a civilian predecessor of the Secret Army Organization (OAS). The FLN believed that The Red Hand was supported by the French intelligence service.³³ The Swiss Orlikon firm also sold special high-velocity antitank artillery to the Algerians. Firms in Sweden, Belgium, and Italy occasionally supplied weapons on a cash-and-carry basis.

Foreign Sanctuaries and Other Support

In 1957 the FLN was permitted to set up what came to be known as the East Base at Souk-Ahras near the Tunisian border, and the West Base at Nador on the Moroccan frontier. These bases, designated as autonomous zones within the ALN command structure, were used as training and staging areas for reinfiltration into Algeria until the French effectively closed off the borders in 1958.

In addition to physical sanctuary provided the ALN in the East and West bases, various Arab governments provided other protective services—granting citizenship, issuing passports, and even according diplomatic status to FLN agents. These agents traveled freely about the world bearing Moroccan, Tunisian, Libyan, Egyptian, Syrian, or Iraqi passports. A wry touch was added by the government of Morocco, which sometimes issued passports to FLN agents identifying them as Moroccan Jews.³⁴

The Algerian nationalists enjoyed the general support of the Arab League and of the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations. Sympathy, as well as material support, was likewise offered by the Sino-Soviet bloc, but, with some exceptions, aid from Communist countries was rejected by the FLN until the later stages of the war. It is not possible to document the precise dates when foreign aid to the Algerian rebels began or ended.

Diplomatic support given the Algerian cause at the United Nations by Arab and Afro-Asian countries and the Communist bloc was manifested in the inscription of the Algerian problem on the agenda of the General Assembly for several years. This action, which effectively internationalized the Algerian rebellion, achieved a major political objective of the FLN. Pressure of this sort had some influence upon the attitudes of major powers with interests in Africa and Asia.

Effects of Outside Support

External aid enabled the Algerians to wage a very effective military campaign during 1956 and early 1957, even though the ALN was never able to defeat French units in large-scale engagements. ALN efforts were successful, however, in that the French were forced to enlarge their military force to about 750,000 troops and to take other expensive and diplomatically costly actions, such as building electrically charged fences and laying minefields along the Algerian borders with Tunisia and Morocco. In fact, the astronomical cost of the French counterinsurgency effort was considered by the FLN as a victory in the sense that France was being bled white by the effort.

Outside aid had another important effect. It enabled the FLN to maintain itself and to continue activities which impelled the French to adopt repressive measures. These, in turn, exacerbated France's relations with her allies, including the United States, and made the position of the French government politically untenable at home. It was the Algerian rebellion which destroyed the Fourth Republic; and it was de Gaulle's return to power which brought the Algerian nationalists ultimate political victory.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

The early success of the Algerian rebels was due in part to the inadequacy of the initial French countermeasures. Mistakenly believing the 1954 uprising to be another manifestation of tribal warfare, the French reacted by attacking whole villages, thus driving the rural populace closer to the FLN. Subsequent tactics under the French strategy of pacification intensified this trend. By April 1956, when Ferhat Abbas—who had been strongly pro-French—publicly joined the FLN in Cairo, it was clear that French policies had delivered to the rebels a preponderance of Muslim Algerian support. By 1962, despite a military stalemate somewhat favorable to the French, the majority of Algerian Muslims had been driven to substantial support of the revolution.

French Politico-Military Organisation

There was never any real lessening of the totality of French control in Algeria between 1954 and 1962, although there were variations in policy and public administration. The Organic Statute of 1947 had provided that the governor general, appointed by the French Cabinet, would share military responsibility with representatives of the French ministry of defense, in effect putting the French military commander on a par with the governor general. The loi-cadre, or constitutional outline, drawn up by the French National Assembly in 1958 but never implemented, would not materially have affected this condition. In May 1958, the French

government authorized complete martial law and designated the military commander supreme French representative in Algeria. ³⁵

The military had in fact always been the primary manifestation of the French presence in Algeria. All large urban centers had been heavily garrisoned by the French army, and small villages or communes were administered under military supervision. Military influence extended to the police. The Algerian police services, first established in 1844 in Algiers, Constantine, and Oran, lacked the strength to maintain order outside the cities, and French military units were made responsible for certain police activities under civil administrative guidance. Although Algerian police services were constantly strengthened, the line between civil and military police activities was always blurred, especially outside the major cities. After the outbreak of the 1954 rebellion, police and army units were placed under joint command. ³⁶

In 1955 the Algerian police were integrated into the regular French police system under the general directorate of national security in Paris, and placed at the disposal of the governor general by the French minister of interior, who maintained ultimate control and who had the power to transfer policemen from France to Algeria or vice versa. In practice, however, the minister seldom interfered with the governor general's handling of the police, and actual control rested with the latter. ³⁷

Within the government general in Algeria, the general directorate of general security executed the governor general's responsibility to maintain order. It directly operated administrative services, active plainclothes police services, the criminal police, the general information service, and the territorial surveillance directorate. The general directorate also controlled the external services—uniformed police attached to the départements and the communes. These services were more decentralized than their counterparts in France, which are directly controlled by the ministry of interior. In Algeria, considerable police authority was delegated to one of the two secretaries general of the prefect administering each département. Under his guidance the subprefects administering the arrondissements were authorized to employ the police personnel and materiel put at their disposal by the government general. ³⁸

Strength of the French Forces

In January 1955 the governor general established new police units in rural areas—84 mobile groups of rural police totaling 6,000 men. By mid-1957 this force was increased to 8,700 men in 84 groups. Recruited mainly from among Muslim veterans of the French army, the rural police were uniformed, trained, and paid by the Algerian administration out of funds appropriated by the Algerian Assembly. Rural police units were at the disposition of the subprefects and communal administrators in northern Algeria and operated in collaboration with the French army and other police. ³⁹

French army strength in Algeria at the beginning of the rebellion approximated 55,000. By the beginning of 1956 army strength had been increased to around 200,000, and by August of that year, to more than 400,00. By the end of the rebellion in 1962, total French troop strength was estimated by FLN intelligence to be about 750,000, including some 150,000 Muslim auxiliaries.⁴⁰

Casualties

According to French Premier Georges Pompidou's official statement of August 25, 1962, a total of 23,045 French soldiers died in Algeria between January 1, 1954 and December 31, 1961. Of these 10,809 were draftees and the rest career soldiers. Deaths in operations or "by accident" were included in the figure.

Some 2,348 European and 15,674 Muslim civilians were said by French sources to have been killed in attacks during the same period.⁴¹ FLN sources claimed that the French figures on Muslim casualties were ridiculously low. They maintained that there were some 1,500,000 Muslim casualties of the rebellion. The vast majority of these casualties were said to have been civilian noncombatants, but there are no available breakdowns on dead, wounded, and missing.⁴²

International Ramifications of the French Effort

Reaction in France to the use of French troops to put down the uprising varied; only the right wing of French politics supported the action strongly. From liberal circles and the Catholic Church there were impassioned protests as the war dragged on. Special protests were made against the use of conscript troops in Algeria, although the French army asserted that in fact these troops were rarely employed in active combat.*

Externally, France received some diplomatic support from her NATO allies and other countries linked to NATO, in the form either of votes or of benevolent abstentions on various motions brought before the United Nations. It was alleged that the French government, ranking Algerian considerations above NATO commitments, diverted from NATO certain contingents of manpower and equipment. Mild U.S. protests were unavailing. In the opinion of high FLN leaders, this U.S. failure was a factor in the FLN's gradual alienation from the West, as personified chiefly by the United States, and their orientation toward the neutralist and Communist blocs.⁴³

When the FLN cited French use of NATO-supplied weapons to suppress the Algerian rebellion and depicted the United States as a supporter of colonialism, it placed the United States in a defensive position. In July 1957, John F. Kennedy, then a U.S. Senator, asserted that the U.S. government should use its influence to bring about an equitable solution of the problem.

*Official French casualty statistics listing almost half of total French army casualties as draftees would seem to belie these claims.

Senator Dennis Chavez, in considering the defense appropriations bill, which included military assistance to France, demanded that the aid "be used for the purpose it is supposed to serve, but not for the purpose of killing Algerians in North Africa."⁴⁴ Congressional concern as illustrated by the Kennedy and Chavez statements had no discernible effect. Within two weeks after Senator Kennedy's statement, North African elder statesman and warrior emeritus Abdel Krim* was authorized by the FLN to communicate directly with both Kennedy and President Eisenhower. This he did, cabling each for permission to send a delegation to Washington. President Eisenhower sent Krim a polite note of refusal via the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya.⁴⁵

Strategy of Pacification

French strategy in putting down the Algerian insurgency remained basically unchanged throughout the course of the war, although the tactics varied. That strategy was to end the guerrilla warfare and terrorism by force, rendering the rebels incapable of maintaining a sustained and effective insurrection, while at the same time devising measures to win Muslim support for the French position and thus deny that support to the rebels. This overall strategy has been called the strategy of pacification.

Tactics of Quadrillage

Pacification through the tactics known as quadrillage⁴⁶ was formulated by the French army in 1956 and fully implemented by 1957. Quadrillage has been defined as a "grid operation, garrisoning in strength all major cities, and, in diminishing force, all towns, villages, and farms of Algeria."⁴⁷ This tactic enabled the French to stop the military course of the revolution and produced a favorable military stalemate by mid-1958. To coordinate military-civilian operations, a hierarchical organization was set up, based on the civil administrative structure: the administrative département became a military zone, the arrondissement a sector, and the canton a quartier (subsector). Most of the military activity took place at the sector level, and sector activities were coordinated by the zone commander.

Quadrillage tactics were supposed to isolate the guerrillas by physically denying them popular support and to win over the population by civic action. At the sector level, French troops garrisoned all major cities to help the local police fight terrorism and to prevent the underground from supplying guerrilla units in nearby rural areas. In the countryside, troops were stationed in all large and strategic villages, hamlets, and farms to erect barbed-wire fences, watchtowers, pillboxes, and other weapons emplacements and to recruit the inhabitants for harkis (home guard units). French troops moved the inhabitants of remote villages to new areas near military camps, launched "police" operations to root out subversive elements, and issued

*See Chapter Two, "Morocco (1921-1926)."

new identity cards which entitled the holders to subsistence allowances. Medical treatment was provided, schools were built, and jobs were made available.

Quadrillage Frees French Troops

Once these defenses were organized, especially at the village level, garrison troops were freed for patrolling the countryside to track down guerrilla units. Of battalion size, broken up into four infantry companies of 150 men each, these troupes d'inter valle operated between one village and another. They were strong enough to engage guerrilla bands independently or in conjunction with other such units. Their mission was to destroy the rebel political organization in the sector and to eliminate the guerrillas. The zone commander also disposed of large zonal reserve troops, the troupes d'intervention, which could be reinforced by theater of operations reserves to undertake large-scale counter guerrilla operations.

The French made a point of the fact that the majority of their forces, especially the conscripts, were not intended to be employed in combat operations, but to serve as garrisons and in a support role. (Nonetheless, there were many conscript casualties.) For combat purposes, the French army preferred to rely upon paratroopers and the Foreign Legion. These tough, well-trained troops, highly mobile and equipped with the latest weapons, were, however, limited in number. One member of the French Assembly who had served as a pilot in Algeria estimated that French combat troops on active operations in Algeria numbered no more than about 40,000, approximately the same size force that the FLN had. The objective of these tough regulars was to "crush the rebellion and vindicate their honor by fencing Algeria off from the world, taking the population in hand, and binding it to the standard of France."⁴⁸

Border Control, Air Operations, and Regroupement

Isolation of the Algerian battlefield was an important element in French strategy. On Algeria's Tunisian border, the French constructed a long series of heavily fortified positions known as the Morice line, extending 200 miles to the sea. The Morice line consisted of thick strands of widely spaced barbed-wire and electrified fencing, minefields, rocket and gun emplacements, and a complex system of automatic alarms and searchlights. Along the Moroccan border, the western line was less elaborate, but quite formidable. The army divided areas having large rebel forces into security zones—the Collo Peninsula, parts of the Aurès and Kabyle ranges, and the Ouarsenis. From these areas, the inhabitants were cleared and their dwellings burned. Planes, tanks, armored cars, and infantry units patrolled these zones, firing at anything that moved. Together with the frontier areas, these zones of security became the principal theaters of operations.⁴⁹

Air power was extensively employed by French forces to facilitate the rapid deployment and redeployment of troops to the ever-changing zones of combat. To this end, helicopters obtained

from the United States played a major role. Helicopters and other slow-flying aircraft were also used for artillery spotting and other close support tactics. Naval power was successfully employed to blockade or to intercept shipments of arms to the rebels via ports adjacent to Algeria.

Having sealed off the frontiers and security zones, the army moved to manage and penetrate the rest of the country, ostensibly to protect the inhabitants from the FLN. In a tactic known as regroupement, entire populations of many remote villages were uprooted and moved to specially built camps and villages near military posts. Some came voluntarily; most were coerced. According to official French reports, more than one million persons were relocated. According to the International Red Cross, the number was closer to two million.⁵⁰

The Battle of Algiers

Control of Algiers was another milestone in French counterinsurgency operations. The so-called Battle of Algiers was prompted by a general strike called by the FLN in January 1957. To crush this strike, blanket police authority was granted to the 10th Paratroop Division under Gen. Jacques Massu. Massu cordoned off the whole Casbah, or Muslim sector, took a census of the population, and issued new identification cards to every man, woman, and child on the list. Checkpoints were set up at strategic corners in the Casbah. Troopers could stop Muslims in the street for identity checks, and long lines of Muslims awaiting clearance became a common sight. At random hours of day or night, homes and shops were sealed off and searched for arms, propaganda material, or rebel personnel. Any sign of resistance was immediately met with force. Prisoners arrested during these searches had no legal rights and were often subjected to brutal torture while being questioned. Some were murdered. The survivors were sent for indefinite periods to concentration camps, where indoctrination courses stressing duties to France were underlined by harsh treatment and submarginal living conditions.⁵¹

The French had won the battle of Algiers by September 1957. A total of 3,000 Muslims had been killed, and another 5,000 were in prison or concentration camps. The FLN underground and bomb networks were completely smashed.

Population Control Under the Îlot System

To consolidate their control of the city, the paratroopers set up the îlot system, whereby one person in each family group was made responsible for the location of all other family members. The responsible family men on every floor were responsible to floor chiefs, who in turn were responsible to building chiefs. The chain extended upward through a series of block leaders, and so forth. Under the îlot system, the French military could put their hands on any of the 75,000 Muslim inhabitants of the Casbah within minutes and could apply pressure at all levels. Through Muslim intermediaries—called blous by the FLN because of the blue jeans worn by

Muslims working at odd jobs in French army camps—the army passed down orders for demonstrations and on how to vote. During 1958 and 1959, the Muslim population in the Casbah could not make a move without word from the bleus. French army penetration of the Casbah was complete.⁵²

Similar tactics were followed throughout Algeria. Outside the big cities, the army's hold on villagers was reinforced by its control over all basic services: food, transportation, employment, medical treatment, and education. Military officers registered births and marriages, ran the mail service, published newspapers, and managed the elections.⁵³

The French Establish the SAS To Regain Rapport With "Controlled" Muslims

French control of the interior was intensified by the creation in September 1955 of special administrative sections (SAS). The mission of the SAS was to re-establish contact between the European and Muslim populations, develop administration in the Muslim communes, and weaken FLN influence over the population—especially in rural areas—by asserting the French presence. Through SAS units, the French army assumed an important role in local administration and supplied most of the "special delegates" appointed to exercise the powers of both municipal council and mayor in areas where the rebellion prevented elections.⁵⁴ By late spring of 1958, about 800 SAS units were in operation, supplemented by more than 20 urban administrative sections operating similarly to the SAS, but among the Muslim populations in the cities.⁵⁵

SAS units normally consisted of a specially trained volunteer from the officer corps of the French army, assisted by a volunteer noncommissioned officer and up to three civilians under contract. A detachment of from 30 to 50 Muslim volunteers was armed by the French army to protect each unit.* On the civilian side, the officer in charge was responsible, through the sub-prefect and the prefect of the département in which he was working, to the general directorate for political affairs and civil service in the government general. On the military side he was answerable through the military chain of command to the colonel in charge of the service of Algerian affairs in the government general. The SAS units handled all strictly local problems in the areas to which they were assigned, from the reconstruction of sabotaged school buildings and the teaching of Muslim children to the development of the local economy and the settlement of individual disputes.⁵⁶

The SAS concentrated its efforts on young people, seeking to mold their minds with meticulous and detailed care. In some cases, the boys in vocational schools lived with their teachers, and the curriculum included courses dealing with moral behavior and patriotism (to France) as

*It was not uncommon for a number of the Muslim "volunteers" to murder their French officers at night and desert, with weapons, to the FLN.

well as normal academic and vocational subjects. Simple homilies, useful knowledge, and political themes both subtle and blatant were blended in the instruction.⁵⁷

The salient lesson of the French civic action program under the SAS units, however, is analogous to the old saw about the operation being a success despite the death of the patient—the patient in this case being a French Algeria. The SAS units were efficient and dedicated. They performed a useful social service greatly appreciated by the beneficiaries. Yet the sentiments of Muslim youth remained generally favorable to the FLN, although a relatively large fraction may have been won over to the French. FLN sympathies seemed strongest exactly where the French army had been most successful in clearing the area of rebels and then moved on. The benefits bestowed by civic action as a facet of pacification merely whetted the appetite for more, and many Muslims interpreted the beneficial aspects of civic action as primarily a response to the rebellion and thus to the credit of the FLN.⁵⁸

Psychological Warfare: A Doctrine of Revolutionary Warfare

Psychological warfare operations in Algeria were conducted by the "seventh arm of the French general staff"—the service of psychological action and information. The nominal objective of this service was to gain public favor for the army and its projects. Psychological warfare operators conducted indoctrination courses in the concentration camps, broadcast propaganda over portable sound systems throughout Algeria, and disseminated leaflets and wall stickers—all contrasting the strength and beneficence of the French with the weakness and duplicity of the nationalists.⁵⁹

French psychological warfare had originated in Indochina, where the Viet Minh chose an ideological battlefield, and the French army found itself strong on armament but weak on ideology. Taking their cue from the enemy, the creators of the seventh arm steeped themselves in the works of Mao, Menachem Begin,* and a host of other philosophers and writers in the field of ideological persuasion. Gradually seventh arm officers filled most of the key intelligence and information posts in Algiers, especially in the paratroop headquarters of General Massu. "Their slogans dominated the conversation, and their teachings permeated the mental outlook of the most active officers in Algeria."⁶⁰

Much of what the psychological warfare officers produced was trivial. But amidst the confusion there appeared a new doctrine of revolutionary war—guerre révolutionnaire—that appealed to the soldiers by raising their experience to the level of historically furthering the Christian cause. The doctrine held that in 1917 the Bolsheviks launched revolutionary war as a new means of aggression which subsequently attacked the foundations of Christian civilization all over the world. The target was not territory, but the minds of men. If revolutionary war

*See Vol. II, Chapter Fourteen, "Israel (1945-1948)."

was invented by the Communists, its tactics were also used by nationalist parties fighting for independence. And having been devised by Communists, revolutionary war inevitably worked to Moscow's advantage. In other words, according to French psychological warfare doctrine in Algeria, Communists and nationalists were almost identical: "The enemy is always the same."⁶¹

According to French doctrine, revolutionary war could be defeated by adopting its tactics and using them against the enemy. Several elements were needed to accomplish this. First, a large and disciplined army in the disputed territory, to play the role which in Communist countries was played by the party, had to be established. Once in place, the army must create a series of "parallel hierarchies"—labor unions, peasant groups, veterans' organizations, and so forth—to penetrate the entire population. Then the inhabitants must be organized and trained by the army to join in its fight against the rebels. This could be accomplished only by coordinated action at every level in the fields of politics, administration, economics, and cultural activity. Subversive groups had to be identified and eliminated. Captured rebels had to be reindoctrinated and persuaded to adopt the new system.⁶²

Two Themes: Integration and Voluntarism

The above prescription is exactly what transpired in Algeria under pacification. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers occupied the land under quadrillage. They penetrated the local population with SAS units, built concentration camps, organized their bleus.

To these elements two new political ingredients were added. A catchword was invented to rally mass support and to destroy the "myth" of independence. This was "integration"—meaning the integration of all Algerians into France as equal citizens with equal rights. Although never endorsed by the French National Assembly (which seemed to prefer autonomy), integration became the central theme of French army propaganda in Algeria. The evidence is that the Muslims did not believe this propaganda, but the French army did, falling thereby into the oldest pitfall of the propagandist.⁶³

The second innovation of French psychological warfare was the theme of "voluntarism"—the will is the way. Voluntarism was expressed in the declaration that the army would never abandon Algeria. This was primarily a show of strength to convince the fearful, but had its impact in Paris also. For it was plain to French politicians that voluntarism on the French army model was an attack on the principles of liberal, internationalist democracy, to which France had long proclaimed her dedication.⁶⁴

In short, psychological warfare underlined the philosophy of the French army in Algeria. It represented the military effort there as the defense of the free world against communism and fostered the use of the most ruthless methods. By binding French policy to rigid and increasingly untenable positions, psychological warfare injected the army into politics and, in the final analysis, helped to ensure the defeat of France. French military propaganda brainwashed

the French, not the Muslims. And in the process, Algerian determination to resist was strengthened.

Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Intelligence collection became a major preoccupation of the French army, which realized that both the planning and implementation of FLN activities, especially in the cities, must necessarily be known by an often considerable part of the Muslim population. In the search for information, French troops resorted to widespread brutality, torture, and reprisals against hostages. Beatings, electric shock, especially to the nipples, genitals, or other sensitive areas, the internal administration of pressurized gases and liquids, the mutilation of body orifices by the forced insertion of wine bottles—all became interrogatory procedures.⁶⁵

Internationally, French intelligence and counterintelligence techniques included exploitation of French prominence in Interpol, the international police organization (by denouncing suspected FLN sympathizers as common criminals), and of the French position in NATO (by planting material about the FLN or its suspected adherents in NATO intelligence liaison channels). French military intelligence also worked extensively through such civilian groups as the terrorist Red Hand, which operated against FLN logistics activities in Switzerland, West Germany, and Italy.⁶⁶

The Dearth of Economic and Social Reform

No truly significant economic reforms were implemented by the French either in the period just after World War II or during the nationalist rebellion. Because of the obvious disparities in land tenure between the European and Muslim communities, some rather half-hearted attempts at reform were carried out, and some decrees limiting irrigated holdings and controlling the disposition of abandoned estates were issued in 1956. By 1958, however, only a few thousand Muslim families had benefited from these relatively minor measures.⁶⁷

Nor were meaningful social reforms sparked by the rebellion. Such gestures as were made toward granting Muslims social and political equality with Europeans remained empty and unfulfilled.

The Long Road to Settlement

Throughout the rebellion, elements on both sides groped for means of reaching a negotiated settlement. In this regard the French army presented a greater obstacle than did the ALN. In October 1956, while Paris sought to negotiate with responsible FLN leaders through intermediaries, the army kidnaped four of them. In November 1957, while the French government tried to back away from pacification, the soldiers threatened to "find alone the road to total victory." In February 1958, while the French government explored new negotiations through Tunisia and Morocco, the French air force bombed the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef.

In May 1958, pressure from French army officers in Algiers for more effective government support brought down the Fourth Republic in Paris. Gen. Charles de Gaulle was called back to the presidency by popular demand, in the hope that he could settle the Algerian question. After de Gaulle returned to power, the army tried twice more to call the political shots but found in de Gaulle a resolve strikingly absent in the Fourth Republic—a resolve which exposed much of the army's political strength as an illusion.⁶²

De Gaulle's Aims and Political Flexibility

De Gaulle's objective was to preserve French influence in Algeria by the implementation of economic and political reforms designed to link Algeria to France by the free choice of the majority. By favoring the principle of a single electoral college in Algeria, he hoped to build a Muslim elite independent both of the settlers and of the rebel leadership. Rebel opposition to de Gaulle's plans was based upon the belief that he was attempting to place Algeria in the hands of French puppets. The colons saw in de Gaulle's plans the beginning of Algerian independence and the end of economic and political domination of the country by its European elite.

Between August 1958 and November 1960, de Gaulle issued a series of pronouncements and offers to negotiate with the rebels under terms increasingly hostile to settler desires but far short of rebel demands. Self-determination replaced the army theme of integration, but the conditions of self-determination seemed to the rebels to leave the French army free to manipulate the entire political future of Algeria and to ignore the very existence of the FLN. The immediate response of the FLN in September 1958 was to proclaim a provisional government which expressed a continuing willingness to negotiate, but only on terms calculated to place Algeria's future in Algerian hands.

By June 1960, de Gaulle had survived a major settler-provoked crisis in Algiers (the celebrated Le Gaillard-Ortiz barricades of January 1960) and formally invited the FLN to send representatives to France to discuss an "honorable end to the fighting." The nationalists sent Ahmad Boumendjel and Mohammed ben Yahia to conferences held at Melun, in France. These talks were broken off within a few days, however, because of French insistence on unilateral concessions.⁶³

An "Algerian" Algeria

In the autumn of 1960 events took a new and dramatic turn. In attendance at the U.N. General Assembly, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced de facto recognition of the Republic of Algeria Provisional Government (GPRA). In response, de Gaulle announced a new policy, calling publicly for an "Algerian Algeria . . . with her own government, her institutions, and her laws."⁶⁴ He expressed conviction that at the time of self-determination, Algeria would remain united with France for economic, technological, educational, and defense matters.

(implying that the Algerian Algeria would have her own foreign office and policy). The effect of this new approach to self-determination would be a new Algerian constitution, guaranteeing home rule, but written by the French and implemented without any prior agreement with the FLN. The provisional government categorically refused the French offer, but de Gaulle's move served effectively to rule out direct U.N. intervention.⁷¹

Settler resistance precipitated an overwhelming series of pro-FLN demonstrations by Muslims in Algiers, Oran, and Bône which engulfed the de Gaulle policy. De Gaulle went through the motions of a referendum on a new statute for an Algerian Algeria, but the impressive endorsement of the FLN by Algerian Muslims persuaded him to bury it. He then moved again, through Tunisian President Bourguiba, for direct negotiations with the FLN on the political future of Algeria. "Melun," de Gaulle said, "never happened." After the FLN demonstrations in Algiers he said: "The FLN created a spirit; hence a people; hence a policy; hence a state."⁷²

De Gaulle Overcomes an Army Coup

These new and radical developments provoked a last-ditch effort on the part of a settler-army coalition in Algiers. Four generals—Maurice Challe, Raoul Salan, Edmond Jouhaud, and André Zeller—organized a coup in which, on the morning of April 22, 1961, Algiers was taken over without a shot being fired. On the radio, General Challe called the de Gaulle regime a surrender government and suggested that under de Gaulle Algeria would become a haven for Soviet bases. Although Challe won over commanding generals in Oran, Constantine, and the Sahara, this proved to be the highwater mark of the coup.

President de Gaulle rushed his minister of state from place to place in Algeria to rally resistance. The French navy was persuaded to remain neutral and both the air force and conscript units in Algeria supported de Gaulle. By nightfall the president had assumed dictatorial powers under the emergency clause of the constitution, stripped the rebellious generals of their rank, and delivered a radio and television appeal to the nation, forbidding all Frenchmen to cooperate with the leaders of the coup. The air force quickly removed transport aircraft to France, and the generals in Algeria found themselves isolated and without the means to reach France. Within three days, Challe was under arrest, his fellow plotters in hiding, and their small following of troops back in the barracks.⁷³

Evian Accord Leads to European Insecurity and Algerian Independence

On May 20, 1961, high-level representatives of the French government and the GPRA met publicly at France's resort town of Evian-les-Bains. After protracted negotiations, the French government and the Algerian provisional government signed an agreement on March 18, 1962. Both parties agreed to order a cease-fire on March 19, and France recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. Under the terms of the agreement a transitional period

was to follow, after which a national referendum would be held to settle Algeria's future. During the interim period a provisional administration and a court of public law were set up. A high commissioner represented France and was responsible for national defense and the maintenance of public order. Also included in the agreement were provisions for a general amnesty, guarantees for individual rights and liberties, and clauses concerning future cooperation between France and Algeria, settlement of military questions, and settlement of litigations.

During the transitional period, however, the already chaotic situation resulting from eight years of war was aggravated by the activities of the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS), a dissident group of diehard French generals and their followers. The OAS organized and carried out a brief but effective terrorist campaign in a vain attempt to provoke Muslim retaliation against Europeans. Its members hoped that such retaliation would justify the use of French troops to restore order and hence sabotage the Evian agreements. There were no retaliations, but the general air of insecurity prompted thousands of Europeans to leave. The destructive tactics of the OAS severely damaged public buildings and facilities and destroyed many of the administrative and financial records of the former French colonial government. With the capture of OAS leader General Salan, the organization lost most of its effectiveness and ceased to present a serious threat to Algerian security.

On July 1, 1962, the national referendum was held in Algeria, and the overwhelming majority of the population voted for independence from France.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

In the chaos of the transition and the weeks following the vote for independence, two major conflicts within the FLN emerged. One was the question of collegial versus individual responsibility; the other, the issue of regionalism versus centralism.⁷⁴

The issue of individual versus collegial responsibility was the central matter to come before the FLN congress at Tripoli, Libya, in June 1962. Ben Bella and his supporters believed that the establishment of a single-party dictatorship led by hard-core revolutionaries was best suited to implement the FLN platform. Opposition to Ben Bella came from Ben Khedda, head of the provisional government; Belkacem Krim, who had headed the Algerian peace negotiators; and Mohammed Boudiaf, one of Ben Bella's prison mates since 1956. They favored a parliamentary government dominated by the FLN, but which did not exclude other parties. During the ensuing power struggle, Ben Khedda discharged army chief C. I. Houari Boumedienne, a Ben Bella supporter, but was then faced with Boumedienne's army marching on Algiers from the previously fenced-out bases in Tunisia and Morocco. Ben Khedda was forced to resign. Ben Bella and a six-man political bureau assumed power, but Boumedienne and the army remained the only organized and disciplined force in the nation.⁷⁵

The issue of centralism versus regionalism came to a head when Ben Bella tried to whittle down the power of guerrilla units, some of whose chiefs desired virtual autonomy within their own wilayas. Wilayaism was especially strong in the area around Algiers and in the Kabylia Berber region. To placate the guerrilla chieftains and the army, which had temporarily supported the guerrillas to enhance its power against civilian politicians, Ben Bella agreed to accept army nominations for the majority of seats in the forthcoming elections for a Constituent Assembly. When the wilaya commanders in Algiers and Kabylia tried to force further concessions, Ben Bella fled Algiers for Oran and Sétif, where he sought once more the support of the army. In August-September 1962 Algeria faced another civil war as the army fought with some of the guerrilla units. But a modus vivendi reached between Ben Bella, who had slipped into Algiers ahead of the army, and the commanders of the insurgent wilayas put an end to the fighting. The army chose to disregard the cease-fire and Ben Bella's promise to make Algiers a demilitarized zone long enough to enter Algiers and assert its control. These crises left Ben Bella and the political bureau, and Boumedienne and the army, as the two principal forces in Algeria, with Boumedienne still lacking the prestige to displace Ben Bella.⁷⁶

On September 16, 1962, the nation elected a 196-member Constituent Assembly. The election, which did not allow for competition within or outside the FLN, was regarded as a request for a national vote of confidence in the political bureau. Shortly thereafter, Ben Bella and his cabinet were invested by the Assembly, and the government settled down to attack the pressing economic problems facing Algeria.⁷⁷

Economic Consequences of the War

Economically the war had ravaged Algeria. Land had been left untended for years. Farm machinery had fallen into disrepair. There was a shortage of food. The mass departure of Europeans had deprived the country of essential technicians. It had also shut down industry, thus raising the unemployment level as high as 70 percent. Taxes had not been collected since March 1962, and the treasury was nearly bankrupt. To alleviate the economic crisis, Algeria turned to France, the United States, and the West in general. The Algerian government made lucrative offers to former European residents to lure them back, at the same time borrowing \$400 million from the French government.⁷⁸ The United States contributed massive supplies of food. Communist aid was also forthcoming. Tractors and automotive equipment were sent from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, to be placed in the hands of French technicians by the Algerians. Yugoslavia announced plans to build several factories in Algeria.⁷⁹

Although the United States continued its shipments of surplus foods to Algeria and undertook other programs of assistance, the American-Algerian relationship was somewhat inhibited by Ben Bella's association with Fidel Castro, who had offered early sympathy to Algeria. The Algerians, on the other hand, believed that the United States was reluctant to risk antagonizing

de Gaulle, who did not want to see France replaced as the dominant external power in Algeria. These same officials viewed the German diplomatic representatives in Algiers as similarly reluctant. East European countries, unhampered by Gaullist considerations, continued to cement their growing relationship with Algeria.⁸⁰

Political Problems of Freedom

No permanent solution has been reached to the problems of wilayaism, especially that voiced by Ait Ahmed and his Berber guerrillas around Tizi Ouzou. The Berber problem was exacerbated by the Moroccan-Algerian border dispute, which had serious economic implications involving possible rich mineral deposits in the disputed area as well as political discord involving substantial Algerian suspicions of Moroccan complicity in the betrayal of Ben Bella (and, paradoxically, Ait Ahmed) to the French in October 1956.⁸¹ Centralism and wilayaism were the root of the friction that developed between Ben Bella and Boumedienne in early 1965. In a sudden coup, General Boumedienne replaced Ben Bella's government, and Ben Bella himself mysteriously disappeared.

Thus the Algerian republic seemed by late 1965 to have its future intertwined with the problems of Arab nationalism, North African political jealousies and economic rivalries, and severe internal economic and political crises.

Reviewing the conditions that led to the Algerian insurgency, one might speculate that the rebellion itself might have been averted had the economic and social causes underlying Muslim discontent been alleviated after World War II. But this was not done and, once launched, the rebellion was susceptible to neither an economic nor a military solution. Politics became foremost.⁸² When the French army was able to tip the balance of French politics and to pursue policies that drove the Algerian Muslims into the arms of the FLN, it created a situation that it lacked the power to control.

NOTES

¹ Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare From Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 25.

² From a statement by Jacques Soustelle printed in The Times (London), December 3, 1958, cited in ibid.

³ Clifford R. Barnett (ed.), Area Handbook for Algeria (Foreign Areas Studies Division: Washington: Special Operations Research Office, August 1958). Pages 59 and 60 give the 1958 population figures and European and Muslim birth and death rates from which the 1954 estimates were projected.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 57-59.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 633-34, 642, 647.

⁷ Ibid., chapters 6, 7, and 8.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 408, 412-14.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 414-19.

¹⁰ Ibid., chapter 21.

¹¹ Brian Crozier, The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 196-98.

¹² Paul A. Jureidini, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria 1954-1962 (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), p. 38.

¹³ Barnett, Algeria, chapter 21.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 546-47.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.; Ferhat Abbas made this point clear to the author during a dinner conversation in Rome shortly before his famous press conference in Cairo in April 1956.

¹⁷ Jureidini, Case Studies: Algeria, pp. 49-50.

¹⁸ Joseph Kraft, The Struggle for Algeria (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961), p. 69.

¹⁹ Jureidini, Case Studies: Algeria, p. 70.

²⁰ Barnett, Algeria, p. 480-81.

²¹ Ibid., p. 482.

²² Ibid., pp. 549-50.

²³ Ibid., p. 484.

²⁴ Jureidini, Case Studies: Algeria, p. 70.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 70-71.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Serge Bromberger, Les Rebelles Algériens (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958), p. 154.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Jureidini, Case Studies: Algeria, p. 82.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 72-73.

³¹ The author visited Tripoli, Libya, in July of 1957 and observed the Chinese in question en route to Algeria. Their identities and mission were confirmed in conversations with high-ranking Libyan government officials.

³² Ahmad Kamal, an American Muslim, President of Jamiat al Islam, was present during the transfer of funds from Natsir's representative. The Saudi Arabian figures were obtained from FLN representatives in Geneva in 1959-1960.

³³ The author interviewed Otto Schlüter in Hamburg, Germany, in December 1961.

³⁴ The author has seen many of these passports.

³⁵ Barnett, Algeria, pp. 393-433.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 501-502.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 502-503.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 508.

⁴⁰ Author interviews with responsible FLN leaders, 1959-60.

⁴¹ The Washington Post, August 25, 1962.

⁴² Author interview with A. K. Chanderli, FLN representative in New York, 1962.

⁴³ These statements were repeatedly relayed to the author from high FLN sources throughout the latter portion of the rebellion.

⁴⁴ Richard and Joan Brace, Ordeal in Algeria (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1960), p. 159 (quoted from the Congressional Record, Vol. 103, part 8, 85th Congress, 1st Session, July 2, 1957, p. 10780).

⁴⁵ The author was present at the Jami'at al Islam offices in Tripoli when Eisenhower's note was delivered to Idris Abdel Krim by two officers of the U.S. Embassy.

⁴⁶ For a discussion of quadrillage, see Roger Trinquier, La Guerre Moderne (Paris: La Table Moderne, 1961), pp. 123-57.

⁴⁷ Kraft, Struggle for Algeria, p. 94.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 99.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ The author received this information during interviews with officials of the International Red Cross in Geneva, in December 1961.

⁵¹ Kraft, Struggle for Algeria, pp. 104-105.

⁵² Ibid., p. 105.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 106.

⁵⁴ Barnett, Algeria, p. 419.


- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 420.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 420-21.
- ⁵⁷ Kraft, Struggle for Algeria, pp. 107-108.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 109.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 111.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 113.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 114.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 115.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁵ Kraft, Struggle for Algeria, p. 102. The author has received corroborating reports from many Algerians, including eyewitnesses.
- ⁶⁶ This information was obtained by the author from Swiss federal police officials during 1959-1962. The reader interested in further details should investigate press accounts concerning the scandal in Switzerland during 1956-1957 surrounding the expulsion of the French military attaché, Col. Marcel Mercier, from Switzerland and the subsequent exposure of the Swiss Procurator General, M. René Dubois, and a Swiss federal police official as French agents. M. Dubois took his own life.
- ⁶⁷ Nevill Barbour, A Survey of North West Africa (The Maghrib) (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 244.
- ⁶⁸ Kraft, Struggle for Algeria, pp. 116-17.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 237.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 240.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 241.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 246.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 247-48.
- ⁷⁴ William H. Lewis, "Algeria: The Plight of the Victor," Current History, XLIV (January 1963), 25.
- ⁷⁵ Jureidini, Case Studies: Algeria, p. 106.
- ⁷⁶ G. H. Jansen, "Algeria Analyzed," Middle East Forum, XXXVIII (1962), 17.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.
- ⁷⁸ Jureidini, Case Studies: Algeria, p. 108.
- ⁷⁹ Correspondence to the author from an Algerian official charged with economic planning functions, September 1963.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁸¹ Information regarding Algerian suspicions of the regime of Mohammed V and his son, Moulay Hassan, was obtained from associates of Ferhat Abbas during the period 1957-60.
- ⁸² See Kraft, Struggle for Algeria; ch. 5, "The Politics," contains a remarkably detailed and lucid analysis of French politics which should be studied by anyone who wishes to understand what happened in Algeria.

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Chapter Nine

ANGOLA
1961 until 1965



ANGOLA (1961-1965)

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ANGOLA (1961 until 1965)

by Thomas Okuma

Portuguese troops have held African nationalist guerrillas in northwestern Angola at bay since 1961 in what promises to be a protracted struggle against determined insurgents who have operated freely across the Congolese border and enjoyed considerable internal and international support and sympathy.

BACKGROUND

When open rebellion broke out in the Portuguese Congo district of northwestern Angola on March 15, 1961, it marked the beginning of a new era in that country's history.¹ For the colonial power, Portugal, which had believed itself uniquely able to understand and govern Africans, the rebellion was a traumatic experience.

The revolt in Angola was not an entirely new phenomenon, however, for there had been many uprisings in the 400 years of Portuguese rule. The struggle for sovereignty between the indigenous African population and the Portuguese colonial power may be divided into several historical periods. Early Portuguese discoverers, who first arrived in northwestern Angola in 1483, accepted the local African king of the Bakongo people on an equal footing with the royal courts of Europe. The prevailing idea of that era was to make the Congo comparable to a European kingdom and to ally it with Portugal. To achieve this end, the Portuguese clothed, educated, and instructed the Congolese elite in the ways of Lisbon. The Congolese kings were converted to Roman Catholicism, and in 1570 the manicongo (king) formally became a vassal of the king of Portugal. This alliance lasted through the 16th century, although there were occasional conflicts between the unequal partners.

The climate of the 17th century was different. The growing slave trade, the intrigues of European settlers, and tribal warfare doomed to failure Portugal's ambitious attempts to Westernize the Angolan tribes. Pushing south from Luanda (founded in 1576) and inland from Benguela and other coastal outposts, the Portuguese waged a continuous campaign to subdue the indigenous population. Insurrections, rebellion, and defiance of Portuguese rule continued into the 20th century. These 300 years may be designated as years of active, albeit sporadic and unorganized, resistance by indigenous rulers.²

An Interim of Peace

The years following World War I brought a period of acquiescence. Western-educated Africans set aside their indigenous customs to become assimilated into the Portuguese culture and, as such, they were called assimilados. The Portuguese expanded their civil administration and instituted a system that was relatively effective in controlling the peoples of Angola. Internal warfare ceased, legitimate commerce expanded, and some industrial activities were initiated. During this period most Angolan Africans adjusted to the structural form of the Portuguese colonial system.

Yet even as more and more Angolan Africans aspired to become assimilados, the realization dawned that Portuguese affirmations of equality in an integrated multiracial society were belied by the actual situation. The Portuguese discriminated against the assimilados economically, socially, and educationally. Africans therefore held that they were assimilated Portuguese in name only. Dissatisfied Angolan Africans began to organize small groups centered in the cities of Luanda and Lobito. The seeds of revolt were Portugal's broken promises and the contradictions between her theory of equality and her practice of discrimination.

Geography and Climate

Portugal's resistance to Angolan nationalism is understandable: Angola is her most prized overseas possession. Approximately twice the size of Texas and fourteen times as large as Portugal, Angola covers an area of 481,351 square miles and is strategically situated on the western coast of Africa and borders the Republic of the Congo, Rhodesia, and South-West Africa. Its coastline stretches for about 1,000 miles from the Congo River in the north to the Cunene River in the south. Luanda and Lobito are the chief seaports; rail communications run inland from these cities and from Moçamedes, a lesser port in the south.

In the northwestern part of Angola, where the insurgents were operating even at the time of this writing in 1965, the climate is tropical and humid. A coastal plain extends inland for about 150 miles, where a mountainous plateau begins, rising to a height of over 6,000 feet. In the mountains the climate is more agreeable and healthful than in the tropical coastal belt; here the dry season lasts from May through September, and the rains occur mainly between October and May.

Economic Conditions

Angola's economy, which is predominantly agricultural, is based on its exports of coffee, diamonds, sisal, corn, fish meal, cotton, iron ore, and sugar. Coffee has long provided the largest part of Angola's export earnings. The Congo district is a major coffee-producing region, and the 1961 revolt in that area was detrimental to production. Other than mining, there has been almost no industrialization in the country, because of the lack of capital, adequate transport facilities, skilled labor, and sufficient coal and iron resources.³

Europeans completely control the economic and commercial life of the country. European plantations, called *fazendas* in Portuguese, are responsible for most of Angola's agricultural production for export, and some four-fifths of the country's coffee acreage was in European hands in 1957. Since 1940, an influx of Portuguese peasants and laborers has drastically limited the African's economic mobility. In 1960, there were 7,000 unemployed white workers in Angola. Even as domestic servants and semiskilled workers, Angolan Africans faced competition from "poor whites" who had migrated from Portugal. Such job competition naturally fanned the flames of racial antagonism.⁴

Angola's Peoples

The total population of Angola is about 4.5 million. In 1961, there were nearly 175,000 Europeans in the country and some 30,000 mulattoes; the rest (over 95 percent) were Africans of various ethnic groups—1.5 million Ovimbundu, 1 million Kimbundu, 0.5 million Kikongo, and a number of smaller tribes.

The Kikongo-speaking group, whose ancient Bakongo kingdom was divided into French, Belgian, and Portuguese colonies, live in northwestern Angola's Congo district. The Kimbundu are their neighbors to the south, around Luanda. The largest tribal group, the Ovimbundu, live in central Angola, in the districts of Huambo and Bié on the Benguela plateau. The European population is concentrated in the cities of Luanda, Lobito, Benguela, Nova Lisboa, and Sá da Bandeira. Luanda alone contains about one-third of Angola's white population and most of the mulattoes.⁵

Approximately half the population identify themselves as Christians. Of the two million Christian Africans, over a half million are Protestants and the rest are Roman Catholics. Most Europeans and mulattoes are Catholic, since the Roman Catholic Church is an integral part of Portuguese culture. The government has long been suspicious of Protestant missionary activity among Angolan Africans; the events of 1961 seemed to justify Portuguese fears of such influence, since Protestant Africans were prominent in the leadership of insurgent forces.⁶

Portuguese Colonial Administration and Policy

Portugal itself has a single party form of government headed by Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar, who first became prime minister in 1932. A "new state" was established by the Constitution of 1933, and since 1958 there has been only one legal political party in the country, a government party known as the União Nacional. Since 1951, the Portuguese have officially regarded Angola as an overseas province of Portugal; in terms of civil and political rights, however, Angola's status remains strictly that of a colonial territory. There is a governor general appointed from Lisbon for a term of four years at the head of Angola's administrative hierarchy and a governor over each of the administrative districts in the country.

Apologists for Portugal's colonial policy point to opportunities promised to Africans under the assimilado system. Under this system, the African population was divided into two classes—the assimilated, or assimilados, who were legally Portuguese citizens; and the non-assimilated, known as indígenas, who were governed by a separate regime de indigenato. Supposedly all the rights of Portuguese citizenship were extended to Africans who could demonstrate that they were "civilized" by speaking good Portuguese, being gainfully employed, and meeting certain other requirements. In actual fact, however, there were only about 30,000 assimilados in Angola, and until September 1961 the rest (over 99 percent) of the African population was governed as indígenas.

For the indígenas, Portuguese rule meant paternalistic but harsh control by European administrators and chefes de posto, who often governed through African headmen used as tax collectors and labor recruiters. The indígenas constantly faced the threat of being sent away from their villages under some form of contract labor, often to the coffee plantations of the north. Ironically, the practice of transporting African workers from the south to the more politically conscious districts of northern Angola has undoubtedly contributed to the growth of African nationalism. Under attack from foreign journalists, humanitarians, and liberal critics in Portugal, the system of contract labor has been reformed in recent years. The Portuguese have also made some attempt to improve African village life by setting up agricultural cooperatives called colonatos; however, no more than 5,000 Africans had been involved in these undertakings by 1961.⁷

The Two Faces of Angolan Nationalism

There have been two distinct nationalistic movements in Angola, one among the Europeans and the other among the Africans. The Portuguese in Angola have long desired more political and economic autonomy within the Portuguese system. It is thought that many Europeans and assimilados in Angola may have voted against the Salazar regime in the 1958 presidential elections, but election figures were never published. It is the movement among the Africans that poses a threat to internal security and is the subject of this paper.

African Nationalism

African nationalism in Angola became an organized movement in the early 1950's, with efforts to petition the United Nations to intervene on behalf of the indigenous peoples of Angola. One Luanda group formed at this time an underground nationalist party which called itself the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). In the meanwhile, political ferment was accelerating in the nearby Belgian Congo and affecting the entire district of the Portuguese Congo in northern Angola. By 1954, a second nationalist party, called the União de Populações do Norte de Angola (UPNA), opened offices in the Belgian Congo's administrative capital of

Leopoldville, affiliating itself with the Abako movement there to recreate a Bakongo state comprising Portuguese Angola's Congo district, the Belgian Congo's Leopoldville Province, and parts of the French Congo. The UPNA, which in 1956 dropped the "norte" from its name to form UPA (União de Populações de Angola), has been active in the Congo district of Angola, while MPLA activities have been concentrated in the Luanda region.

From these small beginnings, African nationalism mushroomed in Angola, partly because of world events and partly because of the example of other African or Asian peoples emerging from colonial rule. The Angolan drive for self-rule assumed major proportions after Belgium acceded to the Congolese demand for independence on June 30, 1960.

Unrest Is Transformed into Violence

Indicative of the unrest and latent violence in the Portuguese territory was a village demonstration protesting the arrest and imprisonment in June 1960 of the MPLA president, Agostinho Neto, a medical doctor and nationalist poet. A group of Africans from Bengo (Dr. Neto's birthplace) and the neighboring village of Icolo marched to the government post in Catete (located 60 kilometers east of Luanda) to demand his release. The demonstration was broken up when reinforcements arrived from Luanda and arrested the demonstrators, reportedly a thousand strong. Some 30 Africans were killed and over 200 injured by troops firing into the crowd.⁸

Seven months later, on January 22, 1961, a bizarre episode drew world attention to the Angolan situation. Capt. Henrique Galvão, a political opponent of the Salazar regime, hijacked the Portuguese luxury liner Santa Maria in an attempt to dramatize and consolidate anti-Salazar sentiment. He hoped to sail the Santa Maria from the Caribbean, where it had been seized, to the west coast of Africa, gather reinforcements on the island of Fernando Póo and in Spanish Guinea, and then sail for Angola, where he expected to be welcomed by anti-government groups.⁹ Although he did not reach Angola, rumors of his plans spread through the city of Luanda, adding to existing tensions, and on February 4 there occurred a rising in Luanda. Whether this incident was planned to coincide with the arrival of the Santa Maria in Angola is not known. All that is certain is that a group of Africans, variously estimated at from 200 to 500, attacked the São Paulo jail and the two police barracks in Luanda, killing seven policemen. Rioting broke out again the next day at the policemen's funeral.¹⁰

A few days later, rumors trickled into Luanda of another rising several hundred miles east of the capital city, in the Baixa de Xassange region of the Malange district. This outbreak was a protest against the enforced quotas and controlled price system in the cotton-growing program, which favored Cottonag, a government-sponsored enterprise, to the detriment of the workers. African farmers attacked the residences of government officials and broke the windows of European shops, but there were few casualties in the initial outbreak. A complete breakdown of civil authority followed, and troops were sent in to quell the rioters. It was

apparently a spontaneous uprising; no organized resistance followed, and order was quickly restored by Portuguese military forces. There were many African casualties. Some persons fled to the Congo, and others hid in the surrounding countryside until order was restored. Although the colonial administration kept the incident from the public, word-of-mouth news of the rising was passed on by Africans who had fled the area.¹¹

INSURGENCY

Armed revolt broke out abruptly on March 15, 1961, in the Portuguese Congo district of northern Angola, where African insurgents attacked in 50 or more widely separated places over a 400-mile front. These initial attacks were extremely violent; it is estimated that some 300 Portuguese settlers were massacred in the first few days of the uprising.¹²

There was apparently no long-range strategy, no elaborate preparation, and little coordination among rebel groups. Each unit simply attacked the plantations and administrative posts in its immediate area, usually striking in the predawn hours. The only advantage the insurgents enjoyed was that of surprise: The Portuguese were totally unprepared for a mass rising in the north.¹³

The number of participants in the first attacks is difficult to determine, but a reasonable figure would seem to be from 3,000 to 4,000. Except for several Angolan deserters from the Portuguese army, none of the early insurgents had any military training, and only a trickle of military supplies had crossed the Congo frontier into Angola. Most of the rebels' arms had been captured from the Portuguese.

After their initial success, the insurgents were gradually pushed back into the mountains by Portuguese military forces and forced to abandon the towns and main roads they had seized in the first few weeks of the revolt. But this was not to be the end of the Angolan insurgency.¹⁴

Conflicting accounts have been offered to explain the general uprising. Some maintain that the rising was from the beginning part of a planned coup by Angolan nationalists, timed to take maximum advantage of a U.N. debate on the Angolan question and of weather conditions in the Congo district. Others explain the revolt as essentially a spontaneous demonstration against the labor policy of coffee plantations in northern Angola.¹⁵ Whatever its origin, the rising was quickly channeled into an organized resistance movement by the local leaders of the African nationalist movement.

Holden Roberto and the UPA

The revolt was essentially regional, being confined to northwestern Angola, which had close ties to both the French and Belgian Congos. Once independence had been achieved by these fellow Bakongo people to the north and east of Angola, it was perhaps inevitable that a nationalist

leader and a political party from the Portuguese Congo would rise to agitate for Angolan independence. The leader was Holden Roberto; the political party was the Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA).

The UPA, which had begun as a regional political movement of the Kikongo-speaking peoples in the north of Angola, began in 1956 to include representatives from other sections of Angola. In 1958, UPA was further reoriented in the direction of Angolan nationalism and away from Bakongo separatism when Holden Roberto, one of the UPA's earliest members and a staunch advocate of a supratribal basis for Angolan nationalism, emerged as president of the organization.¹⁶

Holden Roberto was born in 1925 in the small north Angolan town of São Salvador, the ancient capital of the Bakongo kingdom to which the Portuguese had originally come. His family soon moved to Leopoldville, Belgian Congo, where he attended French Protestant mission schools and for eight years worked in the finance department of the Belgian Congo administration. Keeping in touch with Angolan affairs through several visits to his homeland, Holden Roberto became active in the nationalist movement in the early 1950's. In the fall of 1958, as the new leader of the UPA, he made his way by boat, on foot, and by hitchhiking, to Accra, Ghana, arriving there just in time to attend the first All-African Peoples' Conference in December.

This was the first time that most of the outside world became aware of the African nationalist movement in Angola. Since then, Holden Roberto has traveled widely in the free world, gathering international support for the UPA in its struggle against Portugal. In 1959 he entered the United States incognito, as a member of the Guinean delegation to the United Nations; after the 1961 revolt he returned, this time as the avowed spokesman of the Angolan revolutionaries, seeking diplomatic support and military aid. A pragmatist rather than an ideologist, Roberto has been quoted as saying that "the heroic struggle of the Algerian people has done more for the liberation of Africa than all of the fine speeches and ornate theories."¹⁷

Formation of a Front and Government-in-Exile

Greatly influenced by the example of the Algerian National Liberation Front, the UPA in March 1962 joined with a smaller nationalist group, the Democratic Party of Angola, led by Emmanuel Kounzika, to form a national liberation front for Angola, the FNLA (Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola). This coalition subsequently led to the formation of an Angolan revolutionary government-in-exile, known as GRAE (Governo Revolucionário de Angola em Exílio), which claimed overall responsibility for the military, diplomatic, and propaganda offensive against Portugal. Holden Roberto, then living in Leopoldville, became its president; Kounzika, its vice president. But despite Roberto's desire to cast Angolan African nationalism in supratribal terms, his guerrilla forces consisted mainly of the Kikongo-speaking peoples of the north, where UPA claimed 40,000 dues-paying members.

UPA's Major Rival—MPLA

It should not be thought, however, that the desire for political independence was limited to the Portuguese Congo district. In the Luanda area, the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) had been active for more than a decade as a clandestine political movement among African intellectuals, including many mulattoes and a few Europeans. At one time the MPLA claimed a membership of 35,000, although this may have been an exaggeration.¹⁸

The arrest of its leaders in the spring of 1960 by Portuguese security police seriously hampered MPLA's growth as a political movement: thereafter it became a movement-in-exile in Conakry, Guinea, under the leadership of Mário Pinto de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz. MPLA's political status was further undermined when the UPA became an active resistance group after March 1961. Although MPLA has received some support from the governments of Guinea, Ghana, and the Congo (Brazzaville), a final blow to its political stature came in August 1963. At that time, after all efforts to unite the UPA and the MPLA had failed, a committee of the Organization for African Unity* recognized UPA as the representative Angolan political party and recommended that African states channel their financial aid and diplomatic support for Angola through the Congo (Leopoldville) government in behalf of the UPA and Holden Roberto's government-in-exile.

After this decision, the MPLA fell apart and its leaders scattered; Neto, when freed from prison, went to Brazzaville; and Andrade, who had left Conakry for Leopoldville, had to return to Conakry. As a result of ethnic and geographic circumstances and the Congolese political situation, the UPA apparently outmaneuvered the MPLA as the dominant force in the Angolan revolutionary movement.¹⁹ The leaders of MPLA, however, could still not be dismissed as politically defunct; Agostinho Neto especially commanded wide support in the Catete area of the Luanda district.

In spite of their rivalry, UPA and MPLA remained in basic agreement as to their common desire to drive the Portuguese colonial regime from Angola. African nationalists hoped to weaken Portuguese rule in Angola to such an extent that it would be militarily feasible to begin revolts in other Portuguese areas. When this might become possible depended on many factors, both within Angola and on the international scene, and is still, as of this writing, indeterminate. One factor was the military potential of the insurgent forces; another, the amount and kind of foreign support available to the insurgents. These factors have been closely interrelated.

Guerrilla Organisation, Leadership, and Strength

After their initial reverses at the hands of counterattacking Portuguese forces, the Angolan insurgents were able to achieve a more military bearing by the end of 1961. Regional commands

*A regional organization of independent black African and North African states loosely comparable to the Organization of American States (OAS).

were established in the field and a commander in chief, João Baptista, was appointed head of all UPA forces in Angola. Each guerrilla outfit still operated to a large extent as an independent unit, although there was a central command to determine broad strategy and each unit's area of military responsibility. On February 6, 1962, Baptista was killed in action near Bembe. He was succeeded by José Kalundungo, who came from the Ovimbundu people of central Angola.²⁰ The insurgents paid special attention to maintaining an ethnic balance among guerrilla officers in an effort to emphasize the supratribal nature of the nationalist movement.

Units varied widely in strength. By late 1963, one guerrilla force of over 1,000 men was reportedly operating in the Serra de Canda area, 65 miles south of the Congolese border. The UPA-dominated guerrilla force, which called itself the Angolan Liberation Army (ALA), probably contained more than 7,500 disciplined troops in early 1964, although some insurgent sources set ALA troop strength at four times this number.²¹

According to one visitor to the rebel-held Serra de Canda in late 1963, the insurgents' morale was high and their leadership confident of eventual victory over Portugal. Guerrilla soldiers were volunteers sworn to serve without pay in the liberation army until independence was won. "Their motivation seemed to spring from a sense of being part of something African," the correspondent wrote. A favorite marching song among the UPA guerrillas was "The Yellow Rose of Texas"; and, after the return of 25 Angolan medical corpsmen from training in Israel, Hebrew songs caught on quickly.²²

Transport and Tactics

Inside Angola, guerrilla bases and campsites had to be moved constantly to avoid detection by Portuguese patrols and spotter planes, although some permanent camps were apparently established in the Serra de Canda mountains. An ingenious system of transport was devised by the UPA, which organized more than 10,000 Angolan volunteers between the ages of 15 and 35 into an auxiliary transportation corps. These volunteers, while waiting for openings at training centers in the Congo, relayed supplies on foot between guerrilla camps and supply depots, usually at night and often covering 40 miles by daybreak.²³

Although increasingly well coordinated and organized, the Angolan rebels' basic concept of warfare apparently did not change after their initial attacks. Military convoys remained favorite targets, with the insurgents mining roads to block troop transport. Waiting until a Portuguese convoy reached a bend in the road or hit a mine, the insurgents opened fire, threw grenades, fired several rounds from a bazooka, and then disappeared again into the tall elephant grass and timbered forest. The mountainous terrain is ideal for this type of warfare, which places a premium on the tactical elements of surprise, mobility, and elusiveness.

Underground Operations

The UPA developed an underground support base which it presumably still controls as of this writing in 1965. In most villages in the Portuguese Congo district UPA officers are responsible for political work at the village level and in charge of liaison between the civilian population and guerrillas in the area. Villagers and refugees are asked to share their food with the local guerrillas, who otherwise would be forced to live off the land, eating wild bananas and pineapples or, at worst, jungle roots.

The nationalists hold frequent mass meetings and membership drives. Through its newspaper, The Voice of the Angolan Nation, published in French, Portuguese, and Kikongo editions, the UPA disseminates pro-nationalist and anti-Portuguese propaganda. In some Serra de Canda villages there are local officials of the UPA-dominated revolutionary government-in-exile (GRAE) who mediate civil disputes and register births, deaths, and marriages. There is even a rudimentary postal system serving rebel-held villages.²⁴ GRAE has also been active in organizing special groups, such as labor, women, and students, in Angolan communities in the former Belgian Congo, as well as in parts of northern Angola.

External Aid and Sanctuary

The Angolan insurgents have had the advantage of considerable foreign assistance in their struggle with Portugal. During the formative years of the revolt between 1958 and 1961, Tunisia backed UPA leader Holden Roberto, permitting him to travel on a Tunisian passport to seek international support for the Angolan cause. In 1961, the Algerian FLN* offered to train Angolan "freedom fighters," and the UPA sent 22 Angolan soldiers to Algeria to train with Algerian FLN units; their return after a year changed the character of the insurgent forces. Israel has also aided the insurgent cause by providing medical training in that country for Angolan corporals. Most of the insurgents' arms have come from the Algerians, who in December 1963 sent a 100-ton arms shipment through the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville).²⁵

In August 1961, the Adoula government in Leopoldville permitted the Angolans to establish military training camps on Congolese territory. A basic training course was set up in 1963 at Camp Kinkouzou just across the border from Angola, where FLN-trained UPA officers hoped to turn out 2,200 guerrilla fighters every eight weeks.²⁶ The Adoula government, which has consistently favored the UPA nationalist faction over others, also took the lead in extending diplomatic recognition to Roberto's government-in-exile in 1963. By the end of that year, the Angolan revolutionary government had gained diplomatic recognition from Tunisia, Algeria, the United Arab Republic, Senegal, Guinea, and several other African states. The Adoula government has

*The successful Algerian nationalist organization called in French the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).

also permitted GRAE to operate freely in the Congo, where it maintains schools and other social services for refugee Angolans. Newly independent African states, through the Organization for African Unity, have raised over \$5 million to help finance the Angolan rebels and national undergrounds elsewhere in Africa.²⁷

Role of Communism

As late as 1964, the Angolan nationalists were apparently free of direct Communist influence. Some MPLA leaders visited the Soviet bloc, but any ties formed with the Communists appear to have been expedient rather than ideological. The dominant UPA, which was considered "an authentic African nationalist party, free from any Communist association,"²⁸ was consistently more Western oriented than the MPLA. Early in 1964, however, Holden Roberto, in an action which he described as a "radical change in policy," announced his readiness to accept aid from Communist countries and disclosed plans to send an Angolan delegation to Peking. This action was necessary, he concluded, since "the United States supplies . . . Portugal, with arms that are used to kill us"; and African nations were apparently too poor to provide sufficient materiel.²⁹ Whether this measure reflected desperation, bluff, or a political reorientation was not clear.

Premier Cyrille Adoula of the Congo (Leopoldville) government took Holden Roberto at his word. At ceremonies in Leopoldville marking the third anniversary of the Angolan revolution, Adoula warned the Angolan rebels to keep the cold war out of their struggle against Portugal.³⁰ The reaction of the Congolese government indicated the fluid nature of African politics and emphasized the dependence of the Angolan insurgents on the Congo. A Leopoldville administration hostile to Roberto and his party could upset the balance of power in the Angolan nationalist movement and materially affect its chances of success.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Traditionally, the Portuguese have reacted strongly to any internal security threat in Angola. By the end of 1960, the situation in Luanda was tense, the arrests of Angolan nationalist sympathizers having cast a spell of anxiety over the African population. In January 1961, Portuguese security forces imposed a 10 p.m. curfew, and police began patrolling the Muceques, the African section of Luanda, arresting any African found on the streets after sunset. Despite these precautions, the Portuguese were taken by surprise on February 4, 1961, when African crowds suddenly stormed the Luanda jail and two police barracks, killing seven policemen. That evening the Luanda municipal police and Portuguese state police, known as PIDE (Polícia Internacional de Defesa de Estado), augmented by military troops and angry white settlers, marched into the African sections of the city to take strong reprisal measures. When rioting

broke out again the next day at the funeral of the slain policeman, Portuguese security forces again retaliated, killing 24 Africans, wounding a hundred, and arresting a score of others.³¹

Portuguese forces also reacted swiftly and violently in the Baixa de Xassange area, where African farmers rioted in early February in protest against the government's agricultural policies. Military forces were called out to crush the uprising, and the Portuguese air force bombed recalcitrant African villages. Joint action by security and military forces quickly routed the mobs. Order was restored in the area, military forces withdrew, and Portuguese civilian officials returned to their posts. All seemed to be in order; no further security measures were taken by the government.

Although military troops had been called out to subdue African rioters in Luanda and in the Baixa de Xassange area, responsibility for the country's security remained in the hands of PIDE security forces until the situation changed radically on March 15, 1961. When general insurgency broke out in northern Angola, only token military units were stationed in the northern towns of Carmona and São Salvador; major military forces were concentrated in Luanda and Nova Lisboa to the south. The Portuguese might well have lost northern Angola to the insurgents during the month of March if the latter had been prepared to take advantage of their initial success. For a time, white civilians and government officials were at the mercy of the insurgents, and there was a complete breakdown of administrative machinery in the area.

Reaction to the March Attacks

When word of the insurgency reached Luanda, the Portuguese government immediately mobilized its military forces of some 7,000 men for all-out war. But the lines of communication were broken, the insurgents having blocked the few main roads from Luanda to the north. Portuguese troop transports encountered hundreds of large trees felled across the main roads and more than 300 large pits. Consequently, it took the first military contingent 18 days in the initial weeks of the revolt to cover the 350 kilometers from Luanda to Maquela do Zombo. The Portuguese were forced to depend on air lifts as the major means of troop and supply transport. Civilians and army recruits hastily cut air strips near Carmona, São Salvador, Bembe, and Nambuangongo.

While administration forces were making their way to the area of insurgency, white settlers reacted immediately, vigorously, and brutally. During the first weeks of the upheaval, raiding columns of whites burned villages and indiscriminately shot the inhabitants. The terror was worst in the Congo district, where several thousand Africans were killed in reprisal for the death of several hundred whites. Africans reported that in May alone 1,500 people in the Luanda district were killed by white vigilantes who raided African homes and shot people on the spot. Educated Africans were particularly suspect. Any African accused by a Portuguese refugee from the Congo district of being a terrorista was likely to be summarily shot. The creation of

the *Corpos de Voluntários* on March 31, 1961, cloaked these civilian acts of terror with legality and a certain measure of respectability. As a result, thousands of Africans took to the bush; as early as May 1961, more than 100,000 refugees had fled across the border into the Congo.

Portuguese Military Buildup

Troop reinforcements were ordered to Angola, and between 2,500 and 3,000 paratroopers were immediately flown to Luanda. On May 5, 1961, the converted passenger liner, *Vera Cruz*, sailed for Angola with 3,400 troops aboard. A sister ship, the *Rita Maria*, followed with a cargo of arms and military equipment. The military conscription program in Portugal was accelerated, all males 20 years of age and above being subject to the draft for a period of 24 months. By the end of May, there were 20,000 Portuguese troops in Angola and the Salazar government promised more reinforcements in the coming months. The military buildup continued until, by the end of 1963, there were over 40,000 Portuguese troops in the rebellious colony.³²

As a result of the insurgency, the Portuguese fused civil and military functions in Angola, and the civilian Governor General Silva Taveres was replaced by a military officer, Gen. Venâncio Deslandes. At his commissioning in Lisbon, General Deslandes emphasized the priority of military functions, stating that, since the African nationalists had made war on the Portuguese people, there were only two roads—"unconditional surrender or extermination." To implement his policy, General Deslandes suspended civil administration in the areas of revolt and violence, appointing four military men as district governors in northern Angola. Furthermore, all European men in Angola over the age of 20 were to be drafted into the army at once, sent to Nova Lisboa for their basic training, and then shipped to a military post in Angola.

Portuguese Use African Loyalists

The problem of African draftees was different; in the first few weeks of the "war," as the government termed the insurgency, officers were hesitant to use Africans in combat, doubting their loyalty. Later, however, when Portuguese troops had regained control of the main roads and towns, they found it expedient to use Africans from the south against the northern insurgents. The age-old tactic of playing off one ethnic group against another was reactivated, pioneer European settlers recalling how this method had been used to conquer the Angolan peoples in the 19th century. By the end of April 1961, the military had increased the number of African draftees, doubling the peacetime indigenous force of 7,823 men. Moreover, northern coffee plantation managers proposed that contract laborers from the south who were working in the area should be armed, so that they could defend themselves from the attacks of the African nationalist insurgents; the "loyal southerners," especially the Ovimbundu from central Angola, could also be utilized to hunt down rebels in the forests.

Counterinsurgent Strategy and Operations

By April 1961, a counterinsurgent military strategy had been developed, expressing the following aims: first, to suppress the insurgents and regain control of the areas in revolt; second, to win back the confidence of the Africans; and third, to reestablish law and order so that the economic life of the country could be stabilized.³³ The first of these objectives was partially realized by the end of April 1961, when Portuguese troops had squeezed the insurgent forces into half of the original area which they had overrun in the first weeks of the revolt.

Portuguese military operations were concentrated in the area of Serra de Canda in the Portuguese Congo and against pockets of resistance in the areas of Nambuangongo and Úcua in the Luanda district. Throughout 1963, the Portuguese were able to contain the main guerrilla forces in the mountain forests in the north of the Dande River, which government troops patrolled carefully.³⁴ Commando patrols and airborne paratroopers were used to ferret out guerrilla bands.

Aircraft were extensively used to locate and destroy rebel encampments in the forests, although the guerrillas, forewarned by the sound of approaching planes, were often able to escape from the target area before the air strike could be carried out. In the first weeks of the revolt, Portuguese aircraft bombed and strafed many north Angolan villages which may or may not have harbored rebel forces. Fear of more such attacks sent thousands of African villagers into the forests or over the Congolese border as refugees.³⁵

Military operations were not accomplished, however, without considerable loss of life on both sides. On June 12, 1962, the ministry of defense in Lisbon informed the public that 289 Portuguese officers and men had died in Angola since the revolt began. Most casualties probably occurred in the first three months of hostilities. There were no reliable estimates of the number of insurgents wounded or killed by the Portuguese, since the rebels usually succeeded in carrying away their wounded and dead. Estimates of Africans killed, including civilians as well as combatants, ranged from 10,000 to 30,000.³⁶

Efforts to Regain African Confidence

Since the reprisal measures of civilian officials and European settlers had alienated much of the African population from the colonial government, military authorities soon recognized that winning back the confidence of the Africans would be extremely difficult. In truth, the army faced a herculean task: It had to prosecute the war while trying to pacify the countryside. Officers explained the nature of the undertaking to their men and ordered them to protect all inhabitants of the war area, both black and white. Military planes dropped leaflets in the besieged areas, offering safe conduct to all Africans who had fled their homes. Messages emphasized that troops were friends.

Along with the campaign to entice Africans-in-hiding to return to their villages, the army formed "psychosocial units" to try to reestablish confidence between whites and blacks. Army recruits from Portugal supported this effort, playing soccer with Africans, rebuilding village schools, and teaching African school children. Medical corpsmen also entered into the program, mounting dispensaries in the rural areas and ministering to health needs. Moreover, the policy of integrating African draftees into Portuguese army units helped to create an image of a friendly relationship between blacks and whites.

The Portuguese claimed that 150,000 Africans returned to their villages soon after the institution of this program. The program was especially successful in the Carmona area, where dozens of settlements, each housing 1,500 refugees, were established. European civilians, however, were not happy; they accused the army of "spoiling" the Africans. This difference in attitudes between the army and white settlers has created tensions; in fact, the army's relations with Africans have been much better than its relations with the white Portuguese in the revolt area.³⁷

Economic Stabilization

When the army's program to reestablish law and order was partially realized in May 1961, the military government then turned its attention to stabilizing the economic life of the country. But this was a difficult matter. The war brought financial crisis to Angola; military operations cost some \$98 million a year by 1963. The government received an emergency loan of 5 million escudos (\$17.5 million) from the bank of Angola to finance military projects necessary to carry on the war. Priority projects included the construction of airfields, roads, and communication lines.

In Portugal, the government had to increase taxes on tobacco, liquor, automobiles, gasoline, income, land, loans, and construction materials. Furthermore, the interruption of the coffee-growing program in northern Angola in 1961 was a serious economic setback to the Portuguese economy. Continued sabotage of equipment and harassment of workers on the northern plantations hampered the efforts of coffee planters to meet production schedules, and there was some doubt that the economic life of Angola could be stabilized. In sum, the financial drain of the war effort depleted the resources of both Angola and Portugal.

Psychological Operations in Portugal and Angola

To gain domestic support for the counterinsurgency and for the expenditures it entailed, civil authorities in Portugal began a domestic propaganda program almost immediately. Throughout the country, signs such as "Angola Is Portugal" were soon prominently displayed on streetcars, commercial buildings, and taxicabs. There was some political opposition in Portugal at the time, but it was not directed against the government's efforts to win the war in Angola;

it was an anti-Salazar movement. Domestic opposition forces hoped to take advantage of the unrest in Angola to undermine the Salazar regime. In general, however, the anti-Salazar opposition has been ineffective and the government has had little difficulty in rallying the Portuguese people to the national cause of crushing the rebellion, which it describes as Communist inspired and sponsored by outsiders. The Portuguese at once attached the Communist label to the UPA and warned their Western allies that the revolt in Angola was the beginning of a Communist plot to take over that country.

In Angola, municipal officials sponsored patriotic rallies to demonstrate that the Angolan population supported the government. Africans were especially urged to participate and non-attendance was interpreted as a hostile act toward the government. Featured speakers were African teachers, who were expected to emphasize their allegiance to Portugal and its civilizing mission in Angola. In their effort to arouse enthusiasm among Africans, the Portuguese made extensive use of mass media to explain Portugal's position. Of these, radio broadcasts have been the most effective. Broadcasts in various indigenous languages exhorted the Africans to support the Portuguese struggle to repel the insurgents from the north.

The Portuguese also sponsored several collaborationist African political factions, such as the Movimento para a Defesa do Interêsse de Angola (MDIA) and Nto-Bako, meaning "The Source of the Bakongo," which opposed the nationalist movement and favored continued Portuguese rule with a few modest reforms. These groups, like the royalist Muxicongo party, which opposed the UPA in the Bakongo country, had no mass following; and their major usefulness to the government was as intelligence sources.

A Program of Reform

Indicating its awareness of the issues underlying the insurgency, the Portuguese government did not neglect civil reform. Soon after the start of the revolt, the overseas ministry in Lisbon proposed several economic, social, and political measures. One of the first, announced in May 1961, was the abolition of the practice that required African farmers to raise cotton according to a quota system established by Cottonag, a government-controlled agricultural cartel. By this decree, the government hoped to eliminate the source of irritation which had precipitated the preliminary February riots in the Baixa de Xassange region.

Another decree, promulgated on June 12, 1961, led to the reestablishment of the principle of municipal representation. On the local level, African inhabitants who had reached a specified educational and cultural level could now share in running community affairs, electing administrators for their rural communities. On the district level, municipal inhabitants were to elect representatives to the legislative councils: the basic intent of this decree was to promote more local participation by African and European inhabitants on both local and district levels of government.³⁸

Three months later, on September 6, 1961, in still another reform, the overseas ministry announced the abolition of the regime de indigenato, which had discriminated against the great mass of black Angolans. In a speech on August 28, 1961, before the Oporto Commercial Association in Portugal, Overseas Minister Adriano Moreira stated that the laws for the nonassimilated class of the population had originally been made to respect the private lives of the Angolan black race, but he acknowledged that it was "now timely to repeal it, so as to have it clearly understood that the Portuguese people are subject to a political law which is the same for everyone, without distinction of race, religion, or culture."³⁸ The Portuguese constitution now applied with equal legal force to all the inhabitants of Angola.

On the same day that the government abolished the regime de indigenato, another decree set up "provincial settlement boards" for the purpose of creating multiracial communities in Angola. To carry out this aim, the boards were "to promote or encourage initiatives tending to consolidate the bonds of solidarity and association of the different classes, or social or ethnic aggregates, particularly through sports, folklore, or cultural manifestations, youth labor camps, auto-construction of houses, etc."⁴⁰ Of particular interest to Africans was the implied desegregation of the African quarters in the cities, and the creation of integrated multiracial communities in Luanda, Lobito, and smaller towns.

The Role of World Opinion

These civil reforms were designed in part to minimize international criticism of Portuguese policy in Angola, primarily in the United Nations. At the time of the revolt, the U.N. General Assembly had just called on Portugal to comply with a recent U.N. mandate urging all colonial powers to grant self-rule to their non-self-governing territories. On April 20, 1961, the U.N. General Assembly voted to appoint a subcommittee to investigate the Angola crisis.

The support which several of her allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) gave to the United Nations resolution made Portugal skeptical of the worth of the NATO alliance. At a NATO meeting in May 1961, Portugal hinted at withdrawing and threatened to use her NATO-committed troops against the Angolan insurgents. If Portugal had carried out her threat, her NATO allies, particularly Great Britain and the United States, would have been embarrassed: African nations and the Communist bloc had already accused Portugal of using NATO arms and supplies in suppressing the revolt. A few weeks after the May meeting Portugal's Western allies, with the exception of Britain and France, once more approved a United Nations resolution which called on Portugal to cease repressive measures in Angola.

Meanwhile, the U.N. subcommittee to investigate the crisis in Angola was denied permission to enter Angola by the Salazar government. Instead, the president of the subcommittee, Dr. Carlos Salamanca of Bolivia, was invited by the Portuguese government to come to Lisbon as a private citizen for discussions. When the subcommittee's report was presented to the General

Assembly on November 28, 1961, its recommendations further isolated Portugal from the international community. The document was sharply critical of Portugal's policy in her African possession, although it recognized some recent reforms relating to the labor system. In spite of these improvements, the committee strongly recommended that Portugal recognize the right of self-determination for the indigenous peoples and reminded Portugal of her obligation to prepare Angola for self-government. Portugal refused to abide by the findings of the subcommittee and was condemned by most of the world community for her attitude.

After 1962, world opinion, especially among the Afro-Asian nations, increasingly hardened against Portugal and her determination to keep her colonies as overseas provinces. With international criticism continuing, there even seemed some possibility that Portugal might withdraw from the United Nations, in which she had only two firm friends, Spain and South Africa. It was through these two countries, territorial neighbors in Europe and Africa, that the Portuguese had access to arms, supplies, and military intelligence. Otherwise, in her struggle with the Angolan insurgents, Portugal stood alone before a hostile world community.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

By the end of 1965 the final outcome of the revolt in Angola still remained undetermined. The military situation was a stalemate. The insurgents lacked strength to drive the Portuguese from the country, and the Portuguese, despite superior military power, could not rout the nationalist guerrillas from their strongholds in the mountains and forests of northwestern Angola, close to the most economically valuable agricultural regions of the country.

Portugal Faces Continuing Problems

What were some of the factors responsible for the 1965 situation facing the Portuguese in Angola? On the military side, a major reason for Portugal's difficulties was that troops had to adjust to a new kind of military operation in terrain almost ideal for guerrilla operations. Moreover, the difficulty of moving troops and maintaining logistic support over several hundred miles of extremely bad roads, especially during the rainy season, forced the counterinsurgents to rely heavily on air support. By all accounts the greatest single obstacle to a Portuguese victory in Angola was the impossibility of closing the 500-mile Congolese border through which the insurgents received arms, supplies, and reinforcements. Since it was militarily impossible for Portugal to patrol this frontier, her best recourse appeared to be through diplomatic and political pressures brought to bear on the Leopoldville government of the Congo Republic.

On the political front, the Portuguese definitely lacked the full support of the African population of Angola. Insurgent forces apparently enjoyed the enthusiastic support of a UPA-organized civilian underground in much of the revolt area; furthermore, it was generally

believed that the African population in other parts of Angola would come to the aid of the nationalist cause if active insurgency extended to their areas. Internationally, Portugal was further hampered by international criticism of her colonial policy.

Most Africans were aware that self-government in its customarily accepted sense was contrary to Portuguese policy, for Portugal insisted that Angola, as an overseas province of Portugal, was already self-governing. Nationalist Angolan insurgents denied this contention. African nationalism and Portuguese nationalism thus seemed to be irreconcilable; if so, one ultimately must prevail over the other.

African Hopes

If African nationalist insurgents are able to hold out long enough, time may be on their side. Military supplies, arms, and reinforcements could become more plentiful as time goes by, provided that the Congolese base of operations continues to be available. A prolonged war in Angola would assuredly be a drain on the financial and other resources of Portugal, one of the poorest countries in the Western world, and might force the Salazar government to face the alternatives of giving up Angola or bankrupting the Portuguese economy. With each passing year, the likelihood of Portugal's being confronted with other military fronts in Africa increases: African nationalists have been active in Portuguese Guinea* and Mozambique. On the other hand, time imposes certain burdens on the Angolan insurgents. The leadership is by no means monolithic, and the movement faces the possibility of internal dissension and destructive rivalry among its component factions.

Despite this possibility, Angolan insurgents, who see many parallels between their situation and the eight-year Franco-Algerian struggle, are optimistic. While they freely admit their present inability to beat the Portuguese in the field, they are confident that they can wage a war of attrition "until the politicians are ready to talk."⁴

* See Chapter Thirteen, "Portuguese Guinea (1959-1965)."

NOTES

¹This paper is based largely on the author's book, Angola in Ferment: The Background and Prospects of Angolan Nationalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962).

²James Duffy, Portugal in Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 47-72.

³Okuma, Angola, pp. 5-7.

⁴Duffy, Portugal, pp. 204-205.

⁵Okuma, Angola, pp. 7-8, 18-19.

⁶Ibid., pp. 50-57.

⁷Ibid., pp. 23-32.

⁸Duffy, Portugal, pp. 213-14; for a more detailed account, see Basil Davidson, "Angola, 1961," Présence Africaine (English ed.), X (1961), 9-10.

⁹Henrique Galvão, Santa Maria: My Crusade for Portugal (London: Weindenfeld, 1961), pp. 113-14.

¹⁰Duffy, Portugal, pp. 214-15; Davidson, "Angola, 1961," p. 12.

¹¹McVeigh, "The Present Situation in Angola," in Ronald Waring, The War in Angola (Lisbon, 1961), pp. 12ff.

¹²Duffy, Portugal, p. 222.

¹³Lloyd Garrison, "Revolt in Angola," Army, XIV (February 1964), 57-58.

¹⁴Duffy, Portugal, p. 221; Garrison, "Revolt," p. 58.

¹⁵Anonymous, "The Angola Revolution," Présence Africaine (English ed.), XVII (1963), 155-57; Andrew Westwood, "The Politics of Revolt in Portuguese Africa" (Washington: Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, April 6, 1962), p. 3.

¹⁶Westwood, "The Politics of Revolt," pp. 2-9.

¹⁷John Marcum, "The Angola Rebellion: Status Report," Africa Report, IX (February 1964), 5.

¹⁸Westwood, "Politics of Revolt," p. 12.

¹⁹Marcum, "Angola Rebellion," pp. 4-7.

²⁰Ibid., p. 4.

²¹Garrison, "Revolt," pp. 56-58; Anon., "The Angola Revolution," 160.

²²Garrison, "Revolt," pp. 58-59.

²³Ibid., pp. 58-60.

²⁴Ibid., p. 60.

²⁵Ibid., p. 58.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., p. 60; Marcum, "Angola Rebellion," pp. 6-7.

²⁸Duffy, Portugal, p. 218.

²⁹Marcum, "Angola Rebellion," p. 7.

³⁰The New York Times, March 23, 1964, p. 10.

³¹Duffy, Portugal, p. 215.

³²Garrison, "Revolt," p. 57; Davidson, "Angola 1961," p. 13.

³³Waring, War in Angola, pp. 37ff.

³⁴Garrison, "Revolt," p. 59.

³⁵Ibid.; Okuma, Angola, p. 83.

³⁶Duffy, Portugal, p. 221; Davidson, "Angola 1961," pp. 15-17.

³⁷Waring, War in Angola, pp. 42ff.

³⁸Adriano Moreira, Portugal's Stand in Africa (New York: University Publishers, 1962), p. 188; for more details and insurgent criticism of these reforms, see "The Situation in the Territories under Portuguese Administration Since January 1961," Présence Africaine (English ed.), XVII (1963), 175-96.

³⁹Moreira, Portugal's Stand in Africa, p. 187.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 245.


⁴¹Garrison, "Revolt," p. 58.

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Chapter Ten

CAMEROON
1955-1962



CAMEROON (1955-1962)

Chapter Ten

CAMEROON (1955-1962)

by Victor T. Le Vine

Cooperation between French and Cameroonian officials responsible for military and police action, together with political and administrative measures and the acquisition of national independence, undercut insurgent aims, resources, and prospects.

BACKGROUND

This study of insurgency in the Cameroon between 1955 and 1962 and the measures taken to counter it necessarily focuses more on the political than on the military aspects of the situation. The insurgency never grew in scale to the point where large military units were engaged; rather, the conflict involved small, mobile units operating at sporadic intervals. The insurgency eventually ebbed, not so much in response to military or police counteraction, as to a changing political situation that brought about first a fragmentation of the rebel leadership and then a gradual reduction of the conflict when the insurgents became convinced of the futility of the rebellion.

The conflict took place mainly in the former French areas of the present Federal Republic of Cameroon, an independent state on the west coast of Africa made up of West Cameroon and East Cameroon. The larger eastern region was first a League of Nations mandate and then a U.N. trust territory under French administration until 1960; simultaneously, as the state of Cameroun, it was an associated territory, first in the French union from 1946 until 1958, then in the French community until January 1960, when it became the Independent Republic of Cameroun. The western region was the former Southern Cameroons, which the British administered until October 1961 as a trust territory closely linked with the British colony of Nigeria. On October 1, 1961, pursuant to a plebiscite held in the British Cameroons, the British and French territories merged to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon.*

The federation is approximately 700 miles long from north to south, and stretches from the Bight of Biafra to Lake Chad; it is slightly larger than the state of California. It may be divided into five geographical zones on the basis of dominant topographical, climatic, and

* Regarding spelling forms, the gallicized "Cameroun" and the anglicized "Cameroons" will generally be used as appropriate to the areas and time periods dealt with. "Cameroon" will refer to the Federal Republic of Cameroon established October 1, 1961, and in descriptions not related exclusively to any specific time period.

vegetation features: the mountain region, the coastal plain, the central forest plateau, the Adamawa plateau region, and the northern savanna plain.

The mountain region along the western border constitutes most of West Cameroon as well as East Cameroon's Wouri, Mungo, Bamileké, Bamoun, Adamawa, and two northern administrative divisions. It includes a chain of irregular mountains and hills running from Mount Cameroon (13,500 feet) on the coast to the Mandara Hills near Lake Chad. Here the climate varies from hot and humid to generally fair and cool.

The coastal plain, which is between 10 and 50 miles wide, is hot and humid most of the year, with great variations in rainfall; average precipitation is about 60-80 inches per year.

A central forest plateau, making up most of the south, extends inland approximately 300 miles and is about 1,200 to 1,500 feet in elevation. Climate is highly variable, with temperatures up to 87° F. during the day and down to the mid-60's at night. The Sanaga and several smaller rivers flow southeast through this forest plateau and coastal plain, emptying into the Atlantic.

North of the tropical rain forest is the Adamawa plateau region, an area between 50 and 150 miles wide, which is generally cooler and drier. Rainfall averages between 40 and 50 inches per year in the region, which has a mean altitude of 3,400 feet above sea level.

Extending north of the Adamawa plateau to Lake Chad is a savanna plain, where vegetation is typically sparse; the area as a whole tends to be hot and dry. Temperatures vary widely between night and day, and rainfall is generally restricted to a six-weeks period in July and August, during which precipitation up to 40 inches may occur. The short period of rainfall causes the Benue and its tributaries to overflow, providing the basis for the limited agriculture of the region.¹

The Peoples of the Cameroon

Although there is no complete census, the total population of the federal republic is estimated to be somewhere between 4,100,000 and 4,907,000, the latter figure representing the December 1961 estimate made by the United Nations. The population of the East Cameroon is about 3,225,000, and that of the West Cameroon approximately 900,000.

The population is composed of a wide variety of ethnic and linguistic groups. In the Cameroun Highlands, there are 700,000 Bamileké, 300,000 Tikar and related groups, and 80,000 Bamoun; in the coastal region, there are the Coastal Bantu groups, including 45,000 Douala (in and around the city of that name) and 128,000 Bassa-Bakoko; in the central forests, there are 700,000 Equatorial Bantu, including Bulu, Fang, Ewondo, and many other smaller tribal groups; in the northern regions, there are 550,000 Kirdi and 400,000 Fulani. There are also some 15,000 Europeans in East Cameroon and about 2,000 in the west.²

There is no official or state religion in the federal republic. Slightly less than half of the federation's total population professes either Christianity or Islam. In 1959, there were some

886,000 Catholics and 608,000 Protestants concentrated in the coastal region and urban centers of the south and some 575,000 Muslims in the northern part of the country. The remainder of the population adheres to some form of traditional religion, usually involving animist beliefs, the ancestor cult, and the practice of witchcraft or divination.³

It is significant that most of the insurgents were drawn from the heavily populated Bassa and Bamileké areas in the southwest; to a high degree they were relatively unlettered peasants, usually animist by persuasion. On the other hand, the rebel leaders came principally from the Cameroun's "intelligentsia," men with at least a secondary school education and largely of Christian background. Surprisingly few rebel leaders—or followers, for that matter—were Muslims, an indication of the relatively low impact the rebellion had on the Muslim populations north of the tropical rain forest.

Economic and Social Problems Undergirding the Rebellion

Even though the causes of rebellion were largely political, a widely felt social and economic malaise contributed to its outbreak and continuation. In 1955 French Cameroun found itself with a relatively stagnant and essentially pre-industrial economy. The vast majority of its population was engaged in subsistence agriculture; official reports in 1954 noted that only 141,408 persons worked for regular wages. Although per capita income and gross national product figures are not available for 1955, it is significant that one rough index of the standard of living, the minimum hourly wage, was extremely low, varying between 7 and 19 francs CFA* (\$0.04 to \$0.1085).

Ninety percent of French Cameroun's exports consisted of agricultural products (such as cocoa, coffee, palm kernels, bananas, rubber, and peanuts), but exports accounted for less than 10 percent of the country's economic activity, most of which was devoted to the production of food for local consumption. There was no large-scale industrial enterprise; such industry as existed provided cigarettes, soap, palm oil, cotton fiber, beer, cement, and other items for local consumption.⁴

A high level of urban unemployment—up to 30 percent of the males of working age in Douala, Yaoundé, and other southern towns—provided the leaders of the rebellion with a discontented and easily mobilized indigenous element. Most of the urban unemployed were rural immigrants from the Bassa, Bulu, and Bamileké areas who had often fled unfavorable socioeconomic conditions at home or sought opportunities unavailable in the villages.

The Bamileké, an energetic and aggressive people crowded within the narrow confines of the Bamileké region, had for some time experienced mounting social tensions and challenges to traditional authorities. Land was becoming scarce, and overpopulation was becoming a critical

*Communauté Financière Africaine.

problem. Large numbers—almost 100,000 by 1955—had been migrating elsewhere; and their presence in the towns and villages of the southern régions had begun to present vital economic and social problems for the resident local populations.

The influx of Bassa-Bakoko in the southern towns was also symptomatic of widespread discontent in the Sanaga-Maritime region, where most Bassa made their homes. The Bassa felt that they were treated as "poor relatives" by their more prosperous neighbors and claimed that the government had neglected the development of their area. Further, the rebel leadership found ready recruits among young Camerounian "intellectuals" displeased with the pace of development, anxious to be rid of the French presence, and highly aware of the symbols of Camerounian nationalism that by 1955 had become common political currency.

Political Tensions; the Isolation of the UPC

The political situation in French Cameroun both reflected and contributed to the general tension felt throughout the territory at the beginning of 1955. Still administered at that time as a trust territory, with France responsible to the United Nations for the management of the trusteeship set up in 1946, the Cameroun's administrative structure was headed by a high commissioner responsible to the ministry of overseas territories. Under the high commissioner, Roland Pré at the beginning of 1955, were the various administrative and technical services for the territory, including the French officials who headed the 19 régions into which the Cameroun was divided. By virtue of the reforms of 1946-47, the French Cameroun also possessed a Territorial Assembly containing a Camerounian majority (32 of 50 seats) which had limited advisory and legislative powers. Although ultimate authority rested in French hands, the Territorial Assembly in fact dominated the local political scene. In this Assembly, the most capable of the Camerounian politicians—men such as Paul Soppo Priso, Douala Manga Bell, André-Marie M'Bida, and Charles Okaia—operated with considerable political finesse and strove to move the territory toward eventual independence.

The Camerounian deputies to the Assembly represented leading political parties, of which the most important was the Bloc Démocratique Camerounaise (BDC), a coalition of northern and southern politicians with a program that could be characterized as restrained nationalism.

One of the principal parties in the Cameroun in 1955 was not represented in the Assembly, however, and had failed to obtain seats in previous assemblies. This was the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), founded in April 1948 by a group of trade unionists and by all odds the most dynamic and best organized party in the territory. The UPC was the first Camerounian party to espouse a coherent and vigorous nationalist program. By 1955 the UPC program contained four main points: (1) immediate withdrawal of the French, (2) immediate termination of the trusteeship, (3) reunification with the British Cameroons, and (4) immediate independence. The only important anti-government group in the Cameroun, the UPC controlled various

subsidiaries such as the Jeunesse Démocratique Camerounaise (JDC), the Union Démocratique des Femmes Camerounaises (UDFC), and the Union des Syndicats Confédérés du Cameroun (USCC).

By the beginning of 1955, the UPC found itself frustrated and alienated from the other political forces in the country. It had seen the nationalism issue, of which it was the first champion, preempted by the other parties; it had failed in successive elections; and it had been subjected to the increasingly hostile attention of the French administration, particularly since the arrival of High Commissioner Pré, because of its Communist ties. Especially opposed to the UPC was the moderate BDC, which, in the spring of 1955, persuaded the local Catholic hierarchy to launch a vigorous anti-UPC campaign. In April 1955, UPC extremists led by Dr. Félix Roland Moumié—a great admirer of Mao Tse-tung and revolutionary violence—gained control of the party and the stage was set for the outbreak of violence.

The political situation at the beginning of 1955 was thus explosive in the extreme. Although most of the 15,000 Frenchmen in the Cameroun supported the administration, most of the politically articulate Camerounians could be said to have ranged themselves along a continuum extending from minimal opposition to violent distaste for the colonial power. The UPC enjoyed widespread support throughout the southwest and had managed to recruit the most militant opponents of the regime.⁵

INSURGENCY

Political tensions erupted into the violence that gripped southwest Cameroun in late May 1955. Between May 22 and 30 a series of disturbances took place in Douala, Yaoundé, Bafoussam, Meiganga, Nkongsamba, Mbanga, Loum, Penja, Dechang, and Ngambé. Attacking with almost wanton fury, the demonstrators killed or wounded any Africans or Europeans who happened to be in their path. Houses were burned, cars were demolished, and considerable other property was damaged. In Douala, some 3,000 rioters, armed with nail-studded clubs, machetes, axes, iron bars, and some firearms, stormed the central radio station and spread havoc throughout the New Bell section of town. In Yaoundé, the demonstrators stormed the police station, freeing a number of UPC prisoners, invaded the Territorial Assembly, and set up a roadblock. Elsewhere similar incidents were reported. By May 30, when the authorities had restored order, it was reported that 26 persons had lost their lives and 176 had been wounded. Other estimates ran as high as 125 killed and more than 300 wounded.⁶

The series of riots and demonstrations begun on May 22 suggested well-laid plans; the rebels apparently believed that by creating widespread disturbances and the illusion of a general revolt, they could cause the Camerounian people to rise up and support the UPC in driving out the French. The UPC profited by the element of surprise in the May disturbances, but never again did the insurgents have sufficient organization or strength in the urban centers to launch

another series of attacks on a similar scale. Thereafter, occasional urban violence, widespread guerrilla raids, and underground activity were the principal forms of rebel resistance. Underground resistance probably began soon after the UPC and its affiliate organizations were banned on July 13, 1955, and lasted until the ban was lifted in February 1960.

UPC Leaders

The leaders of the UPC who fled across the border to Kumba, the British Cameroons, in July 1955, included Félix Roland Moumié, Ernest Ouandié, Théodore Mayi Matip, Abel Kingué, and many lesser figures. Reuben Um Nyobé, the UPC's president, who was in Nigeria when the violence erupted, joined his colleagues in Kumba.

There is very little biographical information available on these leaders. Um Nyobé, born in 1913 at Song-Mpeck, near Boumnyebel, was a Bassa labor leader, one of the organizers of the Cameroun branch of the Communist-dominated French Confédération Générale de Travail (CGT) and a founder of the UPC, which he headed as president from 1948 to 1958. Educated in Protestant mission schools, Um Nyobé once studied for the ministry and was later a civil servant and a law clerk; as a political agitator his speeches often made use of Biblical references and citations. Returning to the Cameroun in late 1955, Um Nyobé led guerrilla operations until his death in September 1958.

Dr. Félix Moumié, another founder of the insurgent organization and a dominant member of its exile leadership group, then became president of UPC. Moumié, born in November 1926 at Ayos, near Fouban, studied medicine in Dakar, French West Africa, and was active in Camerounian politics prior to 1955, when he became an exile. Moumié traveled widely abroad in behalf of the UPC cause; he died of poison in Geneva, on November 3, 1960, under mysterious circumstances.

UPC Vice President Ernest Ouandié succeeded Moumié in 1960 as president of the exiled UPC. Born in 1924 in the Bamileké country, Ouandié was a teacher and an early member of the CGT in Cameroun. Another prominent member of the UPC for a time was Théodore Mayi Matip, who worked closely with Um Nyobé and was head of the UPC youth affiliate, the JDC. Born in 1928 in Eseka, Mayi Matip was a journalist and politician prior to the insurgency; in 1958 he broke with the insurgents.

A Split Develops in the UPC Between Leaders in Exile and Those At Home

Although the UPC was the best organized political group in the Cameroun—other groups involved in the insurgency were either UPC affiliates or fronts—it was unable to maintain its organizational unity throughout the period of the revolt. A split began to develop in the party when a majority of the members of its Comité Directeur decided to wage the struggle from

outside the country, first from their headquarters in Kumba, the British Cameroons (until 1957), and then from sanctuary in Khartoum, Cairo, and finally, Conakry and Accra. Meanwhile an internal UPC organization had begun to reassert itself. Guerrilla operations got under way in late 1955 in the Sanaga-Maritime région soon after Um Nyobé and Mayi Matip returned from Kumba.

Um's return among his fellow Bassa marked the beginning of the "Bassa phase" of the insurrection, which was to last until his death in September 1958. During this period of almost three years, the insurgents controlled much of the rural areas of Sanaga-Maritime. During 1957, guerrilla attacks spread to the Bamileké, Mungo, and Wouri régions; and after 1958 almost all rural guerrilla activities shifted to these areas. The very success of the insurgents, however, took its toll upon the UPC's cohesion. By the time Um was killed, the internal and external wings of the party had moved fairly far apart psychologically—though physical contacts remained close—if only because the guerrilla and underground leaders at home had begun to feel that their involvement in the fight gave them a legitimacy superior to that of the external leaders.

When Mayi surrendered to the authorities in September 1958 after Um was killed, he began to pull sizable numbers of maquis* into the legal political arena with him, and the UPC split once again. By the beginning of 1960, there were in fact three UPC leadership groups, each claiming primacy: (1) the external leadership of Moumié, Ouandié, Kingué, Osende Afana, and others; (2) the maquis "irreconcilables," including such rebel chiefs as Momo Paul, Martin Singap, Alexandre Tagatsi, Singan Tantan, and Tankeu Noé; and (3) the rallié rebels, now no longer insurgents but members of the legal opposition, led by Mayi Matip and Pierre Kamden Ninyim.

UPC Aims Eventually Stress Revolution

The UPC's political aims, echoed and reechoed by its various affiliates at home, at the United Nations, and through "friendly" presses and radios throughout the world, were always relatively simple. As noted earlier, the basic line included termination of the trusteeship, immediate independence, reunification of French Cameroun and British Cameroons, and complete elimination of the French presence. After the UPC and its affiliates were proscribed in 1955, the lifting of the ban and "national reconciliation"—i.e., bringing the external UPC home to participate in the government—became part of the UPC program. "National reconciliation"

*The French words maquis and rallié will be used here because they convey meanings difficult to translate. "Maquis" refers to "rebels," "underground fighters," and an older World War II fighter, the "partisan." "Rallié" means "rallied," or "returned to legal status." The French and Camerounians used these terms, both of which carry a peculiar undercurrent of approval, to refer to the guerrillas.

became, in fact, quite a popular political theme in the Cameroun between 1956 and 1960; it was espoused by a variety of legal political groups, and even, to some extent, by the government itself.

In 1957, the status of French Cameroun changed, since the country, as an associated territory in the French union, achieved local administrative and financial autonomy in that year. France allowed the Camerounian National Assembly to select a cabinet and prime minister—André-Marie M'Bida from May 1957 to February 1958 and, after that, Ahmadou Ahidjo, whose support came from a northern-based party, the Union Camerounaise (UC).⁷

As the insurgency dragged on, the external UPC added the aim of overthrowing the Ahidjo government; and, by the end of 1959, it was demanding the formation of a "revolutionary transitional government." This was to be brought about by holding general elections before independence and was obviously to be dominated by the UPC. Following the death of Moumié in November 1960, the external UPC unequivocally stated its goal as the violent revolutionary overthrow of the Ahidjo government.⁸

The UPC's Links With Communism

In contrast with the more cautious and moderate programs of the legal political groups in the Cameroun, the UPC's aims reflected not only the prevailing nationalism espoused by most Camerounian politicians but also some very definite Communist influences. It should be noted that the UPC never became a Communist party per se; some of its leaders even asked for formal admission to the French Communist Party (Moumié, Kingué, and Ngom, for example) but were refused. As late as 1962, the UPC was still being referred to by French Communists as a "fraternal" rather than a Communist party.⁹

The UPC owed its founding, however, to pro-Communist groups, such as the Cameroun branch of the CGT; and, soon after its formation in 1948, the UPC allied itself with the pro-Communist branch of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA). Liaison between the UPC and the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) was always close and included such things as regular exchanges of correspondence, documents, and publications; continuous work by the PCF among Camerounian students in France, who for the most part belonged to one or more of the pro-Communist youth and student organizations active in Paris and elsewhere; and regular attendance by UPC leaders at PCF conferences, training courses, and rallies. The UPC thus maintained close contact with international communism, either through the PCF or directly. UPC members and leaders attended congresses of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the Communist-sponsored world youth festivals held at Vienna, Peking, Bucharest, and East Berlin. Moumié and his colleagues visited Moscow and talked with Khrushchev in 1960; and Moumié, Kingué, Ouandié, and their wives were guests of Communist China in November 1959 and again in July 1960.

The UPC's Communist links did not end with these personal contacts: UPC guerrilla fighters were openly trained in Communist China, arms and munitions made in Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. found their way through Conakry and Accra to the Cameroun guerrillas, and the UPC and its "struggle for national liberation" were the subject of several laudatory articles in Soviet, Chinese, and East European publications.¹⁰

Internal Support for the UPC

Even considering the extent of aid from Communist sources outside the country, the UPC found its most effective supporters within the Cameroun itself. In 1954-55, the UPC probably had as many as 70,000 dues-paying, cargo-carrying members; total membership, including UDFC and JDC members, probably came close to 100,000. No other political party in the Cameroun even remotely approached these figures or enjoyed such widespread sympathy and approval. Even after five years of proscription, the UPC could still claim 30,000 members in 1960. The strength of popular support in the 1955-60 period is attested by the recognition given the UPC by the other Camerounian political groups who found it expedient to support a policy of "national reconciliation" and to adopt many of the themes and programs first advanced by the UPC. After 1961, however, the party's fortunes declined, and by mid-1964 its membership numbered probably no more than 5,000 persons.

Although it is impossible to give numbers for UPC's sympathizers, it may be said that widespread popular sentiment existed for the UPC cause throughout the Cameroun southwest between 1955 and 1960, particularly in the Mungo, Wouri, Sanaga-Maritime, Nyong-Kellé, and Bamiléké areas. In November 1960, the UPC claimed that 400,000 people were actively aiding the rebels.¹¹ There is, of course, no way to confirm this claim, but it is certain that considerable popular support was one of the factors that permitted the rebels to control large sections of the countryside at various times.

Underground Organisation and Operations

The underground organization of the UPC retained the basic structure it had developed before proscription: this consisted of a tightly knit hierarchical structure based on cells at the lowest local level and capped by the party executive committee, the Comité Directeur, and an annual congress, which, however, did not meet between 1955 and 1960. After the split at Kumba the Comité Directeur retained its identity under the control of the external leaders. The exiles probably numbered no more than 200 persons, a figure which included both wives and children. Within the Cameroun after 1955, the party operated through various front groups. Later, to provide a basis for military organization of its widely dispersed and relatively uncoordinated guerrilla groups, the UPC set up the Comité National d'Organisation (CNO) and the Armée de la Libération Nationale Kamerunaise (ALNK). In addition to its formal structures,

the UPC found support among the 15,000 refugees from the Mungo and Bamileke areas fleeing near Tombel in the British Cameroons, where the UPC had five guerrilla camps for a time.¹²

The UPC's underground operations tended to fall into three main areas: (1) propaganda, (2) terrorism, and (3) destruction of property. The principal propaganda outlet for the insurgents was through the external leadership. These exile leaders published a monthly journal, *La Voix du Cameroun*, in French and English--the French version being printed in Cairo, the English, in London--and issued numerous pamphlets and newsletters. In Cairo, the UPC was permitted to use government radio facilities for weekly shortwave broadcasts in French and Arabic. Within the Cameroun, various UPC fronts published mimeographed newspapers and distributed UPC material printed outside the country.¹³

Terrorism, the most important weapon of the rebels, probably accounted for the lion's share of the civilian casualties incurred during the revolt. The insurgents employed both selective and random terrorism. Selective terrorism was directed against such key persons as native chiefs (notably in the Bamileké area), wealthy planters and businessmen, and candidates for public office. Its victims were in both the towns and the rural areas. Random terroristic attacks were directed against all the inhabitants of occasional villages or against small groups of individuals in the towns. Some Europeans, including businessmen, planters, and missionaries, were the objects of terrorist attacks, but most UPC terrorism was directed against Africans. Destruction of property generally accompanied terrorist acts; there are no records of the amount of property damage done during the insurgency, but innumerable houses, plantations, and shops were burned, pillaged, or generally damaged.

Guerrilla Strengths, Leadership, and Areas of Operations

It is difficult to draw a clear distinction between the underground and the military phases of the insurgency because of the scale and nature of the resistance. The rebels never employed conventional military tactics involving positional or large-scale warfare. Guerrilla bands seldom contained more than 50 men, and only in the last half of 1959 did a few rebel bands number as high as 300 or 400 men.¹⁴ Even at that point, however, the rebels avoided open confrontation with police or military forces, remaining elusive and highly mobile.

Some distinction may be made, however, on the basis of the principal areas in which the insurgents operated. Guerrilla operations began in the Sanaga-Maritime région and involved mainly the Bassa population. This was the so-called Bassa phase of the insurgency, which lasted from the end of 1955 to the end of 1958. The bands were led by Um Nyohé and Mayi Matip; they were usually limited in manpower, the average maquis unit having about twelve men. At the height of the Bassa phase, there were probably no more than 50 such bands in operation. It is thought that no more than 1,500 persons actually participated during this period: one indication of the numbers involved is that when the Bassa phase ended approximately 2,500 "rebels," including both maquis and civilian refugees, returned to their homes.

After the Bassa phase, operations shifted to the Wouri, Mungo, and Bamileke areas, there were also several gangs of urban terrorists operating in the territory's principal cities by this time. In the Wouri région, guerrilla units were under the overall command of Tamo Henry and Martin Singap. Maquis bands in the Mungo région were under the joint command of Momo Paul, until he was killed in November 1960, and Martin Singap. Both Momo and Singap were also responsible for operations in the southern part of the neighboring Bamileké région, south of Dschang and in the Bafoussam area. In addition to Momo and Singap, Pierre Kamden Ninyim (before his defection), Singan Tantan, and Alexandre Tagatsi commanded other bands in the Bamileké area. Tankeu Noé had responsibilities in the Sangha-Maritime after 1958, and was known to have been involved with groups in the Bamileké area. Simply organized, the rebel bands usually included between 10 and 50 men under a single chief. By 1959, operations in the Bamileké area had been coordinated under Singap as chief of staff, and the bands were then termed units of the ALNK.¹⁵ Only after May 1959 was there evidence that the bands were larger than usual, and one authority claims that groups of 300 to 400 men operated in the Bamileké area.¹⁶

As for the total number of guerrillas engaged in the insurgency, neither official nor insurgent sources provide much enlightenment. At the height of the insurrection (1958-59), there were probably no more than two or three dozen active guerrilla bands, with a total strength not exceeding 3,000 persons. That figure diminished as the insurrection began to die down, and by 1962-63 there were probably no more than 500 still active maquis. These figures do not include village populations assisting the maquis or those actively aiding the UPC gangs in the larger towns; during 1958-59 probably 300,000 persons are thought to have been actively sympathetic to the rebels in the Bamileké areas alone.

Rebel Recruitment, Training, and Equipment

More definite information is available about the recruitment and training of the rebels. Um Nyobé was able to gain village recruits among the Bassa, often with the open blessing of local chiefs. After 1958, rebel recruitment shifted to the rural areas of the Bamileké, Wouri, and Nyong-Kellé régions. By and large, the rebels recruited young men who joined because of strong political convictions, promises of material rewards, a desire for adventure or resentment and frustration against the French, the Cameroun government, or the local chiefs. The bands tended to be composed of persons of the same ethnic background. Sometimes entire villages shifted their allegiance to the rebels, either because of coercion by the rebels, resentment against the authorities, or the orders of their chiefs. Guerrillas were usually trained locally, but guerrilla leaders frequently went abroad for training. A number of UPC leaders were trained in Red China, for example, where they received instruction in the use of explosives, planning and executing sabotage operations, guerrilla combat tactics, defensive strategy, evasion and escape techniques, and, of course, ideological indoctrination.

had a certain amount of literature, which was usually available on a planned basis only for those instructors who went abroad for training. Local commanders usually received literature from the external leadership. Marxist materials and some training manuals published in China and other Communist countries were widely circulated.

Since the rebels operated on their home ground for the most part, logistical problems were few. They usually had no difficulty in obtaining local transportation and they tended to live off the land. Their bases were seldom fixed, with the possible exception of those in the British Cameroons. What bases they did have were usually in villages friendly to their cause, and they vacated these points when raids were imminent.

The rebels' equipment tended to be relatively simple and adaptable to mobile operations. Firearms included 7.65-mm. pistols of Communist manufacture, some imported machine pistols, rifles, and other small arms, explosives, fowling pieces, and an array of knives, spears, and other traditional weapons. An occasional machinegun was captured by the rebels, but there is no evidence that they ever used mortars or heavier field pieces.

Insurgent Casualties

Figures on rebel casualties are either unavailable or unreliable. This writer's guess is that some 600 were killed, 300 wounded, and 200 to 300 captured between 1955 and 1961. Official casualty figures released in the press by government agencies do not distinguish between members of rebel bands, those who may have been helping them, and innocent bystanders. All casualties were simply reported as "rebels." For example, a casualty count of "rebels," "outlaws," or "insurrectionists" mentioned in the Presse du Cameroun between May 1955 and January 1961 reveals approximately 1,800 casualties. Government figures tended to overestimate, while UPC sources underestimated rebel casualties.

Strategy and Tactics of the Guerrilla Warfare

There is no definitive blueprint of the rebels' strategy and tactics, but an examination of UPC operations and extrapolation from the mass of propaganda material released by the external leadership reveals the broad outline of their strategy. The UPC was apparently attempting to create civil disorder and an unstable security situation in the country—complete military subjugation of the government being ruled out as unattainable—in order to hasten the coming of independence and to force the United Nations to call for general elections before independence. As a major political force in the Cameroun, the UPC hoped to be able to replace the Ahidjo regime in any United Nations-sponsored national election.

To achieve these ends, the rebels evolved four main tactics. They attempted to dominate the southwest through terrorism, attacks on property, and the neutralization of government forces. Second, they tried to disrupt agriculture and communications between the principal

towns. Similarly, they used periodic acts of sabotage, involvement of the unemployed in riots, and both selected and random acts of terrorism in order to achieve their third tactical objective: disruption in the larger towns. Finally, by the use of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, they hoped to force the government to take countermeasures that would antagonize the population and lead to disapproval by the United Nations, thus forcing concessions to the UPC.¹⁷

External Support and Foreign Sanctuary

Because of its Communist ties and its radical nationalism, the UPC received extensive external assistance both from Communist states and from some of the more militantly anticolonial African states, including the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Ghana, and the Sudan. In addition, the UPC—at least before 1960—could count on support within the United Nations from Liberia, Morocco, and sometimes Tunisia. The Soviet Union, Communist China, Algeria, and the UAR are known to have provided training in internal warfare and on ideological matters. The largest contingent of insurgents appears to have been trained in Communist China; one source estimated that in 1961 perhaps 300 Camerounians were receiving military and ideological training under Peking's auspices.¹⁸ Both Russia and Czechoslovakia provided small arms through Guinean and Ghanaian distribution sources between 1957 and 1961.¹⁹

Money in large quantities seems to have been available to the insurgents from Communist and some African sources, although no precise information exists as to the amounts involved. The only available figure is the official Camerounian assertion that Félix Moumié left 771 million francs CFA (slightly over \$3 million) in a Swiss bank account at his death.²⁰

Foreign sanctuary offered to the UPC exiles was also an important form of aid. Though both the British and French governments disapproved of the UPC, its members operated subsidiary headquarters in London and Paris. Between August 1955 and June 1957 the British Cameroons afforded a nearby haven for UPC guerrillas and the Comité Directeur. Upon their deportation from Kumba, the exile leadership took up temporary residence in Khartoum, capital of the Sudan, and then, late in 1957, moved to Cairo and the protection of the Egyptian government. In Cairo, the UPC was given an office and money, was permitted to publish propaganda material, and was allowed time over Cairo radio to make weekly "Voice of Kamerun" broadcasts. One of Moumié's lieutenants, Osende Afana, was even given a post in the secretariat of the amorphous Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference. In May 1959, however, there was a falling out with the UAR government. The UPC's Communist contacts were apparently embarrassing to UAR President Nasser, who realized in any case that his country could no longer support the rebel group with Cameroun's independence imminent.

Moumié then left Cairo for Conakry, capital of Guinea, where he set up UPC headquarters under official auspices. He was given office space in the National Assembly building and traveled abroad on a Guinean diplomatic passport.²¹ Both Conakry and Accra, the capital of Ghana,

remained centers for UPC activities until 1962 and 1963, respectively, when Camero and Chaou established diplomatic relations with the Ahidjo government. Even then, according to all reports, the remaining UPC leaders continued to reside in Congo.

The net effect of all the external aid given the UPC insurgents appears to have been extremely limited. At most, it served only to prolong the hostilities. It was insufficient to alter the final outcome, and it did not even enable the UPC to gain pre- and post-independence concessions the rebels had hoped for. On the other hand, the withdrawal of the overt support of Ghana and Guinea when these African states recognized the Ahidjo government may have helped the Cameroon government's efforts to halt the insurgency.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

The Camerounian rebellion was brought under control not so much by military as by political and psychological means. Credit for diminishing and almost ending the conflict goes primarily to the government of Ahmadou Ahidjo. Its reconciliation policies, its liberal amnesty laws, and its willingness to co-opt defectors from the rebellion into the political life of the country effectively isolated both the internal "irreconcilables" and the external Comité Directeur. The result was that the internal UPC lost its ablest leaders, and without them the insurgents had little chance of success.

In addition, both France and the United Nations played important contributory roles—France by providing the military means and logistical support to contain the insurrection, and the United Nations by refusing to sanction pre-independence elections which in the troubled year of 1959 might conceivably have brought the UPC into power.

There is little sense in attempting to draw a fine line between indigenous and external contributions to the counterinsurgency effort, since both France and the indigenous Camerounian authorities worked together closely. Military and police forces contained both Camerounian and French elements; planning was a joint Camerounian-French operation, particularly after 1958, and the execution of administrative and political counterinsurgency measures before 1960 was carried out by both French and Camerounian officials. Only over questions of political strategy did French and local authorities differ substantially, and these differences did not materially impair the counterinsurgent effort.

Initial Governmental Response to the Outbreak of Violence: Restoration of Order and Suspension of Civil Liberties

The French were conscious of an increased tempo in UPC agitation during the latter part of 1954 and early months of 1955, but it was the sudden outbreak of violence in May 1955 that first alerted the authorities to the possibilities of widespread insurrection.²² The government's initial responses appeared to be directed primarily toward the early and rapid restoration of order.

Police and French troops attempted to quell the disturbances with conventional means by the end of May, when order was generally restored, some 637 persons had been arrested and indicted for acts of sabotage, violence, and rioting. On July 13, 1955, the government formally dissolved the UPC and its affiliated youth group (JDC) and women's organization (UDFC), and was about to do the same to the Communist-dominated CGT labor organization when it transformed itself into the Union des Syndicats Confédérés du Cameroun (USCC).

The government also inaugurated measures to curtail or suspend civil liberties. French decrees specifically limited certain freedoms after 1955. Later, a whole series of special statutes, passed in 1958, formed the basis of the extensive Camerounian security and control measures. These statutes set up special criminal courts (later called special military tribunals) and gave the minister of interior authority to enforce curfews, arrest persons suspected of being "a danger to public security," declare a state of emergency in one or more régions of the country, seize newspapers, and confiscate presses. They authorized the dissolution of all organizations "acting against the public order."²³ Whenever large-scale violence broke out, the government usually declared an état d'urgence (state of emergency) in the affected towns or administrative divisions. Then curfews would be imposed, all pedestrian and vehicular movements subjected to control, and houses and persons searched without warning. In general, these restrictions were imposed for only as long as the authorities deemed necessary. Almost all of the southern administrative divisions were at one time or another affected by the 1959 statutes.

Buildup of Military and Paramilitary Strength

At the time of the initial eruption of violence and until January 1, 1960, the Camerounians had no national military forces; the military and police were French responsibilities. Troop units were generally led by French officers and manned by Camerounians. These forces included (1) the Gendarmerie (in 1957, 470 Africans and 262 Europeans); (2) the Sûreté and police (in 1957, 762 Africans and 214 Europeans); and (3) the Garde Camerounaise, exclusively African in composition and command (in 1957, 759 officers and men). The total strengths of these three forces ranged from 1,500 in 1955, to around 2,400 in 1957, to about 3,300 in 1960, a figure which included two companies of Cameroun troops in training.²⁴

In addition to these local forces, French troops were brought in after 1956. Usually arriving in company or platoon strength and under the command of French officers, these troops operated under the orders of the French high commissioner before 1960 and thereafter under the direction of the independent Cameroun government.

The French probably never had more than about 3,500 troops and "advisers" in the Cameroun. French forces in the Cameroun were initially quite small; for example, in 1957 there were only 476 Frenchmen in the territory's police and security forces. Their numbers grew, however, as the rebellion increased in scope and intensity. By December 1958, when security

for is numbered approximately 1,000 men, about 1,000 were French troops. In January 1960, President Ahidjo asked for and received two additional French battalions, a total of about 1,500 men. These French troops operated in conjunction with Cameroun security forces, and their organization tended to be determined by tactical rather than strategic considerations. In the spring of 1960, for example, five companies of French troops were grouped in the Bamiléké area. General Briand was in charge of all French troops in the country. By the end of 1961, the French military mission included about 2,000 officers and men.²⁵

In 1960, the Cameroun government ordered the organization of paramilitary units, called autodéfense units, which were locally recruited and trained, and stationed them in the most troubled areas. In 1960, there were some 17 of these units in the Bamiléké area alone, at first under the control of the local préfet, but later responsible to the area's resident minister.²⁶ In 1961, President Ahidjo ordered the training of 5,000 additional autodéfense commandos.²⁷ With the exception of these units, no special counterinsurgency troops were used in the Cameroun.

An Estimate of Casualties

Casualties incurred during the insurgency were numerous, but again, reliable figures are impossible to obtain from official sources. Possibly no more than 1,000 military and police personnel, both French and Camerounian, were killed or wounded; of that number, probably two-thirds were members of indigenous security forces. Some 250 civil administrators were also killed or wounded. Civilian casualties are the hardest to assess, but it is probable that between 10,000 and 20,000 civilian casualties were sustained from 1955 to 1962. Most occurred among the rural population, against whom most of the rebel violence was directed. The estimate of civilians is admittedly quite high, but to this writer it does not appear excessive.

External Military Aid to the Cameroun Government

Special French counterinsurgency aid to the Cameroun government, which began in 1960 under the terms of the Franco-Cameroun Accords of that year, was included in the broader general assistance provided for in the treaties. Under the 1960 Accords, France extended to the Cameroun government \$4.9 million in credit. By the end of 1960, the Cameroun had enough equipment for eight infantry companies, one mobile squadron of four platoons equipped with armored cars and four-wheel-drive reconnaissance cars (Land Rovers) mounted with machineguns, and several administrative and service units. France also financed and conducted the training of Camerounian officers at the École Militaire Interarmées in Yaoundé, opened in 1960.²⁸ At the Independence Day celebrations on January 1, 1961, this writer observed five armored cars and a dozen Land Rovers mounted with machineguns and recoilless rifles, all belonging to the Camerounian army. In addition, the United States became actively involved after 1960, extending credits for the purchase of military hardware and giving the Cameroun government some equipment. During 1962-63, this included—in addition to credits—vehicles valued at \$321,000 and a C-47 plane.

The total cost to France of its military operations in the Cameroun is almost impossible to estimate, principally because of the difficulty in separating security from other expenditures in the 1955-60 period. One source claims that since 1961 French military aid in support of the present (1964) 2,700-man Cameroun army has cost \$7 million per annum.²⁹

British Reactions in the Southern Cameroons

The British Cameroons was involved in varying degrees in the UPC insurrection in the French Cameroun until the termination of the trusteeship and reunification of the two sections on October 1, 1961. For the British administration of the Southern Cameroons, the problem was a particularly difficult one, since many Southern Cameroons political leaders were directly or indirectly involved with the UPC and its affiliates. All the principal political parties in the Southern Cameroons had liaison with the UPC at one time or another, and the growth of nationalism in the area—especially the reunification theme—owed much to contacts with the UPC. The presence of the UPC Comité Directeur in Kumba between 1955 and 1957 and the more than 15,000 refugees in the "Tombel triangle" northeast of Kumba presented British authorities with a serious political dilemma.

The British response was equivocal; they tolerated the UPC exiles until 1957 and permitted the refugees sanctuary despite French protests, but sought—with limited success—to control the activities of the UPC and its leaders and to prevent guerrilla operations from originating within British territory. Only when an augmented battalion of British troops was stationed near Buea in anticipation of the February 1961 U.N. plebiscites, held to decide the question of reunification, were vigorous and effective countermeasures taken against the guerrilla bands operating over the border from the Southern Cameroons.³⁰

Counterinsurgent Strategy and Tactics

So far as may be discerned, there was no elaborate military strategy for handling the insurgency. The French apparently considered the problem one for police and security forces, and planned to call in military forces only if disorders flared up which were beyond the capabilities of the local security units. Counterinsurgent tactics with few exceptions consisted of providing for the security of local populations by creating strategic hamlets and autodéfense units and carrying out counterstrikes after rebel attacks had taken place. The operations of military and police units within the affected areas were usually restricted to daylight hours, cases of night fighting being relatively rare.

Field operations were basically of three types: the ratissage, a swift raid with the target area first encircled and then saturated with attackers; the riposte, or counterstrike; and the so-called opération tactique, such as the operation of March 24-26, 1960, in which a company of troops attacked guerrilla camps and stores in the valley of Metchie (Bamileké area).³¹ Airpower

was used principally in support of ground forces. Broussard reconnaissance planes were used, and, according to one report, army helicopters carried troops for a strike against a guerrilla camp near Baham.

Mobility and Weaponry

Like the rebels, security forces experienced few logistical problems. The southwest part of the Cameroun is heavily populated, and its extensive network of relatively good dirt roads was generally usable the year round. In addition, the all-weather macadam road from Douala to Nkongsamba, in the heart of the Bamileké area, and two rail lines, one from Douala to Nkongsamba and the other from Douala to Yaoundé, ran through most of the areas affected by the insurgency. Equipment, provisions, and men could therefore be moved with relative ease both north and east from the port of Douala.

The military had available a good range of weapons and other equipment: non-tracked armored vehicles, trucks, four-wheel-drive reconnaissance vehicles, some aircraft, and such weapons as small caliber mortars, machineguns, rifles, carbines, machine pistols, and various kinds of explosives. As far as is known, no heavy field weapons were used.

Problems Facing Security Forces

If logistical problems were few, other, more serious problems tended to make the task of the counterinsurgency forces extremely difficult. The civilian population in the affected areas was often unfriendly, if not hostile to the government. This fact made it extremely difficult to gather intelligence and frequently impossible to surprise rebel units, since they were usually forewarned of impending attack and fled the target areas. Furthermore, counterinsurgency forces were undoubtedly undermanned. With no more than 2,500 men (including forces needed throughout the rest of the country) to cover an area almost as large as the state of New Jersey, the military's effectiveness was seriously impaired. Nor was this all. Indigenous troops were often afflicted with unmilitary timidity; they frequently refused to fight at night and not uncommonly refused to pursue rebel bands into the forests. Possibly the most serious problem faced by government forces in the early part of the campaign was the fact that rebel bands could flee over the border into the British Cameroons and melt into the forests or disappear among the 15,000 refugees living near Tombel. This condition continued until late 1960, when the British stationed an augmented battalion of Grenadier Guards at Buea and began to "clean up" the refugee camps.³²

Governmental Measures Create Resentment and Distrust

The government's military and security countermeasures were not always appropriate to the situations; quite often they appeared excessive and unnecessarily harsh. For example, Martin Nkamgang, an African Catholic priest writing in the weekly *Effort Camerounais*, reported

indiscriminate retaliation against civilians. In fact, the only direct confirmation that countermeasures may have been overly harsh was given in March 1961 by M. Jean B. Mabaya, Camerounian Minister of Armed Forces, when he admonished his troops against excessive compulsion and retaliation against civilians in rebel areas.³³

Part of the unfavorable popular reaction to the government's countermeasures may also have been due to the fact that in 1960 the government set up special military tribunals in Douala, Yaoundé, Loum, Nkongsamba, and Dschang to try apprehended insurgents. Appeals were rarely allowed from sentences given by these courts. The special military tribunal of Yaoundé even tried and condemned in absentia nine rebel leaders, five of whom were living in exile. Between 1959 and 1962, there were well over a dozen public executions of rebel leaders and other insurgents.³⁴

The civilian security measures imposed by the French and Camerounian administrations were not always well administered or well received. As late as the end of 1961, Camerounians traveling within the country were subject to periodic searches and sometimes received rough treatment. One informant wrote that during a trip by bus from Yaoundé to Dschang in November 1961—a distance of perhaps 200 miles—the bus was stopped no less than fifteen times, all the passengers were forced to alight, and both bus and passengers were completely searched at seven of the fifteen stops. Some of the women passengers were indecently handled, and at two of the stops the police openly demanded bribes before the bus could proceed.³⁵

During 1959, 1960, and 1961, reports of police and military brutality, repression, and intimidation in the rural areas circulated widely and with almost alarming frequency. No documented evidence of such behavior was ever published except in the opposition press, but reliable sources have provided sufficient confirmation to indicate that some basis for these stories existed.

Outside of the Sanaga-Maritime, the military measures taken by the French and the Camerounian governments were generally ineffective. Military and police actions did not noticeably affect the insurgents' ability to commit acts of terrorism and sabotage or impede their mobility, but they did prevent the insurgency from spreading beyond the southwest area.

Nonmilitary Measures To End the Insurgency

Political measures, combined with such factors as the length of the insurrection and the war-weariness of those involved, had far more to do with the ending of the rebellion than did military operations. This is not to suggest that nonmilitary measures were all equally effective. Some were notably unsuccessful, and still others were talked about but never fully implemented or implemented too late. Had there been any attempt, for example, to attack the socioeconomic problems of the Bamiléké in a thoroughgoing manner or even to pursue a planned

resettlement of the surplus Bamileké population, some of the dynamism of the rebellion might well have been drained off months or even years earlier.

There was no attempt at large-scale resettlement, though plans were laid in 1959 for a program to provide new homes for Bamileké who wished to move into the Mbam region and other less crowded southern and eastern areas. What resettlement was undertaken was purely local and temporary. During the Bassa phase of the insurrection, the government set up two dozen strategic hamlets in the Sanaga-Maritime, within which the inhabitants of the most troubled areas were temporarily resettled. After 1958, several dozen stockades were built in the Bamileké area for security forces, and it was not uncommon for some of the villagers to take shelter in them at night.

Administrative Reform, Revision of Land Tenure, and Capital Investment

Only two administrative reforms of any note were undertaken in the Bamileké area, and these came after the heat of the insurrection had subsided. The old Bamileké region was split into five new départements on November 4, 1960; this action gave additional administrative structure to an area long considered under-administered. Then in the spring of 1963 the government passed a new law providing for legal possession of lands previously owned by custom alone or held under communal rights. This land tenure act drastically revised real property rights among the Bamileké to the benefit of thousands of African farmers long at the arbitrary mercies of their tribal chiefs.

The record is somewhat better in the Sanaga-Maritime where, in the spring of 1958, the government created a new région (Nyong-Kellé), established Makak as an administrative subdivision, and opened up several roads for all-weather trucking. At this time the government also appropriated some 264 million francs CFA (about \$1 million) for capital development in the areas most affected by the insurrection.³⁶

Propaganda and Amnesties Win Over Many Former Rebels

By far the most effective nonmilitary measures stemmed from the Cameroun government's determined psychological and propaganda effort to undermine the popular base of UPC support by extending fairly generous amnesty terms, fostering a policy of "reconciliation," and overtly co-opting rallié rebel leaders into the country's political life and the government. In the operational areas, pro-government literature was widely distributed, and both administration and rallié leaders made tours and addressed local groups. Promises of fair treatment, amnesty, and pardon were liberally given to induce defections. That this may have been done for less than altruistic reasons--many of the ralliés were subsequently imprisoned--in no way vitiated the effectiveness of the government's policies.

During the Bassa phase (late 1955 to September 1958), there were no offers of amnesty or parole until the government of Ahmadou Ahidjo was invested in February 1958. On June 12 of that year, Ahidjo promised amnesty to UPC guerrillas who defected to the government; and, on June 19, he gave conditional releases to large numbers of political prisoners. Um Nyobé's death in September 1958 and Mayi Matip's defection soon afterwards undoubtedly contributed to the widespread ralliments (defections), which, according to official figures, reached 2,070 persons by November 1958.³⁷

The next important step was taken in early 1959 when Mayi Matip and several other ralliés presented themselves as candidates for the by-elections in the Sanaga-Maritime, Bamiléké, and Nyong-Kellé districts. The government not only did nothing to prevent the candidacy, but in fact contributed to their victory. Their electoral success encouraged further defections during 1959, and in the spring of 1960 additional ralliés throughout the southwest contested and won seats in the new National Assembly. The widespread defections were made possible in part by the amnesty law of 1959 and its subsequent liberalization in 1960, as well as by the government's February 1960 action setting aside the 1955 laws outlawing the UPC and its affiliates. The re-enfranchised UPC lost no time in contesting seats for the National Assembly, and new waves of ralliments occurred throughout 1960 and 1961.

Between the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1961, probably more than 5,000 persons could be counted as ralliés, an estimate which included both active guerrillas and their passive supporters.³⁸ Ahidjo even brought ex-rebels into his cabinet; Pierre Kamden Ninyim, leader of the Bamiléké rallié deputies, became a minister of state. Mayi Matip and Dr. Bebey Eyidi were also offered portfolios, but they refused the offers.

In its campaign to win over the rebels, the government relied not only on liberal amnesty offers, but also on such themes as the length of the insurrection, the loss of crops and economic well-being, and the high cost to life and property. Through its press and radio facilities and by way of its touring officials, the government sought to convince both the rebels and their sympathizers that the insurrection was not only futile but increasingly meaningless as well. With the coming of full independence in January 1960 and the reunification of the French Cameroun and British Cameroons in October 1961, the government's message looked even more convincing.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

Beginning in 1959, the political and military strength of the rebels began to erode as a result of the political measures taken by the Ahidjo government. The government correctly guessed that, once independence had been achieved, the younger leaders could be weaned away from the rebellion by providing them and their supporters with an attractive political alternative, through participation in the new state's political system.

External Support for UPC Fades

The attractiveness of the government's policies was reinforced by the gradual disappearance of the UPC's international support as the country moved toward independence and as the success or even the necessity of the rebellion became increasingly more dubious. In 1959, Moumié was asked to leave the United Arab Republic. In 1960, Liberia recognized the Ahidjo government, as did Mali in 1961, followed by Ghana in 1962 and Guinea in 1963. The latter two states continued to give sanctuary and some aid to UPC exiles, but only covertly and on a much lesser scale. Even the U.S.S.R., which had long been hostile to the Ahidjo regime, opened an embassy in Yaoundé in 1964.

There is no question that the normalization of relations between the Cameroon Federal Republic and other African states, as well as the U.S.S.R., seriously hurt the UPC's exiled leaders. Not only has pro-UPC propaganda emanating from these countries virtually ceased, but it is conceivable that the exiles may soon find themselves unwelcome in the countries that have given them haven for so long. Of the major Communist powers, only Communist China continues to give open support to the external leadership of the UPC.

Violence Wanes

Military hostilities have never officially ended, and there has been no negotiated settlement or any formal end to the UPC insurrection; rather, the process has been one of gradual tapering off in an erratic diminution of the frequency and intensity of violence. Hostilities began to diminish in the southwest during the spring of 1959, and a marked change in the political climate cut violence down further in 1960. By May 1961, it was possible to drive through the Bamiléké départements without the previously usual police escort. In mid-1962 there was still occasional violence, and Vice President John Foncha, on a speaking trip through the Bamiléké area, was reportedly fired upon.³⁹ As late as July 2, 1963, President Ahidjo admitted that "several terrorist bands still live in the bush, and that from time to time, they commit crimes, they burn huts, they cut cocoa and banana trees."⁴⁰

By the time of this writing in the summer of 1964, occasional violence was still flaring up, but its perpetrators—a mixed bag of "irreconcilables"—lacked both the organization and popular support of previous years. In any event, the Cameroon now has a well-equipped army of 2,700 men, in addition to local police and gendarmérie units, and reports from the country seem to indicate that the situation is militarily under control.

Human and Economic Losses

The nine years of violence and destruction in the Cameroun have taken a heavy toll. During those years some 15,000 persons lost their lives. Another 15,000 or so were driven from their homes to seek refuge in the British Cameroons; and possibly another 10,000 were displaced within the country. By 1964, most of them had returned home or been resettled, but their

absence took thousands of farms out of cultivation and generally depressed the already low living standards in their home areas.

There are no figures that accurately describe the economic losses caused by the rebellion, but it is known that the richest agricultural areas of the Cameroon suffered serious and sometimes irreparable damage. A large number of banana and cocoa plantations were burned or destroyed, and during 1959 agricultural production in the Mungo and Bamileké areas came virtually to a standstill. A large number of villages—perhaps as many as 200—were burned or otherwise destroyed by guerrilla or government forces, and many of these have not yet been rebuilt. Nor is this all. The country lost nearly eight years of economic opportunity in that almost no foreign capital investments—exclusive of French public moneys and credits—were made during the period of the rebellion; this situation began to change appreciably only after 1961. Economically then the rebellion represented a net loss to the country and one that it could ill afford.

The prevailing economic situation has in certain ways improved over that of 1955. By July 1963, the government had made several important economic and social advances: reforms in the land tenure system eliminating diffuse customary rights over land; attempts to stabilize the wages of government functionaries; a reduction of the prerogatives of cabinet ministers by curtailing the use of official cars, government housing, and so forth; and the creation of new administrative subdivisions in the southwest. In addition, foreign aid has become available, as, for example, some 40 million Deutsche marks from West Germany and over \$100 million lent by an international consortium toward the construction of the trans-Cameroon railway which, when completed, will stretch north from Douala to Fort Archambault, in the neighboring state of Chad.⁴¹ In general, however, the level of unemployment has not dropped appreciably, and the pressing economic and social problems of the Bamileké have not been attacked.

Political Results of the Rebellion

The political consequences of the revolt have been mixed. First, if the rebellion conferred political benefits, these unquestionably accrued to the ruling party, the Union Camerounaise, and its leaders. The rebellion enabled the government to employ much more forceful measures against its political opponents than might have been otherwise possible. The years 1958-60 permitted the UC and the Ahidjo government to build an interlocking party-governmental machine that no opposition group could hope to overcome. By skillful use of its emergency and security powers, the UC was gradually able to eliminate opposition parties by jailing leaders on charges of subversion, sedition, and conspiracy. After 1960, most opposition groups found their members and leaders defecting to the UC, saw their activities come under increasingly hostile pressures from the government, or went out of business. The net result for all who failed to agree completely with the regime was a constriction rather than a broadening of political

horizons. In sum, the length of the insurrection and the measures employed to overcome it undoubtedly contributed to the development of a one-party state in which the primary political beneficiary has been the ruling Union Camerounaise.⁴²

The UPC is still a legal party, but it is dispirited and almost powerless. Mayi Matip, its principal leader, is in jail, and its membership has been reduced by wholesale defections to the ruling UC. Those UPC exiles such as Ouandié, Kingué,* Afana, and others who are still abroad, presumably in Conakry, find the prospect of returning quite dim. Both Kingué and Ouandié face prison sentences if they set foot in the Cameroon. It is possible that the UPC may once again go underground and try in this manner to revive some of its revolutionary ardor, but there are as yet no indications that the party is prepared to take such a step.

The government retains elements of instability insofar as it remains based on northern rather than southern support; and it is forced to rely heavily on a number of southern politicians—some of them formerly in the opposition—whose political reliability is probably quite low. The UC has a firm grip on the machinery of power, however, and if it can continue to extend its influence among the southern populations, particularly among the Bassa and Bamileké, its immediate chances for survival will be quite good.

The long-run prognosis is less favorable. Ethnic conflicts still simmer below the surface, and the government, by creating a one-party state, has made itself vulnerable to covert oppositional activity. A good deal of anti-government sentiment is known to exist among the leftist trade unions, certain business elements in Douala and Yaoundé, the still restive Bamileké, and religious circles—particularly among Yaoundé Catholics.⁴³ All this, of course, does not mean that the fall of the regime is imminent; what is suggested is that these unstable elements in the Cameroon political picture make a long-range optimistic prognosis hazardous.

This most interesting case is remarkable in that, although militarily it represents at best a stalemate it stands as a political victory for the counterinsurgents. With the imminent withdrawal of the French at hand, the Ahidjo government was able to adopt the aims of the rebels, to co-opt their leadership, and to entrench itself ever more firmly in power. Specific moves taken by the government exemplify the range of efforts: permission granted to rallié leaders to run for the legislature in 1959 and 1960; legalization of the UPC and its affiliates in 1960; the bringing of ex-rebels into the government in 1960; Africanization of the counterinsurgent role as other African governments recognized the new republic, beginning in 1960; and neutralization of political opposition groups through use of emergency and security powers against their leadership in 1962. Thus the government absorbed the goals of the insurgents and successfully defended itself against the insurgent thrust for power.

*Since this paper was written, former UPC vice-president Abel Kingué died in Cairo on June 16, 1964. Africa Report, IX (August 1964), 15.

NOTES

Author's Note: Except for official—and mainly unavailable—reports, there are, to the best of my knowledge, no published articles, books, or reports dealing directly with this insurgency situation. I have therefore had to rely to an embarrassing degree on my own published materials, the documents, notes, and other ephemera gathered during my two research tours in the Cameroun (September–November 1959 and September 1960 to May 1961). I have also had the benefit of Prof. David Gardinier's excellent study of the Cameroun trusteeship—Cameroun, United Nations Challenge to French Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); some contact, by letter and in person, with various members of the UPC leadership; and extensive discussions on the general situation with French and Camerounian officials in Yaoundé, Paris, and New York. I must therefore apologize to the reader for the frequent citations to my own work, and share with him the hope that a much more definitive study of the rebellion—one written perhaps by a leading participant—will appear some day.

¹The geographical abstract is derived from Victor T. Le Vine, "The Cameroun Federal Republic," Five African States, ed. Gwendolen Carter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 282–83; and from the Atlas du Cameroun (Yaoundé: Institut des Recherches Camerounaises, 1961).

²Victor T. Le Vine, The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), Table 1.

³Adapted from the author's table in Carter, Five African States, p. 304.

⁴U.S. Department of Commerce, "Basic Data on the Economy of the French Cameroons," World Trade Information Service Reports (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957); France, Ministry for Overseas France, Rapport Annuel du Gouvernement Français à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies sur l'administration du Cameroun placé sous la tutelle de la France, 1955 (Paris, 1957). Subsequent references to the French annual reports will be abbreviated "Rapport Annuel," with the relevant year cited.

⁵The summary of political conditions in 1955 is taken from Le Vine, The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence, Chapter VI; Gardinier, Cameroun, pp. 67–71; and the author's unpublished notes on conversations with Raymond Lefevre, assistant to High Commissioner Roland Pré during 1955.

⁶Le Vine, The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence, p. 252.

⁷Ibid., pp. 162–66; Paul A. Jureidini et al., Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1962), p. 288.

⁸The UPC aims appear frequently in UPC publications.

⁹"Déclaration Commune de Parti Communiste Français et de l'Union des Populations du Cameroun," L'Humanité (Paris), August 20, 1962, p. 3.

¹⁰The UPC's Communist connections are discussed in "Summary of the report submitted to the United Nations Visiting Mission concerning the organization, activities, and propaganda methods of the UPC," United Nations Visiting Mission . . . to the French Cameroons, 1955, U.N. Doc. T/1240 (New York, April 1956), pp. 43–47; Franz Ansprenger, Politik in Schwarzen

Afrika (Koeln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961), pp. 392-404, passim; Rolf Italiaander, Schwarze Haut im Roten Griff (Vienna: Econ-Verlag, 1962), pp. 257-61; Fritz Schatten, Afrika Schwarz oder Rot? (Munich: R. Piper Verlag, 1961), pp. 87-105, passim. Chinese Communist training of UPC guerrillas is discussed in "Training of Cameroonian Terrorists in Communist China," Le Journal FEAPAN (Abidjan), No. 54 (November 1961), p. 3, translated in the JPRS: 12321, February 6, 1962; "Peking Training Young Africans in Terrorism," The Sunday Telegraph (London), July 23, 1961, pp. 1, 16.

¹¹ "La Révolution Kamerunaise" (UPC pamphlet, November 1960), p. 32.

¹² The data in this paragraph are drawn mainly from Victor T. Le Vine, "Political Parties in the Cameroun," Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, eds. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964).

¹³ For a partial list of UPC propaganda materials, see the author's bibliography in "Three Collections on the Cameroun," Africana Newsletter (Hoover Institution), Summer 1963, pp. 9-16.

¹⁴ Gardinier, Cameroon, p. 94.

¹⁵ The author's unpublished notes from research in the Cameroun, 1960-61; Moussa Yaya, "Le Terrorisme," Premier étage de formation des responsables de l'Union Camerounaise (Yaoundé, 1961), pp. 29-45.

¹⁶ Gardinier, Cameroon, p. 94.

¹⁷ These characteristics of UPC strategy and tactics are derived from the author's conversations with underground and rallié UPC leaders, 1960-61, and from various UPC publications, including The UPC Denounces Planned Systematic Tortures in the Kamerun (Cairo, 1958), Voice of Kamerun (3 issues in 1959), A UNO Visiting Mission in the Kamerun (Cairo, 1958), La Tutelle Internationale à l'épreuve (Cairo, 1957), and Rape of Cameroons (London, 1959).

¹⁸ Neues Afrika, May 1962, p. 169.

¹⁹ Not only did French and Cameroun officials repeatedly affirm this, but President Ahidjo on July 2, 1962, confirmed that "arms come from Ghana." Presse du Cameroun (July 3, 1962), Supplément special.

²⁰ See Schatten, Afrika Schwarz oder Rot?, p. 250; also Foreign Minister Okaia's speech in [Procès Verbaux], L'assemblée Nationale du Cameroun, Séance plénière du 9 décembre 1960.

²¹ See Schatten, Afrika Schwarz oder Rot?, pp. 87-105, passim, and Le Vine, Cameroons from Mandate to Independence, Chapter VII. It is interesting to note that Moumié's corpse was taken from Geneva (where he died of poisoning) to Conakry, where it was met at the airport by high Guinean government officials and a military honor guard.

²² That the government was aware of the UPC pre-insurrectionary activities is attested by a long catalog of UPC meetings, demonstrations, and agitational activities in a special report written for High Commissioner Roland Pré ("Les événements de 1955") by his administrative assistant, Raymond Lefevre.

²³ Law 59-31 of May 22, 1959, and laws 59-32, 59-33, 59-34, 59-35 of May 27, 1959.

²⁴ Rapport Annuel, 1957, pp. 41-45.

²⁵ Sources include the Rapport Annuel, 1957; Le Monde (December 25-31, 1961); Le Figaro (Paris), January 22, 1960.

²⁶ Voice of Kamerun (London), July-August 1960, p. 14.

²⁷ Daniele Hunebelle, "Le Cameroun à trois mois de sa réunification," Le Monde (July 11, 1961), p. 4.

²⁸ Bulletin Quotidien de l'Agence Camerounaise de Presse, November 30, 1960.


- ²⁹ "The Armies of Africa," special issue of Africa Report, January 1964, p. 5.
- ³⁰ The UPC-British Cameroons relationship is examined in Chapter 8, "The Political Development of the British Cameroons," of Le Vine, The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence.
- ³¹ Presse du Cameroun, March 29-30, 1960, p. 1.
- ³² The conclusions drawn in these paragraphs emerged from the author's conversations with French and Camerounian officials during his stay in the Cameroun, 1960-61.
- ³³ "Le Cercle Vieux de la Violence," L'Effort Camerounais, June 18, 1961, p. 4, and speech by M. Mabaya on Armed Forces Day, January 12, 1962 (mimeo.).
- ³⁴ L'Effort Camerounais, May 7, 1961, p. 2.
- ³⁵ Letter from Pastor Amgang to author, December 7, 1961.
- ³⁶ United Nations Visiting Mission . . . 1958 . . . Report, p. 20.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ The estimate is the author's; official figures are generally unreliable and usually fail to make any distinction between guerrillas and other persons.
- ³⁹ Letter from Mr. R. Paissy, Yaoundé, to the author, January 1963.
- ⁴⁰ Ahidjo's press conference, in "Supplément" to the Presse du Cameroun, July 3, 1963, p. 4.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 1-6, passim.
- ⁴² See Neues Afrika, May 1962, pp. 169-70; Gardinier, Cameroon, pp. 103-136; Le Vine, The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence, Chapter IX, passim.
- ⁴³ For a discussion of possible centers of political opposition in the Cameroon, see the author's section in Carter, Five African States, pp. 332-34.

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Chapter Eleven

KENYA
1952-1960



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by D. M. Condit

British colonial authorities, faced in 1952 with the Mau Mau insurgency of the Kikuyu and associated tribes, used both loyal African and white security forces in a militarily successful counterinsurgency campaign. Nonetheless, Mau Mau political objectives were largely attained.

BACKGROUND

As the 20th century reached its midpoint, few political observers would have forecast that the British colony of Kenya was to achieve independence within the next 15 years. East Africa seemed a distant and primitive place; Kenya's white settlers held a monopoly of economic, social, and political power; Kenya's African population was generally regarded as hardly ready for direct participation in government, let alone self-government; and British plans for the dissolution of empire did not appear to include Kenya in the immediate or even intermediate future. Basic British policy, world opinion, home reactions, and the questionable economic value of the colony were all factors in the final decision to give Kenya her independence. The still unanswered question is the extent to which the political timetable may have been changed by an insurgency that was militarily defeated.

Kenya, an equatorial country lying on the eastern coast of Africa, embraces about 225,000 square miles. It is four times the size of the state of New York and almost as large as Texas. Counterclockwise from the north, Kenya shares boundaries with Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania. The capital city of Nairobi is situated in the heart of the country; Mombasa, the only other city of importance and size and the major seaport, is located on the southeastern coast on the Indian Ocean.

The northern part of Kenya, which includes about half of the total land mass, is largely arid or semidesert and sparsely settled. The southern part, favored in both climate and terrain, is divided into three climatic zones—the eastern coast, the central highlands, and the western lake region. The lake and coastal regions, especially the latter, are hot and humid, but the highlands enjoy a bracing atmosphere with cool breezes. Warm, sometimes hot, days alternate with cool, even frosty, nights. Nairobi's mean temperature ranges between 56° and 79° F. Rainfall, occurring mainly in April-June and October-December, averages about 32 inches

per year. Between July and September, there are thick fogs. There is little seasonal variation.

Special Features of Southern Kenya

The terrain of the southern part of Kenya varies. Proceeding northwest from a low coastal plain that varies from two to ten miles in width, the land rises about 1,000 feet in altitude to thorn scrub country and then still further to a broad plateau studded with mountain ranges. This central and western section of Kenya includes about one-quarter of the country and ranges in altitude between 3,000 and 10,000 feet. Here are to be found the Aberdare Mountains and Mount Kenya, at 17,040 feet the highest point in the country. Here are many of the major African reserves. And here, bisected by the Great Rift Valley, are the highlands, some 35,000 square miles of temperate forests and farmland, the most desirable land in Kenya. It was in this section of Kenya—on the settler farms, the African reserves, and the forested mountains at the very heart of the country—that the Mau Mau insurgency was fought.

The forests and wildlife of Kenya were to give a special flavor to many of the military operations. The eastern and southeastern slopes of the mountains are generally covered with rain forests, while the western slopes usually have dry forests. Unlike the inhospitable jungle forests of Malaya, Kenya's forests, while difficult, are healthful and provide a safe habitat for the Mau Mau. "The Kenya forests are among the loveliest forests in the world," wrote one enraptured white settler. "Nature did a perfect job on them."¹ A special feature of the Kenyan landscape is the big game; lions, elephants, African buffalo, and rhinoceros abound. Some farms are encircled by wide troughs to keep out elephants.

The Peoples of Kenya

According to the census of 1948, the population of Kenya numbered approximately 5.5 million, of whom non-Africans totaled 158,000, or about three percent of the total.* Of the non-Africans, Europeans, mostly British, numbered fewer than 31,000, or a good deal less than one percent of the population. There were also some 98,000 Indians and Goans, 25,000 Arabs, and 4,000 others.²

Indians played an important role in commerce, formed a skilled group in the building trades and railway repair shops, acted as small middlemen in the African trade, and entered the professions of medicine and law. Arabs operated in industrial and commercial capacities as artisans, merchants, and traders. Europeans were engaged in commerce, public service, and farming. The per capita cash income of all Kenyans averaged only \$60-\$70 per year, with Europeans producing 75-80 percent of the country's total income.³

*By 1962, new figures indicated that the non-African population had increased absolutely by 75 percent but still constituted only four percent of the total Kenyan population. (Leonard S. Kenworthy, "Changing East Africa," Current History (December 1962), pp. 354-58.)

At mid-century, Europeans exercised a dominant role in agriculture, industry, trade, and government. The white settlers in Kenya were no mere exploiters who hoped to make their money and leave. To them Kenya was home and they felt deeply that "We are African—white Africans*—and Africa is our home and our country as much as it is the home and country of the black African." Many of the more recent British arrivals were conservatives to whom postwar Britain seemed impossibly socialistic. As a group, the white settlers tended to be rigid in their social attitudes, apparently unable to understand African aspirations or to accept any change in the status quo.⁴

The 5.5 million Africans, 97 percent of the population, were divided among a number of tribes—depending upon the criteria used, estimates range from 40 to 80 tribes—and included such diverse groups as the Kamba, the Masai, the Luo, the Wanderobo, and the Kikuyu.† Numbering well over a million, the Kikuyu were the largest and usually considered the most advanced African group in Kenya. Traditionally living on the forest fringes in individual family groupings and accustomed to retreating into the forests for safety when threatened, the Kikuyu appeared to many, even most, white settlers as an individualistic, secretive, fractious, self-seeking, and efficient people, disliked by many of the other tribes. To some few whites they seemed "a most lovable people, with a great future, as they are intelligent, forceful and hard-working."⁵ In any event, by reason of intelligence and efficiency, as well as geographic accident, the Kikuyu were the tribe most closely associated with the European settlers.

Conditions Underlying the Revolt of the Kikuyu

It was the Kikuyu, along with some members of associated Meru and Embu tribes, who were the instigators, the supporters, the recruits, and in the end the victims of the anti-white Mau Mau insurgency of 1952-60. The question has been asked why the most advanced tribe in Kenya should have rebelled against the Europeans in a manner that startled the world with its overtones of barbarity, primitivism, cruelty, and perversion. L. S. B. Leakey, an anthropologist and the only white man to be an oathed member of the Kikuyu tribe, has suggested that the Kikuyu, more than other tribes, had genuine grievances that could be exaggerated and used to work up feeling against the Europeans: that they were in a state of mental unrest, instability, and irresponsibility as a result of the breakdown of their tribal institutions under the impact of European civilization and the lack of a satisfactory substitute; that they were in closer contact with the whites than were other tribes; and that Mau Mau leaders, Kikuyu of personality and magnetism, naturally exerted the greatest impact on their own tribe.⁶

*Nonetheless, in this paper "African" will mean black African citizens of Kenya.

†Also spelled Gikuyu or Gekoyo, particularly by Jomo Kenyatta. (See Facing Mt. Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu, reprint; New York: Vintage Books, 1962, passim and p. 308.)

The Major Source of Friction Is Land

Land was the longstanding and unresolved problem between the Kikuyu and the Europeans. Early in the century, Europeans had begun to settle on seemingly unused parts of highlands territory, laying it out in European-type farms and bringing it to a high state of productivity. The British government regarded land not under useful native production as open for disposal by the Crown; and under the Crown Lands Ordinances most Europeans received what they considered morally and legally valid leases or titles. Of the highlands, some 12,000 square miles were eventually alienated as exclusively "white highlands," while another 4,000 square miles were set aside as game preserves.

The Kikuyu, on the other hand, claimed that much of this land was theirs and that it had been left unoccupied only when a number of natural disasters had decimated their tribe. Contrary to the system of tenure practiced by many tribes, the Kikuyu declared that they acknowledged individual and family ownership of land. The fact that the land was not farmed did not, therefore, mean that they had forfeited ownership. As the Kikuyu population increased rapidly during the early part of the 20th century, its need for and the urgency of its claim to the land grew. The problem was aggravated by the fact that because of a color bar Africans could not buy even unfarmed land in the "white highlands." Many Kikuyu lived as squatters and workers on European farms—territory which they felt to be rightfully Kikuyu land.*

In the 1930's a British commission headed by Morris Carter investigated Kikuyu claims, found them to be grossly exaggerated, and made certain recommendations for land reform; but the degree of restitution to the tribe satisfied neither its claims nor its needs. The Kikuyu continued to think that the European part of the highlands had been stolen from them and that the return of this land would automatically solve their economic problems.⁷

Quite apart from the question of the validity of Kikuyu claims to the "white highlands," there was little doubt that their population was having difficulty living on the land available to them. Compared with the 12,000 square miles available to about 4,000 white families, cultivable land in the Kikuyu reserves amounted to about 2,000 square miles for over a million people. By 1933, the Kikuyu reserve held an average of 283 persons per square mile; by 1944, densities in certain areas were reported to have reached 1,100 and 1,800 persons to the square mile. The Kikuyu custom of dividing land among all sons reduced family holdings so that they fell below the 11.5 acres considered necessary to support an average family of slightly less than six persons. Adding to the problem were traditional agricultural methods adhered to by the Kikuyu women, who did most of the farming. In the 1930's the average family landholding was only slightly over eight acres; by the 1950's, it was estimated to consist of about four

*The complexity of the land question is undeniable. There is evidence to indicate that the Masai tribe once owned much of the alienated highlands; apparently the loss of land did not produce so great an effect on the nomadic, much smaller, and politically less developed Masai.

acres strung out in seven pieces over eight miles. Even on this land, the Kikuyu felt insecure, for unlike the Europeans they held no legal titles, and they feared further encroachment.⁸

Other Economic Pressures Increase Kikuyu Discontent

Bare subsistence, moreover, no longer sufficed for the Kikuyu, who by now needed money for poll taxes, school fees and uniforms, and a variety of foods and products not produced on farms. Although the Kikuyu as a tribe were not poor and some members were, in fact, quite well-to-do, there was a greater economic disparity among individual Kikuyu families than ever before. It became necessary for at least one member of most families to go to the city to earn money.⁹

Although this movement might have eased the burden on Kikuyu land, it actually increased the economic and psychological stresses to which the Kikuyu were subjected. Urban wage scales were determined by color—European workers were paid the most, Asian workers were the next-best paid, and African workers were paid the least. Pay scales for the Africans were generally insufficient to support families in the city, and many workers lived in tiny rooms or even 4-by-8-foot bed spaces. Under such conditions, marital instability increased. The young African worker who was unable to have his family with him, to buy a cottage in the city, or to save for sickness or old age depended on his little holding of land in the reserve for support in days of adversity.¹⁰ Thus, the exodus to the city not only created a reservoir of uprooted urban workers, but failed to free the land for those remaining in the country.

Traditional customs and beliefs—already seriously eroded through the breakdown of the Kikuyu tribal system of educating their young—were further negated in the city. The rates for African crime and prostitution in Nairobi were high. These urban conditions highlighted a situation that reached into the rural areas.

The Impact of Western Religion, Education, and Discrimination

The introduction of Christianity and the opening of both mission and secular schools had helped to break down tribal customs and had diminished the prestige of the illiterate Kikuyu elders, who had been the ones to instill traditional virtues in the young; but Christianity had not completely filled the cultural gap it had helped to create. Kikuyu quickly noticed the discrepancy between Christian beliefs and the white man's practice; they were aware of the rivalry between various denominational missions; and they took issue with the churches' interference with such entrenched practices as polygamy, female circumcision, and widows having children by their dead husbands' brothers—practices they could not find proscribed in the Bible.

To many Kikuyu, the religious teaching of the whites seemed not simply a presentation of Christian beliefs, but the unwanted imposition of an alien culture. Some Kikuyu became devout Christians; more, it seemed, outwardly accepted the religion in order to obtain educational

benefits. Under the impact of a different religious and social system, the old order of Kikuyu religious and tribal customs, based on a foundation of oath-taking and of belief in witchcraft and sorcery, had lost some of its hold, but the new order had not been fully accepted.¹¹

If economic hardship and cultural instability helped to set the stage for insurgency, educated Kikuyu provided the catalytic agent. Some young Africans who went to England to be educated returned embittered by their experiences; others who found acceptance in the white world, in some cases even social lionization, returned to find little professional opportunity and a degrading color bar. "Stores, shops and restaurants, buses, schools and hospitals," wrote one observer, "all exist on a segregated basis."¹² Rejection by the white Kenyan community pushed potential political leaders back into the African community; their advocacy of anti-white positions became a matter of both personal vindication and political advancement.

Political Life in Kenya Under White Control

The political establishment in Kenya was, however, also dominated by whites. British settlement had begun in the 1890's, and the East African territory of Kenya had become a crown colony in 1920. The coastal strip leased from the Sultan of Zanzibar remained distinct from Kenya colony and was officially known as the protectorate of Kenya. The head of Kenya colony was a governor responsible to the Colonial Office in London. In the 1944-52 period preceding the Mau Mau uprising, this position was held by Sir Philip Mitchell; after a brief interim, Sir Evelyn Baring became governor on September 30, 1952, and remained in Kenya until the autumn of 1959.

The governor was assisted by a deputy governor and an executive council (exco) consisting in 1950 of seven ex officio members and four members appointed by the governor. There was also a legislative council (legco), which the governor, as its president, could suspend at any time. Until 1944, the African community was represented by appointed Europeans, usually missionaries. That year, Kenya became the first East African territory to have an African in its legislative council; and by 1951 there were eight African members. All were appointed by the governor from a list of names submitted by local officials. There was still, on the edge of the emergency, no African franchise.¹³

Although whites firmly controlled the government of Kenya at the beginning of the 1950's, this did not mean that government policy was entirely set by the white settlers or entirely indifferent to African desires. It is true that after 1838 the basic British colonial policy was to promote the settlement of "backward" areas, encourage economic development, and guide colonists to self-government; but just as the white settlers in Kenya began to hope for self-government, British policy underwent a change. In 1923 London stated that henceforth the "interests of the African natives must be paramount,"¹⁴ and this policy, although never wholly applied, was not officially dropped until 1949. The following year Colonial Secretary James

Griffith enunciated a new policy of **multiracialism**, declaring that the solution to the African problem depended upon the development of a true partnership of all communities.

Whatever the policy, within the colony of Kenya it was interpreted and carried out by white men. White settlers might feel that London discriminated against them in favor of Africans, but the latter generally assumed that white power was a monolith working in their disfavor. Many Africans who apparently at first liked the multiracial policy soon began to feel that there was no meaningful difference between settlers' self-government and London's multiracialism since both promised continued control by the whites.¹⁵ Thus on every front—economic, social, religious, and political—the lines of black-white friction were clearly drawn.

Beginnings of African Political Protest

Although the Europeans controlled Kenya in 1950, the Africans, particularly the Kikuyu, had had 30 years' experience in organizing political protest—much of the time under the disadvantage of being considered subversive by the government. Harry Thuku, who in 1920 formed what is considered to be the first African political group in Kenya, the Kikuyu Association, was arrested and deported by the government in March 1922. Remnants of his group then formed the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), which was to become a powerful force in Kikuyu life. Its main theme was "to get back the land"; and its supporters were mainly landless Kikuyu in Nairobi and the highlands. In 1928, Jomo Kenyatta—who was to become by mid-century the towering figure in Kikuyu politics—became secretary of KCA and editor of its newspaper; between 1929 and 1946, however, Kenyatta spent most of his time in Europe.¹⁶

During this period the leaders of the KCA quarreled, and the party went through a period of decline. After the association was reorganized in 1938, it was accused by the government of involvement in subversive activities, including traffic with enemy Italians; and on May 30, 1940, it was declared illegal. For the rest of World War II, there was little direct African political activity, but Kikuyu participation in the war effort outside of Kenya brought many ex-soldiers with an increased sense of self-worth, a new spirit of nationalistic ferment, and a greater desire for self-government. These new feelings were to be reflected in the activities of the major Kenyan political organization to develop after World War II—the Kenya African Union (KAU).¹⁷

The Kenya African Union (KAU)

The origin of KAU may be traced to 1944, when the first African member of the legco—Eliud Mathu, the son of a Kikuyu medicine man and a product of Balliol College at Oxford—formed the Kenya African Study Union in an effort to create an intertribal association. Its aims were to unite the African people, to work for an African nation, and to foster African social, economic, and political interests. In 1946 the study union became the Kenya African Union. In September 1946, Jomo Kenyatta, having made a name for himself in the academic

world through his anthropological studies on Kikuyu life, returned to Kenya; and he was elected president of KAU the following June. Under Kenyatta, KAU became the most powerful African political organization in Kenya.

KAU offered an opportunity for legal political activity by former members of the proscribed KCA, and the British have claimed that by 1949 its central committee was dominated by extremist Kikuyu who had been members of the outlawed KCA.¹⁸ Certainly KAU's activities between 1947 and 1952 were extremely important, at least in creating a climate for the coming insurgency. Under Kenyatta, KAU was able to use a number of other organizations to further its aims, which from a Kikuyu standpoint may have been regarded as "nationalist," but which the government viewed with increasing alarm. In the latter's view, the Teachers' Training College at Githunguri became "a political as well as an educational center."¹⁹ The independent schools, which had been founded in opposition to the mission schools, had more than 40,000 students by 1952 and apparently inculcated antimission, antiwhite, and antigovernment attitudes. Vernacular newspapers were brought into the KAU orbit and reached ever-increasing audiences as a new feature began to appear—the antiwhite cartoon. KAU was also tied in with ex-soldiers' organizations, social groups, and labor unions.²⁰

Mau Mau Declared Illegal

Finally, Mau Mau, a movement that some observers viewed as originally nativistic, began its rapid growth, apparently under cover of KAU. The overlap of personnel, organization, and activities between KCA and KAU, and KCA and Mau Mau, was eventually to create in British minds the impression that KAU and Mau Mau were inextricably intertwined and that the leaders of one were the leaders of the other. In August 1950, the government declared Mau Mau—but not KAU—illegal. Its activities, however, continued unabated.²¹

INSURGENCY

Much remains unclear about Mau Mau. The name itself is unofficial; some say it derives from Kikuyu word play and is an anagram of uma, meaning "out," but even this is uncertain. A serious problem encountered in writing this study was the lack of accounts by Mau Mau of the active insurgency; such information as is available comes mainly from British intelligence efforts.²²

The Aims and Strategy of Mau Mau

Mau Mau insurgents never publicly defined their aims, but it is generally agreed that the most important ones were to recover the land that the Kikuyu considered stolen by the white man, to obtain self-government, to destroy Christianity and restore ancient customs, and to drive out or subjugate all foreigners.²³

There is far less certainty about the strategy that Mau Mau leaders intended to use. One school of thought holds that Mau Mau was originally meant to be a violent antiwhite resistance that would bring about the death of all or the great majority of Europeans. Another view is that Mau Mau was originally envisioned as the means to implement a civil disobedience campaign like the one so successfully staged against the British in India. The question of Mau Mau's strategic intent—outright violence or civil disobedience as the means of achieving African supremacy—thus depends upon a reconstruction of the intent of the Mau Mau leadership.

The Role of Jomo Kenyatta

By general consent, the most significant personal and individual force behind the rising Mau Mau movement was Jomo Kenyatta. At mid-century, Kenyatta—born Kamau Wa Ngengi approximately 48 years earlier, educated as an anthropologist in England, and author of two anthropological studies giving a highly idealized account of Kikuyu tribal life and customs—was an extraordinary personality who exercised an almost mystical domination over the Kikuyu. He was most certainly a spokesman for the Kikuyu and to some extent for all black Kenyans' aspirations and feelings of nationalism; his further political convictions or leanings were at that time less certain. Although he had gone to Russia during the 1930's and had apparently received some financial support from the Communists, there is little to indicate that he ever became a confirmed Communist.*²⁴ Former Governor Mitchell described him as "animated. . . by a lust for personal power and the gratification of his physical appetites more than anything else,"²⁵ but Kenyatta practiced political asceticism, reprimanding the Kikuyu for thievery, beer drinking, and consorting with prostitutes. By the end of 1951, Kenyatta had prevailed over all serious political rivals in or out of KAU and was the strongest Kikuyu political leader.

Since Kenyatta was the dominant Kikuyu leader, he was accused of organizing and sponsoring the Mau Mau, which was then rapidly expanding its activities and intensifying its control over the Kikuyu. Whatever his actual role at this time, Kenyatta never publicly claimed leadership of Mau Mau. At the same time, he was equally careful not to disavow Mau Mau, generally sidestepping the issue when asked by the government to denounce the society. In July 1952, for example, he said:

I think Mau Mau is a new word. Elders do not know it. . . . I do not want people to accuse us falsely—that we steal and that we are Mau Mau. I pray to you that we join hands for freedom and freedom means abolishing criminality. Beer harms us and those who drink it do us harm and they may be the so-called Mau Mau. . . .²⁶

*Corfield states that Kenyatta became a Communist party member; if true, this may have been more a matter of convention than conviction. Future events may do much to clarify this situation. ([F. D. Corfield] *Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau* (Great Britain Colonial Office Cmd. 1030; London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960), p. 42.)

On the other hand, it was reported that those initiated into Mau Mau swore, among other things, that "If I ever fail to follow our great leader, Kenyatta, may this oath kill me." ²⁷ If Kenyatta did not claim Mau Mau, the movement nonetheless claimed him.

Whether by design or by accident, Kenyatta appeared to be the leader of Mau Mau, but even if true this does not necessarily mean that he chose the violence that Mau Mau came to symbolize. The inland geographical location of the Kikuyu, British control of Kenya's borders, and the lack of any major external source of support made the choice of open violence illogical. Governor Mitchell for one was convinced that Kenyatta intended a "nonviolent, Gandhi-like" withdrawal of Africans, to force European concessions. ²⁸ It may be significant that Mau Mau, although already preparing for and tinged with violence, did not turn to open operations until after Kenyatta and other leaders had been arrested by the British when they declared a state of emergency in October 1952. After a trial held at Kapenguria, Kenyatta was convicted by a British court in early 1953 of managing the Mau Mau conspiracy; he spent the entire emergency period under arrest or detention. Whatever his role prior to October 1952, he was obviously unable to control events after that date.

Mau Mau Underground Organisation

The British contended that the Mau Mau organization ²⁹ was brought to life within Kenyatta's KAU, mainly by former KCA members, and that the early organization of Mau Mau was largely a reconstitution of KCA. Insofar as the government could determine, it was not until October 1951 that a separate central committee, consisting of representatives of 18 Mau Mau divisions, was set up to formulate Mau Mau policy and to promote its interests. The central committee soon moved to Nairobi; by the spring of 1952, it was thought to have organized subordinate district, divisional, and local committees. Surprised in October by the British declaration of an emergency, this central organization was disrupted by the concurrent arrest of its leaders. About February 1953, a group of new leaders apparently organized the Kiama Kia Wiyathi, or Council of Freedom. Under the council, three subordinate groups operated: One recruited workers, one transmitted orders from the council to the districts, and one consisted of taxi drivers who transported men and supplies and performed acts of terrorism. Then in the spring of 1954, the Mau Mau central organization, which had continued to undergo a series of changes and leadership struggles, was vitiated, if not completely destroyed, by large-scale counter-insurgency operations in Nairobi. After this point, the Mau Mau were organizationally and operationally fragmented.

The lower echelon organizations carried on without central leadership. The districts, which transmitted their orders to lower echelons, were known to Mau Mau as district governments. They were said to be run by nine men who were subject to certain strict rules. In each district three elders formed a high court which had the power to impose the death sentence.

Below these district committees were divisional and then local committees, reportedly composed of seven men enjoying a large measure of operational autonomy. This decentralized committee system has been described as loose and extremely flexible. Arrests of leaders certainly did not disrupt the total organization. Substitutes, in many instances already appointed by the arrested men for such contingencies, usually men who were outside the regular chain of command, simply moved in; where the takeover was less easily accomplished, the subordinate local committees functioned as usual until a new district committee was formed. "The Kikuyu," wrote a British author with grudging admiration, "showed himself outstanding in his ability to carry on. . . ." ³⁰ Nonetheless, successive leaders were considerably less able and experienced in administration and leadership than their predecessors, and the lack of overall direction was eventually to affect Mau Mau's striking power.

Mau Mau Underground Operations: Propaganda

Whatever chance of overall strategic success Mau Mau ever had was undoubtedly due to the early work of the so-called passive wing. This work, estimated to have involved 30,000 active participants, was essentially an underground activity carried on within the framework of ordinary civilian life, mainly in the city of Nairobi and in the reserves. Its primary objective was to gain African, and especially Kikuyu, support for the Mau Mau movement. In this endeavor, it supplemented the political activities of KAU (which was not outlawed until mid-1953) with Mau Mau propaganda, oath-taking ceremonies, and collection of funds and weapons.

Hymns were an especially successful and important propaganda device. Set to well-known tunes such as "Onward Christian Soldiers," "Abide With Me," "I Am Washed in the Blood of Jesus," and "God Save the King," Mau Mau songs were easily learned, pleasant to sing, deeply moving, and could be sung anywhere. Few British understood Gikuyu, the language of the Kikuyu, and while Europeans commented on African loyalty and religiosity, the Kikuyu sang hymns glorifying Jomo Kenyatta as their messiah and monarch, decrying the white man, mocking Christians, and threatening "those who help the Europeans." Later, even in prison camps, the Mau Mau continued to create and sing the songs that glorified their struggle. ³¹

Oathing Ceremonies Create a Mystic Acceptance of Mau Mau

In addition to utilizing such propaganda, the Mau Mau took early steps to enlarge their control over the Kikuyu through highly ritualistic oath-taking ceremonies. Until the declaration of the emergency, only two types of oaths are known to have been administered. The first—planned to be given to every Kikuyu man, woman, and child—on either a voluntary or forced basis—appears to have been designed to inculcate a passive attitude toward Mau Mau. The second oath was apparently planned for a Mau Mau elite group and was supposed to be administered only to willing volunteers. They had to promise to obey Mau Mau leaders; to help kill a European if called

upon to do so; to kill any Kikuyu against the Mau Mau "even if it be my mother or my father or brother or sister or wife or child"; and to help dispose of the body of a murdered person. In practice—which varied widely according to the oathing administrator—the two oaths were often administered simultaneously and to unwilling persons. Oathing ceremonies, usually held at night, sometimes involved hundreds of persons. Those who had heard but refused to take the killing oath were likely to be beaten into submission or, if still refusing, to be killed, so that the authorities would not know what was happening and so that the other initiates would understand that the Mau Mau were serious.³²

The effect of these oaths, at least in the first years, was apparently overwhelming for the Kikuyu, a people once described by Governor Mitchell as "particularly given" to ritualism, including ordeals by oath and poison."³³ Kikuyu circumcision ceremonies that marked initiation into adult status for both boys and girls were particularly rigorous; Mau Mau oathing ceremonies borrowed many of their forms and benefited from the conditioned responses thereby evoked. The Mau Mau oathing ceremony was regarded as a second initiation into life, a new life that was to be a clear break with the tribal past. Mau Mau taught that unless followers went through this second initiation, they could not be true "children of the House of Mumbi and Gikuyu" (the Kikuyu equivalents of Eve and Adam), nor could they share in the benefits and privileges that were to come to Mau Mau adherents. Furthermore, the oath bound all together in brotherhood and freed all members from fear of death invoked by the sorcery of another initiate.

The ceremony "left my mind full of strange and excited feelings. . .," wrote one initiate. "I had become a true Kikuyu with no doubts where I stood in the revolt of my tribe."³⁴ Even for those who had taken the oath under force, the fear of supernatural punishment that they felt must follow any oathbreaking was usually enough to assure adherence to the terms of the oath, and thus to Mau Mau. Fear, superstition, opportunism, and true belief all combined to fortify the cause of Mau Mau.

By October 1952, over 20 percent of the Kikuyu were thought to have been oathed, and Mau Mau influence was sufficient to insure general tribal support. By 1953, British estimates of Kikuyu support for Mau Mau ranged from 70 to 90 percent.³⁵ Political activity, propaganda, and the mystique of the oath had been fused in a many-sided and brilliantly executed psychological campaign, in which Mau Mau had for many assumed the aspect of a new religion.

Fund Raising

Adherents of the new "religion" were expected to give not only psychological but financial support.³⁶ Money was needed for the wages and traveling expenses of organizers; the printing of newspapers, leaflets, and hymnals; support of families of active or detained Mau Mau

members; equipment, medical supplies, and food for active members; rewards for weapons and ammunition; and legal defense for various Mau Mau leaders.

Money was raised in a number of ways. KAU dues were said to have been used for Mau Mau; in addition, Mau Mau itself levied dues and taxes. Initiates in the oath-taking ceremonies always paid for the privilege. When these means did not provide sufficient money, Mau Mau "courts" were used to bring in funds. Originally set up to punish members for infractions of rules, the courts were apparently also used to levy large fines on wealthy Africans, including those who were not Mau Mau members. It was reported that, after a few of those who had ignored the fines were found strangled or mutilated, the fines were paid promptly.

Mau Mau bookkeeping was at first fairly open; lists of subscribers were kept and money was banked, often in the names of leaders. When these accounts became suspect by the British, new ways had to be found. Trading companies and social groups were formed and used as "fronts" to control funds for the insurgency. These means were successful, on the whole, since it was very difficult for the government to prove that such funds had been illegally collected for illegal purposes.

Collection and Manufacture of Arms and Ammunition

Another major task of the Mau Mau passive wing was the collection of arms and ammunition--another project that began long before the outbreak of violence.³⁷ There may have been some limited trade in left-over World War II weapons with Somali and Ethiopian tribes, and returning Kikuyu soldiers may have brought back a small number of arms, but the main sources of both weapons and ammunition were local and white.

Mau Mau got most of its ammunition by stealing from government depots. Some 285,000 rounds of ammunition are known to have been taken from the Command Ordnance Depot in 1949, but this source was shut off after steps were taken to tighten a "ludicrous" security situation. Further attempts to find a large-scale source were mostly unavailing. Although the prostitutes of Nairobi were said to have been organized during the emergency to demand payment in ammunition (usually five rounds), they apparently succeeded in supplying only relatively small amounts to the Mau Mau cause. Ammunition, however, was not a particularly serious problem since, according to reliable estimates, the Mau Mau supply at the outset of the active operations was at least 140,000 rounds.

Arms, however, were a continuous problem. Mau Mau acquired many arms by theft from white civilians. Between 1948 and 1952, over 500 weapons were reported stolen; and many more arms losses are thought to have occurred. It is estimated that at the outset of the emergency the Mau Mau had at least 400 and possibly as many as 800 assorted precision weapons. By the end of 1953, Mau Mau was supposed to have had a maximum of 1,300 to 1,400 weapons.

or not quite one weapon for each nine men. Most warriors were thus forced to depend on the panga, a native machete-like weapon.

Failing to find a source of modern rifles and guns, Mau Mau manufactured simple weapons made of iron piping attached to a wooden stock, with a bolt (often a door bolt) held back by a spring or even a strong rubber band. These arms, though dangerous for their users and effective only at short range, were manufactured in quantity. Mau Mau lost some 3,600 of these homemade weapons to security forces; more were undoubtedly hidden away and never found.

Mau Mau Militant Wing Is Organized Into Three Armies

The militant wing of Mau Mau³⁸ evolved during 1953; by the end of that year it had reached its peak strength of around 12,000 men. At this time, it was composed of three land freedom armies. The first army was based in the Aberdare Mountains and had its own council of elders, generals, and other ranks. The major leader in the Aberdares, Dedan Kimathi Wachiuri, is supposed to have been recruiting actively from September 1952 on. Undistinguished before 1952, later subject to hallucinations, and probably psychotic, Kimathi was merciless toward his followers. Although he gave himself in time such titles as Field Marshal, Commander in Chief, Knight Commander of the African Empire, and Popular Prime Minister of the Southern Hemisphere, Kimathi was never known to lead his men in battle. Captured by government forces in late 1956, he was the last important leader to be captured and the last Mau Mau to be tried and hanged by the British—after which event he became a legendary African hero.³⁹ His second in command in the Aberdares, Stanley Mathenge, was never captured.

The second land freedom army, organized with a council similar to the first, operated around Mount Kenya. The highest ranking Mau Mau commander in this area was Waruhiu Itate, best known as "General China." A former corporal in the King's African Rifles, China had served against the Japanese in World War II. Although reputed to have taken his first Mau Mau oath under duress, China certainly led his men in battle; he was captured during active operations in early 1954. His second and third in command, Kagenthe and "General Tanganyika," carried on.⁴⁰

The third army, about which all too little is known, operated in Nairobi. It is said to have received direction not from the Nairobi central organization but from its own 15-member central committee. The life of this third army was abruptly terminated by counterinsurgency action in April 1954.

Recruitment for and Life in the Mau Mau Armies

Recruitment for the armies was fairly easy, especially during 1953, when there was a mass movement of Kikuyu from the "white highlands" to Nairobi and the reserves, spurred by government eviction, by the action of white settlers, and by fear of a new identity card system. By

April 1953, some 60,000 Kikuyu had returned to the reserves, and the exodus continued periodically throughout the year; eventually the number reached the neighborhood of 100,000. In addition, by the end of 1953, about 30,000 Kikuyu and allied tribesmen had swelled Nairobi's African population to 65,000, or about one-third the total population of the city. In both cases, the net effect was a continuing surplus of unsettled persons, often without land or a job, a natural pool of recruits for militant Mau Mau.⁴¹

Life in the armies in this early period was highly organized. Subordinate units under Kimathi and China were known as armies, battalions, companies, platoons, and sections. Sections usually had 10 to 15 men; platoons, 5 to 100; and companies, 100 to 250. Battalions and larger units differed in strength. Early Mau Mau camps, modeled on the British, were quite elaborate, with separate barracks for leaders, their women, and the rank and file. Mau Mau commanders held muster parades, granted formal leave, and even transmitted orders by bugle. Some of the armies had a Prophet who advised when and where to attack. Discipline was extraordinarily strict, and the slightest infractions of the rules often brought severe punishment. Furthermore, provost groups were sent out to inspect units, and summary courts-martial were often held. Punishments—lashing, mutilation, death by strangling, or a combination of these—were carried out immediately and were said to have good results for morale.⁴²

In the later phases of the insurgency, life in the forests lost its orderliness. By mid-1954 it had become impossible to maintain formal camps, and groups that had formerly contained 50 or more members were down to 20 or even 10 members, including women followers. Such gangs slept in camouflaged hides that could be easily and quickly moved, cooked only at night when smoke was invisible, and avoided bathing. Interestingly, their odor apparently made them more acceptable to the forest animals and thus helped them to escape detection. The ability of the Mau Mau gangs to live in the forests on animal terms became legendary; they became the most elusive and most exciting "quarry" ever known to the hunters in the counterinsurgency forces. The few die-hard Mau Mau who managed to survive after 1955 illustrated a whole new chapter in man's ability to adapt to primitive and animalistic conditions.⁴³

Security, Intelligence, and Oathing in the Armies

Despite the difficulties under which the Mau Mau functioned, an elaborate security and intelligence system was maintained throughout the period of the insurgency. In the reserves, communication was by the usual Kikuyu system of voice calls passed along the ridges. In the forests, Mau Mau sentries were posted several miles outside the camps, and signals were sent through the forests by tapping on tree trunks or beehive boxes. Mau Mau were also very addicted to letter writing, and an elaborate code and postal system with hidden letter boxes grew up. As long as the armies were able to maintain communication with Kikuyu in Nairobi and the reserves, Mau Mau intelligence was excellent.⁴⁴

Oathing in the armies was almost continuous and far more elaborate than that administered to the Kikuyu in the reserves. Instead of two oaths, seven or possibly eight were administered. After the final oath, the process was repeated with variations. Following the third (forest) or fourth (platoon) oath, the oaths took a new and more serious form. Acts of desecration, blood sacrifice, copulation with animals, cannibalism, and other types of ritualistic obscenity have been reported. Since such acts were beyond redemption in Kikuyu tribal law, it has been suggested that they were deliberately prescribed to make it impossible for Mau Mau warriors to leave and return to tribal life. Acceptance of such acts may, in some instances, simply have reflected the psychological state of persons who were being hunted and who were confined in a deep forest environment.⁴⁵

Mau Mau's First Operations Are Against Loyalist Kikuyu

In 1952 and early 1953 Mau Mau seems to have limited itself to acts of harassment and assassination directly against individual Africans. Cases of arson were common throughout 1952. In October 1952, Mau Mau gunmen shot the loyalist Senior Chief* Waruhiu to death; and participants in an oathing ceremony hacked Senior Chief Nderi to death when he ordered them to disperse. In January 1953, Mau Mau entered a government hospital and killed Chief Hinga. By mid-February 1953, Mau Mau had taken 177 African victims and many more persons were missing.⁴⁶

By the spring of 1953, Mau Mau was operating on a larger scale. On March 26, dual attacks were simultaneously executed against loyalist African homesteaders at Lari and against African police at Naivasha.⁴⁷

At Naivasha, one group of Mau Mau attacked the office and killed all duty personnel, a second group smashed the armory, loaded weapons and ammunition onto a waiting truck, and a third group released more than 170 prisoners. The police in the barracks fled. About 80 Mau Mau accomplished all this in approximately 20 minutes. Since no European officers were stationed at Naivasha and since native police slept in the barracks away from their weapons which were neatly stored and locked up in the armory (even though five months had passed since the emergency had been declared), it is not too surprising that the attack succeeded.

While the attack at Naivasha was under way, about 1,000 Mau Mau were preparing for the attack at Lari, a 7- by 3-mile area of loyal Kikuyu homesteads, consisting of clusters of three to five huts arranged in individual family groupings along a ridge in the usual Kikuyu fashion. Assembling at prearranged stations, groups of 30 to 100 Mau Mau were assigned to kill specified families. Each group divided into three subgroups: one to bind huts with rope or cable to prevent escape, one to soak the huts with gasoline and set them afire, and a main subgroup to stand

*Senior Chief was an honorary title bestowed on three outstanding Kikuyu chiefs.

by and kill any escapees. The attack was planned and carried out so that the entire ridge went up in flames at once. Since most of the men of the area were away on patrol, the victims were women and children: 84 were hacked to death, 31 hideously wounded and scarred, and an uncountable number burned beyond recognition. Two hundred huts were destroyed and a thousand cattle maimed. Again, the Mau Mau were aided by steps the government had taken: Although information was at hand concerning Mau Mau's intent to raid Lari, troops had been removed from that area the day of the attack.

Although later Mau Mau raids on African settlements never reached the proportions of the Lari operation, Mau Mau continued to attack loyalist settlements, individual stores and farms, home guard posts, and small police stations. By the end of 1953, Mau Mau were known to have killed 613 Africans and wounded 359. By the end of the emergency in 1960, the Mau Mau toll reached about 2,000 African civilians killed and another 1,000 wounded. Still more persons were missing and unaccounted for.⁴⁸

Mau Mau Attacks on Whites and Asians Result in Few Casualties

Mau Mau attacks on white homesteads began almost immediately following the British declaration of the emergency in October 1952. The pattern was set with the murder of a settler who was something of a recluse. Attacks generally took place around nine o'clock, the usual dinner hour; this gave the Mau Mau time to reach the place after dark and if necessary to intimidate the servants into cooperation. The houseboy was often ordered to make his routine appearance with a tray, and the Mau Mau rushed in behind him. The victim had about two seconds in which to reach his gun and shoot, and he had to kill with the shot; if the gun were in his pocket instead of cocked beside him on the table, it was usually too late. The first Mau Mau blow would sever the hand in the pocket, and then would follow the "usual demented hacking, severing, and mutilation"⁴⁹—not unlikely when the attackers were in a frenzy and the weapons were pangas.

Mau Mau operations against both whites and blacks were said to have been characterized by a strange barbaric lust. It has been reported that the blood of victims was drunk, often before they died, that amputation of limbs and castration of men were commonplace, that pregnant women were disemboweled, and that children were sliced to death. One white settler was carried away and buried alive. The cattle were sometimes taken away by the Mau Mau; if not, they were maimed by hamstringing or disemboweling and left.

The publicity that such acts evoked has to a large extent deflected attention from the tactical inefficiency of much of this campaign of terrorism. During the entire emergency—a period of more than seven years—exactly 32 European and 26 Asian civilians were killed, while 26 European and 36 Asian civilians were wounded. Furthermore, although some white settlers left, European settlement in Kenya actually increased during this period. If the strategic aim of Mau Mau was to physically destroy or drive out the white settlers, their antiwhite operations were remarkably ineffective.⁵⁰

In other ways, too, Mau Mau tactics seemed deficient. The Kenyan railway, which ran through Mau Mau territory, was generally undisturbed except for one successful episode of sabotage, when stones were piled on the track and several trains derailed. Telephone and telegraph wires, though highly vulnerable to sabotage, were seldom cut and then usually only in raids on a single house. Suburban Nairobi was never seriously bothered. The Nairobi water supply was dependent on two big dams in the Kikuyu district, but the Mau Mau neither broke the pipes leading to Nairobi nor polluted the water.⁵¹

Mau Mau Strength and Casualties

The military strength of Mau Mau may be seen as a curve rapidly rising until the end of 1953, when there were about 12,000 warriors.⁵² At that point, the Mau Mau were considered about equal to government forces and were still on the offensive. By the end of 1954, counter-insurgency forces had begun to take the initiative. In mid-1955 the British estimated that there were 5,000 militant Mau Mau and 51 major leaders; by the end of that year, the estimate dropped to about 3,000 warriors and only 20 important leaders. Whereas there had been an average of 100 aggressive Mau Mau acts per month in September 1955, the figure dropped to less than 30 by February 1956. At the end of 1956, fewer than 400 Mau Mau were thought to be still active, and the British considered militant Mau Mau a broken power.⁵³ By this time, and according to British count, Mau Mau casualties amounted to 11,503 killed, 1,035 captured wounded, 1,550 captured in action, and 2,714 surrendered.⁵⁴ Nonetheless, a few die-hard individuals, numbering perhaps 100 and including at least one important leader, eluded trackers throughout 1957, 1958, and 1959, and even after the end of the emergency in January 1960.⁵⁵

COUNTERINSURGENCY

British strategy in Kenya was designed to achieve at least four main objectives: (1) regaining and controlling areas in which the Mau Mau held sway; while simultaneously (2) pacifying and controlling the local population, particularly the Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu; (3) rehabilitating known and suspected Mau Mau, including hard-core members; and (4) instituting political and economic reforms to open the way for the eventual settlement of outstanding issues. Thus active military operations were to be integrated with a continuous campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of the Kikuyu. In retrospect, this appears to be a brilliantly conceived and well-coordinated plan. At the time, it seemed more a matter of "keeping the lid on," while constantly improvising, adapting the lessons of Malaya,* and experimenting to find the correct formula for Kenya.

*See Vol. I, Chapter Fifteen, "Malaya (1948-1960)."

Early Reactions of Government to Mau Mau

As early as August 1950, Kenyan authorities had declared Mau Mau an "illegal society," and many persons were tried and sentenced for belonging to it. But to forbid insurgency was not to quell it. Furthermore, the government's attempts to rally loyal Kikuyu in a campaign against onthing failed dismally, as did its effort to persuade Jomo Kenyatta to denounce Mau Mau publicly and unequivocally.⁵⁶ On July 14, 1952, the commissioner of police for Kenya wrote in a top secret letter that "something in the nature of a general revolt against European settlement and the policy of Government has been planned, and. . . the plan has already begun to be put into effect."⁵⁷

Despite knowledge of Mau Mau plans, the Kenyan government did not react strongly. In the opinion of F. D. Corfield, who was later appointed to investigate the reasons for this failure, the main cause lay in the lack of governmental machinery to assess and to act upon available intelligence information.⁵⁸ In addition, Sir Philip Mitchell, an African expert whose term as governor did not expire until late summer 1952, disagreed with the police assessment of the situation.⁵⁹ The new governor, Sir Evelyn Baring, did not take office until the end of September. Shortly after reviewing the situation, he stated that Kenya was "facing a planned revolutionary movement."⁶⁰

British Limit Civil Liberties and Arrest African Leaders

On October 20, 1952, Governor Baring declared a state of emergency. Although the governor's declaration did not place Kenya under martial law, it did enable the government to assume special and extraordinary powers to act. Such powers were not invoked all at once, but rather were made available for use as needed. They increased the government's powers to arrest, control the movement of persons, restrict the holding of meetings, declare certain areas restricted or prohibited, impose curfews, and so forth. The death penalty was set for a number of offenses, including unlawful possession of firearms, consorting with an unlawfully armed person, and involvement in the administration of a Mau Mau oath.⁶¹

At the same time that the emergency was declared, a battalion of British troops was brought into Kenya for a show of force in Nairobi and the reserves, and 183 African leaders suspected of close association with Mau Mau were ordered arrested. The arrests began before dawn on October 21; by nightfall 99 persons, including Jomo Kenyatta, had been taken into custody. These acts—the declaration of emergency, the show of force, and the arrest of African leaders—constituted the most important counterinsurgency operations in 1952.⁶²

The Emergency Organization of Kenya

By the end of the year, steps had been taken to name a military commander and to make certain organizational changes in the government machinery, but there was apparently no

particular sense of urgency in government circles. Demands for a more vigorous pace came from the settlers, who, from the very first, were on the front lines of the conflict. On January 27, 1953, three days after the Mau Mau murder of a popular and respected white family, extremely bitter groups of settlers mobbed Government House; their action probably spurred the government to reorganize somewhat more rapidly for the conflict. Throughout the emergency period, however, white settlers tended to criticize what they felt was the dragging pace of governmental reaction.⁶³

The organization of Kenya to meet the emergency reflected the fact that—unlike Malaya, where insurgency was threatening the entire country and the offices of civil administrator and military commander were combined in a military person—the Mau Mau were confined to two provinces, or about one-sixteenth of the total country. Governor Baring remained fully responsible for the civil administration of the country, while a military commander was appointed to direct operations.⁶⁴

Early in February 1953, Maj. Gen. W. R. N. Hinde, a veteran of the desert campaigns of World War II, arrived in Kenya as military adviser to the governor, but his title was changed within a few weeks to director of operations. Hinde's verbal instructions from the commander in chief of Middle East Land Forces had been to "jolly them all along," and this job he performed with talent, winning the respect of security forces in the process.⁶⁵

On May 30, 1953, General Hinde moved to the post of deputy director of operations when Gen. Sir George Erskine became commander in chief of a newly established East Africa Command. Kenyan operations were now under an independent military command, responsible directly to London, with a full general in charge of all military measures to restore law and order. Erskine—a dynamic and flamboyant figure, plainspoken, and with the "promise of toughness"—was to remain in Kenya until May 1955, when he was replaced by Gen. Sir Gerald Lathbury. On July 1, 1957, General Lathbury was in turn succeeded by Maj. Gen. N. P. H. Tapp.⁶⁶

A joint system for the control of security forces, borrowed from Malaya where it had proved successful, was utilized in Kenya. To ensure coordination and make general policy governing all elements of the security forces, an emergency committee was set up at colony level in late 1952. In March 1954, the committee was superseded by a war council comprising the governor, the commander in chief, the deputy governor, and a member nominated by the governor. Below colony level, emergency committees functioned at province, district, and division levels—consisting in each case of the highest ranking administrative person as chairman, the senior ranking police officer, and the senior army officer, and in certain cases prominent local men.⁶⁷

Organization, Strength, and Mission of Security Forces

Security forces consisted of those forces under the army, the police, and the administration. Army forces reached a strength of about 11 battalions* by the end of 1953. In mid-1955, there were some 7,500 British and 8,000 African troops in Kenya, but this strength was decreased in September and again later that year. There were three types of soldiers: the battalions of the King's African Rifles (KAR), ordinary British infantry battalions, and the Kenya Regiment. Augmented by young European settlers conscripted at an early stage of the emergency, the Kenya Regiment normally produced officers for the KAR; during the emergency it also provided leadership for the police, the army, and the Kikuyu home guard.⁶⁸

The Kenya police, an organization with European officers which generally operated in white areas and towns, functioned at all levels during the emergency. From the end of 1954, the police were headed by R. C. Catling, who had been deputy commissioner since July. The police included the Criminal Investigation Division and the Special Branch, whose duty it was to provide intelligence for operations. Consisting of only three persons and headed by a junior officer at the outset of the emergency, the Special Branch was totally reorganized into an eventually effective intelligence service. A subsidiary organization was the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR). Members of the KPR—Europeans who often did part-time police duty in addition to another job—worked on headquarters staffs, manned police stations, and made patrols. The KPR also operated an air wing which consisted of light aircraft piloted by volunteers. By the end of 1953, total police strength had reached about 21,000 men.⁶⁹

Separate forces were traditionally controlled by the administration. The tribal police operated where the Kenya police did not normally come—in the African reserves. Africans served in this force in their own home locations directly under the control of local administrative officials. The Kikuyu home guard, later called simply the Kikuyu guard, was originally formed of some 5,000 loyal African volunteers shortly after the start of the emergency. It was increased to around 10,000 men by January and to 25,000 by August 1953. Originally armed with bows, arrows, and spears, the guard was issued some rifles and shotguns after the Lari massacre in March 1953. Commanded and led by Europeans, the Kikuyu guard had the mission of constructing and manning a series of strong points in the reserve; it also provided intelligence on local matters.⁷⁰ Both the tribal police, particularly those under African chiefs and headmen, and the home guard were prone to use methods and procedures not strictly in accordance with the written law. Abuses, particularly by the home guard, led in late 1954 to the resignation of a police commissioner who disagreed with the government's toleration of these practices.⁷¹

*A British battalion normally consists of 900 to 1,200 men.

Problems of Security Forces

The problems of security forces were so many and so complex that only the most important ones may be listed briefly in this paper. First, there were the organizational difficulties inherent in rapid buildup of strength, including many untrained persons; the lack of experienced officers; and the need to coordinate activities among various army and air units, the police forces, and the home guard. Second, there were the difficulties of operating in unknown and rugged terrain, where roads suddenly ended and communication facilities were poor, and where the techniques of forestcraft and living among wild animals had to be mastered. Third, the language barrier created problems: Very few whites spoke the Kikuyu language; it was difficult to learn; and interpreters, seldom fluent in both languages, generally failed to catch subtle nuances and thus lost the real meaning. Fourth, whereas the Mau Mau had almost complete information on British movements, security forces lacked, initially at least, almost any intelligence on Mau Mau. And finally, the security forces were faced with a great deal of adverse home country criticism--some of which was justified, but some of which resulted from lack of understanding about the technical and legal handicaps under which the forces operated, particularly in the reserves.⁷²

The first strategic necessity in Kenya was for security forces to regain and control the areas in which the Mau Mau were a menace. The British were concerned with only one-sixteenth of Kenya, but this threatened area included all seven districts of Central Province, embracing approximately 14,000 square miles and involving parts of the "white highlands"; Nairobi; the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru reserves; and the forested mountains of the Aberdares and Mount Kenya.⁷³ Each of these areas required separate treatment.

Defense of White Homesteads in the Highlands

In the highlands,⁷⁴ the European settlers, concerned over their vulnerability to Mau Mau attack, took immediate steps to defend themselves. Security discipline was instituted in each household. Weapons were kept on the person or within reach at all times. Doors and windows were barred and, particularly after dark, opened only after precautions had been taken. Signals to summon help from neighbors and nearby police forces were prearranged. Even hiding places inside the house were sometimes planned. As the emergency dragged on, some settlers became lax, however, and at times security forces actually had to persuade them to continue with precautionary and defensive measures.

Livestock also had to be corralled at night as a defense against mutilation and stealing. Later in the emergency, mid-1955, when Mau Mau had lost their other supply bases, a food denial operation, codenamed HUNGERSTRIKE, was carried on in the settled areas. Following this operation, cattle thefts dropped from an average of 150 to 50 per week.

So that African families needed for work on white farms would be less susceptible to Mau Mau exploitation and could be defended during Mau Mau raids, the white settlers regrouped them into miniature villages with defensive fortifications. African farm guards were organized. As already noted, all workers not needed on farms were sent away, but this exodus exacerbated problems both in the reserves and in Nairobi.

The Army Clears Nairobi in Operation ANVIL

By the end of 1953, disorders in Nairobi had risen to such proportions that General Erskine decided that the city must be brought back under control. In operation ANVIL⁷⁵ he planned to use some 25,000 British troops and police for the selective screening of about 65,000 Africans in Nairobi. Suspicious persons were to be held in detention camps, initially prepared to receive 20,000 detainees, but later much increased in capacity. Preparations obviously could not be hidden, but the date for the start of ANVIL—April 24, 1954—was successfully concealed.

Early in the morning of April 24, the exits to Nairobi were posted and African sectors of the city successively cordoned off. All inhabitants were assembled, and the Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu were identified by personnel able to distinguish members of these tribes from others. Those identified were carefully screened. If a person lacked a good reason for being in Nairobi, if his papers were not in order, or if he behaved in a suspicious fashion, he was subject to detention with or without charges. His possessions were removed to storage, his dependents were returned to the reserve, and he was sent to a detention camp. There he was searched, screened, and documented before being moved to a more distant camp.

Within two weeks, some 28,000 persons, or almost half of Nairobi's African population, had been screened: of these, 16,538 persons were detained and 2,416 dependents were sent back to the reserves. Furthermore, during May, the British made return cordon and search visits to various sectors (actions known as "pepper-pots"), expanded their camp system, took steps to stop dependents from returning to the city, and instituted a more comprehensive identity card system for Nairobi Africans.

In the process of ANVIL, the British were able for the first time to use Mau Mau informants successfully on a large scale. Covered by hoods, a dozen or more informants were seated in a line past which suspects were led. Each hooded man gave his escort officer information about suspects; corroboration was usually obtained through additional recognition by other hooded men and often by full confessions from terror-stricken suspects. The intelligence information obtained during ANVIL surprised counterinsurgent forces: For the first time a clear view of the organization of Mau Mau both in Nairobi and in the forests was available.

ANVIL's success placed the capital city firmly in British hands. Whereas the crime rate had averaged 450 major crimes per month before the emergency and had risen to 950 per month by April 1954, for the two weeks following ANVIL there were no serious crimes in

Nairobi. The rate in May was only 152, and crimes remained considerably below the 450 figure for the duration of the emergency. Another important result of ANVIL was that it disrupted the Mau Mau passive wing organization in Nairobi and gave the British the means to prevent its effective reorganization. The loss of an important logistics base in Nairobi also affected the organization and supply of the Mau Mau militant wing.

Furthermore, it was now possible to begin to cut off Mau Mau support in the reserves which had become increasingly unsettled. Gaining control of the reserves was a prolonged operation, however, not finally completed until mid-1955.

Operating in the Reserves

Since the Mau Mau were virtually in control of the Kikuyu reserves during the first half of 1953, the measures used to reinstitute government control were of utmost importance. Under the emergency regulations, the Kikuyu reserve was declared a "special area." This meant that security forces could shoot a person who failed to halt when challenged; but if a challenged man stopped and was held, he had to be turned over to the police for legal action.⁷⁶

To help manage the desperate situation, army forces were called in and police strength was augmented. Using local labor, the government built new police posts and stations, and by 1954 these had uniform defense features. Police posts were also set up along the forest fringes to intercept forest-based Mau Mau moving into and leaving the reserves. As the home guard was built up, posts for 50-man units were also established in the reserve, and relief procedures for these frequently attacked posts were worked out with police contingents. Mixed police and home guard patrols were instituted. They were often involved in running battles with Mau Mau operating in the reserves; on March 31, 1954, a mixed patrol augmented by army units finally ended the career of General Kago, considered by the British to be Mau Mau's "most daring leader in the reserves." This was a signal victory in the battle for control.⁷⁷

Resettlement of the Kikuyu

Mau Mau attacks had shown that the most vulnerable target in the reserves were Kikuyu families who traditionally lived in small groups of huts. Something had to be done which would both protect those who were loyal and control those who were Mau Mau supporters. Since resettlement had proved its value in Malaya, the British undertook to apply the same technique in Kenya. Cutting across tribal tradition and disregarding the opinions of certain experts, the Kenya government devised a massive scheme for moving the Kikuyu into villages. Administration officials chose sites and laid out the villages according to a standard pattern; Africans using their own materials built them; and tribal police supervised the work. The entire program was carried out with astonishing rapidity: in one area, 350,000 persons were resettled within four months. By the end of 1954, "villagization" was complete, with approximately a million Kikuyu resettled in 720 villages. Building costs averaged \$140 per village.⁷⁸

The new villages, though bitterly resented at first, became more acceptable as time passed and the advantages of such urban comforts as nearby shops and community centers were perceived. More important for the counterinsurgency, each village contained a tribal police or home guard post. Active patrolling and nightly ambushes helped to deny food to Mau Mau in the forests. By mid-1955, with food denial tactics working and the Mau Mau no longer generally able to pass back and forth, the police could view the situation in the Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu reserves* as "well under control."⁷⁹

Open Warfare in the Forests

The success of resettlement and the ability of police and administration forces to control the reserves freed army forces for active operations in the forests in early 1955.⁸⁰ Although security forces had reduced the potential strength and underground support of Mau Mau, they had not yet come to grips with the militant warriors in the forests of the Aberdares or Mount Kenya, nor had they eliminated the smaller groups of Mau Mau who operated in the forest fringes along the edges of the reserves.

Certain steps had already been taken to control the forests. Very early in the emergency, the forests had been declared "prohibited areas," which meant that anyone in them could be shot on sight; such areas were later enlarged to include a mile-wide strip, 100 miles long, separating the forests from the reserves. In this prohibited zone, government forces could wage open warfare.

At first the army made great sweeps through the forests but these had proved a failure by mid-1953. Following this, army forces cut long swaths of approximately 6,000 yards into the forests, and established base camps. From these, small army units went out on patrols and ambush, the men lying motionless for long hours. But everywhere the problem was the same—Mau Mau could not be found. Even when seen, Mau Mau warriors darted off in different directions and could seldom be tracked down.⁸¹

Air Operations

One hope for locating the forest-based enemy lay in the use of aircraft. In addition to the light Piper Tri-Pacer planes of the Kenya police reserve air wing, General Erskine had available at most only two flights of royal air force Harvards, which carried a machinegun and eight 19-pound bombs, and a squadron of Lincoln heavy bombers, whose standard load was fourteen 500-pound bombs. These were used both to spot and to bomb Mau Mau gangs. About 35 airstrips were built on the forest fringe so that close air support could be given ground troops. Pilots also evacuated casualties, took reconnaissance photographs, marked targets, and dropped supplies

* Shortly afterward, Operation HUNGERSTRIKE (already described) began to limit the Mau Mau's ability to obtain food in the highlands.

to patrols operating deep in the forests—all the while operating under the hazards created by altitudes of 9,000 to 11,000 feet above sea level.* Air bombing of the forests began in April 1953 and reached a climax in the early fall of 1954.⁸²

The value of air operations in Kenya is generally acknowledged, except for the bombing of the forests, over which controversy lingers. Air exponents have claimed that Harvards alone killed more than 1,000 Mau Mau in a period of a year and a half in 1953-54. Ground forces, although grateful for most air activities, were less sanguine about the bombing of the forest. Despite its initial psychological effect, it created little hardship for the Mau Mau, who dispersed and sat it out. Animals were often severely wounded, however, and, learning to fear all noise, became a much greater danger to ground forces; in some operations, security forces suffered more casualties from animals than from Mau Mau.⁸³

Aircraft were also used to disseminate propaganda encouraging the Mau Mau in the forests to surrender. Sky shouts proved ineffective as a propaganda device, however, and in at least one instance counterproductive. Not quite understanding the words but recognizing his own language coming from the plane, one Mau Mau concluded that "Field Marshal" Dedan Kimathi had finally set up his own air force. Other propaganda devices such as leaflets were also quickly discredited among the Mau Mau.⁸⁴

Surrender Offers Achieve Only Limited Results

Mau Mau responses to surrender offers were generally disappointing. In August 1953, in a "green branch" offer, the government promised nonprosecution for the offenses of consorting with terrorists and unlawful possession of firearms to all those who surrendered voluntarily. In February 1954, after the capture of General China, surrender talks were initiated, using him as an intermediary in an operation facetiously named WEDGWOOD. This was abruptly terminated in April, when gunfire from a military unit which had blundered into the surrender area discredited the government's offer. A year later, negotiations for another mass surrender took place, following the government's offer of nonprosecution for past terrorist activities. These negotiations were also broken off by Mau Mau. The government withdrew its offer on July 10, 1955, and the next day issued an order that deprived more than 3,000 known Mau Mau of their land and land rights. The original green branch offer, however, still remained in effect. Between August 1953 and February 1956, a total of 2,373 Mau Mau surrendered; but it was clear, long before that, that the majority of militant Mau Mau would not give up without fighting.⁸⁵

* These altitudes generally prohibited the use of helicopters.

A Series of Large-Scale Sweeps Proves Futile

In early 1955, therefore, General Erskine resumed major military ground operations in the forests. Operation HAMMER, the largest single operation in Kenya to date, followed intensive preparatory bombing of the Aberdares and took place from January 11 to February 12, 1955. Ninety percent of the total counterinsurgent military force was utilized in an effort to kill or capture a large number of Mau Mau, to prove that the forests were an unsafe refuge, and to show that security forces could take the offensive in forest areas. Starting at the top of the range, army forces, resupplied by air drops, swept downward, with the objective of driving the Mau Mau to the forest fringes where tribal police and home guards had pre-established ambush positions in depth. Mau Mau casualties—only 99 killed, 32 captured, and 30 surrendered—again showed the tactical ineffectiveness of a sweep through difficult terrain with dense vegetation.⁸⁶

Tactics were therefore changed for Operation FIRST FLUTE, in which government forces combed the forests of Mount Kenya for two months, from late February to April 1955. This operation was preceded by widespread screening and detention of over 1,000 Mau Mau suspects in the village of Nanyuki, considered to be the main supply base for Mau Mau on Mount Kenya. During the operation, individual security units, supplied by air drops, were assigned responsibility for knowing and dominating specific areas of the forest. As troops put it, they were "flogging the forest." FIRST FLUTE yielded only 277 Mau Mau. Operation DANTE, which took place in July 1955 in the Kiambu Forest near Nairobi, confirmed the pattern.⁸⁷

Furthermore, as British statisticians noted, the cost of operations was now about \$28,000 for each dead Mau Mau, and it was estimated that there were still 5,000 militant Mau Mau.⁸⁸

Regular operations in the forests, by causing the Mau Mau to break up their large units and to forsake permanent camps, actually made it even more difficult than before for regular troops to find the elusive enemy. Fortunately for the government, the solution was already at hand in what has been called the turning point⁸⁹ of the emergency—the widespread organization of "pseudogangs" of captured Mau Mau to hunt down the still militant warriors.

Using Ex-Mau Mau Against Mau Mau

For a year, ever since the summer of 1954, various officers in military intelligence, in the police Special Branch, and in the Kenya Regiment had been successfully experimenting in both the reserves and the forests with the use of captured Mau Mau in actual operations. Usually employed for intelligence purposes, they worked in groups known as pseudogangs, which also contained loyal Kikuyu and whites in Mau Mau costume and blackface. Once Mau Mau were located, the pseudogang would withdraw and then pinpoint the real gang for security forces' action. By the summer of 1955, however, at least one British leader, Asst. Supt. Ian S. M. Henderson, was arming and using former Mau Mau in open warfare against Mau Mau gangs operating in the forests. His success led to the formation by the police of five special forces

teams, each initially consisting of ten (later many more) ex-Mau Mau commanded by one of the few available officers who could speak Gekikuyu.⁸⁰

Selection of Captured Mau Mau for Work in Pseudogangs

Even granting that these few whites could actually communicate with captured Mau Mau, how did they persuade them not only to work against their former companions, but even to kill them? Henderson has written that, in selecting pseudogang members, he first discarded all those who were suspected of specific atrocities or who were "bad characters." Selected Mau Mau had to be men who would respond, but Henderson did not expect them to be convinced morally: "We were trying to persuade them to change their regiment, not their souls."⁸¹

To persuade them, Henderson used a variety of techniques, starting with ego deflation: He showed them the government's progress and the peaceful condition of the reserve; he took them out to the rifle range and demonstrated how poor they were as shots in comparison to the soldiers; he took them up in a helicopter and briefly turned off the engine. His power—his "magic," as it were—was proved. Empathy was established as he patiently discussed the evil of the Mau Mau leaders who used terroristic methods even on their own men. Above all, Henderson felt—and others confirmed—that the key lay in firm, kind, and gentle handling; good treatment and food; the stabilizing presence of other former Mau Mau; and the faith shown by allowing them to retain their weapons in camp and to roam freely. Nine to ten days of such treatment produced a marked change in former gang members, and in many cases it took even less time.⁸²

Other units used other techniques with equally good results. In one, a three-phase "taming" system was worked out: Harsh treatment including chaining and poor food gave way to limited work around camp under guard, which in turn was replaced by absolute trust and first-rate treatment. The whole cycle was occasionally completed in 24 hours. This unit had such complete information about the real gangs under surveillance that the white leaders picked out the Mau Mau members they wanted for their pseudogang even before they had been caught.⁸³

Loyalty was, of course, the problem uppermost in the minds of all those associated with the pseudogangs. But "of the hundreds of Mau Mau whom we captured and used again in the forest," wrote Superintendent Henderson of his operation, "there was not a single case of desertion or loss of firearms."⁸⁴

Problems and Value of the Pseudogangs

The most crucial operational problem was to maintain the credibility of the pseudogang, particularly after the militant Mau Mau realized what was happening. Every precaution now had to be taken in camp to maintain the Mau Mau look. No one was allowed to wash, lest he lose his distinctive Mau Mau smell; and women were introduced to add authenticity, since the real gangs were accompanied by female assistants and companions. Since it was extremely important that

no one notice the absence of a given group of men from the forest, they had to be seen there constantly. Mau Mau letterwriting had to be kept up-to-date, food stores had to be maintained, and traps and hideouts had to be watched and managed. Finally, preliminary meetings had to be arranged with hostile Mau Mau so that the final lethal ambush could be sprung—usually at night after heavy eating and feasting together. Since at this stage no disguise was good enough to deceive the suspicious Mau Mau, white leaders could only wait in the background, well out of sight until the last moment.⁹⁵

The pseudogangs, made up of terrorists who had surrendered or been captured, were "inevitably less tough, less primitive than the hardcore in the forest."⁹⁶ For this reason, the advantage they gained by surprise was offset in part by the Mau Mau's intuitive sensing of danger. Once a pseudogang member developed a feeling of security, he had already lost his sensitivity to the forest and much of his value as a counterinsurgent.⁹⁷

Were the pseudogangs worthwhile? At the end of 1955, before their widespread use, some 3,000 Mau Mau and 20 important leaders were still at large, and only a handful were being captured each week. In 1956, on the other hand, an average of 22 terrorists per week were at one point being accounted for by former Mau Mau. By that fall Superintendent Henderson was waging a continuing personal duel against Field Marshal Dedan Kimathi, the major Mau Mau leader still active. On October 21, Henderson lost his quarry when Kimathi was captured by tribal police.⁹⁸

Military Phase Ends As Army Withdraws

In November 1956, the British withdrew their army from active operations in Kenya, leaving the administration and the augmented police establishment, including special forces, with full responsibility for maintaining law and order. By the end of 1956, terrorism had officially "ceased to be a military problem."⁹⁹

The Detention Camp Pipeline to Rehabilitation

The state of emergency was maintained even after 1956, however, because of the "substantial problem" posed by those Mau Mau and their sympathizers still being held in detention camps.¹⁰⁰ One of the most interesting aspects of the counterinsurgency measures taken in Kenya was the fight the government waged to regain the loyalty of both passive and hard-core detainees. In November 1956, Governor Baring enunciated policy: "The Kenya Government," he said, "regards no man as lost, and the most assiduous efforts are being and will be made to reclaim him for society."¹⁰¹

By that time, the government had already managed to reduce its camp population from the May 1955 totals of 55,000 detainees and 16,000 convicts to 24,000 detainees and 8,400 convicts.¹⁰² Each man and woman was rescreened, categorized, and pushed through a "pipeline" of camps back into society. The usual routine was for a confession of sin to be followed by a regimen of

work, re-education, athletics and sports, and amusements. This routine was carried out to different degrees in different camps. Detainees on the road to rehabilitation progressed through camps until finally they were back in their own locations, where they could be visited by their families and chiefs and where jobs could be found for them after their release.¹⁰³

By October 1957, Governor Baring reported that more than 50,000 detainees had been released in less than three years, that no disorder had so far resulted, and that those left in the pipeline were largely intractable and a problem of the rehabilitation service. By the end of March 1958, detention camps held just over 10,000 persons whose desperate character was again given as the main reason the emergency was continued. By October, the number had dropped to 5,000, but some former detainees were reported to be in Kiama Kia Muingi* cells—a recrudescence of the old Mau Mau in a different guise. Nonetheless, rehabilitation continued. By the end of March 1959, there were fewer than 2,000 detainees; by May, the number of detainees had been halved, and only about 100 persons were serving sentences for Mau Mau crimes. By that time, a total of 77,970 detainees had been released. In November 1959, an amnesty was announced for all those convicted and imprisoned for offenses connected with Mau Mau. In 1961, a year after the end of the emergency period, only 2 persons remained in detention and only 44 were under restriction.¹⁰⁴

This was a remarkable record in handling some extremely difficult hard-core insurgents, whose "look of settled hatred as they sat about motionless on the ground," according to one observer, "evoked something much deeper than normal fear both for them and for those they hated."¹⁰⁵ The record was spoiled, however, by the persistent recurrence of charges of brutality. Every prison system invites brutality. The British, lacking an adequate detention system in Kenya, had had to create one quickly, depending mostly on half-trained and untrained Europeans to supervise about 14,000 untrained African warders. The actions of hard-core Mau Mau exasperated and enraged prison personnel, and it is doubtful if anyone would challenge the statement that prisoners were mistreated at times.

In March 1959, an international scandal began at Hola Camp when eleven Mau Mau hard-core detainees were beaten for ten minutes after they had refused to work. According to eyewitness accounts, they then drank water, lay down, and died. Autopsies confirmed maltreatment, investigations were held, reports were written, and an outraged public opinion, led by the Labour party opposition in England, had to be placated.¹⁰⁶

* Outlawed by the government in January 1958. Between April 1958 and April 1959, 2,250 KKM suspects were arrested, 94 percent of whom were former Mau Mau. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XI, 15964B; XII, 17034B.)

New Economic Programs and New Land Policies

Concurrently with their military operations and rehabilitation of hard-core Mau Mau, the British pushed through a program for social and economic development in Kenya. A five-year, \$49 million plan for African agricultural development was announced late in 1953. In addition, a three-year development plan for January 1954-June 30, 1957, costing over \$64 million, was approved. Of this amount, 40 percent was to be spent on agriculture, 25 percent on economic services, and 19 percent on social services, while less than 10 percent was allocated for security measures. The villagization program undertaken in 1954 as a security measure proved a boon to the economic and agricultural programs.¹⁰⁷

At this time, the British also undertook a program of land consolidation to remedy the economic problems arising from the fragmentation of the African, and especially the Kikuyu, land holdings. Each man's many bits of land were measured, and he was given one piece of land equal to the total minus a 5 percent deduction for public purposes. This work went ahead expeditiously, considering the difficulties, and in Central Province, seat of the Mau Mau problem, the task was almost finished by the end of 1958. In instances where tribal custom recognized the concept of individual ownership, titles to holdings were issued to individual Africans—thus meeting one of the Kikuyu grievances. It was hoped that land consolidation would increase African agricultural productivity—a hope justified by events—and farm planning services were expanded at the same time. In addition, previous restrictions on African production of such cash crops as pyrethrum (a powder for killing insects) were lifted.¹⁰⁸

A major economic step directed toward meeting African complaints about land policy was announced in April 1959: Land tenure and management were to be placed on a "similar basis throughout Kenya, regardless of race and tribe." The "white highlands," bastion of the white settler, were thus opened to black farmers, although steps were taken to help ensure the rights of whites to their farm property and leaseholds. The program for resettlement of African small farmers in the highlands and of landless and unemployed persons on the highland fringes was, however, delayed until after the end of the emergency period.¹⁰⁹

The British Move Toward Political Disengagement

During the emergency, the British—who may once have felt that they would stay in Kenya indefinitely—began to pursue political disengagement, which to some extent may also be viewed as political counterinsurgency. Although KAU had been proscribed in 1953, by April 1954 the British moved toward at least one of its political objectives, enunciating the policy "to build within the British Commonwealth a strong and prosperous Kenya owing loyalty to the British Crown."¹¹⁰ No date was set for Kenya's eventual independence, and it was not specified who would control Kenya after the British left—white Africans or black Africans. Meanwhile, the government of Kenya was reconstructed in 1954, and a number of steps were taken to increase

the participation of black Africans in what was still essentially a white government. The pronouncement and concessions were sufficient to make at least one Mau Mau realize that "Progress by politics was becoming possible again."¹¹¹ Political organizations were allowed to operate on a local basis in 1955, and in March 1957 the first direct African elections were held to elect African members of the legislative council.¹¹²

When the eight elected Africans could not agree upon constitutional arrangements, the settlement was revised in the winter of 1957-58; among other changes, six additional African members were to be elected by their community and four by the legislative council itself. Nonetheless, African opposition continued; and on November 4, 1958, the African members of the legislative council walked out during the governor's speech. In April 1959, the colonial secretary, speaking in the House of Commons, again declared that the British were trying to build in Kenya a nation based on parliamentary institutions and enjoying responsible self-government; he would not predict, however, the date when the British would leave. In May, after discussions with the colonial secretary, the elected African members returned to their seats in the legislative council.¹¹³

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

On January 12, 1960, the governor of Kenya ended the state of emergency, and political change proceeded even more rapidly than before. In January and February 1960, members of the Kenya government met with the colonial secretary at Lancaster House in London for discussions that paved the way for the next constitution, which became operative that November. After the elections of January-March 1961, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) formed the largest single group in the legislative council, but its members refused to form a government until Jomo Kenyatta was freed unconditionally. This demand was denied at the time, but Kenyatta was released from all residential restriction that August. In October, he became president of KANU, and in January 1963 he entered the legislative council.

Meanwhile, preparations for full internal self-government continued. In May 1963, KANU won a majority of the seats in the new 117-seat House of Representatives, and Kenyatta was called to form the new Kenya government. As the new prime minister took office on June 1, 1963, Kenya achieved full internal self-government, and the issue of white versus black control was firmly decided in favor of the latter. Full independence came on December 12, 1963.¹¹⁴

A Review of Some Military Aspects, Including Costs and Casualties

With the political aims of Mau Mau seemingly fulfilled, what may one conclude about military aspects of the insurgency and counterinsurgency?

The overwhelming impression left by the insurgency is its military inadequacy, as evidenced by its lack of an overall strategy and its deficient tactics, poor leadership, pitiful weaponry, and

failure to hold the loyalty of many of its adherents. Furthermore, it operated in an essentially isolated battlezone without chance of external support or safe haven.

Yet this revolt, however poor or inadequate, threw Kenya into turmoil. The military phase of the operation lasted from October 1952 to the end of 1954, and the emergency had to be extended until 1960 because of the problems associated with rehabilitation. Even after the emergency was ended, two special measures were required in 1960 to enable the government to act against any recurrence of violence. The Preservation of Public Security Ordinance gave the government power to control public meetings, maintain the new villages, and register political societies; the Detained and Restricted Persons Ordinance made it possible to act against unreconciled Mau Mau. In 1960 renewed "hooliganism" and "thuggery," including oath-giving, required strong action and tested the value of the ordinances. ¹¹⁵

The cost of suppressing the Mau Mau revolt was not insignificant. Up to June 30, 1959, the counterinsurgency cost approximately \$156 million; the British government made grants of \$68 million, and the rest was borne by the government of Kenya. Some part of this cost was borne by the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru, since a special additional emergency tax was imposed on every adult male of these tribes. ¹¹⁶

The cost in security force casualties, up to the end of active military operations in 1956, was 1,749 killed and wounded, of whom 174 were Europeans. In addition, 2,735 African, 62 Asian, and 58 European civilians were killed or wounded. On the Mau Mau side, the government counted about 11,500 terrorists killed and over 2,500 captured. More than 1,000 Mau Mau were executed after trial and sentencing, and close to 80,000 persons were detained on suspicion for varying lengths of time. ¹¹⁷

The British achieved military victory less as a result of purely military actions than because of the success of their measures to cut off the militant Mau Mau from their support bases and to control the population. This accomplishment was indeed remarkable, since observers noted that even pro-government Kikuyu serving in the home guard and police force viewed only the Mau Mau's aims with disfavor, not its methods. A people in essential agreement with Mau Mau aims was thus used to defeat Mau Mau operations. Even more remarkably, some captured Mau Mau warriors were themselves successfully turned against their comrades of the day before. These phenomena illustrate the British success in managing and controlling an alien and essentially hostile population, an achievement which probably forms the outstanding lesson of this campaign.

Despite the costs of the effort, the long-range effects of certain aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign were economically and socially beneficial. Villagization and the concomitant program of land consolidation will probably, ironic as it might appear, help the Kikuyu to maintain their dominant position in Kenya.

Mau Mau and Independence

Finally, what was the relationship between the Mau Mau insurgency and the achievement of independence? Indisputably, Mau Mau was decisively defeated by the British before independence was granted. As one assesses the situation, it appears that the British could have maintained their position in Kenya if they had wished—not forever perhaps, but for a time. They chose, rather, to continue their liquidation of empire and to grant Kenya its independence sooner than might have been expected at the outset of the emergency. Thus, although Mau Mau in and of itself did not force independence, its existence probably affected the timing.

What is even more important for the future is that many Africans, both Kenyans and others, believe that Mau Mau forced the British hand. Former Mau Mau tend to think that as liberators of their country they deserve the fruits of victory. Demands for Kikuyu domination and for take-over of all land from the whites appeared in 1965 to embarrass the Kenya government. Thus, both the heritage of violence and the lingering belief in its efficacy challenge the security of a government now led by the Africans themselves.

NOTES

¹ J. F. Lipscomb, White Africans (London: Faber & Faber, Limited), p. 149.

² Encyclopaedia Britannica (1958 ed.), XIII, 343.

³ George E. Haynes, Africa—Continent of the Future (New York: The Association Press and Geneva: The World's Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations, 1950), pp. 23-24; Leonard S. Kenworthy, "Changing East Africa," Current History (December 1962), 354-57.

⁴ For quotation, see Lipscomb, White Africans, p. 18; also Maj. Gen. R. E. T. St. John, Letter to D. M. Condit, October 9, 1964. For a summary of economic conditions in Kenya, particularly in agriculture, see C. C. Wrigley, "Kenya: The Patterns of Economic Life, 1902-45," in Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver (eds.), History of East Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 209-64.

⁵ Statement by Dr. J. W. Arthur, in Report of Kenya Land Commission; Evidence and Memoranda (London: His Majesty's Printing Office, 1934), pp. 473f; Lipscomb, White Africans, p. 143; John Gunther, Inside Africa (New York: Harper and Brothers, c. 1953), p. 286; Maj. D. C. B. L. Esmonde-White, "Violence in Kenya," Army Quarterly, LXVI (July 1953), 183.

⁶ L. S. B. Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau (London: Methuen [1954]), pp. 105-109, 127-32; L. S. B. Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu (London: Methuen [1952]), p. vii; Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, 'Mau Mau' Detainee: The Account by a Kenya African of His Experiences in Detention Camps, 1953-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 32.

⁷ For a discussion of the land problem in general, see [F. D. Corfield] Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (Great Britain Colonial Office Cmnd. 1030; London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960), pp. 14-20; Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya: The Land of Conflict ([London]: Panaf Service, Ltd. [1944]), p. 4; Leakey, Mau Mau, pp. 105-106; Sir Philip Mitchell, The Agrarian Problem in Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1947), pp. 10-11.

⁸ Lipscomb, White Africans, p. 55; Haynes, Africa, pp. 32, 455 (n. 16); Leakey, Mau Mau, pp. 108-109; Keesing's Contemporary Archives: Weekly Diary of World Events . . . (Bristol: Keesing's Publications, Limited), XIII, 18239; Martin L. Kilson, Jr., "Land and the Kikuyu: A Study of the Relationship Between Land and Kikuyu Political Movement," The Journal of Negro History, XL (April 1955), 103-153; Martin L. Kilson, Jr., "Behind the Mau Mau Rebellion," Dissent, III (Summer 1956), 268.

⁹ Haynes, Africa, pp. 35-36; Leakey, Mau Mau, p. 106.

¹⁰ Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, pp. 134-7; John Colin Carothers, The Psychology of Mau Mau (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1954), p. 23.

¹¹ Carothers, Psychology, p. 26; Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, pp. 127-32; Haynes, Africa, pp. 46-51; Lipscomb, White Africans, pp. 37-39; Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 9, 40-41.

¹² Quotation from Kilson, "Behind the Mau Mau Rebellion," *loc. cit.*, p. 270. See also Lipscomb, White Africans, pp. 118-29; Kariuki, 'Mau Mau' Detainee, p. 21; Thomas R. Adam, Government and Politics in Africa South of the Sahara (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 47.

¹³ Gt. Brit. Colonial Office, The Colonial Territories, 1952-53 (London: HMSO, 1953), p. 15. This is a yearly publication which is hereafter identified only by title. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XII, 17013A, 17543; Haynes, Africa, p. 25; Encyclopaedia Britannica,

XIII, 343-44; C. Grove Haines (ed.), Africa Today (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 295-97.

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¹⁵ Adam, Government and Politics, pp. 45-46; Lipscomb, White Africans, p. 130; Haynes, Africa, p. 25; Robert G. Gregory, "Crisis for the British Empire: The East African Challenge to the Durham Tradition," The South Atlantic Quarterly, LIX (Spring 1960), 147-53; Margery Freda Perham, The Colonial Reckoning: The End of Imperial Rule in Africa in the Light of British Experience (New York: Knopf, 1962), pp. 117-18; George Bennett, "Settlers and Politics in Kenya," in Harlow and Chilver (eds.), History of East Africa, pp. 265-332.

¹⁶ Corfield, Historical Survey, p. 39. For the KCA program, see Kenyatta, Kenya, pp. 12-14.

¹⁷ Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 40-43, 46-48; Kariuki, 'Mau Mau' Detainee, p. 21; Brian Crozier, The Rebels (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960), pp. 62-63.

¹⁸ Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 49, 54-55, 58-59, 84.

¹⁹ Quoted in Fred Majdalany, State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 58.

²⁰ Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 51, 272.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 62, 78. See also quotation cited below in footnote 29 for an African view.

²² This account of the insurgency is based mainly on Corfield's Historical Survey and Leakey's Defeating Mau Mau. Kariuki, author of 'Mau Mau' Detainee, was in detention camps throughout the emergency period and thus cannot give a first-hand account of operations. Since the writing of this study, there has been news from Kenya of efforts to record Mau Mau history by former participants in the movement.

²³ Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, pp. 21-31.

²⁴ Corfield, Historical Survey, p. 51; Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 45-54.

²⁵ Quoted in Haines, Africa Today, p. 488.

²⁶ Quoted in Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 304-305.

²⁷ Quoted by Mitchell in Haines, Africa Today, p. 491.

²⁸ Mitchell, quoted in Haines, Africa Today, pp. 488-89.

²⁹ A general account of Mau Mau organization from the viewpoint of British intelligence is contained in Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 259-61, 299. Kilson, in "Behind the Mau Mau Rebellion," loc. cit., states on p. 274 that "Kikuyu informants of the author maintain that what is called Mau Mau emerged as a dissident group within the KAU that wanted to push harder and faster for African advancement than did the KAU leadership." (Kilson's italics.)

³⁰ Ibid., p. 261.

³¹ Mau Mau propaganda is described in some detail in Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, pp. 53-76. For detention camp propaganda songs, see Kariuki, 'Mau Mau' Detainee, pp. 56-57.

³² On oath-taking, see Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, pp. 77-93; for variations described by an initiate, see Kariuki, 'Mau Mau' Detainee, pp. 25-33. One British authority who felt that the oaths had little power over the warriors after mid-1954 was Maj. Frank Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1960), pp. 126-33; for a psychologist's view, see Carothers, Psychology of Mau Mau.

³³ Mitchell, quoted in Majdalany, State of Emergency, p. 97.

³⁴ Kariuki, 'Mau Mau' Detainee, pp. 30-31.

³⁵ Majdalany, State of Emergency, p. 138; Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, p. 42.

- ³⁴ For details on Mau Mau financial matters, see Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, pp. 97-99.
- ³⁵ For a general description of Mau Mau arms and ammunition collection, see ibid., pp. 95-97; Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 225-34; Kitson, Gangs, p. 17.
- ³⁶ The "Militant Wing" organization is described at some length in Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 157-60; Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 260-61.
- ³⁷ Kariuki, 'Mau Mau' Detainee, pp. v, 120-21.
- ³⁸ Majdalany, State of Emergency, p. 158.
- ³⁹ W. Robert Foran, The Kenya Police, 1887-1960 (London: Robert Hale, 1962), pp. 202-203; Kitson, Gangs, pp. 124-25; Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 153-56, 192.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 185-86; Kitson, Gangs, pp. 140-43; Kariuki, 'Mau Mau' Detainee, pp. 95-96.
- ⁴¹ Kitson, Gangs, p. 90; Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 185-86.
- ⁴² Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, pp. 37, 118; Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 185-86.
- ⁴³ Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 164-68; Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, pp. 77-93; Kitson, Gangs, p. 129.
- ⁴⁴ Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 94-95, 107, 112-14, 133.
- ⁴⁵ For descriptions of the Mau Mau attacks at Lari and Naivasha, see Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 137-47.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 189; Corfield, Historical Survey, p. 316.
- ⁴⁷ Majdalany, State of Emergency, p. 117.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 107, 119-21, 224; Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, p. 100; Corfield, Historical Survey, p. 316; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XII, 17193B; Mitchell, quoted in Haines, Africa Today, p. 490.
- ⁴⁹ Mitchell, quoted in Haines, Africa Today, p. 492.
- ⁵⁰ Majdalany, State of Emergency, p. 160.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 212, 216, 219; Foran, Kenya Police, pp. 193, 209; Kitson, Gangs, p. 16; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, X, 14621A, 14859, 15633B; "Reduction of Forces in Kenya," The Forces Magazine (June 1956), p. 48.
- ⁵² Corfield, Historical Survey, p. 316.
- ⁵³ Colonial Territories, 1957-58, p. xix; Colonial Territories, 1958-59, p. 14.
- ⁵⁴ Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 268, 271.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 267-70.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 1, 30-37, 276-85.
- ⁵⁷ Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 87-88, 96-97.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 94-99; Baring is quoted in Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 158-59.
- ⁵⁹ Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 242-54; Esmonde-White, "Violence in Kenya," 187-88; Susan Wood, Kenya: The Tensions of Progress (2d ed.: London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 33-34; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XI, 15634A.
- ⁶⁰ Corfield, Historical Survey, pp. 159-61; Colonial Territories, 1952-53, p. 16.
- ⁶¹ Kitson, Gangs, p. 8; Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 124-28.
- ⁶² Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 132, 148-49; Colonial Territories, 1953-54, p. 16.

- ⁶⁵ Kitson, Gangs, pp. 47-48; Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 129-30.
- ⁶⁶ Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 148-50; Foran, Kenya Police, p. 224; Colonial Territories, 1953-54, p. 16; Colonial Territories, 1955-56, p. 15.
- ⁶⁷ Colonial Territories, 1953-54, p. 16; Kitson, Gangs, pp. 11-13; Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 127-50.
- ⁶⁸ Majdalany, State of Emergency, p. 157; Kitson, Gangs, pp. 11-13, 121; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, X, 14423.
- ⁶⁹ Kitson, Gangs, pp. 8, 11-12; Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 98-99, 157.
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- ⁷² Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, pp. 117-26.
- ⁷³ Majdalany, State of Emergency, p. 132.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 217; Capt. N. S. Horne, "39th Brigade in Kenya." The Forces Magazine (March 1956), p. 45.
- ⁷⁵ For Operation ANVIL, see Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 192, 203-209; Colonial Territories, 1954-55, pp. 12-13.
- ⁷⁶ Foran, Kenya Police, p. 208; Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 133, 161-63.
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- ⁷⁹ Foran, Kenya Police, p. 208.
- ⁸⁰ The Colonial Territories, 1954-55, p. 13.
- ⁸¹ Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 133, 161-63.
- ⁸² Ibid., p. 157; J. Robert Blackburn, "Aircraft Versus Mau Mau," Flight (London), LXVI (November 12, 1954), 707-710; Colonial Territories, 1955-56, p. 15.
- ⁸³ Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau, pp. 120-21; Majdalany, State of Emergency, p. 214; Kitson, Gangs, pp. 155-56; Ian Henderson, with Philip Goodhart, Man Hunt in Kenya (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1958), p. 102.
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- ⁸⁶ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, X, 14247; Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 212-13.
- ⁸⁷ Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 213-18; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, X, 14247.
- ⁸⁸ Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 216-18.
- ⁸⁹ Foran, Kenya Police, p. 205.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 205, 211; Majdalany, State of Emergency, pp. 217-18.
- ⁹¹ Henderson, Man Hunt, p. 150.
- ⁹² Ibid., pp. 69-72, 149-50.
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
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- ¹⁰³ For a detainee's view of the pipeline, see Kariuki, 'Mau Mau' Detainee, pp. 79-82, 127-42.
- ¹⁰⁴ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XI, 15870A, 15964B, 16436B, and XII, 17034B; Colonial Territories, 1957-58, p. 12; Colonial Territories, 1958-59, p. 14; Colonial Territories, 1959-60, pp. 15-16; Colonial Territories, 1960-61, p. 14.
- ¹⁰⁵ Margery Perham, in foreword to Kariuki, 'Mau Mau' Detainee, p. xiv.
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- ¹¹⁵ Colonial Territories, 1959-60, p. 16; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XII, 17546.
- ¹¹⁶ Corfield, Historical Survey, p. 316, the total cost is set at \$168 million by Perham. Colonial Reckoning, p. 117.
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Chapter Twelve

MADAGASCAR
1947-1948



Chapter Twelve
MADAGASCAR (1947-1948)

by Elisabeth M. Thompson

French colonial authority—challenged by members of a Malagasy nationalist elite and spear-carrying tribesmen—was successfully defended by strong military and police repression, but in the next decade political concessions were made on the basis of France's adjustments to other colonial situations.

BACKGROUND

Of the colonial insurgencies that confronted France in the aftermath of World War II, the 1947 uprising in Madagascar—which followed the opening of serious hostilities in Indochina and preceded the outbreak of violence in Algeria—has been largely overshadowed by other events. Remote from the principal crisis areas of the postwar world, the uprising on the Great Island off the southeast coast of Africa has been called "an explosion in an isolated laboratory."¹

But the political nationalism that sparked the Madagascan explosion was by no means an isolated phenomenon. Though conditioned by local factors, it was akin to the wider independence movement already sweeping through south Asia and gestating on the African continent. Examples of nationalist action in south Asian lands and words of hope for colonial peoples written into the U.N. Charter were followed with interest and fervently discussed among the Malagasy elite between 1945 and 1947. As a "laboratory" illustrating what havoc political ferment, economic distress, and social tension could wreak in a war-weakened colonial area where local problems and sentiments had long been neglected, Madagascar occupied a position on the spectrum midway between the overtly rebellious territories of Asia and the restless territories of Africa, a position which reflected the unique circumstances within the Great Island itself.

Ethnically, Madagascar has long been distinguished by its intermixture of Asian and African elements. The Malagasy, who constitute over 98 percent of the island's population, are presumed to be descendants of ancient Indonesian immigrants intermingled with later arrivals from continental Black Africa.² Eighteen main tribal groups have been distinguished among the Malagasy, the most prominent of which is the Merina,* who number one-fourth of the total population and

*French writers often refer to the Merina as the "Hova"; but the term Hova applies more accurately to the Merina middle class, which in precolonial times stood between the noble class and the class of serfs and slaves.

are concentrated for the most part in the central plateau region around Tananarive. In physical appearance and cultural traditions, the Merina are closely identified with the island's early Malayo-Indonesian heritage; they also account for a high proportion of its Western-educated intelligentsia. The various coastal groups, known collectively as côtiers, outnumber the Merina by nearly three to one. Predominantly African in origin, the côtiers tend to be less developed culturally.

Despite their racial variety and traditional regional, tribal, and caste divisions, the Malagasy have a remarkable cultural unity. In language, customs, and religious beliefs, the basic patterns are Malayo-Indonesian. A single Malagasy language, with regional variations, is spoken throughout the island, and a written form of the Merina dialect has existed for more than a hundred years. A cult of ancestor worship based on belief in the immortality of the soul prevails among the "pagan" majority and exists as a subreligion among the 40 percent of the Malagasy who have become Christian as a result of Western missionary activity on the island since the early 1800's.

The French Succeed in Establishing Control Over Madagascar

Although Europeans of various nationalities were active along the coasts of Madagascar from the 16th century, no foreign power occupied the island until 1896. Rival efforts by the British and French to penetrate the interior during the 19th century coincided with the rise of a powerful Merina kingdom, several of whose rulers were receptive to Western ideas and technical assistance. In fact, the Merina nearly succeeded in unifying the country: by the 1860's their rulers controlled two-thirds of the island, a more extensive area than any previous group had mastered, and were recognized by Western powers as the kings and queens of Madagascar. But the fate of the Merina state was sealed by an 1890 Anglo-French agreement that cleared the way for France to take over all of Madagascar.

In 1895 the royal court at Tananarive capitulated to a French military expedition supported by dissident coastal chiefs. When armed rebellion broke out in the Merina countryside during 1896, France annexed the island and transferred the eminently successful Gen. Joseph Simon Gallieni from Indochina to serve as pacifier and first governor of Madagascar. Within a year's time, Gallieni had abolished the Merina monarchy and suppressed the "great rebellion." Pacifying those parts of the island that had eluded the Merina sovereigns proved a longer and more difficult task, but it too was completed by Gallieni in 1905; Madagascar was then, for the first time in its history, unified under a single authority.

Gallieni Combines the Use of Force With Political Action

To establish effective French control over the island with the scarcely 7,000 troops at his command, Gallieni combined political action with force in a strategy designed to minimize hostility and to transform opposing forces into useful auxiliaries for the development of the country.

Although he broke up the Merina oligarchy, he retained Merina functionaries to work under his own officers. He also sought the cooperation of local chiefs by proclaiming the principle of equality of all tribes (politique des races).

In subduing the countryside, Gallieni's basic objective was to achieve an occupation in depth by implanting small garrisons of troops whose function was as much to administer and protect the local population as to conquer it. This principle was later given its classic formulation by Marshal Louis Hubert Lyautey, who served as Gallieni's chief of staff in Madagascar before becoming the pacifier of Morocco:* "It will advance not by columns nor by mighty blows, but as a patch of oil spreads, through a step by step progression, playing alternately on all the local elements, utilizing the divisions and rivalries between tribes and between their chiefs."³ Progressive occupation by the famous "patch of oil" (tache d'huile) technique was to be used again in Madagascar in 1948.

Some general passages in Gallieni's instructions of May 22, 1898, were also to provide useful guidelines for French authorities 50 years later:

. . . we should turn to destruction only as a last resort and only as a preliminary to better reconstruction. . . . Every time that the necessities of war force one of our colonial officers to take action against a village or an inhabited center, his first concern, once submission of the inhabitants has been obtained, should be the reconstruction of the village, creation of a market, and establishment of a school. It is by combined use of politics and force that pacification of a country and its future organization will be achieved.⁴

Because of his intense concern with local problems Gallieni has been described as a man of dual loyalty, "whose conscience was torn between policies that would primarily benefit metropolitan France and those that would keep Malagasy interests uppermost."⁵

For many Malagasy, the replacement of Merina authoritarian rule by its French counterpart was no great tragedy. Slavery and serfdom were eliminated, though not the use of compulsory labor. Numerous social barriers among the islanders were diluted by the acceleration of internal migration and the extension of educational facilities. Gallieni's policy of tribal equality, however, was largely disregarded in practice by his successors. The Merina, favored by superior educational institutions in Tananarive, were used in subordinate administrative posts throughout the island; and in the nature of things they became the dominant group in the new Malagasy elite.

Evidences of Malagasy Nationalism up to World War II

Nationalist feeling among the Malagasy first manifested itself during World War I in a secret society called the Vy Vato Sakelika (VVS or, literally, Iron, Stone, and Plantshoot—substances symbolizing purity and discipline to the Malagasy). Its members were Merina

*See Chapter Two, "Morocco (1921-1926)."

medical and theological students who were inspired by the transformation of Japan from a feudal to a modern state. Accused of conspiring to launch an uprising against the French, the young VVS intellectuals were arrested and tried by colonial authorities in 1916; and many of them were interned for several years.

In the 1920's, a modern nationalist movement, relying on overt political agitation, began to emerge. Founded by Jean Ralaimongo, a non-Merina veteran of the war in France, and led by him and by Joseph Ravoahangy, a Merina formerly associated with the VVS, this movement advanced modest demands for equal rights—specifically, for extension of French citizenship to all Malagasy and for elevation of the island's status to that of a département of France. When the nationalists organized demonstrations on behalf of French citizenship in Tananarive in May 1929, the movement was broken up by the authorities and its leaders were dispersed to places of "fixed residence" throughout the island. The suppression of this embryonic nationalist movement by a colonial administration indifferent to the social evolution and the dignity of the Malagasy was to have serious consequences in the 1940's.⁶

Nationalist stirrings before World War II were limited almost exclusively to the capital and other towns, where the impact of European ideas and European modes of life was strongest. Few of the peasant villagers, who accounted for some 90 percent of the Malagasy, were affected. Although a colon (French settler) problem existed in some coastal areas and the northern part of the plateau around Lake Alaotra, French colonization in Madagascar had fallen short of the original expectations. A few large French companies handled the island's foreign trade, which was limited almost entirely to the export of tropical agricultural products (rice, coffee, and vanilla, supplemented by small amounts of graphite) and the import of manufactured goods. Most of the "middlemen" and retailers in domestic trade were Indian and Chinese merchants. Efforts to promote economic growth were impeded by a shortage of investment capital after the worldwide depression of the early 1930's and by a chronic scarcity of labor.

At the time of World War II the entire territory of Madagascar—as large as France, Belgium, and Holland combined—had a population of only four million. Of this total, fewer than 40,000 (1 percent) were Europeans, while Indians and Chinese accounted for only another 14,000 or so. After the promising start under Gallieni, the French regime in Madagascar had lapsed into economic and bureaucratic stagnation, and the Malagasy intellectuals, assimilated into French culture without being accepted by the French as social or political equals, had become increasingly conscious of being a separate people.

World War II Disrupts Malagasy Life

World War II broke the continuity of French rule in Madagascar, disrupted the island's trade with France, and lowered French prestige among the Malagasy. After the fall of France in June 1940, Madagascar was under a Vichy French regime until 1942, when British and South African

troops sought to occupy it in order to preclude any possibility of its naval facilities being used by the Japanese. When the Vichy French authorities tried to resist the Allied occupation, the Malagasy witnessed their defeat and internment. In 1943, Great Britain transferred civil administration of the island to a Free French regime under Gen. Charles de Gaulle, but the last elements of the occupation forces were not withdrawn until 1946.

The break in Madagascar's trade with France during World War II disrupted the island's economy. During the Vichy period, the country had to live on its own resources without imports of basic consumer goods and without equipment to maintain internal communications. The Free French regime in its turn was confronted with cumulative economic problems. The arrival of imported merchandise, usually in insufficient quantity, gave rise to speculation and a black market, activities which further discredited the local Europeans in Malagasy eyes.⁷ In the early postwar period, production and trade were both below the 1938 level, clothing and other essential commodities remaining scarce. Distribution outside the main towns was impeded by a shortage of vehicles and coastal shipping, and railroad equipment was greatly in need of replacement.

The wartime economic difficulties of the Malagasy were compounded by stringent administrative measures introduced by Vichy authorities and intensified by the Free French as part of the war effort. A system of requisitioning rice from the peasants by arbitrary quotas left many families without enough staple food, and abuses in the distribution system aggravated the shortages. The Malagasy greatly resented the resumption of forced labor during the war, particularly the drafting of Malagasy men to maintain roads and the obligation imposed on forest dwellers to collect Para rubber.⁸ Local French officials, for their part, were not always aware of conditions in Malagasy villages under their supervision. When the Anosibé region between Tananarive and the east coast became a center of rebellion in 1947, an investigation disclosed that the district administrative officer had not made a single visit to Anosibé during the previous eight years.⁹

Brazzaville Conference Recommends Reform But Not Autonomy

The war produced a radically new political situation, with Malagasy aspirations for self-determination greatly intensified. As a result of the Brazzaville Conference of February 1944, the Malagasy learned how General de Gaulle and his territorial governors intended to modify French colonial policy after France was liberated. The conference recommended major political and social reforms for the advancement of native peoples in French territories, but it rejected in principle any idea that they might gain autonomy or independence.

Following the Brazzaville recommendations, a representative council with advisory functions was created in Madagascar in 1945, and the island was given elected representation (two Malagasy and two French citizens) in the French Constituent Assembly charged with drafting a

constitution for the Fourth Republic of France and the overseas territories. Other reforms followed in 1946. In addition to the right to political representation, freedom of the press, of association, and of assembly was recognized in principle. The special penal system for natives (code indigénat) was abolished, and forced labor was outlawed. These reforms established a basis for organized political life in the island and encouraged nationalist hopes for ending the island's colonial status.

Malagasy Leaders Form Nationalist Political Parties and Demand Independence

The two Malagasy elected to the French Constituent Assembly were Joseph Ravoahangy and Joseph Raseta. Together with some Malagasy intellectuals who were living in Paris, they founded in February 1946 a nationalist party called the Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache (MDRM).¹⁰ Ravoahangy and Raseta, Merina of high birth, were both educated as medical doctors and associated with nationalist activities since World War I, when they had belonged to the VVS. Another prominent founder of the MDRM was Jacques Rabemananjara, a Betsimisaraka from the east coast. Rabemananjara, a distinguished poet and an exponent of Malagasy culture, also held a law degree and had worked in the French colonial ministry in Paris for several years.

Although the MDRM appealed to the underlying desire for Malagasy independence, its founders and principal leaders demanded little more than national autonomy. They wanted their country to become an autonomous state associated with France within the framework of the French Union. There were younger activists in the MDRM, however, who were impatient for complete and immediate independence. Some of these "young Turks" also belonged to semisecret organizations, notably Jeunesse Nationaliste (JINA) and Parti Nationaliste Malgache (PANAMA).¹¹

Among the several political parties that emerged in Madagascar during 1946, the MDRM was the most active and the most widely organized. It distributed propaganda and set up local sections throughout the island in the name of a common Malagasy fatherland (la patrie malgache).¹² Among upper-class Merina, the MDRM had two small rivals, one essentially a Protestant party, the other a Catholic party. The former was led by the Reverend Ravelojaona, a moderate nationalist who wanted Madagascar to have a transitional period of trusteeship under the United Nations before achieving independence from France.

The strongest political opponent of the MDRM was the Parti des Dshérités Malgaches (PADESM), formed in June 1946. Its primary objective was to oppose the hegemony of the Merina elite. Although its main strength was on the west coast, it sought to rally the descendants of all those who had been slaves and vassals of the Merina upper classes in precolonial times. Although the PADESM called on the French to provide more cultural and educational opportunities for non-Merina, it directed its main attacks against the "privileged" position of the Merina upper classes.

To the nationalists, the PADESM seemed the handiwork of the local French administration, created to implement a policy of "divide and rule." But this was not entirely the case. The PADESM voiced an old feeling of antagonism toward the Merina.¹³ Since so many of the nationalist intelligentsia were Merina, French officials as well as some non-Merina intellectuals believed that the MDRM demands for effective self-government were motivated by a desire of the old Merina ruling classes to regain political hegemony.¹⁴ When French colonial authorities emphasized the divisive, tribal aspects of the local political situation, however, they underestimated the growing national self-consciousness which led many educated persons to consider themselves part of a wider and unique community of Malagasy, entitled to rights as Malagasy and not merely as citizens of France.

In Paris, the deputies Ravoahangy and Raseta appeared before the Constituent Assembly as spokesmen for this incipient national community. On March 21, 1946, they introduced a proposal for legislation to abrogate the Annexation Law of 1896 and give Madagascar the status of "a free state, having its own government, its own parliament, its own army, and its own finances, within the framework of the French Union." As Ravoahangy later pointed out, this proposal duplicated the formula which the French government had just accepted for Vietnam in an agreement concluded with Ho Chi Minh on March 6, 1946.¹⁵ The bill was referred to a commission, on the grounds that the French Union was not yet in existence. It remained buried, without a hearing, for the duration of the Assembly.

Despite Reforms, Malagasy Grow Increasingly Discontented With French Rule

While political rifts in France delayed the adoption of a new French constitution, conditions in Madagascar became more complex. The reforms proclaimed abruptly from Paris in the spring of 1946 gave the Malagasy a new personal independence and caused many of them to feel, they need no longer defer to French authority.¹⁶ Relations with France were confused by the marked hostility of local French settlers and bureaucrats to the spirit of the reforms. As one French observer, Dr. O. Mannoni, noted, "Half the Europeans encouraged the Malagasy to do as he pleased as a free man; the other half were more hostile to him than ever before—their hostility being the counterpart of the paternalistic attitude."¹⁷ In this unstable situation, latent anti-French feelings were easily aroused by the zealous campaigning of nationalist politicians and the sharp agitation of the Malagasy press for independence.¹⁸

On May 18, 1946, a new Governor General, Marcel de Coppet, arrived in Tananarive and was greeted by manifestations of the changing political temper. In the crowd that gathered for his speech, placards appeared bearing the slogan "Down with the Law of Annexation." These placards later were carried through the streets, and the procession ended with disturbances in which windows were broken and rocks were thrown at Europeans.¹⁹ Later in 1946, the repatriation of some 10,000 Malagasy war veterans from camps in France provided more "young Turks" for the independence movement and supplied a reservoir of "thuggish" elements.

Among the rural population, the most significant of the postwar reforms were those that abolished the hated system of regulating labor. As soon as the wartime labor decrees were revoked, the Malagasy who had gone to work on plantations to avoid conscription for other enterprises felt free to leave their jobs, and they did so in great numbers.²⁰ The sudden shortage of labor disorganized the plantations, and the colons complained of being abandoned by the government.

When in April 1946 the Paris Assembly passed a law prohibiting all forms of compulsory labor in all the overseas territories of France, many Malagasy attributed the reform entirely to the efforts of their own deputies, Ravoahangy and Raseta. Thus, these two MDRM leaders gained reputations as "defenders of the people" and were easily re-elected to the second Constituent Assembly in June 1946.*

France Makes the Malagasy French Citizens and Creates New Political Institutions.

The new Constituent Assembly was no more inclined to discuss the question of Madagascan autonomy than its predecessor. The French Constitution finally adopted in October 1946 provided for the existence of certain "associated states" in a French Union, but failed to grant Madagascar such status. Like most French colonies in tropical Africa, Madagascar was declared an "overseas territory" of the French Republic, and all its inhabitants were given French citizenship. As the French historian Hubert Deschamps observed, such an assimilationist solution had been demanded 20 years earlier, but in 1946 it corresponded "neither to the positions of Malagasy politicians nor to the evolution of the world."²¹ Both Ravoahangy and Raseta abstained from voting on the final text of the Constitution.

New political institutions, promised in the Constitution, were defined for Madagascar in a special decree of October 25, 1946. A territorial Representative Assembly and five provincial assemblies (corresponding to new administrative divisions of the island) were established and given consultative functions and some control of the budget. Members of the Representative Assembly were to be elected indirectly by the provincial assemblies. Each of the provincial assemblies was to be elected directly by qualified voters, but there were separate seats (and separate electorates) for Malagasy on the one hand and for Europeans on the other. Although a majority of the seats in every assembly was allotted to the Malagasy, the number reserved for Europeans was highly disproportionate to their small percentage in the population. The system of separate electorates also applied to the representation accorded Madagascar in the French Parliament: three Malagasy and two European deputies in the French National Assembly, and six Malagasy and two Europeans in the Council of the Republic.

*The first Constituent Assembly was dissolved after the constitution which it drafted was rejected by the French electorate in a referendum.

The establishment of separate electorates, to protect the interests of Europeans, was denounced by the nationalists as contrary to the principle of equal citizenship. Creation of the provincial assemblies, set up to protect the interests of the *côtiens* against "Merina hegemony," was denounced as a French effort to "divide and rule"; and nationalist charges in this vein intensified when the French administration supported the PADESM against the MDRM in the election campaigns.²² Consequently, the series of local elections to bring the new regime into effect took place in an explosive atmosphere, with frequent "incidents" in which partisans of the MDRM clashed with those of the PADESM and with agents of the administration.

The Elections of 1946 Embitter the MDRM

In the elections of November 1946, the MDRM won all three Malagasy seats in the French National Assembly: Ravoahangy and Raseta were re-elected and Rabemananjara became the new third deputy. Elections for the provincial assemblies in January and February 1947 also went heavily in the MDRM's favor. In the central and northeast provinces of Tananarive and Tamatave the MDRM won all the Malagasy seats; in the southeast province of Fianarantsoa and the southwest province of Tuléar it won the majority; only in the northwest province of Majunga was it in the minority.

The fact that the MDRM won 64 of the 92 Malagasy seats in the provincial assemblies should have assured an MDRM majority in the Representative Assembly. But a special part of the electoral mechanism served to deny this majority to the MDRM. Members of the central body were elected by the combined vote of the Europeans and the Malagasy in each provincial assembly, and this procedure operated against the MDRM, which received only 9 seats in the Representative Assembly compared to 12 for the PADESM (the other 15 seats being reserved for Europeans).²³

The election results indicated that a European-Malagasy coalition in the Tuléar and Fianarantsoa provincial assemblies had turned the tables against the MDRM. In the Tuléar assembly, the MDRM held 13 seats, the PADESM only 7; but 4 out of the 5 Malagasy delegates elected to the representative Assembly were PADESM. In the Fianarantsoa assembly, the MDRM held 10 seats, the PADESM just 8; but all of the Malagasy delegates elected to the Representative Assembly were PADESM.²⁴

The Representative Assembly was scheduled to meet for its opening session on March 30, 1947. But political passions were now aroused, and local incidents multiplied. Efforts of the administration to cope with the unruliness by meting out arrests and fines to individual "extremists" did not reduce the general tension.

A Fateful Telegram

In this charged atmosphere some 20 leaders of the MDRM, including Ravoahangy and Rabemananjara, met in Tananarive on March 27 to discuss the political situation. At the end of

the meeting a telegram, signed by the MDRM deputies and the party's political bureau, was sent to all local branches of the MDRM ordering them "to keep calm and composed in the face of all maneuvers and provocations designed to arouse disturbances among the Malagasy people and to sabotage the peaceful policies of the MDRM."²⁶ What relationship this telegram had to the uprising which followed has baffled virtually all impartial investigators of the Malagasy insurgency. Was the telegram, as French officials later maintained, a coded signal to start the uprising? Or was it, as its authors claimed, a last-minute attempt to call off the uprising?

INSURGENCY

During the night of March 29-30, 1947, outbreaks of violence started at widely separated places in the island. An attack was made against the French military camp at Moramanga, which was on the rail line between Tananarive and the east coast. Simultaneously, a raid was launched on an arms depot at Diégo-Suarez, the French naval base in the far north. Hundreds of miles to the south, the provincial capital of Fianarantsoa was isolated by sabotage of its telephone and electric power lines. On the east coast, the town of Manakara fell to insurgents after hand-to-hand combat with the local police force, and nearby Vohipeno came under heavy assault.²⁶

The most serious of these attacks was the one at Moramanga, a major army post about 70 miles northeast of the capital. Here a band of several hundred Malagasy,* armed with spears (*sarsies*), machetes (*coups-coupe*), and a few rifles, surprised the small garrison late that Saturday night.²⁷ The insurgents set fire to the barracks where Senegalese soldiers were sleeping, pillaged arms and munitions stores, and cut telegraph and telephone communications with the rest of the island. Some of the insurgents went into the town, where they found and assassinated the French officers, including the post commandant. Only one of Moramanga's eight French officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO's) escaped death that night, and he was unable to control the frenzied Senegalese soldiers. After eleven Senegalese were massacred as they ran out of their barracks, those who survived chased the insurgents into the countryside, killing indiscriminately some peaceful Malagasy villagers. A number of European settlers living on isolated farms were murdered by the retreating insurgents, raising the death toll in the Moramanga district to about 70, including 23 military personnel.²⁸

The raid on the Lazaret arsenal at Diégo-Suarez was less destructive because a Comorien guard alerted other personnel to the presence of the insurgents, but the latter were able to get away with ammunition and small arms. At Fianarantsoa, some swift preventive arrests by local police kept the city free of violence. Tananarive itself was spared from violence by a rebel miscalculation: An uprising had been prepared in the capital for the night of March 29, but was

*Estimates of the number of Malagasy attackers vary from 300 to 2,000. Stratton concludes that "nobody knows how many there were, one hundred, several hundred. . . ." Arthur Stratton, *The Great Red Island* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), p. 241.

called off at the last moment by the local insurgent commander in the erroneous belief that the French had discovered the plot and were bringing reserve troops into the city. ²⁹ Manakara was quickly recovered from the insurgency when reinforcements arrived by air from the capital.

The Rebellion Spreads Rapidly

While the strategic centers remained under French control, the rebellion spread rapidly through the eastern part of the island. During the spring and summer of 1947, the east coast—all the way from Farafangana to Tamatave, except for the coastal towns—was overrun by insurgents; by midsummer, much of the countryside from Tamatave north to Antongil Bay was also at the mercy of armed bands. The "nerve centers" and main bases of the rebellion were in the steep, forested region between the narrow coastal plain and the central plateau roughly north-east and southeast of Tananarive. In the northeast, the most dynamic center of rebellion was in the vicinity of Moramanga; in the southeast, the "nerve center" at first was the Sahasinaka region, not far from Manakara. ³⁰

Altogether, the districts most strongly affected by insurgency in 1947 constituted about one-sixth of the island's territory and contained about one-fourth of the island's population. These eastern districts included areas of strong French colonization, where European settlers had developed the richest agricultural land and where the requisitioning of Malagasy labor had given rise to much social tension. The forest belt was, moreover, traditionally a zone of insurrection on the island; the various tribal peoples who lived there—the Tanala, the Vorimo, and the Bezanozano—had shown resistance to outside authority even before the coming of the French. ³¹ On the other hand, the Betsimisaraka people, the largest single ethnic group along the east coast prior to 1947, had been noted for their apparent acceptance of outside authority. ³²

Rebel Operations and Tactics

Disruption of overland communications by the rebels greatly handicapped French efforts to contain the situation. During the spring and summer of 1947, rebel groups repeatedly sabotaged and cut the two trunk rail lines between the plateau and the east coast: the northern line from Tananarive to the seaport of Tamatave, a serpentine narrow-gauge track 250 miles long; and the 102-mile-long southern line from Fianarantsoa to the small port of Manakara. For a time, part of the main road linking Tananarive and Fianarantsoa on the central plateau also was blocked. Towns along the east coast often were isolated from their hinterland and had to rely on air or naval transport for supplies and reinforcements. ³³

For about four months, from April to July 1947, the rebels held the initiative in field operations. Guerrilla warfare was intermittent throughout the eastern regions, with rebel bands repeatedly making sorties from the forests, burning houses and granaries, destroying churches, attacking railways and communications, overrunning coffee plantations, ambushing French

patrols, and threatening centers of population.³⁴ Surprise attacks frequently were made on isolated and poorly guarded administrative posts in the bush, as well as on coastal towns, and a number of important outposts were captured by the insurgents in this way (e.g., Fort Carnot, Sahas(naka, Ifanadiena, Antseanavola, Vohipeno, Anosité, Beparasy).

The ambush was a common insurgent tactic, used against convoys as well as small patrols. An example of this tactic was reported in a French military communiqué for May 4-5, 1947. Noting that rebels had dug ditches across the coastal road from Mahanoro to Vatomandry, the French reported that "a mixed detachment of Senegalese paratroopers who left from Vatomandry found themselves stopped by these obstacles and attacked south of Marosiky, while other rebels tried to cut the road in the rear of the convoy." During the fight, 83 rebels were killed and about 100 wounded.³⁵

That same week a second rebel attack on the town of Moramanga, occurring just a month after the attack on the military post outside the town, again succeeded in surprising the defenders. The rebels entered Moramanga in the middle of the night, freed 150 prisoners from the town jail, and forcibly carried off some 100 Malagasy hostages. After the raid, French officials evacuated all Malagasy women and children from the town in order to protect them.³⁶

Terrorism was a prominent feature of the insurgency during these months. French settlers on farms in the bush were attacked by rebel bands, and some were murdered under cruel circumstances. During the first month of the insurgency, the total number of deaths among French civilians and military personnel was between 100 and 153.³⁷ Many Malagasy who remained loyal to the French or at least wanted no part in the rebellion were also killed by the rebels. At the administrative post of Vohilava, the Merina governor, 13 local clerks, 16 security guards, and the local doctor were massacred when they chose to resist a rebel onslaught.³⁸ In some localities the Malagasy murdered by the rebels were members of PADESM, the chief political opponent of MDRM.

The dynamic character of the insurgency was pointed up by the Paris correspondent of The New York Times who, in a dispatch of May 15, 1947, noted the "increasing activity of bands who are attacking isolated posts and storming guarded towns with a reckless disregard of losses. . . . Regular railway traffic from Tananarive to Tamatave has been halted by attacks on trains." Reporting on the "serious" nature of the economic consequences of the revolt, he pointed out that the coffee and tapioca crops were already "disastrously affected."

At this point in mid-May 1947, official French sources were estimating the strength of the rebel bands as "some 6,000 men armed with 200 rifles."³⁹ This figure was undoubtedly a minimal one, and certainly did not include all the rural people who were being stirred to action.

Insurgent Operations and Strength Reach Their Apex in Early Summer of 1947

The peak thrust of the insurgency occurred roughly six weeks later. At the end of June, bands of insurgents, numbering perhaps several thousand men, advanced toward Tananarive from the southeast and at some places came within 20 miles of the capital before they were driven back and dispersed. At about the same time, a marked expansion of rebel activity became evident in the northeast around Tamatave, and during the first weeks of July a series of large-scale attacks took place in the coastal area north of that port. On June 29 Andavoranto was attacked by 800 rebels coming in several bands from different directions. Rebel disturbances northwest of Tamatave became so serious that the French sent a newly arrived French Foreign Legion unit through the rugged countryside from Fénérive to the Lake Alaotra region and thence to Moramanga. In the vicinity of Fénérive and Foulpointe, there were several rebel attacks in which the strength of the attacking group was estimated to be around 500 men, and one, in late July, in which as many as 1,500 persons were reportedly involved in an attack against a Senegalese patrol.⁴⁰ To what extent this upsurge of rebellion was aggravated by the appearance of increasing numbers of French colonial troops from overseas is a moot question. It was at Tamatave, the eastern gateway to the island, that heavy military reinforcements were disembarking during June and July.

The military phase of the insurgency reached its peak during these months. At the end of July 1947, by which time some 10,000 insurgents had deserted the movement, the guerrillas had lost the initiative, never to regain it. The guerrillas who fled to the forests were, after the expansion of military operations, joined by the population of entire villages. Men, women, and children—impelled by panic or terrorist pressure—fled into the depths of the forests, where starvation, exposure, and illness took the lives of thousands. Others surrendered wholesale—more than a hundred thousand by the end of the year. But in May 1948, 300,000 refugees and 25,000 hard-core guerrillas were still thought by the French governor general to be in the forests.

Insurgent Membership, Leaders, and Organization

Although many aspects of the insurgency and its origins are still obscure, it is clear that the insurgents themselves represented many diverse elements in the population. Their initial leadership was undoubtedly militantly nationalistic; but, as will be seen, their precise organizational and political relationships are still debated. Those who planned and directed military operations were veterans of World War II, men who had learned the tactics of irregular warfare while participating in the maquis in occupied France.⁴¹ In many localities, the active centers of rebellion were the local sections of the MDRM.⁴²

Associated with the political activists were a variety of local personalities, including some minor tribal "kings" and many traditional Malagasy sorcerers. The rank and file of the

insurgents were, for the most part, rural villagers and forest people recruited (or impressed) locally on an ad hoc basis in the course of the rebellion. Generally, they represented the less culturally advanced Malagasy tribes (e.g., the Tanala of the southeast) and those who for one reason or another (e.g., dearth of rice and textiles, compulsory labor, land tenure problems) harbored economic and social grievances against the colonial regime.

Because of the lack of specific information, the organization of the insurgents can only be surmised from the course of external events. There is broad agreement that the initial, simultaneous attacks on several strategic points showed a considerable degree of central organization, but subsequent phases of the insurgency appeared to indicate that it was poorly organized and lacked any effective central military command. Samuel Rakotondrabe, a leader of JINA and considered to be the "generalissimo" of the rebels, was captured by a police commando group in May 1947. "General" Kana, an important insurgent chief in the southeast around Fort Carnot, was captured early in the summer of 1948. In the region of Moramanga-Anosibé, northeast of Tananarive, Victorien Razafindrabe succeeded in making himself "supreme military chief" of the rebel groups operating there until his capture by a military patrol in September 1948.

One leading French historian noted that the local rebel commanders operated in an autonomous manner (*ordre dispersé*) and suggested that leaders of subordinate bands merely followed their troops.⁴³ Another French scholar concluded that the emotions engendered by the initial attacks against the colonial regime sufficed to activate a great mass of discontented elements without any need of a detailed organization.⁴⁴ A British missionary has expressed the view that the uprising was organized and started on the basis of a "master plan" (as French officials claimed), but that it quickly got out of hand and led to excesses beyond the limited political aims of its planners.⁴⁵

Rebels Lack Discipline

In any case, the localized, undisciplined, and essentially rural character of the insurgency would seem to account for some of the contrasts which appeared between professions of national unity and evidence of disunity, as well as for much of the xenophobia and the recrudescence of pagan practices. Although the insurgents generally stressed the brotherhood of all Malagasy (*la fraternité malgache*) and displayed a red and white flag on which 18 stars symbolized the 18 Malagasy tribes, in some places historic tribal attitudes and rivalries manifested themselves. For example, the Zafisoro attacked Farafangana, the town of their traditional enemies, the Antefasi. In pillaging farms and plantations, moreover, insurgent bands made little distinction between those belonging to their own compatriots and those belonging to European colons.⁴⁶

The outbursts of xenophobia and the reassertion of traditional beliefs and practices during the insurgency evoked memories of the "great rebellion" of 1896. In 1947, as in 1896, many Christian churches were destroyed by the rebels; sometimes their pastors were killed and their

congregations dispersed. The 1947 rebellion did not appear to be directed against missionaries, however, although one Roman Catholic missionary died by the spear. In some areas, only Catholic churches, which were associated with French missions, were destroyed, while in other areas both Catholic and Protestant churches associated with missions from several Western countries were razed.⁴⁷

The Role of Sorcerers

Much of the fanaticism and reckless courage displayed by the rebels have been attributed to the role played by local sorcerers in mobilizing rural villagers for action. These sorcerers conducted ceremonies in which the recruits took oaths on sacred objects and were assured of magical protection against French weapons. When rebel groups, armed only with wooden spears, advanced to attack troops armed with rifles, they often would shout, "Rano, rano," meaning "Water, water." Rebels taken prisoner by the French explained that the sorcerers had told them this cry would turn the rain of bullets into drops of water.⁴⁸

The sorcerers and other activists also persuaded some of the credulous villagers that the three Malagasy deputies (Raseta, Ravoahangy, and Rabemananjara) had arranged to bring the Americans into Madagascar to help support the rebellion.⁴⁹ At the start of the revolt, insurgents warned French settlers rounded up at Manakara that "50 American airplanes are on their way here with arms and ammunition, and an American ship is already off the coast."⁵⁰ In another instance, belief in the imminence of American aid was strong enough to permit a French junior officer to capture a whole group of rebels by spreading a rumor to the effect that a certain train would be bringing a shipment of American arms. The rebels stopped the train, boarded it, and were trapped by the officer and his patrol, who were hiding inside the car.

The Lack of an Adequate Support Base

There never was, in fact, any American intervention in the rebellion. Nor did the French Communists provide any material assistance to the Malagasy insurgents, although the party tried hard to exploit the Madagascan uprising as a political issue in France.⁵¹

Fanaticism could not long compensate for the rifles, heavy weapons, and the cadres which the rebel bands lacked. Indeed, one observer has suggested that it was "this pagan violence which saved France." It detached from the rebellion many Malagasy who, while desiring independence, wanted to achieve it by other means. The administrators, the intelligentsia, in fact the majority of the Merinas—the very ones who could have furnished the insurrection with the leadership it needed—were not strong supporters of the rebellion.⁵²

Repulsed from the major towns, receiving no material support from outside powers, and confronted by growing French military reinforcements, the insurgent bands by the autumn of 1947 had lost much of their capacity for free-wheeling, destructive action, but they had not yet

been vanquished. The results of the insurgency evident at that time were graphically described by a British missionary.

Thousands have died. Thousands of others have lost all and the smoke of burning villages has frequently clouded the sky. Fear has overtaken the peaceful Malagasy living near the danger areas. It is no pleasant thing to hear the call "the rebels are coming" and to see the breathless panic that immediately overtakes the people.⁵³

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Though the 1947 uprising came as a shock to Paris, the colonial administration in Tananarive had been forewarned of possible large-scale violence. Police and military officials had received warnings of an impending revolt from local agents, and Governor General de Coppet's office was informed at least ten days in advance that an anti-French revolt would be launched on March 29.⁵⁴ Although these warnings were passed on to administrative chiefs of the provinces, they were evaluated in an ambiguous way, allowing for the possibility that they might merely be the latest rumors in the political war of nerves.⁵⁵

The telegram which the governor general sent to all of his provincial chiefs on March 27 read as follows: "Reports have been circulating in certain regions that an action will be launched against Europeans on March 29. Even if this is a rumor without real foundation, you should know about it, and its improbability should not exclude vigilance."⁵⁶ Similar messages sent to the commandants of military posts achieved mixed results.

Some commanding officers, particularly in the south, instituted special security precautions in conjunction with civilian authorities, but others did not. Concerning the night of March 29, the French colonial minister, Maurius Moutet, later pointed out that only two military posts were surprised, and these "where it was difficult to believe, because of the presence of several companies of soldiers armed with modern weapons, that several hundred natives armed with wooden spears and bush knives would accomplish their purpose."⁵⁷ In Tananarive itself, official caution prevailed until 9 p. m. on the evening of March 29, when an urgent phone call from Fort Dauphin prompted authorities to place military and police forces in the capital on a special alert. By the time this alert was ordered, however, the local conspirators had already canceled their plans for a midnight uprising in the capital.⁵⁸

News of the surprise attacks at Moramanga and Diégo-Suarez and of the sabotage at Fianarantsoa reached Tananarive on March 30. Before sending a relief column to Moramanga, de Coppet immediately flew there to assess the situation for himself. When he returned to the capital that evening, he learned that the insurgents had occupied Manakara and were threatening Vohipeno. With one military aircraft and two civilian planes hastily "requisitioned" from Air France, he rushed some reinforcements to Manakara. The swift recovery of Manakara enabled

authorities to make 300 arrests in the first two months of the revolt, and to have about 100 prisoners by April 19.

Strength of Forces at Outbreak of Revolt

At this time, the French appear to have had at most 6,000 to 7,000 security forces at their disposal in Madagascar. Of this total, about 2,000 were police forces (sûreté) and gendarmes stationed in the main towns.⁶⁰ The effective military forces consisted of one battalion of Senegalese mercenaries and four battalions of Malagasy soldiers, with a cadre of French officers and NCO's.⁶¹ Responsibility for protecting administrative outposts in the bush was entrusted to platoons of the garde indigène (native guard) led by French gendarmes. When the insurgency began, only four guard platoons in the entire island were equipped with motor vehicles for surveillance and patrol.

For a country nearly 1,000 miles long and up to 360 miles wide, these were, of course, skeleton forces. Military reinforcements were requested from Paris, but French authorities at first hoped that the disturbances might be confined to a few localities and stopped by a small show of strength. The only troops that arrived during the first two months of the insurgency were a few units flown in from the nearby island of Réunion, a company of paratroopers from France, and a company of Senegalese from Djibouti. Between May 20 and June 28, three battalions arrived from metropolitan France, but by this time the insurgency was too extensive for them to redress the situation. Until the end of July, when four North African battalions arrived, the colonial forces were obliged to remain almost entirely on the defensive.⁶²

Arrest of Malagasy Leaders and Proclamation of Martial Law

The initial shortage of French troops and the potential mass appeal of the Malagasy insurgents' cause underlined the importance of vigorous measures to control the political phase of the insurgency. Police began arresting nationalist suspects in the first days of the revolt, and nearly all the top leaders of the MDRM and those of provincial rank were arrested and interrogated by mid-April.

Ravoahangy and Rabemananjara were taken into police custody on April 12, interrogated under pressure, and held for trial despite their legal immunity as deputies of the French National Assembly and despite their attempt on April 1 to publicly disavow the insurgents.⁶³ Raseta, the third MDRM deputy, could not be arrested immediately, because he was in Paris. All three MDRM senators elected to the Council of the Republic on March 30 were arrested and detained by the local police, as were the various MDRM members who had been elected to the territorial assembly.

In the eight districts most directly affected by insurgency, notably along the east coast and around Moramanga, martial law was proclaimed on April 2, and this step permitted numerous

political cases to be handled summarily by military tribunals. At this time, the local French soldiers were pressing de Coppel to declare martial law throughout the entire island, but he refused to do so, partly on the ground that it might cause many neutral Malagasy to side actively with the insurgents.⁶⁴

French Reactions in Madagascar and in France

On April 19, 1947, Governor General de Coppel finally convened the first session of the territorial Representative Assembly and appeared before it to make his first public statement on the insurgency. In his statement, he flatly accused the MDRM of instigating the rebellion and charged its leaders in particular with launching the uprising through an underground paramilitary organization. They had succeeded in winning over part of the local population, he said, not only by stirring up old superstitions and tribal prejudices, but also by exploiting economic grievances which derived from the circumstances of World War II. These economic grievances were, in the government's opinion, "legitimate," and France henceforth would make special efforts to improve living conditions. But France had no intention of withdrawing from Madagascar or of allowing her political "generosity" to be interpreted as a sign of weakness. As for the counterinsurgency, de Coppel assured the Malagasy that a distinction would be drawn between "the loyal elements and those declared enemies of the sovereignty of France": Only the latter would be punished.⁶⁵

In Paris, the Madagascan crisis became embroiled in French domestic politics. DeCoppel's accusations against the MDRM and its leaders were backed up by colonial minister Maurius Moutet, a moderate Socialist, and the majority of other ministers in the cabinet under Paul Ramadier. The Communist minority in the cabinet, however, refused to approve the arrest of the MDRM deputies and objected to the policy of repression adopted by the colonial administration in Tananarive.

When the Communists were dropped from the French cabinet on May 4, 1947, they used the MDRM issue to harass the government in the National Assembly. The French National Assembly debated the Madagascan situation from May 6 to May 9, with the Communists moving a resolution calling for a parliamentary commission of inquiry to be sent to Madagascar and directing the government to discover "those truly responsible for the bloodshed in the island." This resolution was rejected by 415 votes to 199, and the Assembly then approved, by 375 votes to 41, a motion of confidence in the government.⁶⁶

Rightwing deputies, on the other hand, accused de Coppel and Moutet of "weakness" in dealing with the insurgency. When Raseta spoke before the French National Assembly on May 6, 1947, he defended his party, declaring that the MDRM aimed to achieve independence for the Malagasy within the framework of the French Union and had been founded for the "peaceful realization" of this goal.

On May 10 the French cabinet ordered the dissolution of the MDRM, and on June 7 the National Assembly decided by 324 votes to 195 to suspend the parliamentary immunity of Raseta, who was arrested the same day. A similar decision lifting the immunity of Ravoahangy and Rabemananjara was taken by the Assembly on August 2, 1947.

The French Use a Defensive Strategy at First

Meanwhile French forces in Madagascar were conducting an active defense against the insurgent bands. Their primary concern in these critical months was to safeguard strategic centers like Tananarive, protect hard-pressed towns on the east coast, and thrust some patrols into the rebel-ridden countryside. Insofar as their meager forces permitted, the French were also trying to put a protective cordon around the dissident zone in the west, so as to prevent the rebellion from spreading through the high plateau, where "the watchful attitude of the Merina and Betsileo peoples could rapidly be transformed into active hostility."⁶⁷

The main coastal towns menaced by the insurgents (e.g., Manakara, Mananjary, Vatomandry, Tamatave) were reinforced by small military garrisons, and in some localities paramilitary defense groups were organized among the European settlers. One of the most active groups operated in the Manakara region, where its members cooperated with military personnel in patrol sweeps and eventually participated in the successful operation to reoccupy Vohipeno.⁶⁸

French Tactics Include Use of Air and Naval Increments

Since the insurgents were able to gather superior forces for attacks on widely scattered points, it was constantly necessary for French patrols in the early months to "rush up" to a point under attack, "break loose and weave around" (*accourir, dégager, colmater*).⁶⁹ Paratroopers were an important supplement to the minuscule ground patrols in the coastal belt, and military aviation played a multipurpose role in tactical operations, with World War II planes dropping supplies and equipment to isolated posts, signaling rebel concentrations, scattering propaganda leaflets among rebel villages, and machinegunning rebel bands in open areas. Along some sections of the main railroads, armed patrols operated from special trains to repair lines of communication and disperse rebel groups.

Two units of the French fleet, the *Lapérrousse* and the *Ajaccienne*, were sent to Madagascar for patrol duty along the east coast shortly after the outbreak of the insurgency. They were joined on June 1 by the cruiser *Duguay-Trouin*, which had been diverted from a mission to Indochina. A group of a hundred marine commandos from the *Duguay-Trouin* reinforced tactical operations against the rebels in the vicinity of Tamatave. On June 21, for example, French communiqués reported that "*Duguay-Trouin* commandos and a detachment of paratroopers guided by civilian elements attacked on the morning of the 20th a rebel command post at Maro-

mandia (seven kilometers northeast of Andevoranto); 41 rebels were killed, numerous military supplies were recovered."⁷⁰

Although raids of this type could push the rebels back temporarily into the hinterland, they could not, as the French soon acknowledged, subdue the main rebel bands or keep those bands from ravaging the virtually unprotected countryside for recruits and supplies. French patrols were effective in protecting urban centers and regaining those taken earlier by the rebels. "But the rebels," complained French authorities, "retreat to their bases, the bands renew their incursions, accompanied by burnings and assassinations in the villages, and pillage, sparing neither European nor Malagasy concessions."⁷¹

Reinforcements Are Sent To Fight the Rebels

From the standpoint of French military authorities, a long-term guerrilla war in Madagascar could be averted only by putting sufficient troops into the countryside to fully control the rail lines, disperse all organized groups of rebels, and "pacify" the rural villagers and tribesmen living in the troubled eastern region. It took a strong report from a military mission headed by Gen. Marcel Pellet and the "painful surprises" around Tananarive and Tamatave in midsummer 1947 to prod the Ramadier government, engrossed in a political battle with the Communists at home on the wage issue and engaged in a holding operation in Indochina, to the point of sending enough troops and equipment to do the job.⁷²

Substantial reinforcements began to arrive in June, and General Pellet was sent back to Madagascar to serve as commander in chief of all military forces (commandant en chef inter-armées). On June 25, he appealed to the insurgents to lay down their arms and announced that if they did not comply he would launch a full-scale attack. It was only after the failure of the insurgents' assault on Tananarive, however, that there were sizable defections from their ranks.⁷³ By the end of July, additional French reinforcements had arrived from North Africa, the territorial military command had been reorganized to improve coordination between military and administrative officials at the provincial level, and the French were in a position to begin a major counteroffensive.

The flow of reinforcements continued until the beginning of 1948, when military forces under French command in Madagascar are said to have reached a peak strength of nearly 30,000 men.^{*74} Except for French officers and NCO's of the cadre, the troops from overseas were Senegalese, Algerians, Moroccans, and Foreign Legionnaires (many of them Germans). The Malagasy indigenous guard was strengthened during the insurgency, and its numbers apparently are included in the above figure.

^{*A recent estimate by Arthur Stratton places French peak strength at only about 18,000, including 11,500 reinforcements from overseas (The Great Red Island, p. 246).}

The French Adopt an Integrated Strategy

A comprehensive French strategy of military, political, psychological, and economic measures to wipe out the insurgency was outlined by Governor General de Coppet before the territorial Representative Assembly on July 19, 1947. Militarily, the situation on the island—according to de Coppet—required "energetic" action by a "superior force" against the armed bands. Politically, a distinction needed to be made between the minority who were to blame for the insurrection and thus deserved punishment and the "immense majority" of the Malagasy who remained "faithful to France and its administration." In particular, it was necessary to guard against "abusive generalizations" placing all responsibility for the revolt on the Merina.

Political action in the insurgent zone, according to the governor general, should be stepped up "to separate the hard-core insurgents from those who have been obliged by force to take up arms." For this political action to succeed in detaching insurgent elements from the rebellion, it was considered necessary to demonstrate beyond doubt the superiority of French military strength. Reoccupation of insurgent territory was to proceed by methods similar to those which had been used half a century earlier:

An increase in the number of mobile columns will permit reduction of the bands who are too fanatical for any hope of submission. At the same time, a growing number of fixed military posts will protect the population. Around these posts, life can return to its normal course. They will be the pivots of an action at once political and military, in that famous progression by the "patch of oil," dear to Gallieni, which will achieve, little by little, a pacification in depth, the re-establishment of order. . . .⁷⁵

Economic efforts were simultaneously to be stepped up for rehabilitation and reconstruction. Paris, indeed, had already made special allocations to Madagascar for the purchase of textiles, coal, and other goods for current consumption. Increased expenditures for reconstruction were to be financed partly by credits from France and partly by a "special temporary" tax on the island itself.⁷⁶

In Paris five days later, Minister Moutet defended this overall strategy before the French National Assembly, concluding that in Madagascar, "maintenance of the French presence appears necessary for the evolution of the population of that country toward material well-being and liberty . . . ultimately, toward the true liberty. . . ."⁷⁷

Military Operations in the Summer of 1947

With the military reinforcements that arrived in the summer of 1947, the French were able to cordon off the east coast insurgent zone on its western boundary along the edge of the forest, skirting the towns of Anjozorobe, Ambositra, and Ambalavao, and to circumscribe it on the north and south. Inside the insurgent zone, they made an intensive effort to restore communications

by sending military detachments to guard important stations along the main rail lines and by dispatching engineering units to repair the numerous bridges damaged by the rebels.

At the beginning of August, the French launched a series of offensive operations into the forested escarpment region to recapture the principal posts held by the rebels and to relieve other posts that had been beleaguered since the start of the insurgency.

The first post in the forest region to be reoccupied was Fort Carnot, south of the rail line from Fianarantsoa to the east coast. Fort Carnot was recaptured by several columns of Foreign Legionnaires, Senegalese riflemen, and Malagasy soldiers, who converged rapidly from north and south, engaged the rebels, and took the post on August 1, less than 48 hours after the operation began. A permanent garrison then was installed to conduct patrol and reconnaissance sweeps through the surrounding area. Farther north, other French units penetrated the forest region to recapture Beparasy and lesser posts in the upper valley of the Mangoro River. On August 7, a company of paratroopers took Anosibé, the site of a key rebel command post, and held it while awaiting the arrival of ground units that had been dispatched from Moramanga and the Mangoro Valley but had been delayed along the way by numerous obstructions and difficulties in terrain. While Anosibé and other strong points in the insurgent zone apparently were occupied without effective resistance, patrols fanning out from these posts frequently were ambushed or attacked by rebel groups, and villages in the vicinity often were burned by the rebels before they withdrew into the depths of the forest.⁷⁸

The most decisive results of the general French offensive during August and September 1947 were obtained in the southern sector of the insurgent zone, where the Tanala and the Antaimoro people were subdued and the Betsileo villages in the plateau were pacified. During this period, the towns along the east coast were reinforced or supplied for the first time with military garrisons, and virtually the entire coastal strip was freed from rebel domination by the action of ground, air, and naval units. In the areas regained from the rebels, masses of villagers and tribesmen "submitted" to French authority: some 30,000 in August, 60,000 in September.⁷⁹

In some villages, French authorities organized special ceremonies to receive mass submissions from the local population. At one such ceremony, held in a Betsimisaraka village near Tamatave on August 7, about 3,500 rebels made their submissions to the commander of the cruiser Duguay-Trouin and the chief administrator of Tamatave. The latter then made a speech in which he recalled the "law of the ancestors" to the effect that in crimes against the government only the guilty chiefs would be punished, and pointedly compared this ancestral law to the governor general's pronouncement that all essentially loyal persons should go back to their ordinary work.⁸⁰

Political Operations During the Rainy Season

By October the rainy season and the tropical heat halted all large operations. For six months French military activities were limited to minor patrol operations and coups de main. Some intensive political work was conducted, however, through the military posts that had been implanted in and around the forest zone. The French were further aided by the difficulties which life in the forest entailed for the mass of rebels and villagers who took refuge there. In November 1947, the French accepted the surrender of 55,000 persons; in December, of 44,000.

Early in 1948 de Coppet was replaced as governor general by Pierre de Chevigné, a centrist deputy in the National Assembly and a former officer. The French government of Robert Schuman commissioned the new governor general to prevent military operations on the island from dragging on indefinitely, to push forward with pacification, and to prescribe appropriate measures for avoiding new outbreaks in the future. In short, his job was to keep Madagascar from becoming "a second Indochina."⁸¹ His military partner in this task was Gen. Pierre Garbay, a seasoned professional commander who had been sent from Dakar.

Resumption of Military Operations Results in Massive Submissions

As the rainy season drew to a close in March 1948, large-scale military operations against the rebels were resumed. By this time the insurgency zone had been truncated by the reopening of axial communications between the plateau and the east coast. With increased forces at their disposal, the French installed more posts inside the various insurgent areas, and from these strong points gradually extended their control outward to expel guerrilla elements and pacify villagers in the area. In these operations, the colonial forces suffered relatively few casualties. During the week of March 25-April 1, 1948, for example, casualties on the French side reportedly amounted to only four killed and four wounded, while the rebels reportedly lost "725 killed, wounded, and taken prisoner."⁸²

Although the French used airplanes to bomb rebel camps during this period, they also leavened military operations with politics. A corps of colonial administrators accompanied the troops to rally villagers to the French side and allay their fear of reprisals by guerrilla elements. New massive "submissions" were thus obtained in the reoccupied areas. Some 30,000 Malagasy returned to French authority in March 1948, 60,000 in April, and 40,000 in May, when the grand total of submissions surpassed the 400,000 mark.⁸³

When Governor General de Chevigné went to Paris on official business at the end of May 1948, he made several public statements defending the pacification methods used in Madagascar. In dealing with the mass of villagers who had been frightened into joining the rebels, he said, the army and civil administration were concerned essentially with "repeopling" (repeuplement) the "liberated" villages and providing the means for people to return to order, health, and peaceful labor. He estimated that about "300,000 refugees in a zone of forests" had yet to be

pacified; of this total, no more than 25,000 were hard-core "terrorists," the rest having been dragged along under duress. The rebels were poorly armed, he pointed out, and had at their disposal only "some knives, hunting rifles, and automatic arms taken from isolated posts at the beginning of the rebellion." In fact, very few Frenchmen were being killed in Madagascar—fewer than 50 over the preceding three months.⁸⁴

Military operations against the rebels gradually narrowed down to intensive patrol work in the most difficult parts of the forest. At the beginning of September 1948, a forest patrol succeeded in capturing Victorien Razafindrabe, the supreme military chief of the rebels who operated in the important Moramanga-Anosibé region.⁸⁵ By the end of that month, French forces had penetrated all sectors of the forest region in pursuit of the last remnants of the rebel bands. The final noteworthy military action was the defeat and capture in November 1948 of a rebel chief known as "Marshal Lakoa," who had in his possession only two automatic arms and a few rifles. Minor military operations continued until the end of the year and were succeeded by some police operations designed to ferret out former guerrillas trying to escape detection by mingling with the local population. A grand total of 560,000 persons (roughly 14 percent of the island's population) had been recorded as "submitting" to French authority by February 1949, when Governor General de Chevigné officially announced the end of the insurgency.⁸⁶

Use of Stringent Measures

Repression of the Malagasy insurgency was not achieved without resort to army reprisals and stringent police methods. Some groups of Malagasy prisoners in Farafangana, Manakara, and Mananjary were apparently executed by "mistake," and summary executions are said to have also occurred in rural areas. The most notorious action of this sort was the alleged murder of an entire trainload of Malagasy prisoners: The train was sent from the Lake Alaotra region by way of Moramanga and arrived in Tananarive with only the soldier-escorts still alive.⁸⁷

The police dragnet at the beginning of the revolt was directed at all potentially dangerous elements, including many persons suspected merely of nationalist views; in certain districts all Merina residents, including property owners, businessmen, and government functionaries, were treated as enemies. Several thousand political suspects were held in prisons or concentration camps for a year or more before being either set free⁸⁸ or tried by the courts.

Politically, the repression culminated in a long series of trials of individuals accused of complicity in the rebellion. Several of the trials were conducted by military tribunals, but the great majority were handled by normal civil courts (tribunaux droit commun). The first important court trial, that of persons accused of preparing the uprising in Fianarantsoa Province, was held in December 1947, and additional trials continued through 1950. The trials had mixed

results: A large number of the defendants were acquitted, while by conservative estimates* 3,000 or more received sentences ranging from 18 months in prison to death.

Trial of the MDRM Leaders

Of all the trials, that of the parliamentary deputies and principal leaders of the MDRM was of greatest political significance and stirred the most controversy in France as well as Madagascar. The trial was conducted before the criminal court of Tananarive from July 22 to October 4, 1948, with leftwing lawyers from Paris representing the deputies and others among the 33 defendants.⁸⁹ Raseta, Ravoahangy, and Rabemananjara were charged with masterminding the rebellion. Their telegram of March 27, urging MDRM units to remain calm, was interpreted by the prosecution as the secret signal for beginning the uprising. Raseta was said to have expressed his agreement by dispatching from Paris a telegram ending with the word "Union." The defense, on the other hand, maintained that the rebellion had been organized exclusively by the two extremist groups, JINA and PANAMA, and had been encouraged by agents provocateurs to give the police an opportunity to destroy the MDRM.

During the trial, the prosecution tried to show that JINA's secret agents recruited local personnel for the rebellion under the direction of MDRM leaders, that plans for the revolt were consummated at the meeting of the MDRM political bureau in Tananarive on March 27, and that the deputies' telegram after the meeting set the revolt in motion. The evidence, however, consisted mostly of admissions extracted under duress from the accused and the witnesses. One of the key witnesses, Samuel Rakotondrabe, the "generalissimo of the rebels" and a leader of JINA, was executed for his part in the revolt just three days before the trial began.⁹⁰ The questionable pretrial procedures and the deputies' repudiation of their admissions to the police have made it virtually impossible for impartial investigators to determine the truth about the origin of the uprising.⁹¹ Despite the welter of conflicting statements, one basic fact appears irrefutable: The top leadership of the MDRM knew of preparations for the revolt when they met on March 27, and they also knew that the preparations had been disclosed to the police. Accordingly, their individual and collective roles in the situation cannot be properly evaluated merely on the basis of their own statements about the March meeting and the telegram of March 27.⁹²

At the end of the trial on October 4, 1948, the court found seventeen of the defendants, including the three deputies, guilty of having directed, organized, and provoked the insurrection. Raseta, Ravoahangy, and four others were condemned to death. Rabemananjara and three

* The exact number of sentences imposed by the judiciary is not known. Estimates range all the way from 3,000 to 10,000; Raymond K. Kent places the total "between 5,000 and 6,000" (From Madagascar to the Malagasy Republic (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 111).

others were sentenced to forced labor for life. Seven received sentences ranging from 5 to 20 years' imprisonment. Sixteen persons were acquitted and released from further prosecution.⁹³

Public opinion in France, stirred by liberals as well as leftwing politicians, saved the six MDRM leaders condemned to death. In July 1949 their death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment by the President of the Fourth Republic, Vincent Auriol. A few years later some amnesties were granted. But the MDRM had been thoroughly broken up and its most forceful leaders reduced to political impotence.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

Undoubtedly the Madagascan insurgency and its repression took a heavy toll in lives and human suffering. The precise number of Malagasy who died as a direct or indirect result of hostilities has never been determined, however, and the incidence of atrocities and reprisals has often been exaggerated. Wide variations are found in available estimates, even in those made by French officials in Madagascar.

Estimates of Casualties Inflicted on Both Sides

At the end of 1948, Governor General de Chevigné and General Garbay estimated the total number of dead or presumed dead at 60,000 to 80,000 persons. In 1950, a new Governor General, Robert Barques, asked each district administration to compile a list of those who perished in the revolt; he reported that these lists showed a total of 11,342 victims. The total broke down as follows: 140 Frenchmen, 2 Indians, 19 Chinese, 2 Syrians, 17 Senegalese, and 1,646 Malagasy killed by insurgent forces; 4,126 Malagasy killed by government forces; and 5,390 Malagasy presumed to have died in the forest from cold, starvation, and illness.⁹⁴

In evaluating these official estimates, it is well to note that the 1948 figures are probably exaggerated, because they were made at a time when many village refugees had not yet left the forest and returned to their homes. The lower (1950) figures may give a more accurate impression of the death toll, but they do not include some 1,000 casualties suffered by the French expeditionary force and the numerous non-fatal casualties suffered by the Malagasy. The 1950 figures underline the fact that Malagasy losses far outnumbered those of the French and other island residents.*

*Deschamps considers the 1950 figures to be authentic, because the district lists were compiled in a systematic and detailed way and because underreporting of deaths would have left village chiefs responsible for paying more head taxes than were necessary. Kent, however, feels that local dignitaries in 1950 "were hardly disposed to spell out the whole truth"; he believes that an estimate of 60,000 is closer to the true death toll than an estimate of 11,000 (Kent, From Madagascar to the Malagasy Republic, p. 97).

Economic Costs and Effects

In the material sphere, too, more Malagasy than French were adversely affected. 8,500 privately owned farms and plantations despoiled or damaged during hostilities; 1,500 belonged to French and Creole settlers. The rest were the property of enterprising Malagasy, whose losses were often due to attacks by their compatriots.⁹⁵

Economically, the disruptive impact of the insurgency accentuated the low level of production and trade. Madagascar's exports in 1950 amounted to only 58 percent of its 1938 total, mainly because of the decline in coffee production in the eastern regions.⁹⁶ Vital imports for current consumption, as well as equipment for reconstruction, had to be financed by credits from metropolitan France.

Indeed, the most positive French response to the insurgency was in the economic field. From 1949 to 1956, French policy was directed primarily toward rehabilitation and expansion of the island's economy. A ten-year development plan for economic modernization, improvement of public health, and expansion of educational facilities had been announced in 1947 on the eve of the insurgency; it was applied with vigor throughout the 1950's. Between 1946 and 1958, Madagascar received more than \$270 million in development aid, an amount representing 12 percent of the total public funds appropriated by the French parliament for development of French overseas territories.⁹⁷

Political Repercussions of the Revolt

Politically, the repression of the insurgency restored French authority in the disaffected areas and left the colonial administration in full control of the island. Although de Cheigné had publicly hinted in the spring of 1948 that it might be possible to "legitimize" national aspirations for autonomy, nothing came of his initiative, and no avenue was opened at that time for negotiating any change in Madagascar's territorial status. French policy in the early 1950's was stated succinctly by the overseas ministry in Paris: "The future of Madagascar lies within the Republic of France."⁹⁸

The breakup of the MDRM and the repression of other parties under imposition of martial law left the Malagasy people politically disoriented and divided after the revolt. In the territorial assemblies, the Malagasy seats were occupied by persons whom the administration favored; and in the French Parliament, the five seats of the convicted MDRM leaders remained vacant until 1951. Police surveillance prevented genuine nationalists from reorganizing until the mid-1950's, but it did not impede the formation of a Communist cadre among young people who had been recruited by the French Communist Party while studying in postwar France.⁹⁹

The disorganization of the local nationalist movement gave the Communist cadre a unique opportunity to take over the leadership of the trade unions and to become the principal spokesman for Malagasy nationalism. Communist infiltration of the trade union movement brought about

40 strikes in Madagascar between 1951 and 1953. Equally important, a "solidarity committee," led by the Communist minority, revived the issue of independence and formulated in 1953 a new cause—amnesty for all persons who had been sentenced for complicity in the revolt.¹⁰⁰

The Communists, however, were not the only champions of political and civil liberties for the Malagasy. Christian missions and a group of liberal Frenchmen led by deputy Roger Duveau became in effect "a countervailing voice of nationalism" during this period.¹⁰¹ Both Roman Catholic and Protestant churches helped to form active anti-Communist trade unions that kept the Communist minority from monopolizing the labor movement. The work of the missions in Madagascar and of Duveau in Paris was instrumental in securing the initial amnesty law of March 1956, which reduced the number of political detainees to about 1,400. A second amnesty law in March 1958 granted full pardon to all the remaining prisoners, but just before it was passed by the French Parliament an amendment was added to keep "the principal leaders of the former MDRM" in exile in France until 1963.¹⁰² Raseta, Ravoahangy, Rabemananjara, and some 200 other individuals were affected by this amendment.

Madagascar Moves Toward Independence

In the end, the main initiatives that revived organized political life in Madagascar and put the country on the road to independence came from outside the island. The loi cadre of June 1956, which abolished the dual electorates, granted universal suffrage, and introduced an executive council responsible to the Representative Assembly, was the handiwork of a Socialist government in Paris. The referendum of September 1958, which produced an autonomous Malagasy Republic associated with France in a new French Community, was part of the broader constitutional changes wrought by President Charles de Gaulle. Both of these initiatives from Paris applied to other French territories as well as to Madagascar, and both were part of France's adjustment to the loss of Indochina, the revolution in Algeria, and the growth of nationalism in tropical French Africa.

In Madagascar's general elections of March 1957, the first conducted on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, 18 different parties emerged and 3 or 4 of them achieved a substantial following. On the paramount issue of independence, the main disagreement was over the question of timing, with the militants pressing for immediate independence and the moderates willing to wait a little longer.

During the September 1958 referendum on the new constitution of the French Community, an important test of political strength took place. The campaign for a negative vote was led by the Ankaton'ny Kongresi'ny Fahaleovantenan Madagasikara (AKFM), a grouping of militant nationalists and Communists formed earlier in the year at an "independence congress" in Tamatave. Prominent among the moderate groups supporting the community constitution was the Social-Democratic Party led by Philibert Tsiranana, a west coast political leader of humble

origin. The referendum produced 1,368,059 "yes" votes against 392,557 "no" votes. In October 1958, Madagascar was proclaimed an autonomous Malagasy Republic, "a member of the Community"; and Tsiranana became president of the provisional government.

When the constitution of the Malagasy Republic was adopted in April 1959, Tsiranana was reaffirmed as president for a seven-year term. His methods of dividing his political opponents left him open to the charge of being a "puppet" of France. But, as one authority pointed out, "Unlike many of those who figured in pre-independence Malagasy politics, Tsiranana grasped the simple fact that political success at that time required the support of France and of the Catholic missions in Madagascar."¹⁰³

In December 1959, President Tsiranana announced his desire to start negotiations for full independence. Six months later, in June 1960, France recognized the Malagasy Republic as an independent and sovereign state. Agreements were signed for bilateral cooperation in defense, economic development, technical aid, and education.

With independence accomplished, the issue of amnesty for the "martyrs" of the 1947 rebellion was quickly closed. Ravoahangy, Rabemananjara, and Raseta were permitted to return from France during July 1960. Both Ravoahangy and Rabemananjara joined the Tsiranana government, the former as minister of health, the latter as minister of the economy. Their presence enhanced the prestige of the new government and broadened its base, but the realities of power remained in other hands. Raseta, the oldest of the three and 74 years old in 1960, joined the opposition upon his return home.¹⁰⁴

In 1960, the Malagasy independence movement had survived the counterinsurgency to triumph under a national government dominated by coastal people who had the cooperation and confidence of French leaders. The political influence of the Merina elite had been diluted by the process of universal suffrage. From the European community, liberal elements had emerged to join the new venture in political partnership.

NOTES

¹ Herbert Luethy, France Against Herself, trans. Eric Mosbacher (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), p. 227.

² Raymond K. Kent, From Madagascar to the Malagasy Republic (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 5-6; Hubert J. Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, 2d ed. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1961), pp. 24-26.

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⁷ Ibid., pp. 264-65.

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⁹ Pierre de Chevigné, "Je Reviens de Madagascar," Les Annales conférence, Nouvelle Série, No. 4 (February 1951), 26.

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¹¹ Kent, From Madagascar to the Malagasy Republic, pp. 91-92.

¹² Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p. 266.

¹³ J. T. Hardyman, "Madagascar Problems," Contemporary Review (December 1947), 360.

¹⁴ "Speech by M. Maurius Moutet Before the French National Assembly, 6 May 1947," in Notes et études documentaires (hereafter referred to as NED), No. 713 (August 29, 1947), p. 20.

¹⁵ "Mémoire en Défense Rédigé par M. Ravoahangy," NED, No. 714 (August 30, 1947), p. 20.

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²³ Kent, From Madagascar to the Malagasy Republic, pp. 93-94, 105-106.

²⁴ See "La Situation Politique de Madagascar," NED, No. 713, pp. 6-7, for election figures used for this analysis.

²⁵ Kent, From Madagascar to the Malagasy Republic, p. 109.

²⁶ "Speech by the Governor-General of Madagascar, 19 April 1947," NED, No. 713, p. 8.

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³³ Chevigné, "Je Reviens de Madagascar," p. 30.

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³⁵ France, Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, Bulletin d'Information, No. 101 (May 19, 1947), p. 31.

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⁴² Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p. 271.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Hatzfeld, Madagascar, p. 93.

⁴⁵ Hardyman, Madagascar on the Move, pp. 165-66.

⁴⁶ Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p. 269; Chevigné, "Je Reviens de Madagascar," p. 31.

⁴⁷ Hardyman, Madagascar on the Move, pp. 164-65.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 166; Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban, p. 59.

⁴⁹ Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p. 270.

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⁵¹ France, Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, Bulletin d'Information, No. 121 (June 15, 1948), p. 17; Chevigné, "Je Reviens de Madagascar," p. 28.

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- ⁸³ Ibid., No. 121 (June 15, 1948), p. 35; Cheigné, "Je Reviens de Madagascar," p. 33.
- ⁸⁴ France, Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, Bulletin d'Information, No. 121 (June 15, 1948), p. 17.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid., No. 124 (October 15, 1948), pp. 30, 37.
- ⁸⁶ Cheigné, "Je Reviens de Madagascar," p. 33.
- ⁸⁷ Hatzfeld, Madagascar, pp. 95-96.
- ⁸⁸ France, Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, Bulletin d'Information, No. 121 (June 15, 1948), p. 36.
- ⁸⁹ The principal source of information on the trial is the book Justice pour les Malgaches, by Pierre Stibbe, the Parisian lawyer who represented Ravoahangy and Raseta. Substantial extracts from the police interrogations of MDRM leaders and some of the rebuttals made by the MDRM deputies, even before the trial, have been published in NED, No. 714.
- ⁹⁰ Stibbe, Justice pour les Malgaches, pp. 48-56, 61-66.
- ⁹¹ Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p. 271.
- ⁹² Kent, From Madagascar to the Malagasy Republic, pp. 108-109.
- ⁹³ Stibbe, Justice pour les Malgaches, pp. 104-106.
- ⁹⁴ Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p. 270.
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- ⁹⁶ Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p. 272.
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- ⁹⁸ Deschamps, Histoire de Madagascar, p. 272.
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- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid.
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Author's Note: The circumstances of the Madagascan insurgency and the French counterinsurgency were complex, confusing, and poorly reported at the time. Most contemporary reports were partisan in outlook or reflected censorship. Subsequent French literature on the subject also tends to be strongly biased or, at best, incomplete. The military aspects of the situation, in particular, have received scant attention from French writers.

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Deschamps, Hubert J. Histoire de Madagascar. 2d ed. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1961. A basic history of the island and its people from their obscure origins up to the present-day Malagasy Republic is given by the leading French scholar in this field, who writes from a liberal viewpoint and makes a careful distinction between hypothesis and fact.

France. Direction de la documentation. Notes et études documentaires (NED), No. 713 (August 29, 1947), No. 714 (August 30, 1947). This is an official collection of speeches, testimony, police confessions, election data, and so forth pertaining to the political situation in Madagascar from 1945 to 1947. These notes are in effect a "white paper" on the insurgency.

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Hardyman, J. T. "Madagascar Problems," Contemporary Review (December 1947), 359-62. The author, a British missionary born in Madagascar and one of only a few non-French eyewitnesses to the revolt, was able to evaluate both the nationalist position and the French colonial policy in a dispassionate way.


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Kent, Raymond K. From Madagascar to the Malagasy Republic. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. This book, the first comprehensive study of modern Madagascar by an American scholar, contains a "profile" of each tribe. The institutions of the Merina state are outlined, with focus on developments since the French conquest of 1895-97. Kent's treatment of the 1947-48 revolt is limited almost entirely to its political and economic aspects, and he places most of the blame on the local French administration in Tananarive. He did not intend to write a definitive study of this episode. Many useful sources of additional information are cited in the author's notes at the end of the book. See also Kent's article, "Madagascar Emerges from Isolation," Africa Report (August 1962), 3-8, 19.

- Mannoni, [Dominique] O. Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization. Trans. Pamela Powesland. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. An interpretation of the Malagasy response to French colonization from the viewpoint of a psychoanalyst. The author advances the thesis that the Malagasy, as they emerged from the security of tribal life, became psychologically dependent on the French for guidance in a strange, new world. Applying this thesis to the 1947 revolt, he contends that the Malagasy were frightened by the freedoms granted after World War II, felt that the French were abandoning them, and revolted because they wanted a reassertion of firm authority.
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- Stratton, Arthur. The Great Red Island. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964. Some useful information on the island's history and people has been assembled in episodic fashion in this volume, but it is permeated to such an extent by the author's own views and imagination that the serious reader will find it difficult to determine where fact leaves off and fancy begins. Stratton acknowledges in his bibliography, "I did what I chose with my facts, or conclusions, or beliefs, or educated guesses."

Chapter Thirteen

PORTUGUESE GUINEA
1959 until 1965



PORTUGUESE GUINEA (1959-1965)

Chapter Thirteen

PORTUGUESE GUINEA (1959 until 1965)

by I. William Zartman

Beset by conflict throughout its African territory, Portugal since 1959 has had to expend valuable energy and resources in a holding operation against nationalist guerrillas in the small country of Portuguese Guinea.

BACKGROUND

Like other African colonial territories, Portuguese Guinea was caught up with the fervor for independence sweeping across Africa in the mid-twentieth century. If independence had not been achieved by Guinea in 1958 and Senegal in 1960, there would most likely have been no insurgency in Portuguese Guinea. This was less the result of any direct aid from these two states than simply the psychological influence of neighboring areas' having transformed the slogan of "independence" into reality. In a larger context, the situation also resulted from a world opinion that put "colonialism" in the company of bad words and "independence" among the good.¹

Slightly larger than Massachusetts and Connecticut combined, this small wedge of Portuguese territory on the coast of West Africa, between the former French colonies of Senegal and Guinea, is a tropical lowland region of mangrove swamps and marshes along the Atlantic, with low foothills in the interior. It is roughly comparable in size and terrain to the coastal region of South Carolina. Fifteen to thirty miles off the coast, which is broken by numerous inlets and estuaries, lies the Bijagos archipelago of about 25 small islands. The country's largest city is Bissau, the chief seaport and capital, with a population of 30,000.

Portuguese Guinea's current population is variously estimated at around 600,000, including more than 2,000 Europeans (0.3 percent) and about 4,500 mulattoes, or *mestiços*. The African population comprises over a dozen ethnic groups, none of which constitutes a majority. The largest group—the Balantes—is located in the north along the coast; the next most populous group—the Manjaks—lives around Bissau. The Fulas (also called Fulanis or Peulhs) are in the eastern interior along the Guinean border, and the Mandingos (also called Malinkés) in the northern interior along the Senegalese border. The Diolas are scattered throughout the northwest, and the Bijagos and Blafadas live on the offshore islands. The Fulas, Mandingos, and

Biafadas are Muslim, and they compose about 40 percent of the population. Europeans and mulattoes are generally Roman Catholic.

Administration of the Overseas Province

At the outbreak of the insurgency in 1959, Portuguese Guinea was officially regarded as an overseas province of Portugal and an integral part of the Portuguese state, which itself had an autocratic form of government headed by Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar. The country was administered by a governor appointed by the Portuguese national cabinet on the proposal of the overseas minister and responsible to him. The governor's four-year term of office was renewable for two-year periods, dismissal to be decided by the national cabinet on proposal of the overseas minister. The governor outranked (and still outranks at the time of this writing) all other personnel, civil or military, in the province. He has legislative as well as executive powers and is the chief administrator of the public treasury. He applies laws passed in Lisbon, and there is no formal local check on his power. He presides over an appointed, advisory government council, which gives him its opinion on those legislative and administrative matters which he submits to it. In 1959, Portuguese Guinea had no elected legislative council. During a state of emergency, the governor could assume any powers held by any other organ of government.²

At the beginning of the insurgency, only 0.3 percent of the Africans in Portuguese Guinea had political rights; these, known until 1961 as assimilados, included only those persons who were able to read and write in Portuguese and who had adopted European cultural customs. Although legally Portuguese citizens, the assimilados were frequently subject to discrimination. Nonassimilated Africans, called indígenas, were governed through a paternalistic but generally harsh system of indirect rule. This system, dating from the 1920's, was the keystone of Portuguese colonial policy until nominally abrogated in September 1961.

The National Union, the official government party, was the only legal political party in Portuguese territory. Open to Europeans and assimilados, it engaged in little activity, except for patronizing slates of candidates in National Assembly elections.

Local administration in Portuguese Guinea was of the type reserved for the underdeveloped regions of Portuguese overseas provinces. Ten administrative districts were subdivided into administrative posts. This direct administrative system was supplemented by a system of indirect rule which utilized the traditional institutions of villages, tribes, and chiefs. Local tribunals retained judgment over native disputes, but special courts tried "social" or "fiscal" crimes and crimes against the state.³

Agriculture, the Backbone of the Economy

Portuguese Guinea, an agricultural country, was basically self-sufficient in food, with its largest export crop, peanuts, making up 50 to 70 percent of its annual exports during the decade of the 1950's. The other main crop is rice of an indigenous African variety that is lower in yield than the Asian crop and is produced almost exclusively for domestic consumption. Both of these commodities are grown by African farmers; seed is distributed by the state during the planting season and is repayable in kind when harvested.

Peanuts are bought by Lebanese merchants and African middlemen and, to an increasing extent, directly by Portuguese trading companies, who gain control of trade by paying cash on delivery in Bissau instead of advancing payment through a middleman, as was done in the past. The minimum legal price of about seven cents per kilo (about two cents less than in neighboring Senegal) has not always been respected. Legal bans on usury are not always enforced either, and storekeepers often charge high interest rates for advancing food to farmers between harvests.

Swampland is being reclaimed by the government for rice fields, and three agricultural extension stations now provide free distribution of higher-yield varieties of palm and fruit trees. Agricultural and veterinary studies predominate in the curriculum of the territory's schools, which are geared to the economic reality that the great majority of Guineans will continue to make their living from the land for the foreseeable future.

Portuguese Guinea possesses some good grazing land, and hides form an important export product. But the country lies in the tsetse fly belt, and cattle-raising suffers from a lack of veterinary assistance against endemic diseases.

Industry and Trade

Industry is meager and is chiefly devoted to primary transformation of agricultural products. There are about a dozen factories in all, for oil extraction, rice hulling, sawmilling, and the making of raw paper paste, soap, and raw rubber. Most semiprocessed raw materials are exported to Portugal for finishing. There are no active mines, and prospecting for oil has been unsuccessful. There are deposits of bauxite in the country, but competition for the market is strong along the entire West African coast.

Trade—both internal and external—is a Portuguese monopoly, carried out mainly through large trading companies, such as the *Fabril Union Company* and the *Overseas Trading Company*, and supported by Portuguese Overseas National Bank, the state bank of issue. Portuguese Guinea's main imports are textiles, food, wine, and machinery; and the balance of trade has been consistently unfavorable. Figures for 1957 showed \$8 million imports and \$6.5 million exports; 1961 figures were \$10.2 million imports and \$7.2 million exports.⁴

The internal budget of the country is roughly in balance, with revenues and expenditures for recent years lying between \$4.3 million in 1956 and \$5 million in 1959. The Guinean share

of two six year national development plans (1953-58 and 1960-65) has been financed by Portuguese loans repayable at four percent. The first loan was for \$2.8 million; a second, for \$6.3 million, was changed to a grant when hopes for oil deposits did not materialize.

Minimum legal wages, applicable only to urban workers, are 50 cents per day; and per capita income is estimated at less than \$50 per year. Salary gaps, however, are smaller than in neighboring territories, since the standard of living for Europeans is also low. The governor, for instance, receives a monthly salary of only \$750.

While the Portuguese have in part succeeded in modernizing the economy of Portuguese Guinea, they have at the same time created conditions which give impetus to insurgency. The rise of commercial agriculture, with the development of export crops such as peanuts and oil palms, has disrupted the traditional social structure. Africans have noted inequities between European and African participation in benefits from the modern economy. In both town and bush, uneven modernization has brought dissatisfaction and social disruption, creating a climate in which urban intellectuals could find support first for their early reform demands and later for the nationalist movement.⁵

Reactions of Europeans and Mestiços to Portuguese Rule

Support for Portuguese rule has come from among the 2,000 Europeans and 4,500 mestiços who have full rights in the country.⁶ The former group has continued to support the regime with almost no defections, but morale has fallen and the feeling appeared to be gaining that the colonial system was "against the forces of history."

Among the mestiços a sharp division has occurred between those who reject and those who continue to support the regime. To some extent, mestiço support of the regime was a consequence of their advantageous economic position—the utilization of their skills as well as the employment benefits they received—and of their scorn for darker "natives." The mestiços, who are the result of intermarriage between Portuguese and Africans, are a testimony to the "racelessness" of one aspect of the Portuguese outlook; but if they are the most economically favored of the Africans, they are still at the bottom of the "civilized" group. Many have come from the Cape Verde Islands* with ancestors and relatives in both Portugal and Guinea; they are thus bound to have strong but conflicting feelings of belonging or allegiance. From this ambiguous background, the nationalist movement has evolved.

* Three hundred miles west of the mainland, the Cape Verde Islands are another overseas province of Portugal. Capeverdeans, largely mestiço, make up the core of the trained civil service in Portuguese Guinea.

African Dissidence Is Largely Unstructured

From the urban and "civilized" population, feelings of dissatisfaction and nationalism have spread to the 500,000 Africans living mainly in the interior. In the face of this growing alienation, some support for Portugal has come from tribal chiefs who owe their importance and power to Portuguese backing, and from other tribal elements. Particularly in the Fula regions of the eastern interior, traditional elders have sought and found support from the Portuguese against their younger nationalist rivals.* Traditional animosity between the intermingled Diola and Manjak peoples in the north has also been reflected in conflicting reactions to Portuguese rule.⁸ Intertribal disputes are thus translated into nationalist-colonialist terms, and sometimes they result in African support for the colonial power. In other instances, tribes which agree in opposing the Portuguese have joined rival nationalist organizations because of tribal differences.

Some tribes have a long tradition of resistance to European penetration. The Portuguese had to conduct military campaigns against coastal groups such as the Bijagos and Balantes as late as the World War I period. These tribes are located in the heavily populated areas of the earliest and deepest Portuguese penetration. Farther east in the interior, where there are fewer Europeans, there tends to be proportionately less antagonism to colonial rule.

During the 1950's, opposition to Portuguese rule grew among the mestiços and urban African populations, specifically among laborers and those who had received some education. In 1952 an unsuccessful effort was made to organize an African political club. In 1954, an African sports and recreation association was formed, but it was repressed by the government because it opened its membership to indígenas as well as to assimilados. In 1955 an attempt was made to create a frankly political Movement for the National Independence of [Portuguese] Guinea (MING), but it failed for lack of support among civil servants and commercial employees in the face of Portuguese opposition. Between 1956 and 1958, urban workers were organized informally to the extent that they carried out strikes for specific labor benefits, but no African labor union was permitted.

Political activity during the 1952-59 period was limited to reform groups who concentrated on demands for better wages and political rights as well as for ending "contract" or forced labor and the Portuguese system of dividing the African population into indígenas and assimilados.⁹ As attempts to organize and strike were put down by the Portuguese, these specific grievances became the basis for the nationalist movement.

INSURGENCY

The Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), which despite its lack of legal status was to become the major insurgent organization, was founded in September 1956.

*A similar situation, also involving the Fulas, occurred in neighboring French Guinea under French rule.

It concentrated its efforts among urban workers and artisans, organizing strikes for specific demands. An important change in tactics followed the "massacre of Pigigulti quay" of August 3, 1959, when a port strike in Bissau was ended bloodily with some 50 deaths. After this event, which marked the beginning of active insurgency, the PAIGC organization turned away from the city and toward the bush, where the Portuguese presence was weaker.¹⁰

Insurgent Phases and Areas of Operation

The insurgency involved a preparation stage, a phase of open guerrilla warfare, including some area control from the very beginning, and, from 1964, what may be considered a regular military phase. Actual fighting broke out during the middle of 1962 and has taken place in most of the heavily populated western half of the country. As of this writing in early 1965, the insurgency is still ongoing.

During the first year, the insurgency was largely contained in a southern area between Bissau and Bafatá on the Geba River and the border with Guinea. During the second year of the insurgency, fighting spread to the Senegal border region between the Cacheu River and the frontier around São Domingos, and in the Oio forest between Mansôa, Farim, and the Cacheu River, while intensifying in the original southern zone around Cacine and Catió.

Insurgent Aims, Strategy, and Tactics

The insurgents' purpose was to obtain total independence from Portugal. Their strategy has been to destroy the military and economic foundation of the Portuguese presence and to wipe out installations that the PAIGC regarded as the symbols and bases of exploitation and socio-economic disruption. Attacks were also launched to capture materiel, especially arms and small craft; and PAIGC claimed to have solved its arms problem with captured Portuguese weapons.

Guerrilla attacks during 1963 and 1964 followed several general patterns. Lines of communication—roads, bridges, and river transportation—were primary targets after the first sabotage attempts in 1962. Portuguese barracks and troop stations were other military objectives. Barracks and towns—such as São João and Fulacunda—were raided and burned, but never permanently occupied. Economic objectives were Portuguese trading posts and cercos (peanut storage bins), and installations of the large trading companies have been frequently hit. Guerrilla activity has thus been directed mainly against Portuguese military forces and commercial installations, although native supporters of the Portuguese have been killed along with Portuguese troops.

Attacks occurred most frequently at night, following classic guerrilla tactics of sudden ambush, after which the attacking force melted away into the forest. Before 1964, few operations ever reached a "military" phase, in the sense of pitched battles rather than guerrilla engagements.

Occasionally, the size of forces involved in an ambush led to prolonged fighting rather than simply a hit-and-run raid, but this was usually by accident rather than by design.

Rebel Intelligence and Propaganda Efforts

To prevent counterattack, warning systems were set up around insurgent villages, so that the rebels' own local population could be notified in time to flee into the bush before Portuguese troops arrived. This system was not always effective, however, since Portuguese sympathizers were also found in some villages.¹¹ According to Portuguese sources, insurgent intelligence made extensive use of the women attached to guerrilla groups: On trips into towns to make purchases, they were supposed to observe and report on Portuguese military movements.¹²

Intensive propaganda efforts by the insurgents to encourage desertion by Portuguese soldiers and officers have allegedly achieved some success.¹³ Word-of-mouth propaganda and written tracts have been used to win over the native population and to spread the idea that PAIGC is the wave of the future, while Portugal is on the way out. Any talk of discouragement among the small Portuguese population is inevitably overheard in the towns, and this supports the insurgents' propaganda effort. Continuing attempts are also made to organize the native population—politically, into the PAIGC's territorial units, and functionally, to give food, shelter, and information to the guerrillas.

Military Organization and Strength

Little is known of the military organization of the insurgents. According to Portuguese press reports, the insurgents were organized at the beginning of 1964 into not more than eight groups, each consisting of 300 to 500 men, thus indicating a force of between 2,400 and 4,000 guerrillas. Although fighters have sometimes been pictured in uniforms suitable for a cold climate, they usually do not wear any kind of uniform and are therefore not identifiable by Portuguese troops.¹⁴ Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to distinguish party members from guerrillas, guerrillas from supporters, and supporters from the civilian population at large, since all four groups overlap. Despite the estimated size of the guerrilla groups, operations involving more than a hundred men on both sides were rare, and armed bands operated under decentralized control. In April 1964, however, the PAIGC announced that its guerrillas would be reorganized into "revolutionary armed forces of the people" under a centralized command.¹⁵ Along with the new organization, a change of tactics was envisaged, from guerrilla warfare to regular military operations.

PAIGC Organisation for Underground Political Activity

As politically organized in 1962, the top of the PAIGC party pyramid was the 30-member central committee, headed by a president (Raphael Barbosa) and comprising seven departments for

political and external affairs, control, organization and internal affairs, defense and security, economy and finance, information and propaganda, and social and cultural.¹⁶ The secretary of the political and external affairs department, Amílcar Cabral—a Capeverdean agronomist—was secretary general of the party and its active leader. Under the central committee there was to be a nine-man national committee for each of the two territories—Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands; however, by early 1965, only the Guinean national committee had been constituted. The highest assemblies of the party have been the national conference and the party congress; six conferences have been held; the one held in February 1964 was also called the first party congress. The subordinate territorial units select the conference delegates who in turn choose party congress members.¹⁷

The basic unit of the party was the group or party cell, organized on the basis of common occupation or residence, and often consisting in fact of an extended family unit. Theoretically, five groups made up a section, and varying numbers of sections made up a zone. Portuguese Guinea was divided into six administrative regions, each subdivided into thirteen zones. Each territorial unit—group, section, zone, and region—was ruled by a local committee and a periodic conference. Under clandestine conditions current at the time of this writing, however, there seems to be some trouble in maintaining security and secrecy in the conferences; thus any effective organizational control on each of the four levels is maintained by the elected party committee. Although it is certain that the neat hierarchies provided for in the PAIGC's 1962 statutes, as described above, have not always been respected, it appears that the strongest parts of the organizational structure lie at the highest and lowest levels.

There has been no attempt to create a government-in-exile, but the insurgents announced in 1963 that they intended to establish "a new economic, political, and judicial structure—a new state to replace the colonial state—in the liberated regions."¹⁸ The external seat of the PAIGC is in Conakry, with external bureaus located in Dakar, Algiers, Rabat, and Accra. Training and supply bases are located within the country, in the Oio forest, on Como island, and elsewhere.

PAIGC's Internal Support Base

In the beginning, the PAIGC may have been most popular among the Balantes, the country's largest tribal group of nearly 200,000 Africans, as well as among the mestiços, including Capeverdeans, who tended to dominate the organization. Insurgent activity spread far beyond the Balante area, but by 1965 it had not yet extended into the eastern and more sparsely populated areas. Insurgent activity appeared increasingly to be independent of tribal connections, if indeed it ever was tribally based. This is not to say that tribalism was dead or that all tribes supported PAIGC; some insurgent operations, for example, have been directed against the Fulas and others.¹⁹

The PAIGC's operations and membership gave it the best claim for being the most significant nationalist movement in Portuguese Guinea. Relations with other nationalist groups tended to be hostile, as each group claimed to be the exclusive representative of the nationalist movement or, alternatively, an indispensable segment of the movement that must be taken into account in any unification effort. Within this contradictory atmosphere of hostility and unity, some attempts at political coordination were made.²⁰

A stillborn attempt to unify the PAIGC and the Union des Populations de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (UPG), led by Henri Labery, a Capeverdean in Dakar, took place in that city in July 1961 under the name of the Front Uni de Libération de Guinée et du Cap Vert (FUL). More successful was a later organization, the Front pour la Libération et l'Indépendance Nationale de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (FLING), which brought together the UPG, the Mouvement de Libération de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (MLG), led by Henri and François Mendy of Senegal, and the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain de Guinée (RDAG), led by Doudou Seydi and Cheik Mané of Senegal. In November 1963 FLING was reported to have been reconstituted, bringing into membership the moderate Union des Ressortissants de la Guinée Portugaise (URGP), or Union of Nationals of Portuguese Guinea, led by Benjamin Pinto-Bull, a Capeverdean in Dakar. FLING continues to exist on paper, but, since none of these groups represented much more than a few Senegalese leaders with Guinean tribal connections (MLG with the Manjaks and RDAG with the Malinkés), FLING did little more than issue communiqués.

PAIGC's Relationship With MLG

Since there has been little guerrilla action by groups other than the PAIGC, there has been little chance for military cooperation. However, there appeared to be a relationship—possibly only circumstantial—between PAIGC politics and the only two attacks conducted by another group, the MLG. The collaboration between PAIGC and UPG in forming FUL in July 1961 was immediately followed by an MLG attack across the Senegalese border into Portuguese Guinea. A Portuguese counterattack on Senegalese territory led in turn to the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Portugal by Senegal, the first African state to do so.²¹

The second MLG attack on Portuguese Guinea, in April 1963, was followed by the opening of a new theater of operations by the PAIGC in northern Portuguese Guinea, along the Senegalese border. PAIGC supporters had been told to lie low in the region until this time, and they may have been incited to violence by the MLG attack.²²

The MLG drew its support almost entirely from the Manjak tribe on both sides of the Senegalese border. It claimed support among other tribes, but probably has only scattered members.²³ Its role in the military insurgency has been limited to a few local clashes between its Manjaks and the local Diolas, some of whom were organized by PAIGC. It has little support inside Portuguese Guinea.

Importance of External Aid to the Insurgents

External aid has had the effect of keeping the insurgency alive, primarily by means of supplies of small arms and secondarily through the military sanctuary and haven for PAIGC leadership provided by the neighboring states, Guinea and Senegal. In the case of the splinter movements, including the MLG, sanctuary was everything, for the groups had little support and carried out little activity inside Portuguese Guinea. In the case of PAIGC, sanctuary and haven meant arms, offices for organization, and bases from which to carry out diplomatic operations to influence world opinion.

There is no way to measure the value of diplomatic support as against such material assets as arms or financial aid, but it is safe to say that the African states' propaganda campaign carried on by diplomatic means against Portugal has been of great advantage to the insurgents. Without it the insurgency would have been subject to demoralization, condemnation by world public opinion, and a more vigorous riposte from Portugal; furthermore, it kept hope and faith alive among the insurgents. Thus the diplomatic aspect of external aid, although intangible, may have been more effective than its few concrete victories might suggest.

Collective African Diplomatic Support

African aid to the insurgents of Portuguese Guinea has been given individually by single nations and collectively. It was, for example, at the second All African Peoples Conference, held in January 1960 at Tunis, that the PAIGC joined the Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola (MPLA), led by Mario de Andrade, to form the Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional (FRAIN). In Casablanca in April 1961, this organization was enlarged to include nationalist movements from other Portuguese territories and became the Conferência de Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas (CONCP), with coordinating headquarters in Rabat.²⁴

Three African interstate groups—the Casablanca Group, the African and Malagasy Union, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—have given diplomatic support to the PAIGC, and their members in the United Nations (U.N.) have sponsored measures, such as boycotts of Portuguese goods, in order to exert pressure for the rebel cause. In 1963, the OAU voted \$700,000 to assist the various insurgent movements in Portugal's African colonies.

Support From the African States of Guinea and Senegal

Aid from Guinea to the insurgents began in 1959, soon after that country gained independence from France. The external seat of the PAIGC was set up in the Guinean capital of Conakry following the already mentioned "massacre of Pigigulti quay."²⁵ Guinea's aid in the form of sanctuary led the insurgents to concentrate their efforts in the southern portion of Portuguese Guinea near the Guinean border during the early stages. Arms supply routes run from Conakry across

the border into the Portuguese Guinea interior. A rest and indoctrination center was known to exist outside Conakry. Guerrillas have received training in Guinea, ranging from political and military instruction to political and labor courses in the Guinean "workers' university" in Conakry. Guinea has given financial aid and has beamed radio propaganda across the border to Portuguese Guinea since 1959 in support of PAIGC.

Guinea has given active diplomatic support to the PAIGC through the OAU, United Nations, and Casablanca Group. In an investigation of the Portuguese Guinean problem held by the U.N. in 1962 and by the OAU in 1963,²⁶ the Guinean chairman of the subcommission in each case facilitated the PAIGC's presentation of its case. Guinea is also a member of the OAU liberation coordination committee of nine.

Senegal's position has been equivocal. Senegalese contacts with Portuguese Guineans and Capeverdeans antedated World War II, but Senegal could not proffer aid until it achieved independence in 1960. Both the PAIGC and MLG had bureaus in Dakar, but the MLG took great advantage of this opportunity than did the PAIGC. At the OAU foreign ministers' conference in Dakar in August 1963, Senegal threw heavy diplomatic support behind FLING, of which the MLG was a part, effectively blocking OAU approval of the PAIGC as the sole representative of the nationalist movement in Portuguese Guinea.²⁷ Senegal is also a member of the OAU's liberation committee and special investigatory committee. Portuguese Guineans and Capeverdeans living in Dakar received scholarships and education in Senegalese schools and at the University of Dakar. Some medical care was given to wounded insurgents in Senegalese hospitals. The insurgents also received press support through the Senegalese government's newspaper, L'Unité Africaine, and through Radio Senegal. The leaders of many Portuguese Guinea nationalist splinter groups were Senegalese citizens who had jobs in Senegal.

Support From Morocco, Algeria, and Ghana

Moroccan aid probably began about 1961. Significant events were the founding of the Casablanca Group in January 1961; the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) in Casablanca in April 1961; and the establishment in June 1961 of a Moroccan ministry for African affairs, through which aid to the insurgency is coordinated. The Moroccan army has given training to guerrillas, and Morocco has given both financial aid and important quantities of arms. Office space has been provided in Rabat for the PAIGC bureau and CONCP offices, and diplomatic support for PAIGC has also come from Morocco in the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Casablanca Group.

Algeria became an important source of arms after the end of the Algerian war, principally through the shipment of war surplus; it has also been a source of financial aid. Radio Algiers propagandized the insurgent's cause, and support was given through the Algerian press, particularly

Révolution Africaine, which was read throughout much of the continent. In the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Casablanca Group, Algeria has given diplomatic support to PAIGC against rival groups; it was a member of the OAU special investigating committee and liberation coordination committee. Algerian aid is coordinated through the offices of the president and the foreign ministry.

Ghana also gave diplomatic support to PAIGC through the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Casablanca Group, and has granted arms and financial aid in small quantities. A PAIGC bureau was located in Accra; money, aid, and accommodations are being handled by the Ghanaian African affairs bureau. Ghana's press and radio have given heavy propaganda support to the insurgents.

External aid from African sources has aroused little international reaction. Guinea and Senegal have been very careful to keep their aid limited and to avoid condoning direct guerrilla incursions from their soil, lest the Portuguese use the doctrine of "hot pursuit" to ravage such territory—the Tunisian experience in the Algerian war was a vivid lesson. As a result of this policy, Senegal was even able to have Portugal condemned by the United Nations Security Council on one occasion when it bombed the Senegalese village of Bouniak on April 8, 1963, following an MLG raid. The solidarity between newly independent African governments and aspiring independence movements in Africa has been more or less accepted throughout the world.

Aid From Communist Countries

There was more international concern, especially in the West, over Communist aid. The U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and possibly China have contributed important quantities of arms and given training, including education in Soviet schools, as well as guerrilla and political instruction. In Guinea's "labor university," Communist-bloc instructors also appear to have taught insurgents. There are no reliable reports of any foreign personnel operating with the guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea.

As far as can be determined, Communist influence has been ancillary to nationalism and did not, in any case, initiate the insurgency. Mestiços and modernized Africans, especially the assimilados, have had occasion to contact members of the illegal, clandestine Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) when in Portugal for schooling, training, or work. Insurgency leaders have also been in contact with nationalist leaders from Angola and Mozambique who are themselves influenced by Communists, whether Portuguese or other nationalities. Thus, although indirect contacts exist and have grown since the outbreak of the insurgency, the insurgency is a product of local conditions.

Portugal has emphasized the Communist aspect of the fight in the United Nations, but since the extent of Communist infiltration into the movement is not known, Western governments have

limited their reaction to careful watching. It is by no means proved that arms aid has won for the bloc countries any permanent advantage among the insurgents.

PAIGC's Attempts To Negotiate and Its Plans for the Future

Although the PAIGC has felt since 1961 that only military pressure can bring about its goal, it has nonetheless almost continuously called for negotiations with Portugal. Both before the United Nations in December 1962 and before the African and Malagasy Union (UAM) meeting in Ouagadougou in March 1963, Amilcar Cabral promised immediate cessation "of all action on the part of the Nationalists" if such negotiations were begun.²⁸ He has asked the United Nations, the African and Malagasy Union, and the Organization of African Unity at Addis Ababa in May and at Dakar in August 1963 to arrange contacts with Portugal and at the same time to give effective material and diplomatic aid. In the absence of direct negotiations with Lisbon, the insurgents plan to continue guerrilla activity until the Portuguese are reduced to isolated, beleaguered communities within the country.

PAIGC has announced that if independence is won it plans to adopt a foreign policy based on African unity and characterized by nonalignment with non-African power blocs.²⁹ To avoid the problem of the "two Congos," PAIGC leaders have chosen the name of Kinara (sometimes seen as Ginala in Portuguese), the name of an ancient kingdom, to be the future name of the country. In its domestic program, the party emphasizes the agricultural nature of the country and foresees agrarian reform and the conversion of the single-crop export economy of peanuts to more balanced farming, including an increase in rice production. The public sector of the economy is to be extensive, covering "the principal means of production, communications, and social security," as well as education and culture. There is also to be a voluntary cooperative sector for crafts, agriculture, and the production of consumption goods. Private enterprise will be judged according to its "usefulness to the rapid economic development" of the country, and remaining personal property will be protected. Measures have been envisaged for the extension of social progress and equality and for the protection of basic human rights. Nevertheless, PAIGC plans for the future indicate that persons who favor "colonialism, imperialism or disunity" or who oppose "popular liberty and national independence" will be deprived of property and civil rights.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Portugal's counterinsurgent strategy in this small West African colony evolved in reaction to the escalation of insurgent activity. As the nationalist movement gained momentum, the Portuguese turned from police measures to military operations. Later, the Salazar government instituted political reforms which appeared to have been taken in response to the growth of African nationalism throughout Portugal's African possessions, especially in Angola, which was

in open revolt after 1961. Since Portugal's energies were so fully engaged in Angola, its military effort in Guinea was essentially defensive, although there were several military offensives against guerrilla-held areas.³⁰

Portugal's initial response to the nationalist insurgency was to use police repression. After a number of strikes had taken place, a branch of the Portuguese political police, the *Poliçia Internacional de Defesa de Estado* (PIDE), was set up in Portuguese Guinea in 1957. The Bissau port strike was ended by police action in August 1959, and the first large wave of arrests began in April 1960. Demonstrations in the cities were promptly broken up through the use of police and security forces. After 1959, there were no successful strikes. A 9 o'clock curfew was imposed in the principal towns, but this has been lifted from time to time.³¹

The Security Forces: Strength and Training

Counterinsurgency forces consisted of metropolitan and overseas units of the Portuguese army, Portuguese marines (*fusileiros*), and local police, in addition to the special political police (PIDE). Portuguese troops have been reinforced continually since the main guerrilla offensive began in 1962. European soldiers in the Portuguese army are reported to have numbered 4,000 in 1961, 8,000 in 1962, and 10,000 in 1963, but these figures are probably inflated. More likely figures would seem to be about 6,000 Portuguese troops in 1962 and perhaps 8,000 in 1964.³² Before 1962, there were 2,500 African soldiers in the Portuguese army and 300 in the local police force under Portuguese officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO's).³³ Since then, counterinsurgency operations have been carried out mainly by European troops.

Portuguese troops include both career soldiers and draftees; all Portuguese males are subject to the draft. Although some troops may have received special training for counterinsurgency activity, many draftees were apparently sent to Portuguese Guinea after only eight weeks of basic training.

Logistical Operations and the Use of Air Power

Although the combat zone was small, the terrain is unfavorable for logistical operations. Field units were supplied from military supply posts located in inland villages, with basic supply routes running by land and sea out from Bissau. Even though armed convoys were used, these supply routes were vulnerable to interdiction by insurgents.

Airplanes have been used both for supply and for tactical bombing and strafing missions. Air reconnaissance has been generally disappointing in its results. The Portuguese have called air strikes in reprisal against villages suspected of harboring insurgents, particularly when troop convoys in the area have been subjected to rebel ambush. It has been possible to supply many military outposts in the interior only by airlift, and there have been instances in which government aircraft have been shot down by small arms fire.³⁴

Military Tactics and Operations

For the most part, military field tactics consisted of sending either small companies of about 60 men or larger units into the bush to comb it for insurgent bands. Troops were transported along land or water routes, divided into groups, and instructed to converge on a target point. Suspected villages were often burned. Operations were generally carried on during daylight hours, when they were less dangerous but also less effective. Encounters occurred for the most part only when Portuguese patrols fell into insurgent ambushes. Villages were burned—Portugal has been charged with the use of napalm—in reprisal for ambushes. Field operations made use of water transportation, since the country is honeycombed with waterways, but small craft were good targets from concealed shore positions, and some have been captured by the insurgents. No reliable casualty estimates are available.

Portuguese attempts to regain territory lost to the insurgents have met with little success. By February 1963, the PAIGC had completed its control over Como Island and turned it into a training, rest, and supply base; in an attempt to recapture the island, in January 1964, Portugal launched a major offensive using up to 3,000 troops. Despite a full-scale campaign lasting 75 days, Portuguese troops failed to regain the island. A similar and equally unsuccessful attack was reportedly launched against the insurgents' base area in the forest of Oio in April 1964. In both of these attacks, the Portuguese hoped to take advantage of the dry season to wipe out guerrilla nests.³⁵

Attempts To Defend Settlers and To Gain Intelligence

European women and children within insurgent areas have been evacuated to the fortified towns and from the interior to the coast.³⁶ There did not seem to be any attempt to increase European settlement in an effort to occupy the country and bolster paramilitary forces, as was done in the Portuguese colonies of southern Africa. In addition to evacuation measures, crude defenses were established around the Portuguese sections of inland towns. In Catió and Enxale, for example, the dozen or so tin-roofed Portuguese houses were surrounded by barbed wire, earthworks, and sometimes pillboxes; the periphery of the towns was floodlit and patrolled at night. No one was allowed out of town at night, and civilians who left town during the daytime carried sidearms.

Little is known of Portuguese intelligence and counterintelligence operations. Information networks based on Portuguese sympathizers were used in the interior, but in general the Portuguese appeared to have less information about the insurgents than vice versa. Captured insurgents have been interrogated and perhaps also tortured in an effort to gain information.

Psychological Operations and Civic Action

Portuguese efforts at psychological warfare have met with varying degrees of success. African support of the Portuguese has come from various groups and tribes, notably the Fula, an eastern tribal group that has cooperated quite consistently with the Portuguese.³⁷ Effective use of the printed word has been limited by high illiteracy rates and general lack of public confidence in the government's official statements and commentaries. Government information media have in some cases succeeded in encouraging insurgents to defect, by carrying offers of pardon to guerrillas in the interior.³⁸ Penitent prisoners have been rewarded with high-paying jobs as civilian construction workers, but most efforts at prisoner rehabilitation have occurred in jail. There has been no known offer of general amnesty during the insurgency.

Because of their budgetary inability to carry out a broad program of social welfare, the Portuguese have concentrated their civic action efforts in operational areas; army doctors, for instance, devote much of their own time to helping local people. There has been no native resettlement program, and there have not been enough insurgents captured to warrant a general rehabilitation program. The PAIGC has repeatedly charged Portugal with the use of torture and brutal killings, and also with the maintenance of a concentration and forced labor camp on Galinhau Island.³⁹

Programs of Social and Political Reform

Positive social and political reforms have also been undertaken by the Portuguese in an attempt to restore harmony in their realm. The assimilado system was abolished by the reforms of 1961-62; thus all inhabitants of Portuguese Guinea were presumably placed on an equal footing under Portuguese law. The legal status of indígena and its accompanying head tax were also abolished, along with forced labor laws. However, the effect of these changes has not appeared to be very great. Some "public labor" or even "private labor" still persisted, although it is less widespread than before; other personal taxes replaced the head tax.

Critics of Portuguese policies claimed that the proclamation of equality on paper had little meaning in the absence of greater economic and educational opportunities and that the reform measures, as much as any other measures, were imposed by a foreign authority.⁴⁰ In this view, the extension of Portuguese citizenship to all inhabitants of Portuguese Guinea would have meaning only if effective legislative bodies were created, to be elected by the entire population, and if a vigorous political, social and economic educational campaign were carried out prior to the vote.

Political reforms have also been instituted. New colonial statutes were drawn up in 1961-62 and promulgated in June 1963 to liberalize the political regime of all the overseas territories, including Portuguese Guinea.⁴¹ Pursuant to the Organic Law of 1963, a partially elected legislative council was authorized. On the local level, municipal committees and parish and local boards were established. The new organic law, which was indefinite on the powers of these bodies,

provided for transitional conditions which left effective power in the hands of appointed officials. Laws passed by the council were subject to approval of the Portuguese overseas minister in Lisbon. Elections for the legislative council were held in March 1964, and the first council session opened in April. Voter registration requirements were so rigorous, however, that only a small percentage of the population could vote.⁴² In any case, there was little or no indication that these reforms achieved appreciable positive effects.

By mid-1962, Portugal had also permitted the creation of the moderate nationalist party, the URGP or Union of Nationals of Portuguese Guinea, under the leadership of Benjamin Pinto-Bull, brother of the secretary general of the province. The Portuguese encouraged the URGP and allowed it to present its case for reforms, following which it was immediately criticized by other nationalist groups as "neo-colonialist." According to African reports, the URGP was eventually frustrated by Portuguese intransigence and, tired of impotent moderation, merged with FLING by the end of the year.⁴³

Reactions in Portugal

Public opinion in metropolitan Portugal generally supported the government's suppression of the insurgency, for the territory of Portuguese Guinea has been considered an integral part of Portugal and the insurgents as tools or agents of communism. Portuguese declarations and propaganda, however, have paid much less attention to Portuguese Guinea than to Angola and Mozambique, and many Portuguese were probably largely ignorant of the situation, possibly even of the existence of Portuguese Guinea. Relatively few Portuguese troops were involved, and the economic damage suffered by private investors in Portugal was fairly small and affected few people; thus there were few ways in which the insurgency touched the daily lives of the Portuguese people.

Still, the problem must also be seen in the context of the Salazar regime's general political position.⁴⁴ Instead of retiring in 1958, as had been predicted, Salazar strengthened his hand in order to counter growing opposition. He consolidated his own political position at home, directed popular dissatisfaction against foreign scapegoats, and hardened his counterinsurgency policies in Africa. In June 1964, for example, the post of governor of Portuguese Guinea was combined with that of the military commander in chief. At the same time, Salazar encouraged ostensibly liberal reforms in the colonies, and there were persistent semiofficial rumors of greater liberalization.

International Reactions to Portuguese Policies

Portugal's colonial policies have aroused a variety of international reactions.⁴⁵ Communist-bloc countries loudly condemned Portugal's attempt to maintain its colonial rule in Portuguese Guinea. Spain has given consistent support to Portugal in the United Nations; France, Belgium,

and Great Britain have given partial support. The United States, Britain, and France have at times expressed concern for the violence in the Portuguese colonies, and in April 1963 the U.N. Security Council unanimously voted to condemn Portugal in the Bouniak incident. At the same time, however, Western states have been reluctant to support what they sometimes view as empty and self-righteous resolutions presented by the African states in the United Nations. Western votes for these resolutions have more often reflected an intention to appease the Africans than to condemn the Portuguese.⁴⁶

The United States in particular has sought through its diplomatic offices to influence Portugal to liberalize its African policy. As a member of NATO, Portugal has received some American military assistance: \$17 million in 1960 and \$7.8 million in 1962.⁴⁷ The NATO airbase in the Azores, of great strategic importance as a transportation link between the United States and Europe, has undeniably influenced the United States to continue its aid and perhaps tempered U.S. reactions to Portugal's colonial policy.

Attitudes in Latin American countries have varied. PAIGC officials have cited Brazil and Venezuela as areas where there has been some unofficial support for the nationalist movement, revolving around Salazar opponents in exile there. Through 1963, however, Brazil and the Dominican Republic supported Portugal in the United Nations on matters concerning Portuguese Africa, whereas all other Latin American states have rather consistently voted against her.

Although African countries have generally condemned Portuguese colonial policy, only Portuguese Guinea's immediate neighbors and radical African nationalists have shown much interest in this particular Portuguese colony. African reactions have been based on both moral and political grounds; they have protested the limitation on indigenous African rights and sought to promote solidarity among all African nationalist and independence movements. Portuguese attempts to suppress insurgency in Portuguese Guinea have been supported in Africa only by the white governments of Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, two countries also under diplomatic attack for similar policies.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

It is difficult to draw a constructive lesson from this Portuguese experience. Counterinsurgency measures in Portuguese Guinea have from time to time reduced the number of insurgents, but they had not, as of early 1965, destroyed the insurgency.

Portuguese military measures have been and probably can for a long time continue to be effective in holding the urban areas where European families are concentrated. In many areas, however, Portugal has apparently lost control. Military measures may be able to contain de facto partition of the country, but military action alone seems unlikely to get at the roots of the insurgency.

The basic failure of colonial rule was the failure to create the multiracial egalitarian society which Portugal proclaimed as its own goal. Social and political discrimination (on the basis of culture, not race) meant government by the few who had political rights—the Europeans and assimilados—but even this limited participation of the assimilados pointed toward an eventual goal of self-government by the Africans. Political equality and, even more so, equal opportunity for African and European populations alike to enjoy the benefits of modernization might have created an egalitarian society that would have made Portugal and its African provinces a socio-economic unit. But this apparently was and still is beyond Portugal's intentions and possibly also beyond its financial means.

Such sociopolitical reforms as have been instituted appear to have come too late. If such measures as permission to form the URGP, abolition of the "indigenous" category, and the ending of forced labor had been applied before the outbreak of insurgency, the nationalist surge might have been headed off. Since then, though possibly even at that earlier point, they have served only to vindicate recourse to violence.

Through control of administration, the Portuguese had organizational as well as military superiority; to preserve this ascendancy, they banned budding nationalist clubs. However, they have been unable to infiltrate, control, or destroy the insurgent organizations, in spite of the country's small population and the limited number of political leaders.

The conflict has destroyed villages, reduced rice and peanut trade, slowed down general commercial activity, and blocked and destroyed transportation and communications routes. Europeans have been forced to withdraw from some areas in the interior; and in the cities, although official optimism remains high, discouragement is a creeping disease of Europeans and mestiços alike. The insurgency has meant a severe economic drain for no visible advantage, at a time when Portugal can ill afford it.

One political effect has been the growth of awareness, enthusiasm, and organization among the generally unsophisticated African population. The PAIGC lists 15 consequences of the "national liberation struggle" which it considers important. Summarized, these include development of national consciousness among Africans, weakening of colonial morale and of the Portuguese economy, drawing of world attention to the situation in Portuguese Guinea, and forcing of a number of limited reforms short of independence.⁴⁸

In addition to political consequences in Portuguese Guinea, the prolongation of the insurgency and counterinsurgency has resulted in a growing concern on the part of the Western world. On the one hand, it is feared that continuation of the insurgency will give an opportunity for Communist penetration, if only because of insurgent gratitude for Communist arms aid. At the same time, pressure on the United States to reduce its support to Portugal has resulted in growing tensions within NATO.

Portuguese counterinsurgency must fight the pressure of world events and African nationalism in particular. Not only did the independence of surrounding territories put Portuguese

colonialism on the defensive and create conditions psychologically favorable to the insurgency, but it also provided the insurgents with sanctuary and supply from neighboring Guinea and Senegal. In the author's opinion, the political climate is beyond Portugal's power to control; the best it can do is to hold on in the hope of a reversal of present attitudes. Meanwhile, militarily, Portugal has failed to seal the borders with the two newly independent African nations.

Possible Outcomes Viewed and Weighed

With the insurgency continuing, the question may be posited as to what the outcome might be. It can be argued that Portugal will hang on to Portuguese Guinea indefinitely, even at considerable physical and economic expense, in order to prevent psychological and political deterioration either in Portugal or Africa. Although Portugal may be able to consolidate her colonial rule, this appears highly improbable at the moment of this writing. How, then, might independence be attained?⁴⁸

First, with great effort, the Portuguese army could be defeated militarily and the Europeans pushed to the sea. Practically, this is possible only if such heavy demands should be placed on the army by insurgency elsewhere in Africa that manpower could not be spared for Portuguese Guinea. Supplied by sea, the army could well hold on to the port cities under present conditions, but Portuguese troops would be required in tremendous strength to hold the interior or to meet any possible spread of the insurgency.

A second possibility, abandonment by Portugal, seems more likely as pressures rise in Angola and Mozambique. However, it is hard to conceive of a simple Portuguese withdrawal, without some face-saving political transition. This transition might take the form of liberalization, although it would have to be understood in African terms as "liberalization-to-release" rather than "liberalization-to-hold." Africans feel it is too late to be satisfied with greater participation in a government that would maintain the Portuguese presence. Mesticos and assimilados might be called to rule Portuguese Guinea and possibly even to hold elections, thus paving the way for a request for independence, perhaps via a transitional federation. The appointment of James Pinto-Bull, brother of URGP leader Benjamin Pinto-Bull, as secretary general may be a first step in this direction. In such a case, Portugal might demand heavy Western aid and psychological reinforcement as compensation.

Another path to independence for Portuguese Guinea might come through change in metropolitan Portugal's regime. Paradoxically, the government is threatened, whatever its decision with regard to counterinsurgency in Africa. Public confidence in the regime would be deeply shaken by the loss of any of Portugal's overseas possessions, and Portuguese Guinea is psychologically important in the greater scheme of Portuguese Africa. At the same time, futile continuation of the counterinsurgency may also increase internal dissatisfactions in Portugal. Any change in the present Portuguese government, however, might of itself lead to the release of the colonies.

NOTES

¹Much of the information for this article was gathered in interviews with three men associated with the insurgents—Amilcar Cabral, in Conakry in October-November 1962; Arraujo, in Dakar in May 1963; and Aquino Bragança, in Algiers in August 1963 and with Portuguese Consul Ferrero, in Dakar in May 1963; Portuguese Embassy Secretary Luis Navega, in December 1963; and Portuguese Military Attaché Col. Pinto-Bessa, in December 1963. Some of this interview material was previously published in the author's article, "Africa's Quiet War: Portuguese Guinea," Africa Report, IX (February 1964), 8-12. In the present study, specific source reference will be made to the interviews or to the previous article only when necessary.

²Organic Law of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces (Lisbon: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1963), chapters I, II, IV (secs. I, III).

³For a detailed, if critical, report of the government situation, see Le Peuple de la Guinée "Portuguesa" devant l'ONU (PAIGC, mimeographed, n.d. [ca. 1961]), pp. 6-25.

⁴The first national development plan loan, covering six years, was therefore less than the trade deficit for the single year of 1961.

⁵In addition to general sources, see Le Peuple de la Guinée, pp. 30-50. For a brief review, see "Africa, a Country-by-Country Situation Report," Africa Report (Washington), VIII (November 1963), 35.

⁶Figures from the 1950 census. The official 1959 population estimate was 568,000, and 1964 estimates vary from 600,000 to 700,000.

⁷A perceptive series of articles on the military and political situation appeared in The New York Times, August 30, September 1 and 2, 1963. See also David Hapgood, Bulletin "DH-7" of March 30, 1962 (New York: Institute of Current World Affairs, 1962).

⁸Interview with Professor L. V. Thomas, University of Dakar, May 1963.

⁹Le Peuple de la Guinée, pp. 56-64. See also the series of mimeographed reports submitted by the PAIGC before the Afro-Asian Jurists Conference, Conakry, October 15-22, 1962: "L'Émigration et le travail forcé," "La Situation politique," "Partis politiques et syndicats," "La Lutte de libération nationale," "Situation judiciaire," and "Notre peuple, le gouvernement portugais, et l'ONU."

¹⁰Information on the details of the insurgency is drawn largely from the periodic mimeographed communiqués of the PAIGC. Brief news items, based on this material, can also be found regularly in Le Monde (Paris).

¹¹Interview with Amilcar Cabral.

¹²Translation from the Portuguese Press, January 29, 1964, subject: "Terrorism in Portuguese Guinea," Attachment No. 1 to IR 287.9002464. Unclassified.

¹³See the PAIGC "Message" of February 22, 1963, appealing for desertions and citing previous cases.

¹⁴Translation, "Terrorism in Portuguese Guinea."

¹⁵PAIGC Communiqué, April 14, 1964.

¹⁶PAIGC Statuts et Programme (n.p., n.d. [1962]).

- 17 PAIGC Communiqué, April 22, 1964.
- 18 Letter from Amilcar Cabral, September 14, 1963.
- 19 The best source for population density and ethnic distribution is Cartes Ethno-démographiques de l'Afrique Occidentale, Feuilles No. 1 (Dakar: IFAN, 1952). See also "Comments . . . [on this study]," enclosure with letter from U.S. Department of State to Special Operations Research Office, August 4, 1964; hereafter referred to as "Comments."
- 20 Changing of names, inaccurate reporting, and cutthroat rivalries make reliable information on these groups and combinations difficult to find. Besides Zartman, "Africa's Quiet War," see also Ronald Segal, Political Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).
- 21 See Le Monde, July 28, 1961.
- 22 See Le Monde, April 6, 11, 13, 21, 24, and 26, 1963. The author has also seen the very graphic letter from the PAIGC leader in northern Portuguese Guinea to the PAIGC bureau in Dakar, describing the MLG attack.
- 23 See list of party officers in "Motion contre les traîtres Balbino et consorts" (MLG, mimeographed, April 16, 1962).
- 24 See Conférence des organisations nationalistes des colonies portugaises (Rabat: CONCP, 1961).
- 25 The following information has been gained largely through interviews. See Zartman, "Africa's Quiet War."
- 26 See African Revolution (Algiers), Vol. I, No. 4, 63-69.
- 27 See Le Monde, July 31, August 3, 1963.
- 28 Amilcar Cabral, see Memorandum to the UAM, March 10, 1963, and Speech to the Fourth Commission of the United Nations (U.N.), December 12, 1962.
- 29 See PAIGC Statuts et Programme, from which this information and the quotations on plans for independence are taken.
- 30 Much of the material in the "Counterinsurgency" section is simply factual and can be gleaned from public as well as insurgent sources without any problem of political interpretation. It is regretted, however, that beyond the interviews granted by the Portuguese Consulate in Dakar and the Portuguese Embassy in Washington, there has been little assistance from Portuguese officials in providing information.
- 31 Le Monde, June 15, 1961; Cabral, Speech to the U.N., p. 6; Hapgood, Bulletin "DH-7"; The New York Times, March 22, 1962.
- 32 See The New York Times, December 29, 1961, March 22, 1962, and September 8, 1963.
- 33 Le Peuple de la Guinée, p. 53.
- 34 PAIGC Communiqué and Annex, April 20, 1964; PAIGC Communiqué, February 21, 1963.
- 35 PAIGC Communiqué and Annex, April 20, 1964.
- 36 The New York Times, August 31, 1963.
- 37 "Comments."
- 38 The New York Times, September 2, 1963; PAIGC Communiqué, February 13, 1963; Portuguese Press Agency (ANI), February 8, 1963.
- 39 See Le Peuple de la Guinée; Cabral, Memorandum; Cabral, Speech.
- 40 See also Le Peuple de la Guinée, pp. 25-30.

⁴¹See Organic Law; James Duffy, Portugal's African Territories: Present Realities (Occasional Paper No. 1; New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962); James Duffy, Portugal in Africa (Baltimore: Penguin, 1962); Patricia Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations," International Conciliation, 545 (November 1963).

⁴²"Comments."

⁴³Radio Yaoundé, November 27, 1963.

⁴⁴See Duffy, Portugal's African Territories, pp. 24-27.

⁴⁵See ibid., pp. 27-32; Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations."

⁴⁶U.N. votes are given in Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations," pp. 60-66.

⁴⁷Report to the Congress on the Foreign Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 39.

⁴⁸Le Peuple de la Guinée, pp. 64-65.

⁴⁹See Duffy, Portugal's African Territories; Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations."

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Martelli, George. "The Portuguese in Guinea," The World Today, XXI (August 1965), 345-51.
Editor's note: Published too late for use in the present study, this article gives background material on Amílcar Cabral and reviews the steps taken by General Schulz, of Angola pacification fame, who was sent to Portuguese Guinea as governor and commander in chief.
Martelli, special correspondent for the Daily Telegraph and author of Leopold to Lumumba, takes the point of view that the insurgents are losing since they control or threaten less than 20 percent of the country's territory and have retreated to the forests.

Organic Law of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces. Lisbon: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1963.


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Chapter Fourteen

**SOUTH AFRICA
1961 until 1964**



SOUTH AFRICA (1961-1964)

Chapter Fourteen

SOUTH AFRICA (1961 until 1964)

by Vernon McKay

Now that white apartheid policies have convinced Africans that their only recourse is to violence, the government of South Africa is vigorously pursuing preventive counterinsurgency, with heavy reliance on police suppression and the threat of overwhelming military force.

BACKGROUND

The strenuous efforts of the Republic of South Africa to counter sabotage and terrorism since 1961 provide an instructive case study in internal conflict. This is true even though opinions may differ as to whether opposition to Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd's government had attained the proportions of a revolt, uprising, or insurrection—the usual synonyms for insurgency. When and how does insurgency begin? With sabotage, with terrorism, or not until organized guerrilla warfare starts? And whether one counts South Africa's police and defense buildup as an act of counterinsurgency, it was certainly a precautionary step taken to prevent revolt.

Although South Africa had often experienced sporadic and unpremeditated violence, non-white resistance movements before 1961 had deliberately avoided violent tactics. In the judgment of the court that freed the last of 156 victims of the five-year "treason trial" on March 29, 1961:

On all the evidence presented to the court, and on our findings of fact, it is impossible for this court to come to the conclusion that the ANC (African National Congress) had acquired or adopted a policy to overthrow the state by violence, that is, in the sense that the masses had to be prepared or conditioned to commit direct acts of violence against the state.¹

It is thus evident that the premeditated adoption of systematic violence by African insurgents in late 1961 was a revolutionary change.

A clear indication of the critical conditions in South Africa was the fact that, by June 1963, 126 persons had been convicted of sabotage and another 511 were awaiting trial.² In November, an important trial of ten others began in Pretoria. The indictment against them listed 193 acts

of sabotage in which two persons were killed and twelve injured. It also accused the defendants and 24 others who escaped the police of training guerrillas for an uprising.³ With testimony from more than 200 witnesses, the prosecution further alleged that it had evidence of an explosives manufacturing plant at Lilliesleaf Farm with a production schedule of 210,000 hand grenades, 48,000 mines, and 1,500 time devices for bombs, plus tons of other explosives—enough "to destroy the entire city of Johannesburg." According to the prosecution, "the target date for violent revolution was this year."⁴

Geography of South Africa

South Africa is located at the southern end of the African continent and has 4,638 miles of coast along the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. It has an area of 472,359 square miles, approximately equal to the combined areas of the ten states of the American South—Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Kentucky. In addition, the republic administers the separate territory of South-West Africa, which covers the large area of 317,725 square miles to the northwest. South Africa has three major topographical areas: (1) a coastal belt which varies in width from 3 to 30 miles with an average elevation of from 500 to 600 feet and which enjoys weather similar to the Mediterranean or southern California; (2) a high escarpment of mountain ranges on the east and southeast including the Drakensberg, Stormberg, Nuweveld, Roggeveld, and Bokkeveld, with several peaks of more than 11,000 feet; and (3) a vast interior plateau system sloping gradually toward the semi-desert plains of the west coast. The great plateau known as the High Veld varies from 2,000 to 6,000 feet in elevation.⁵

South Africa is a sunny country with a pleasant and healthful climate and a mean annual temperature of just under 60 degrees Fahrenheit. It is handicapped, however, by lack of water, and large areas have unpredictable rainfall with winter droughts and summer floods. There are no navigable rivers.⁶

The Ethnically Mixed Population of the Country

In the official estimate for 1961, the diverse population of South Africa totaled 16,122,000 persons, with the following ethnic distribution:

Whites	3,106,000
Bantu	11,007,000
Coloreds	1,522,000
Asians	487,000

In 1960 the large arid territory of South-West Africa* had only 525,064 people, including 73,154 whites, 427,980 Bantu, 23,930 Coloreds, and no Asians.

*See Chapter Four, "South-West Africa (1904-1907)." "

More than 30 percent of the whites in South Africa are Afrikaans-speaking descendants of the original Dutch settlers, with a considerable admixture of German, French Huguenot, and other blood. Those who speak English (less than 40 percent) are descendants of pioneers in mining and industry. In 1960 only 1.4 percent of the whites spoke both Afrikaans and English as home languages.

The indigenous Negroid Africans, who were formerly called "natives" in official terminology, are now called "Bantu," although townsmen prefer the word "Africans." They, too, have linguistic and cultural divisions. The four main groups are the Nguni, who include the Xhosa, Zulu, and Swazi; the Sotho, who include the southern Sotho, the Pedi, and the Tswana; the smaller Venda group in the northern Transvaal; and the Shangaan-Tsonga, who entered the eastern Transvaal from Mozambique. Interestingly enough, the "nations" of the Republic of South Africa are officially listed in such a way that the whites appear to be the second most numerous:⁷

Xhosa	3,134,265
European Descended (Whites).....	3,067,632
Zulu	2,788,415
Cape Colored	1,488,267
Bapedi	1,188,859
Sotho	1,156,436
Tswana	866,240
Shangaan	518,775
Asians	477,414
Smaller Bantu National Units	1,134,819

In addition to the Bantu, South Africa still has a small number of Bushmen and Hottentots, with yellow-brown skins, who may be the modern descendants of Africa's earliest men.

The large Colored group is composed of persons with mixed white, Bantu, Hottentot, and Malay blood. This designation includes a special group of about 65,000 Cape Malays who are descended from Malays brought to the Cape by the early Dutch settlers. The Coloreds have adopted the western mode of living and some of them are light-skinned enough to pass as whites. Agriculture and domestic service still provide the largest number of jobs for them, although an increasing number are going into industry.

The Asian group is mainly composed of Indians, originally brought to South Africa in the 1860's as contract laborers to work on the sugar plantations of Natal. By 1951, however, 25 percent of the economically active Indian male population was engaged in wholesale and retail trade. Further Indian immigration was barred in 1911, and more than 90 percent of the present Indian population was born in South Africa. There is also a small Chinese community with about 6,000 members.⁸

Geographic Distribution of the Races and Their Religious Affiliation

The 1960 distribution of ethnic groups among the four provinces of the republic was as follows:

	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Bantu</u>	<u>Coloreds</u>	<u>Asians</u>
Cape Province	1,003,207	2,990,947	1,330,089	18,477
Natal	340,235	2,199,578	45,253	394,854
Orange Free State	276,745	1,083,886	25,909	7
Transvaal	1,468,305	4,633,378	108,007	63,787

As these statistics show, most of the Coloreds inhabit the Cape, while most of the Indians are found in Natal. Between 1936 and 1960, urban populations had a percentage increase of 81 for whites, 156 for Bantu, 112 for Coloreds, and 156 for Asians. By 1960, 29 percent of the total Bantu population was urbanized, along with 80 percent of the whites, 62 percent of the Coloreds, and 80 percent of the Asians.⁹

The religious composition of South Africa is diverse. The three Dutch Reformed churches had the largest total membership in 1960—52.4 percent of the whites, 30 percent of the Coloreds and 5 percent of the Bantu. The two Anglican churches had the next largest total—with 12.6 percent of the whites, 17.8 percent of the Coloreds, 6.9 percent of the Bantu, and 1 percent of the Asians. The Coloreds are over 90 percent Christian, while the Malays, who settled mainly in Cape Town, have retained their Muslim religion. The Indians are about 73 percent Hindu and 20 percent Muslim. About a third of the Bantu are animist, the rest Christian. The Methodist church has the largest Bantu following, with the Catholic, Anglican, and Lutheran churches next. More than 1.5 million Bantu have broken away from mother churches, however, to form perhaps 3,000 small Bantu separatist churches.¹⁰

Conditions Leading to African Disillusionment With the White Government

The spread of education, urbanization, and racial discrimination were, and remain, perhaps the most important social patterns responsible for disaffection. Education in Christian mission schools made Africans conscious of their capacity to advance and taught them the Christian ideal of the dignity and equality of man. Meanwhile, Africans observed the behavior of whites and the failure of many to practice the Christian ethic. This was one of the factors that led to the establishment of the African separatist churches, some of which are anti-white, with their own dogmas of reverse color bars in heaven, where whites are turned away at the gate.

Until a decade ago, the overwhelming majority of Africans who went to school were educated in mission schools aided by the state. To educate Africans for their limited role in an apartheid society, the Bantu Education Act of 1953 took control of education away from the missions by cutting off their subsidies. The new law made certain technical improvements in education, but

it was widely condemned as an attempt to exploit the educational system to implement an objectionable political doctrine.

The urbanization of South Africa was another factor leading to African discontent. The percentage of Africans living in urban areas rose from 12.6 percent in 1911 to 17.3 percent in 1936 and to 30 percent in 1960. The system of migrant labor also brought young African men into the towns on contract to work in mines, leaving their families behind them in the rural reserves. The rapid growth of the cities magnified many social evils, including slum conditions, juvenile delinquency, and prostitution. Under the policy of apartheid, moreover, the Nationalist government not only denied Africans the right to obtain freehold title to homes and businesses in urban areas, but dispossessed them of freehold title already acquired. In the view of the South African Institute of Race Relations, as expressed in 1955 by President Ellen Heilman, "to deny urban Africans the right to own land in freehold and thereby to acquire that stake in the community—permanent home ownership—which, for Europeans, is regarded as the most commendable of aspirations, is a mistake of the utmost gravity which the future citizens of this country will look back on with a bitter incomprehension."¹¹

A third social pattern fostering the growth of insurgency was racial discrimination. Throughout South African history there has been a conflict between advocates of isolation and those favoring interaction of racial groups, between "the desire to remain separate and the compulsion to cooperate." The whites have more and more sought to strengthen their privileges and dominant position; but, at the same time, because of both conscience and economic necessity, South Africa has provided "the educational facilities and social services for the non-white groups which help to defeat its own basic aims."¹² Perhaps the greatest grievance is the discriminatory system of "pass laws," which require Africans to carry passes to travel, passes to be in a white area at night, current poll tax permits, and permits to seek work or visit friends in an urban area. Any policeman may demand to see one of these permits. About 1,000 Africans a day are convicted for pass violations. The pass system naturally undermines African respect for the law and the police.¹³

Another example of racial discrimination is the system which reserves skilled and semi-skilled jobs for whites. Other discriminatory laws ban inter-racial marriages and inter-racial sexual relations, segregate races in different residential areas, ban non-whites from the best universities, and provide separate facilities for whites and non-whites in railroads, buses, taxis, post offices, banks, and other public places. No matter how highly educated a non-white may be, he is treated as if he were inferior to the lowest class of uneducated white.

Growth and Prosperity of the South African Economy

The government of South Africa has worked hard to convince the outside world of its stable and thriving economy. In a recent publication of its Information Service in New York, South

Africa is described as "so diverse, so rich, and, in an African context, so balanced and stable as to defy all comparison. . . . A gilt-edged country [which] has already experienced an era of economic expansion unparalleled in the Western world, and now stands on the threshold of even greater economic progress."¹⁴

The economic growth of South Africa has indeed been remarkable. The net national income has risen from about 700 million rand* in 1939 to over 2 billion rand in 1951 and to over 4 billion rand in 1961.¹⁵ The country's gross national product at market prices in 1961 was approximately 5.5 billion rand.

Moreover, the diversification of the economy in recent years has been most impressive. The number of private industrial enterprises rose from 9,800 in 1938-39 to about 15,000 in 1960-61. In the latter year, they accounted for over 1,100 million rand of the national income, while trade and commerce accounted for nearly 600 million; agriculture, forestry, and fishing for over 500 million; and gold mining for almost 500 million rand. Private industry is thus the largest contributor to the national income today, accounting for one-fourth of the total.¹⁶

South Africa produces more than 40 percent of the mineral output of the whole continent of Africa. In addition to its rich gold and diamond resources (it produces about 65 percent of the free world's gold output), its coal reserves have been estimated at 75 billion tons and its high-grade iron ore reserves at 122 million tons.¹⁷ It can therefore produce low-cost steel and in 1961 and 1962 supplied about 90 percent of its own needs. The South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, Ltd. (ISCOR), a government undertaking, produced more than 2.2 million ingot tons of steel in the same years. Another significant government industry is the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL), which makes oil from coal and helps a growing chemical industry with its by-products.

In the past South Africa has depended on capital from overseas to finance its expansion. By 1961, however, its gross domestic capital formation for the year had reached 1,100 million rand. Foreign investment capital is still needed to assist continued expansion, but the country's remarkable economic growth has put it well on the road to financial self-sufficiency.

Prosperity Increases the Economic Disparity Between White and Non-White

Despite real gains, however, there is a good deal of illusion in this portrayal of a rich and stable country with a booming economy and less than two percent unemployment.¹⁸ The two percent figure, for example, refers only to those workers who have registered the fact that they are unemployed. But according to a South African government commission which reported early in 1963, there are 505,000 unemployed Africans, or about 14 percent of the black workers. In Durban 15,000, or 26 percent, of the Indian workers are unemployed.

*The rand is worth approximately \$1.40.

The South African government points out that its "per capita income is 50 percent higher than that of the next African country and three times as high as the average in the rest of Africa."¹⁹ Although it is true that the annual earnings of the average African worker rose 11 percent or not quite \$50 a year between 1947 and 1961, at the same time the average for white workers rose 35 percent or \$720 a year. As a result, the disparity between African and white earnings was greater than it was 25 years ago.²⁰ Again, it is stated by government sources that "the earnings of Bantu have been rising at a much faster rate than that of the Whites. The total income of Whites since the war increased by approximately 300 percent and that of the non-Whites by more than 500 percent." However, W. R. J. Steenkamp, chairman of South Africa's wage board, wrote that the real wages of Africans in the main urban centers, with a few exceptions, declined in the 1950's. In Johannesburg it was estimated in 1959 that a minimum of \$64 a month was necessary to sustain a family of five, but the average family income was still less than \$48 a month by 1963. As a result, "the incidence of malnutrition diseases in parts of South Africa is the highest recorded in the world." According to one estimate, 57 percent of the Africans, as opposed to 5 percent of the whites, die before the age of 5.²¹

From these conflicting accounts it is evident that South Africa has two economic sectors, one for whites and the other for non-whites. In the words of Harry Oppenheimer, one of the country's foremost business leaders, only the whites as a whole have a reasonable standard of living. Moreover, there are unfavorable signs even in the white sector. It is true that gold reserves recovered to \$700 million in 1963 from a low of \$210 million in June of 1961, and that 21,000 immigrants in 1962 gave South Africa a net gain of 11,000 persons. But per capita real consumption at the end of 1961 had dropped below that of 1956, and in 1962 the amount of money lying idle in the banks had reached record proportions.

Such facts indicated a decline in South Africa's rate of growth, the basic cause being the country's failure to develop its internal market. The African standard of living is declining because Africans are held back by the industrial color bar, the denial of effective trade union rights, and the rigid control of labor through the pass laws.²²

Participation in Political Life Is Reserved to Whites

In politics as in other areas of endeavor, the non-whites are repressed. South Africa left the British Commonwealth of Nations and became a republic on May 31, 1961. Its 150-member House of Assembly and 54-member Senate operate under a modified British parliamentary system. Only whites can serve in Parliament. Neither Bantu nor Asians can vote in national elections, but the Coloreds of Cape Province are allowed to vote on a separate electoral roll.

Although the Nationalist party led by Dr. Verwoerd steadily increased its parliamentary majority after it came to power in 1948, it still has not won a majority of the popular vote. The results of the general election on October 18, 1961, were as follows.²³

<u>Party</u>	<u>Popular Vote</u>	<u>House of Assembly Seats</u>
Nationalist Party	370,431	105
United Party	302,875	49
Progressive Party	69,042	1
National Union Party	35,903	1
Conservative Workers' Party	6,229	0
Liberal Party	2,461	0
Independents	10,704	0

The discrepancy between the popular vote of parties and their parliamentary representation is the result of gerrymandering electoral constituencies in favor of the rural districts in which Afrikaners are concentrated.

The ruling Nationalist party, advocating apartheid or separate development of the races, is supported by the great majority of Afrikaans-speaking whites. The opposition United party (UP), formerly headed by Gen. Jan C. Smuts and led as of this writing by Sir de Villiers Graaf, is a conservative but more pragmatic party whose leaders accept the need to economically integrate the races. In 1961 the UP outlined a new policy advocating gradual change toward the ultimate goal of a federation of races rather than territories. Each racial group would have representation in Parliament, while a rigid constitution would protect the rights of individuals, groups, and areas. The UP also asserted that it would repeal or amend laws infringing the individual dignity of non-whites, drastically revise the Group Areas Act, assimilate the Coloreds politically into the white community, and consult with the Indians regarding the determination of their future status as a permanent part of the population.

In addition to the two major parties, two others should be mentioned. The Progressive party advocates gradual racial integration. It would give the vote to all Africans over 21 who (1) have passed Standard VIII in school, or (2) have passed only Standard VI but have an income of \$840 or occupy property worth \$1,400, or (3) who own property worth \$1,400 and are literate. Literates who could not meet the above qualifications would have a special voters' roll and could elect up to ten percent of the members of Parliament. Minorities would be protected by a bill of rights written into a rigid constitution.

The Liberal party of Alan Paton, founded in 1953 and at that time advocating a qualified franchise, came out in 1960 for universal suffrage after enactment of a bill of rights in a rigid constitution, enforced by an independent judiciary.²⁴

An Estimate of African Reactions

Anti-government sentiment among non-whites has steadily grown as a result of the rigid refusal to meet non-white demands and the ruthless suppression of opposition. A 1963 study of the social, racial, and political attitudes of some middle-class black Africans showed that 83 percent of the subjects reacted with hostility toward the government officials and police with whom they had come into contact. "Usually the subject simply stated that he disliked or hated

or feared them. Most frequently they were described as 'enemies,' or were criticized for the way they handled Africans. In many cases the reaction was one of extreme violence. . . ."25

The group totally rejected the United party as well as the Nationalist party. As a teacher put it, the United party is only the "Nationalist lion with the claws off."26 Forty-three percent of the sample felt that force of some kind had now become inevitable since the government could not be influenced by peaceful means. Afrikaans-speaking whites were much more disliked than English-speaking whites.27 However, a reasonably favorable attitude was expressed toward those whites who appeared to be prepared to accept Africans as equals. Although the African National Congress "appeared to have retained some of its old support the Pan-Africanist Congress seemed to have become the political and spiritual home of the politically militant, especially the University students who could be expected to become the most influential political leaders of the next generation."28 It must be pointed out that this sample of opinion was confined to 150 middle-class male Africans, but it was carefully designed and conducted. It remains a significant omen.

INSURGENCY

If one considers that the beginning of insurgency is marked by the abandonment of peaceful resistance in favor of premeditated violence, he might select December 16, 1961, as a key date in the outbreak of insurgency in South Africa. December 16 is a national holiday to commemorate the victory of the white Voortrekker pioneers over the Zulu army of Dingaan in 1838. On that day in 1961, Africans exploded four bombs in Johannesburg and five in Port Elizabeth in acts of sabotage. That same day they distributed handbills in Zulu and English on the streets of Johannesburg announcing the existence of a new organization called Umkonto We Sizwe or the "Spear of the Nation." Proclaiming Spear's responsibility for the bombings, the handbills indicated that it was aligned with the African National Congress and was a "non-racial" organization under the overall political guidance of the national liberation movement.29

The bombings on December 16 were followed by hundreds of other acts of sabotage and thousands of arrests during the next 16 months until May 1963, when government police forces began to gain the upper hand. During this period, there were also sporadic acts of terrorism that resulted in the killing of a number of whites.

A Brief History of Non-White Protest

Before the sabotage and terrorism are further described, it is essential to outline briefly the origin and development of the resistance movements and to emphasize that protests against the mistreatment of non-whites have a long history in South Africa. They include Mohandas K. Gandhi's passive resistance campaign from 1906 to 1914, the African women's anti-pass campaign of 1913-20, the strikes and boycotts by the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union in

the 1920's, the national anti-pass campaign of 1944-45, the second Indian passive resistance campaign of 1946-48, and the defiance campaign of 1952. In 1960, an organized rebellion known as the hill movement or the Congo movement had broken out among the black farmers of Pondo-land; it was directed against the new system of Bantu administration.³⁰

The first of the two most powerful organs of African resistance is the African National Congress (ANC). Founded in 1912, it functioned for thirty years as a moderate organization advocating negotiation and compromise to achieve peaceful change. During and after World War II, it turned militant, though still non-violent, in its methods. Younger Africans, discontented with the tactics of the older generation, formed the ANC Youth League in 1944.³¹ The Communist Party of South Africa had also been active, though with little success, since 1921. When it was banned in 1950, its leaders went underground and stepped up their efforts to penetrate the ranks of the ANC. In 1952 the new militancy of the resistance movements was strikingly demonstrated by the defiance campaign in which more than 8,500 volunteers deliberately broke the segregation and pass laws and went to jail.³²

In April 1959, a significant break in the African resistance movement occurred. A group of radical and uncompromising nationalists of anti-Communist inclination, led by Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, a language instructor at the University of the Witwatersrand, broke away from the ANC to form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the other influential party. It was the PAC that organized the anti-pass demonstrations at Sharpeville and other locations a year later. When the police fired into an unarmed but menacing mob in the Johannesburg suburb of Sharpeville on March 21, 1960, 67 Africans were killed and 186 wounded. (No whites were injured.) Shortly afterward, both the ANC and the PAC were outlawed, and Sobukwe was sent to prison, where he is still confined as of this writing.

The Decision To Use Violence

Although the ANC and PAC then began to work underground to recruit members and organize demonstrations, it is important to note that they still did not advocate the use of violence. The decision to turn from non-violent to violent methods was apparently made a year or more later. It was crystallized, at least in part, by police action during the celebration for the establishment of the new Republic of South Africa on May 31, 1961. To prevent disturbances, the police jailed large numbers of Africans and broke an ANC strike when 90 percent of the workers went to work under police protection. After the failure of the strike, ANC leader Nelson Mandela told the press that only violent methods remained, and during his own trial he told the court:

We have warned repeatedly that the Government by resorting continually to violence will breed . . . counterviolence. . . . Already, . . . Africans are turning to deliberate acts of violence and of force against the Government in order to persuade the Government in the only language which this Government shows by its own behavior, that it understands.

Mandela was sentenced to five years' imprisonment in November 1962, but only after he had earned the name "Black Pimpernel" by avoiding a police dragnet for 16 months. The use of violence is said to have been formally approved by the ANC late in 1961, and by the PAC late in 1962.³⁴

In addition to the multiracial Spear of the Nation aligned with the ANC, the two other main groups resorting to violence were the multiracial National Committee for Liberation, and a new African group called Poqo. The National Committee for Liberation differed from the Spear in that its members opposed Spear's collaboration with the Communists. Poqo is thought to have been formed initially by an extreme anti-white group of PAC members in the western Cape.

The bombings late in 1961 were followed by a year and a half of sabotage and terrorism. The evidence suggests a planned campaign with mounting stages of intensity. In the first stage, government buildings and minor power, railway, telephone, and telegraph installations were dynamited, but it appears that care was taken to avoid loss of life. After about a year of this, terrorism began against whites. During a Poqo demonstration at Paarl on November 22, 1962, two whites were killed and three others were critically injured. In January 1963, the office of the Afrikaans newspaper, Die Nataller, was bombed without regard for possible loss of life. And the following month, five whites were massacred in a night attack near the Bashee River in the Transkei. Several major acts of sabotage were undertaken in March 1963. Thereafter, sabotage began to subside as the police regained control.³⁵

Estimates of Strength and Support for Anti-Government Groups

Accurate statistics on the numerical strength of the resistance movements are, understandably, not obtainable. In earlier years, the degree of popular support varied widely according to the type of activity undertaken. The largest of the organizations supporting the resistance was Clements Kadalie's Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, a mass union of all kinds of workers which at its peak in 1927-28 had a membership of nearly 250,000 and became in effect "a mass political party of national emancipation."³⁶ In 1952, during the defiance campaign conducted by the ANC and its allies, ANC membership jumped from 7,000 to 100,000, but declined rapidly after the campaign. ANC branches in the eastern Cape accounted for about 60,000 of this increase.³⁷ The Korsten branch of the ANC in the eastern Cape declined from 20,000 members in 1952 to 5,000 members in 1955.³⁸ The South African Indian Congress probably had no more than 30,000 members during the peak of the second Indian passive resistance campaign. The Congress of Democrats and the South African Coloured Peoples' Congress appear to have had no more than several hundred members each, while the South African Congress of Trade Unions claims about 50,000, mostly Africans.³⁹ When these various congresses formed a Congress Alliance and held a Congress of the People at Kliptown, near Johannesburg, on June 25-26, 1955, the 3,000 delegates present, according to one observer, represented

200,000 people.⁴⁰ The Congress Alliance is reported to have approved the turn to violence in late 1961.⁴¹

The relative strengths of the ANC and the PAC today are disputed. Potlako Leballo, a leader, has claimed 100,000 to 150,000 members for PAC; in substantiation, Patrick Duncan, an anti-Communist white member, says that it has about 100 cells, of which at least one has 1,000 members.⁴² On the other hand, many observers believe that vigorous Communist efforts to assist the ANC may give it the greater strength.

If one thinks in terms of "support" rather than "membership," the above numbers would have to be multiplied many times. Because of police intimidation, fear of losing jobs, cost of membership, and other factors, many who gave moral support did not become members. It should also be borne in mind that the support for resistance movements came primarily from the urban areas, where less than one-third of the Africans lived.

Role of Communism

In its efforts to win support, the South African government exaggerates Communist activity as a cause of its troubles. It is important to note, therefore, that this study is not one of counterinsurgency against Communists. The resistance movements are basically Africanist, not Communist. Naturally, the Communists seek to profit from the country's ferment and their opportunities and activities are mounting. In the 43 years since its establishment in Cape Town in 1921, the Communist Party of South Africa has had a checkered career. Communist candidates polled 6,806 votes in the general election of 1943 but only 1,783 votes in 1948. The party dissolved itself on June 20, 1950, just before the Suppression of Communism Act went into effect. Since that date its underground members have stepped up their efforts to penetrate non-white resistance movements. Estimates of its numerical strength vary widely. A 1962 U.S. department of state estimate gives it 800 members and perhaps 6,500 sympathizers.⁴³

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Sabotage and terrorism since 1961 have shocked the government of the Republic of South Africa into taking stringent measures. These included mass arrests, the "sabotage" and "90-day" acts and other rigorous legislation, a large expansion of the police and especially the defense force, the importation of arms and the building of munitions factories, the establishment of police reserves and home guards, the development of a radio network to link the country's nearly 1,000 police stations, the formation of pistol clubs to train white women to shoot, the creation of citizens' protective associations, and the selling of cans of push-button tear gas to white civilians.

There are four main units of white power in South Africa. In addition to a great increase in numerical strength and training, they are being reorganized to work more closely together.

They are the police force; the permanent forces of the army, the navy, and the air force: the citizen force; and the commandos.

The Rapid Expansion of Police Elements

Since there are no armed guerrilla bands roaming the country, the police have remained the main instrument of counterinsurgency, calling on other forces for help as the occasion demands. Police budget estimates rose from 40,800,000 rand in the fiscal year 1962-63 to 50,870,000 for 1963-64. The planned strength of the police force rose as follows:

	<u>1962-63</u>	<u>1963-64</u>
Whites	13,459	14,560
Non-Whites	<u>14,645</u>	<u>14,783</u>
Total	28,104	29,343

Beside this increase of about 1,100 whites on the police force, which included trebling the security branch between January and July 1963, the strength of the police reserves was expected to rise from 12,000 to more than 15,000 by the end of 1963. According to Brigadier J. A. C. Reay, assistant commissioner in charge of the police reserve, the strength could rise to 50,000 men in the next few years. On May 11, 1963, it was officially announced that Colored and Indian police reserves would also be created. The Defense Amendment Act of May 1963 authorized magistrates to call on citizen force or commando units in the armed forces to help the police when necessary for public safety.⁴⁴

When white citizens began to create their own protective associations, the minister of justice reorganized the police reserve in order to incorporate these citizen groups into the police. The reorganization plan calls for dividing a police reserve into four groups: an "A" group to be absorbed into the standing voluntary police reserve and receive normal reservist training; a "B" group to defend homes and other private property in their own localities; a "C" group made up of employees of mines, essential municipal services, and factories; and a "D" group of reservists in the countryside.⁴⁵

Police Methods and Effectiveness

Although the evidence for sound generalizations is inadequate, the effectiveness of the police as a counterinsurgency force has notably improved since 1960. Courtesy campaigns initiated in 1960 have made white policemen less abusive in their treatment of ordinary African law violators. The extraordinary powers granted to the police have greatly strengthened its ability to prevent mass political protests. The minister of justice can ban meetings, and the presence of police and informers at those which are held discourages both attendance and inflammatory remarks. The confiscation of the files of protest groups has multiplied their planning problems.

The latest legislation controlling the movement of Africans in urban areas further increases the ability of the police to curtail political agitation.

Testimony in recent sabotage trials has thrown additional light on the wide-ranging activities of the security branch of the police in combating subversion. Microphone eavesdropping, telephone tapping, mail opening, and infiltration of protest groups by police informers are widespread. Evidence presented in one recent case showed that a police agent who joined the South African Communist Party was sent on a mission to Moscow. Resistance leaders are isolated from their followers by detention, deportation, or confinement to limited areas. Police torture of recent political offenders has been alleged many times, and the police have been accused of becoming agents of the Nationalist government rather than of the law. Whether or not these charges are valid, police methods have broken the spirit of certain resistance leaders to the extent that they have turned informers against their fellow conspirators.

It also appears that unofficial South African elements, somewhat comparable to the French Red Hand in Algeria and elsewhere, are operating. The extent to which they work with or are independent of the police is unclear, but South African refugees in neighboring territories have been kidnaped, a refugee center in Bechuanaland was blown up, and a white Communist refugee in London asserts that a South African "elimination squad" is active there.

Growth and Organisation of the South African Defense Force

The alarm of the South African government over sabotage and terrorism since 1961 is revealed even more clearly in the increased defense budget estimates:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Cost in Rand</u>
1960-61	43,591,000
1961-62	71,550,000
1962-63	119,755,000
1963-64	157,111,000

J. J. Fouché, Minister of Defense, told the House of Assembly on May 28, 1963, "Our aim is to train every young man for military service, whether flat-footed or not." Shortly afterward he declared that South Africa could have 140,000 men in uniform by the end of 1964.⁴⁶ Although government officials have frequently said that the defense buildup is designed to protect the country from possible foreign invaders, it would appear that they also have in mind the use of defense forces against South African insurgents. In fact, parts of the defense forces were called into service after the Sharpeville shooting in March 1960, during the republic celebration in May 1961, and on a number of more recent occasions. In June 1963, the minister of defense stated unequivocally that the first of the three main tasks of the armed forces was "to assist the police to maintain internal order."⁴⁷

The South African defense force (SADF) consists of the permanent force, the citizen force, and the commandos and includes the trained reservists in the reserve of officers, the permanent force reserve, the citizen force reserve, and the national reserve. Although South Africa put 344,900 men in uniform during World War II, its permanent force has always been small in peacetime. The following table shows the recent increases in the armed forces, including the army, navy, and air force.⁴⁸

	<u>1960-61</u>	<u>1961-62</u>	<u>1962-63</u>	<u>1963-64</u>
Officers	1,275	1,421	1,903	2,288
Other Ranks	<u>7,744</u>	<u>9,036</u>	<u>10,797</u>	<u>13,000</u>
	9,019	10,457	12,700	15,288

The commander of the defense force is the commandant general, who is assisted by the chiefs of staff of the army, the air force, and the navy, and by the adjutant general, the quartermaster general, and the surgeon general. The chief of staff of each of the three armed services is also responsible for the control and training of his respective active citizen force units. The South African Military College at Voortrekkerhoogte, near Pretoria, provides promotion courses for officers and non-commissioned officers of the permanent force, the active citizen force, and the rifle commandos. Academic training is provided at the Services Academy at Saldanha Bay in Cape Province, which is affiliated with the University of Stellenbosch for its degrees. Three military gymnasia have also been established for the army, air force, and navy, where one year's training is provided for youths between the ages of 16 and 23.⁴⁹

Adjuncts to the Permanent Force: The Citizen Force and the Commandos

The citizen force, a kind of national guard, is composed of volunteers and others drawn by lot. About half of those reaching 17 years of age are called annually to serve for four years. In 1962, 10,368 youths were called; but in 1963, the number rose to 16,527. If the 1963 rate is continued, the active citizen force will have over 66,000 men available. Since 1961 each member of the active citizen force has been scheduled for nine months' training in his first year of service and three months in each of his last three years (before 1961 it was only three months the first year and three weeks the last three).⁵⁰ The active citizen force is trained by personnel of the permanent force (army, air force, and navy).

The third branch of the South African defense force is called the commandos. It includes volunteers and those white citizens not drawn by ballot for enrollment in the citizen force. The commandos have a long tradition in South Africa, dating back to 1658 when the first burger commando of seven men armed with three muskets and pitchforks was formed. Until recent years the commandos were often mounted riflemen who elected their own officers and trained with occasional target practice and an annual review of arms. They serve without pay. During

the Boer War of 1899-1902, their skill in commando and guerrilla tactics kept South Africa in combat for three years against a vastly superior British army.* By 1956 there were 175 commandos with a total strength of 80,000 men.⁵¹ They have recently been reorganized, and an additional 5 Afrikaans-speaking and 25 English-speaking commandos are being established.⁵²

Training of Commandos and Cadets

The commandos receive training in the use of rifles and infantry platoon weapons and in minor tactics. Each commando member is allowed a free quota of ammunition and may purchase more from government stocks at reduced prices. Because of this tradition and the popularity of rifle shooting, the standard of marksmanship, according to a government source, "is among the highest in the world."⁵³

The training of marksmen begins early. The Defense Act of 1912 provided for cadet training in musketry and drill for all schoolboys between the ages of 12 and 20. By 1956, South Africa had 500 cadet detachments with about 85,000 officers and cadets. According to the State Information Office, "The Cadet Corps was originally established. . . for the protection of the wives and children of the menfolk who were commandeered for service against hostile Bantu Tribes." The quality of cadet marksmanship is indicated by the fact that South African cadets by 1956 had 25 times won the King George V Trophy established in 1925 as a competition for all countries in the Commonwealth.⁵⁴

Provisions for Air Support and Weaponry

An interesting innovation in the Defense Act of 1963 is the provision for air commandos to assist the armed forces and police in transporting troops and equipment, in making reconnaissance flights, and in providing air support for the ground commandos.⁵⁵

A final point is the rapid increase in the budget provision for the manufacture of weapons and munitions:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Cost in Rand</u>
1960-61	368,000
1961-62	3,341,000
1962-63	14,289,000
1963-64	23,572,000

The minister of defense stated on March 15, 1963, that new plans called for "the manufacture locally of ninety-two major items of ammunition." These budget increases were partly motivated by announcements in August 1963 from the British, American, and French governments that they would no longer sell South Africa arms which might be used for "suppression." The United States went further when its representative told the U.N. Security Council on

* See Chapter Three, "South Africa (1899-1902)."

August 2, 1963, that the United States expected to bring to an end the sale of all U.S. military equipment to the government of South Africa by the end of 1963.⁵⁶

The Legal Basis for Apartheid and Restrictions of Civil Liberty

The legal basis for the operations of South Africa's security forces is provided by a stringent and all-embracing network of laws. All people are systematically classified according to their race, and all those who are not white are relegated by law to a permanently lower status. Moreover, it has become a criminal offense to protest against the system. The International Commission of Jurists concluded in 1960 that the application of the principle of apartheid "is morally reprehensible and violates the Rule of Law."⁵⁷ On June 20, 1962, when the sabotage bill was nearing final passage in the South African Parliament, the same commission warned that the bill "reduces the liberty of the citizen to a degree not surpassed by the most extreme dictatorship of the left or right."

The sabotage act, the General Law Amendment Act, No. 76 of 1962, which became law on June 27, was the government's response to the sabotage which began late in 1961. It amended the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Public Safety Act of 1953, the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955, the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956, and the Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960.

It is a complex law covering far more than sabotage; it also deals with extension of emergency regulations to areas outside the emergency area, outlawing of organizations, listing and "banning" of persons from attending gatherings, restrictions on movement of persons, and provisions for house arrest. It includes a one-year extension of the 1961 provision for detention for twelve days without any charge having been proved, broadening of the powers of the minister of justice to prohibit gatherings and attendance thereat, provision for stricter control of newspapers, and prohibition against publishing any statements by a "banned" person. It contains new provisions to help the state take action against people leaving the republic without the necessary documents, and adds numerous new offenses and penalties.

The sabotage clause of the act, section 21, provides among other things that anyone will be guilty of sabotage if he deliberately "obstructs, injures, tampers with or destroys" (a) the health or safety of the public or the maintenance of law and order; (b) the supply of water, light, power, fuel, or foodstuffs; sanitary, medical, or fire-extinguishing services; postal, telephone, telegraph, or radio services; or the free movement of traffic; or (c) any property. Moreover, the onus is thrown on the accused, once the prosecution has proved that he willfully committed one of the acts mentioned, to prove that he was not guilty of sabotage.⁵⁸

Protest Is Followed by Further Restrictions

These Draconian provisions aroused a storm of protest in South Africa, but the parliamentary majority pushed the bill through. In opposing the second reading of the bill, Sir de Villiers

Graaf, leader of the opposition United party, made the following comments on the act. He pointed out that it would deprive citizens of the protection of the courts and put them at the mercy of arbitrary ministerial decisions in such a way as to threaten the freedom of law-abiding people. It would also, he said, create the new crime of sabotage and define it so widely that the lives and liberties of people who were innocent of any intention to subvert the state could be endangered. He further stated that the bill would grant further extensive powers to the government and that it ignored the fact that laws already existed which were adequate to deal with any crisis that might arise. Graaf therefore felt that the provisions of such a law would damage the republic by creating the false impression that a permanent state of emergency existed.⁵⁹

The sabotage act was followed by the General Law Further Amendment Act, No. 93 of 1962, which made it an offense punishable by up to six-months imprisonment to place any placard, poster, writing, sign, drawing, or other mark on the property of any other person or of the state, thereby deforming such property.⁶⁰ In May 1963, South African policies were hardened by another general law which enabled the minister of justice to detain persons without trial for recurring periods of 90 days on suspicion of having committed a crime or of possessing information on the commission of a crime.⁶¹ And on February 18, 1964, the government re-introduced a bill shelved the previous year in a version that would deprive more than two-thirds of all Africans of residential security outside the reserves by increasing the government's already firm control over their movements, homes, and jobs. Denouncing the bill, the opposition leader, Sir de Villiers Graaf, claimed it would turn Africans in the towns and on white farms into a "vast floating labor pool from which the minister can detach individual units from time to time."⁶²

As of December 3, 1963, at least 232 persons had been "banned" from attending political gatherings; 66 of these were also forbidden to attend social gatherings; and 25 were under house arrest. At least 642 persons had been sentenced for sabotage or PAC or ANC activities: 46 of them were sentenced to death, 204 to prison terms of ten years to life, 83 to five to eight years' imprisonment, and the rest to less than five years.⁶³

"Positive" Apartheid, or the Policy of Separate Development

In South Africa, the foregoing legislation is sometimes termed "negative" apartheid, in contrast to certain "positive" apartheid measures designed to develop the rural reserves where about 40 percent of the Africans live. These "positive" apartheid laws may be considered counterinsurgency measures insofar as they are designed to persuade non-whites to accept the system. As *Die Volksblad*, an Afrikaans newspaper, expressed it on July 15, 1963, the apartheid policy must be implemented so fast and so convincingly that the tremendous external pressure on the republic will slacken and the worst internal tensions between the races be removed.⁶⁴

Warning their Afrikaner supporters that "you can't keep the black man down," Dr. Verwoerd and his cabinet ministers have said that they are attempting to erect a structure of "separate development" in which Africans can rise to the top "in their own sphere." This positive apartheid has two main ingredients: economic and social development of the reserves, and a plan for local autonomy within each of these reserves of "Bantu homelands" or "Bantustans." From time to time, depending on the nature of the occasion and the audience, certain Afrikaner leaders have spoken in general terms of the right of secession and the possibility of ultimate "independence" for the Bantustans. More often, however, the goal is projected as a kind of South African federation of about eight Bantustans and one "white" state.

One of these self-governing Bantustans, the Transkei, is already in operation. A brief examination of its status reveals four limitations on its self-government: (1) in the 109 member legislative assembly, only 45 are elected by the people; while 4 are paramount chiefs appointed or recognized by the South African government, and 60 are South African government appointees; (2) the South African government may not only abolish or amend the Transkeian Constitution, but it retains control over defense, foreign affairs, internal security, posts and telegraphs, railways, roads and harbors, immigration, currency, public loans, customs, and excises; (3) all laws passed by the Transkeian Assembly are to be submitted to the South African minister of Bantu administration and development for submission to the state president "who shall have the power thereto, to assent or to refer it back to the legislative assembly for further consideration"; and (4) the control of revenue and expenditure is still in the hands of the South African Parliament.⁶⁵

In economic action the government announced a plan to spend nearly 115 million rand on the development of the Bantu homelands, during the five years from 1961-62 to 1965-66. Moreover, this sum does not include amounts to be spent on health, education, and other services and on commercial and industrial development. This big jump is worthy of commendation because the average annual sum spent on the reserves during the last seven years has been less than eight million rand.⁶⁶ It is indeed a positive step. It is not inseparable from apartheid, however. This long needed development plan for the African rural areas would be just as appropriate for an integrated as for a segregated society.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

There are both economic and political reasons why apartheid cannot solve South Africa's problem. Whites need and want African labor in the white areas, and no government could survive a real attempt to remove Africans. Moreover, even if all Africans could be removed from white areas to the reserves, the reserves could not support them. As one critic of apartheid points out, the reserves have ample untrained manpower, but virtually no capital, a limited supply of raw materials, and very few industrial markets because of lack of buying

power. The amount of capital needed to industrialize the reserves and increase their capacity to absorb a larger population far exceeds anything dreamed of by apartheid theorists.⁶⁷ In fact, Dr. Verwoerd rejected the recommendation of the 1955 Tomlinson Commission that white capital be allowed to go into the reserves to develop them. It is therefore hard to take the economic aspect of positive apartheid seriously. The government's alternative of locating industries on the South African side of the border where they would utilize labor from the reserves during the daytime is hardly calculated to allow Africans to "rise to the top in their own sphere."

The government has no intention, however, of removing all the African labor force from the white areas. It seeks to send back to the reserves large numbers of persons who can be dispensed with, and to transform the remainder into a vast labor pool of transients with no political rights in the white area. This exposes another basic flaw in the theory of apartheid, for there would always be more blacks than whites in the so-called white area. In the attempt to remedy this inconsistency, the government gives Africans in the white areas the right to cast absentee ballots in elections in their "homelands." It is inconceivable that this fanciful idea will satisfy the demand of urban Africans for political rights. In fact, and this is the heart of the matter, the whole concept of apartheid is politically unrealistic because it is entirely a white man's idea, adopted without even consulting Africans, in an age of self-determination when black men everywhere seek to determine their own destiny.

The Government Relies on Armed Strength Against a Future Threat

If "positive" apartheid is doomed to failure, how long can "negative" apartheid preserve white supremacy? White power is too strong for non-whites to overthrow the system in a direct mass confrontation. The police and defense forces have clearly won the first round of the battle against sabotage and terrorism. Just as clearly, the second round is now in preparation. Thousands are in jail, but many hundreds of African refugees have gone into training for sabotage and terrorism in more than half a dozen foreign countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Tanganyika in Africa, and Communist China and Soviet bloc countries outside the continent. About 100 South African Communist refugees are now said to have set up subsidiary headquarters in London, Cairo, Accra, Algiers, Dar-es-Salaam, and Basutoland.⁶⁸ Handicapped by lack of money, the arrest of their leaders, and the failure of the West to give them enough help, Africans seem at this point to be increasingly turning to the Communists for help. The South African government may well win the second round of the battle when it comes, only to face one round after another until its policy changes.

The Organization of African Unity has set up a nine-nation Committee for the Liberation of Africa which has raised a fund to help free southern Africa. By December 1963, the biggest contributors were Nigeria (\$308,000), Uganda (\$140,000), the Congo-Leopoldville (\$196,000), and Tanganyika (\$84,000). In April 1964, a private International Conference on Economic

Sanctions Against South Africa met in London to consider the most effective ways and means of imposing sanctions. And at the United Nations, the new "expert group" met in the spring of 1964 to examine methods of resolving the South African problem.⁶⁸

How effective external aid for the potentially active insurgents will prove remains to be seen. The government of South Africa hopes that the internal troubles of African states and border conflicts between them will weaken their ability to do anything effective. It counts on outbreaks of crises elsewhere to divert world attention to other areas from time to time. It hopes that whites will remain in control for a considerable time in the strategic buffer areas on its border—the territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Southern Rhodesia. And it hopes that the United Kingdom and the United States will cripple any international effort to impose sanctions by refusing to join it.

Since no one can foretell the extent to which these South African hopes will be fulfilled, it is unrealistic to predict how long counterinsurgency measures can maintain control. Ultimately, however, the government's success will depend upon the development of a policy more acceptable to leaders of all racial groups than apartheid.

NOTES

¹Quoted in Thomas Karis, "South Africa," Five African States, ed. Gwendolen M. Carter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 537.

²United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5497, 18 September) (New York, 1963), p. 112.

³The New York Times, November 27, 1963.

⁴The Times (London), December 4, 1963.

⁵State of South Africa—Economic, Financial and Statistical Yearbook for the Republic of South Africa—1963 (Johannesburg: Da Gama Publications, 1963), pp. 30-31. Hereafter cited as Yearbook.

⁶Ibid., p. 28.

⁷Ibid., p. 84.

⁸Vernon and Lila McKay, "Republic of South Africa," Encyclopedia International (New York: Grolier Society, 1963-64).

⁹Yearbook, p. 78.

¹⁰D. R. D. Newsletter (Johannesburg, December 1963), p. 21; McKay, "Republic."

¹¹Ellen Hellman, Racial Laws Versus Economic and Social Forces (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1955), pp. 14-15.

¹²Ibid., p. 1.

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¹⁶Ibid., pp. 10-13.

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¹⁸Two recent articles which point out the weaknesses in the South African economy are Margaret Roberts (pseud.), "South Africa—Behind the Boom," The World Today (October 1963) and Sandor (pseud.), The Coming Struggle for South Africa (Fabian Tract 345; London: The Fabian Society, June 1963).

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²⁰Roberts, South Africa, pp. 17-19.

²¹Sandor, The Coming Struggle, p. 20.

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Part Four
POSTWAR EXPERIENCE
IN LATIN AMERICA

COLOMBIA (1948 until 1958)

CUBA (1953-1959)

VENEZUELA (1958 until 1963)

Chapter Fifteen

COLOMBIA
1948 until 1958



COLOMBIA (1948-1958)

Chapter Fifteen

COLOMBIA (1948 until 1958)

by John J. Finan

A combination of political and economic reforms and military counterinsurgency measures, carried out by a coalition government, brought under control the violence in Colombia that had cost almost two hundred thousand lives.

BACKGROUND

This is an account of the insurgency that devastated a great part of rural Colombia during most of the period from 1948 to 1958 and of the measures which were taken to control it. With an estimated 180,000 deaths attributable to *la violencia* during these years, the Colombian insurgency forms an important chapter in the annals of internal conflict. Its causes were complex and its effects on Colombian society can be assessed only roughly—both because of its enormity and because the violence was not completely ended even in 1958. That year was chosen as a cutoff date for this study because it was marked by the establishment of a new political accord that significantly reduced the disorder.

Situated in northwestern South America and fronting on both the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, Colombia—with an area of 439,515 square miles—is larger than California and Texas combined. It has an estimated population of 17,298,000.¹ About 20 percent of Colombians are of unmixed European ancestry, 68 percent are mestizos (of mixed Indian and European antecedents), 7 percent are nearly pureblooded Indians, and 5 percent are Negroes.² The population is overwhelmingly Catholic, the percentage being estimated as high as 99.³ The church's influence on the society, particularly in rural areas, is among the greatest for any Latin American country.

Roughly 90 percent of the population lives in the western third of the country, which is intersected by three ranges of the Andes. Between these ranges at varying altitudes are valleys and valley basins. The eastern two-thirds of the country, most of it unpopulated, is made up of the Guiana Highlands, a part of the Orinoco Plains, and a small part of the Amazon Plain. Although the sparsely settled *llanos* or plains of this eastern two-thirds are relevant to the problem of the violence in Colombia, of much greater interest is the highland area of the west, in which most of the insurgency has been concentrated.

Areas Affected by La Violencia

Four of the six major regions of concentrated settlement⁴ have been scenes of conflict. The first of these, the high basins of the eastern range of the Andes, includes the basin of Cundinamarca, at the southeastern margin of which is the capital city of Bogotá, and the smaller basins of Boyacá. The density of rural population in this region is between 25 and 60 persons per square mile; most people are engaged in food production, particularly the growing of corn, wheat, barley, and potatoes, and the raising of cattle.

The steeply sloping lower valleys of the eastern range, all below 7,000 feet, form a second important region of settlement in Colombia. The principal economic activity in this region, which includes the departments of Santander, Norte de Santander, and Huila, as well as a portion of Cundinamarca, is the production of coffee on the mountain slopes and cacao, tobacco, and cotton at lower altitudes.

A third region includes the departments of Antioquia, Caldas, and Tolima, all situated in the central range of the Andes; the settlements are on small pieces of flat land at elevations of between 2,000 and 6,000 feet. Coffee, the principal agricultural product of the region, is generally grown on small holdings.

The Cauca Valley, a structural depression lying between the central and western ranges, forms a fourth region. It extends from the city of Popayán in the south to the town of Cartago in the north and includes the departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca. Sugar cane is the leading crop of the region, although cacao and tobacco are also grown.

Two other settled regions—the Pasto region in the south including the department of Nariño, and the Caribbean coastal lowlands embracing the departments of Bolívar, Córdoba, Magdalena, and Atlántico—have not experienced much violence. The Pasto region is made up chiefly of small subsistence holdings of Indians and mestizos. The coastal lowlands, which include the principal ports of Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Santa Marta, have a large Negro population.

Industry and Agriculture

Geography as a factor in the violence is clear—the regional divisions, mountainous terrain, and difficulties in transportation and communication created serious obstacles to its control. Economic background factors are harder to pinpoint. Colombia's economy, preponderantly agricultural, is closely linked to the production of coffee. This crop, grown mainly on high-yield, medium-size farms by more than 400,000 farm families, earns over 75 percent of the country's foreign exchange. Because coffee is so important an export product, fluctuations in its international market price severely affect the Colombian economy. To reduce this vulnerability, Colombia has sought to diversify her exports, but with only slight success. For many years petroleum has ranked as the country's second export product, but it is minor compared to coffee. Colombia's precious high-quality emeralds are known throughout the world, but they are a monetarily inconsequential export product.

A growing industrial base has been established in Colombia, particularly since World War II, from domestic capital—an important consideration. Sufficient textiles, shoes, tobaccos, beverages, and fuels are produced to meet Colombia's domestic demand. There is almost no heavy industry; most capital goods are imported. The country's industrial growth rate, about 7 percent annually for the past 15 years, has been among the highest in Latin America. However, its agricultural growth has been so much lower, about 2.5 percent annually, that the overall growth rate has been depressed to about 3.5 percent, which barely exceeds the 2.5 percent annual population increase.⁵

The low growth rate of Colombian agriculture is a manifestation of stagnation in much of the country's domestic sector. Many factors account for the low productivity. Much of the best land is not effectively used because many owners are concerned principally with the social prestige attached to landowning. Others use some of the most fertile lands for grazing cattle rather than for crops; still others look to landholding merely as a hedge against inflation. Too, the latifundio, or large estate, that is characteristic of much of rural Colombia has, historically, been undercapitalized in relation to the land and to the peasant laborers, most of whom are illiterate, undernourished, and underemployed.

Various Issues Divide Colombians Into Two Antagonistic Groups

Given these social, geographic, and economic particulars, one may attempt to trace the roots of the insurgency. The conflict, which many have called a civil war because of its scale and because of the involvement of the two great national political parties, has distant origins. In the middle of the 19th century, deep partisan cleavages were created in the populace by fundamental issues concerning the position of the church in the society and the question of whether the country's constitutional structure should be federal or unitary. These issues were intensified by regionalism, personalism, and militarism. During the latter half of the century, several civil wars erupted between those who favored retention by the church of its colonial power and privileges—its own special courts outside the civil jurisdiction, its control of education, and its support by the state—and those who called for complete separation of church and state or at least a significant reduction in the church's role in national life. Those who took the latter position, the Liberals, also preferred a federal political structure, which would allow greater autonomy for the diverse regions, many of them separated by the high mountain barriers which fragment Colombia. The Conservatives, who were partisans of church privilege, favored a more centralized, unitary constitution which would permit control of the regions from the national capital.

The regional autonomy which the federal constitution of 1863 permitted seems to have encouraged the development in some regions of a militant Conservative position, and in others of a Liberal one.⁶ At least since early in the present century, the population of Colombia—almost all of those integrated into the society—has been fairly firmly divided between the two political

parties. Certain cities, such as the capital Bogotá, became overwhelmingly Liberal; others, such as Medellín, strongly Conservative. Likewise, in rural areas there are peasant villages and towns that are militantly Conservative, and others that are Liberal.

Such militant identification with one or the other of the two national parties, characteristic of almost all Colombians whether they be wealthy estate owners or urban workingmen or peasants, has no clear socioeconomic basis: Each party is composed of all social classes. The parties are highly cohesive. In general it may be said that a given socioeconomic group, such as the peasantry, identifies more closely with members of its own party who belong to other classes than with its social counterparts in the other party.

A Background of Violence

Several dates have been suggested for the beginning of the violence. Although most would agree that the conflict dates from the assassination of the Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán in April 1948, others⁷ would argue that violence has been endemic in Colombia since 1930 and has only become more intense since 1948. They point to the disturbances which occurred after the Liberal Enrique Olaya Herrera succeeded to the presidency in 1930 following four decades of Conservative control. The conflict between victorious Liberals and defeated Conservatives was particularly evident in the departments of Santander and Boyacá. Despite an attempt by the government of President Olaya to quell the conflict, it continued and became enlarged in a chain reaction of vengeance and countervengeance, the latter exacerbated, according to the Conservatives, by the assassination of Conservatives by the national police force, which it was charged, was a Liberal tool.

That the violence predated 1948 is also indicated by the disturbances that attended the election of Conservative President Mariano Ospina Pérez in 1946, following 16 years of Liberal control. The conflict became so intense in the department of Valle del Cauca, largely as a result of strikes by the Liberal-oriented trade union confederation (CTC), that the national government declared a state of siege in that department. Such disturbances also occurred in rural areas. For example, a conflict which developed between Conservatives and Liberals in the small Boyacá Conservative town of Moniquirá in July 1947 resulted in 6 persons being killed and 12 wounded. Incidents such as this gave rise to further violence which spread from the department of Boyacá to the department of Caldas, where the first group of Conservative trigger men (nicknamed pájaros—"birds") was organized. The pájaros terrorized Liberals in towns and villages and forced many to flee or migrate from several traditionally Liberal areas. Another example of the developing and spreading tension was the clash in early 1948 in the department of Santander between the inhabitants of the Liberal village of Román and those of the Conservative village of San José de la Montaña.⁸

Assassination of Dynamic Leader Precipitates La Violencia

Although all of the above incidents provide evidence of tension and conflict in Colombia, the event that triggered la violencia was the assassination of the Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán on April 9, 1948. Much has been written concerning this event, but the known facts are meager. A disappointed and probably demented office seeker killed the popular Gaitán as he was leaving his office in downtown Bogotá. The popular reaction was intense. Many Liberals charged that the Conservatives were responsible; many Conservatives charged it was engineered by agents of "international communism" to disrupt the Pan-American Conference which was being held in Bogotá at the time. The rioting that followed the murder, during which much of the city of Bogotá was destroyed, gave rise to the term *Bogotazo* to signify riotous destruction.

The man whose assassination was the immediate cause of the insurgency and unrest in 1948 had been born in 1898 of middle-class Liberal parents and had studied law in both Colombia and Italy. At the age of 26 Gaitán wrote an influential volume, Las Ideas Socialistas, on the need for social reform in Colombia. He became even better known in 1929 when, as a congressman, he publicized the grievances of rural workers on foreign-owned banana plantations in northern Colombia, and decried the use of the army to put down their strikes for improved working conditions. He organized his own party to agitate for reform, but later returned to the Liberal party, assuming leadership of its left wing in 1945. An intellectual, Gaitán also had a charismatic quality that appealed to the lower class members of both parties.

In the May 1946 election, the Liberal party could not decide whether to back him or a representative of the party's moderate wing as its presidential candidate. This split cost the party the election, which was won by the Conservative candidate Mariano Ospina Pérez, who tried to form a coalition government and invited Liberals to assume six cabinet posts. Gaitán, who assumed leadership of the Liberal party after the election, refused to cooperate with Ospina Pérez and castigated those Liberals who wished to do so, declaring that such cooperation reflected an alliance of party oligarchies rather than of the total parties. His statements and fiery oratory further increased his popularity among the lower classes. By early 1948, it was becoming clear that Gaitán had achieved an unassailable position in the Liberal party, and with his growing popularity his election as president in 1950 was considered a certainty.⁹

The assassination of Gaitán in April 1948 removed a man of incalculable potential for bringing political and social change to Colombia, a charismatic, magnetic figure who bespoke the yearnings of hundreds of thousands of Colombians. Had he lived, he might have succeeded in uniting the Conservative and Liberal lower classes for the first time in Colombian history.

INSURGENCY

On the same day that Gaitán was assassinated, there escaped from the penitentiary in Ibagué, the capital of Tolima, a man with the nickname *Tirofijo* ("Sure Shot") who was to

become well known as a bandit leader during the ensuing years of violence. He fled to rural Huila and began to recruit peasant followers, calling for revolution to avenge the murder of Gaitán and to oppose the government. To gain support, he emphasized that the area was under attack and that war was coming; he demanded regular financial support from the inhabitants, setting quotas and terrorizing those who would not or could not pay. A pattern of banditry was thus established that was to characterize much of Colombian rural life during the next 15 years.¹⁰

Violence by Regional Groups Increases

Other events in following years further exacerbated the differences between Conservatives and Liberals, thereby increasing rural unrest. The presidential campaign of 1949 and the 1950 election of another Conservative, Laureano Gómez, brought charges from Liberals that the election was fraudulent. In an effort to control the spreading violence, President Gómez used repressive measures in both the cities and the countryside. Most of these measures, which included outright massacres by the military forces, were directed against Liberals, who, to protect themselves and their adherents, began organizing into Committees of Resistance. After the Liberal newspapers El Tiempo and El Espectador cried out against the actions of the Conservative government, their buildings were burned and uniformed police were observed participating in the arson.

The rural violence that plagued the country during the period 1949-53 pervaded areas in the departments of Tolima, Boyacá, and Santander del Sur, the territory of Meta, the fringes of the department of Cundinamarca (in which Bogotá is located), northern Huila, and eastern Cauca, Valle, and Chocó. Most of Colombia was torn by civil war, a war fought essentially between Liberal and Conservative peasants, under a rationale that was "monstrous, but with a macabre simplicity."¹¹ In the Liberal view, the Conservatives supported the government that had caused the violence and this meant that they must be destroyed; in the Conservative view, the Liberals had rebelled against the Conservative government and were therefore marked for annihilation.

Although Colombia enjoyed relative peace during the latter half of 1953 as a result of an amnesty declared by Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who had assumed governmental power, this interlude was brought to an end in November 1954 when the army killed several peasants in Tolima. In the months that followed, the violence again spread throughout Tolima and Caldas to eastern Valle and Cauca and to northern Huila, where it became concentrated.¹²

Guerrilla Organization and Membership

By the end of 1952, a broad organizational pattern could be detected in the insurgency. At no time was it a unified or centrally directed movement, but a dozen or so regional groups or commands became fairly well organized. These "revolutionary commands" were active in the eastern llanos, where some 19 guerrilla forces were in organizational contact; in the departments

of Santander and Norte de Santander; in northern Cundinamarca and western Boyacá; in eastern, southern, and central Tolima; and in northern, western, and eastern Antioquia. Communist-led commands were active in Viotá, Sumapaz (southern Cundinamarca), Gaitania (southern Tolima), Rio Chiquito, and Simbota-Paez (a mountain area on the Cauca-Huila border).

Who were the guerrillas? Much of the reality of the violence can be conveyed by a description of one guerrilla leader. Teófilo Rojas, who became well known by the nickname Chispas ("Sparks") operated in Colombia's central mountain range, principally in the departments of Caldas and Tolima. When the violence was sharply intensified in 1948 following Gaitán's death, Chispas was 14 or 15 years old, living with his family, who were Liberals, in rural Tolima. His older brother joined a guerrilla group that was forming in reaction to police repression in the region. Chispas and his family, fearing police reprisal because of his brother's guerrilla activities, fled to the woods. When his mother was killed the following year, Chispas joined one of the guerrilla bands in Tolima, commanded by two leaders, Fermín Charry, known as Charro Negro, and Jesús María Oviedo, known as Mariachi. Chispas spent four years with them and, although totally illiterate, proved himself an able, natural leader. When the government of Rojas Pinilla declared an amnesty in 1953, Chispas surrendered and received enough assistance from the government to acquire a farm on which he worked for one year.

When violence broke out again in 1954, largely as a result of clashes between peasants and the army, Chispas did not at first participate; he limited his action to defending himself and his holding from attack. Gradually, however, he resumed his guerrilla role and it is estimated that between 1954 and his death in 1963 he was responsible for 592 deaths, most of them Tolima and Caldas peasants who did not pay the quotas of money he imposed. A common method of killing was by decapitation, a technique used by Chispas' band in the case of 125 persons.¹³ Chispas' band was typical of many other, smaller groups: There appeared to be little or no coordination between them, and there was certainly no one overwhelmingly acceptable leader.

Acquisition of Weapons and Funds

The insurgents secured arms from three main sources. Most were probably acquired from captured members of the armed forces, including the national police. A second large source was Liberal law officers who defected with their arms at the time of the Bogotazo. The best known of these was Rafael Rangel Gómez, who had been police chief in Santander and who organized a band that controlled an important section of the Magdalena Valley.¹⁴ Arms were also smuggled from Venezuela.

The principal method of financing the guerrilla groups was exaction of payments from rural families for protection. A demand for money was usually accompanied by a threat of death or harassment in the event of noncompliance. Badges or other certificates which the guerrilla forces sold locally testified that the purchaser supported the political party (Conservative or

liberally espoused by the guerrilla group. Bandit groups frequently moved into rich coffee-growing regions at harvest time, forcing the owners or managers off the land and seizing coffee for clandestine sale to help finance their guerrilla operations.¹⁵

Guerrilla Communications and Tactics Used Against Villages

Many means were devised to enable members of a given insurgent group to communicate with each other. Whistles having a distinct sound, similar to a bird call, were commonly used to summon guerrillas to a meeting or to indicate the presence of an enemy in the area. Cow horns were used for the same purpose. Code messages written on the bark of trees also served for communication. Some guerrilla bands used mimeograph machines to communicate propaganda messages designed to increase support. Bands tended to be identified with certain slogans, such as "Lucha por ser libre" ("Fight to be free"). Leaflets nailed to trees often indicated that a given guerrilla band was in the area and that it was seeking assistance from the local populace.¹⁶

A tactic the guerrillas commonly used when they moved into an enemy area was to send a boleteo, or anonymous message, to one or more peasant families ordering them to leave their homes within a specified time or risk death. If they did not comply, the bandits descended upon the house and killed the head of the household and sometimes the whole family as a warning to others in the village. If others did not follow subsequent orders to depart, the bandits often moved in and decimated the whole village. As a result of such tactics, entire communities were forced to migrate from one part of Colombia to another, usually from a rural area to the closest city.¹⁷

Communist Influence on the Violence

The extent of Communist activity among the guerrillas is difficult to assess. It has sometimes been argued that, because Fidel Castro was in Bogotá in 1948 at the time of the Bogotazo, much of the disorder in rural Colombia was induced by agents of international communism. Indeed, the Conservative government broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union shortly after the Bogotazo as an indication of its displeasure with what it believed to be Communist involvement in or exacerbation of the disorder. Although it would be wrong to suggest that the problem of la violencia in Colombia is essentially one of Communist manipulation of peasants—the causes, as have been shown, are much deeper—it seems clear that some of the guerrilla leaders have been Communists.

Communist influence was (and still is) very great in two areas involved in the insurgency. The first of these was the "republic of Tequendama near the small town of Viotá, about 50 miles from Bogotá. Established about 1934 in a high mountainous area on lands that were a part of an old coffee estate, the "republic" has maintained its autonomy in the face of the

government attempts since the 1940's to quash it. Although the residents of this Communist enclave frequently gave temporary refuge to guerrillas, they have been generally peaceful and have not otherwise participated in the insurgency.¹⁸

The other region of strong Communist influence—Sumapaz, an area southeast of Viotá and extending into Tolima to the town of Villarica—was, and still is at the time of this writing, the stronghold of one of the most belligerent and destructive of the Colombian guerrilla bands. The chieftain of this group is Juan de la Cruz Varela, a man known to cooperate actively with the Colombian Communist Party. The band has been generally successful in its efforts to resist Colombian army attempts to crush it. The insurgents are able to flee quickly in the face of attack, and the mountainous terrain of the region inhibits pursuit.¹⁹

Another Communist guerrilla leader was Roberto González Prieto, nicknamed Pedro Brincos, who headed a group in Tolima and Cajamarca from 1950 until he was killed on the spot during his capture in 1963. He is known to have spent some time in Cuba in the early 1960's and to have clandestinely trained guerrilla fighters on his return to Colombia. He printed and distributed leaflets and booklets on guerrilla warfare and was described by Colombia's minister of government as "the ideologist of the Communist bandits."²⁰ Another well-known guerrilla leader, William Angel Aranguren (who took the nickname Desquite) was said to be a Communist by Jacinto Cruz Usma, another bandit chief who worked closely with him.²¹

An Estimate of Casualties Caused by the Violence

For many reasons, it is difficult to calculate the number of deaths caused by the violence in Colombia. First of all, census data are fragmentary for departments most affected by the violence; when the information from the census of 1964 is analyzed, sounder calculations can perhaps be made. Secondly, the phenomenon of la violencia has been largely confined to scattered, rural areas; records of victims buried in local church cemeteries probably represent only a small portion of those actually killed, since many were either buried on the spot or left unburied.

Probably the most reasonable way to calculate the casualties for the years 1949 to 1958 is to multiply by ten the number of deaths by violence for the best-recorded year (1958) in all departments affected by the violence except Tolima (where the calculation was based on an earlier annual statistical compilation made by the departmental government), and Antioquia, Huila, and the eastern llanos (where it was believed that the records for 1958 were not an adequate base). This method yields a total of 85,144 civilians killed by guerrillas for Colombian departments affected by la violencia during the period 1949-58. Guerrillas also killed an estimated 6,200 members of the army and 3,620 members of police forces and government officials. Add to this an estimated 40,000 other civilians killed, many of them while fighting government forces, and the number of deaths directly resulting from the violence between 1949 and 1958 is

approximately 135,000. To this must still be added an estimated 45,000 persons who died later as a result of wounds inflicted during the violence, making a grand total of some 180,000* persons.²²

In addition to the losses in deaths and injuries, the violence has caused many persons to leave the country. Important population shifts have also occurred within Colombia. It has been estimated that some 800,000 Colombians had to change their residences between 1949 and 1961. Many cities including Cali, Ibagué, Medellín, Pereira, Armenia, Cartago, and Palmira, have attracted migrants. Bogotá has attracted the largest number: Approximately 60,000 persons migrated there between 1949 and 1953, and the influx has continued.²³

COUNTERINSURGENCY

After declaring a state of siege and suspending constitutional processes, President Ospina Pérez, in the face of the rebellion of April 9, 1948, established, with the cooperation of most of the leaders of the Liberal party, a bipartisan government of national union. Half of the posts in the President's cabinet, including the important portfolios of minister of government and minister of war, were assigned to Liberals. As the armed forces brought the rebellion under control, the bipartisan government acted to restore political tranquility to the country. As a result, by December it was possible to lift the state of siege.

Political Bipartisanship Fails and Civil Liberties Are Curtailed

The national union government lasted for only about 13 months, however, the principal factor in its breakup being the heated party strife which developed in connection with the mid-year congressional elections. Neither party was able to prevent a great portion of its membership from engaging in vehement partisan activity. With the disintegration of the national union government, civil strife was resumed.

With the renewal of violence, President Ospina reinstituted a state of siege some three weeks before the presidential election scheduled for the 28th of November 1949. Ospina also issued decrees which suspended the legislature, established censorship of the press, forbade all public meetings, and gave wide powers to departmental and local officials acting for the national government.²⁴ As it turned out, this time the state of siege was to last for more than eight years and until 1958 it was within this political context that Colombian governments were to carry out their generally unsuccessful counterinsurgency measures.

Measures of the Conservative President Gómez

The aged Conservative Laureano Gómez, who succeeded Ospina Pérez as president in

*According to many estimates, this is low. Newspaper sources frequently refer to as many as 200,000 to 300,000 persons killed (e.g., Washington Post, July 18, 1965, p. E-2).

August 1950 after an election from which the Liberals abstained, strengthened both the army and the national police. To deal with the violence Gómez remodeled these forces, particularly the army which had been traditionally nonpolitical, as Conservative arms. Liberal officers were purged from both security forces. Conservative strength in the national police was increased, and additional police training schools were established. Gómez appointed the Conservative Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez as minister of war and gave him and the army wide powers, including summary execution, to deal with the insurgency.

As one of his first counterinsurgency measures, Urdaneta sent an expedition to the essentially Liberal llanos region, which had been completely out of control for many months. Planes flew ahead of the troops, dropping leaflets ordering residents to depart; the troops which followed burned the vacated villages. Although this tactic temporarily brought under control sections of an area in rebellion, it resulted in mass migration and vast refugee problems which were to encourage rebellion elsewhere.²⁵

In April 1951, President Gómez created a new post, commanding general of the armed forces, and the following year he appointed to it a military leader of Conservative allegiance, Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.²⁶ Friction soon developed, however, between the president and his military leader. Gómez was deposed in June 1953 and Rojas assumed the presidency, an office which he was to retain for almost four years.

General Rojas Tries Amnesty and Rehabilitation

The counterinsurgency measures of the Rojas regime fall into two broad categories: those relating to a program of amnesty and rehabilitation undertaken during the latter half of 1953 and during 1954; and those relating to the renewed strengthening and use of the armed forces and national police to quell the violence, particularly after disorder began to increase in late 1954.

In early July 1953, General Rojas offered a general amnesty to all guerrillas. The insurgents were promised that they would not be punished if they turned in their weapons, swore to stop their rebellion, and returned to their former occupations. The amnesty declaration proved to be the most effective counterinsurgency measure since President Ospina's establishment in 1948 of the bipartisan government of national union. Some 600 rebels surrendered in Medellín a few days after the amnesty announcement. Later in July, it was reported that 4,000 Liberals who had been in rebellion in the mountains for five years had moved to surrender. By the beginning of September, it was estimated that most of the 20,000 or so rebels in the countryside had surrendered, including almost all of the powerful guerrilla leaders.²⁷

Rojas took other positive measures which, while not so effective as the general amnesty, indicate something of the scope of his counterinsurgency program from the latter half of 1953 through 1954. In August 1953 he decreed the formation of the Colonization and Immigration Institute, which was to make idle public lands available to refugees and surrendered guerrillas.

Capitalization of 100 million pesos was announced for this institute, to be allotted over a period of about a decade.²⁸ The following year, Rojas established a National Social Assistance Secretariat (SENDAS) to offer help to those affected by the violence. Lacking funds and poorly administered, SENDAS proved to have more form than substance in Rojas' program of counterinsurgency.

Rojas Augments the Armed Forces But Loses Political Support

Given the strongly Conservative orientation of both the armed forces and the national police as well as the Rojas government itself, it was perhaps inevitable that the success of the amnesty was brief. Charges by Liberal refugees of violations of the amnesty promises by troops and police increased, and by the end of 1954 great sections of the rural areas of Colombia were again ravaged by violence. The Rojas government's counterinsurgency program then turned to increasing the strength of the military. It is estimated that the strength of the armed forces was more than doubled, growing from 14,000 in 1948 to 32,000 in 1956.²⁹

Despite the added strength of the army, the measures of the Rojas government proved ineffective. The primary reason for this lay in the changing nature of the Rojas regime itself. Installed in power in July 1953 as a representative of the traditionally nonpolitical armed forces, Rojas had been hailed as a leader who would bring peace to a country rent by political and insurgent disorder for over five years. Indeed, the very success of the amnesty declaration he made shortly after he assumed executive power gave substance to this widespread hope. It became glaringly clear in the following year, however, that the armed forces were not nonpolitical and that Rojas' ambitions were not confined to solving the problem of insurgency.

In dealing with the armed forces, Rojas took no measures to reverse the steps the previous regime had taken to transform the army into a Conservative instrument. Indeed, as he increased the strength of the army to curb the resurgence of rebellion toward the end of 1954, he was strengthening an essentially Conservative mechanism. This was the view of the thousands of Liberals who suffered at its hands and then organized into guerrilla bands to take action against it and the government which it represented. In short, a vicious circle of increasing action and reaction resulted from the strengthening of the military forces.

Rojas' developing political ambitions also tarnished his early image as a soldier transcending partisan rivalry to bring peace to his strife-torn country. By 1955, it was evident that he was seeking to construct his government and bases of power on the model of the government of Juan Domingo Perón (1946-55) in Argentina. As certain leaders of the Conservative party and church officials withdrew their support, the effectiveness of the Rojas government in controlling the insurgency was severely reduced.

Political Leaders Agree on a Political Truce

Counterinsurgency problems and measures during 1956 and 1957 must be analyzed not only in terms of the Rojas government's ineffectiveness but in terms of other political forces, unofficial but nonetheless relevant and important, which led toward the goal of political union of the two rival parties. On the initiative of several Liberal leaders, particularly the able and distinguished Alberto Lleras Camargo, a civic front was proposed in the spring of 1956 to unite the Conservative and Liberal parties against the Rojas regime. When it became clear that the acquiescence of the most powerful Conservative figure, Laureano Gómez, in exile in Spain, was required for the formation of such a front, Lleras traveled to Spain in July 1956 and signed with Gómez the Pact of Benidorm, an agreement taking its name from the small Spanish village where the two men met.

At Benidorm the two political leaders agreed on a truce between the two parties until constitutional government could be firmly re-established in Colombia. This agreement was reiterated in July 1957, following Rojas Pinilla's fall, when Lleras and Gómez again met in Spain and made public a proposal for constitutional reform providing for parity between the two parties in all branches of government. The agreement was to be viable for twelve years, the presidency alternating between the two parties during this period.

Execution of the agreement for a national front government was delayed by lack of consensus among Conservative leaders concerning a presidential candidate for the first four-year term, which was to be assigned to the Conservatives. In the face of this indecision, it was agreed that the Liberals would put forward a candidate and have the presidency during the first four years. The fairly unanimous choice of the Liberals was Alberto Lleras Camargo, who, upon being inaugurated in August 1958, set the first national front government in motion. It was also agreed at this time to extend the coalition from 12 to 16 years; in other words, it was to last until 1974.

Within three weeks of his inauguration, President Lleras lifted the state of siege which had been in effect since 1949. This was a clear indication that the coalition government or national front of the two major parties was the most effective counterinsurgency measure since the national union of President Ospina in 1948 and the general amnesty declaration of General Rojas in 1953. The national front made it clear that the insurgency no longer had partisan political bases or support; la violencia had become outright banditry. It has been dealt with as such ever since, for it still continues.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

What conclusions may one tentatively draw from the Colombian experience? Military means alone have certainly not been adequate in dealing with the problem; indeed, it may be argued that military measures such as those taken from 1950 to 1953 and from 1954 to 1957

exacerbated the violence and occasioned its resurgence. Furthermore, the financial burden imposed by the military task of suppressing banditry is great. The efforts of the Colombian government over a period of years to capture the bandit leader Chispas and put an end to his guerrilla activity are estimated to have cost about one million pesos (then about \$125,000).³⁰

If one looks at the violence since April 1948, three periods of reduction in the conflict emerge. The first was during the latter half of 1948 and early 1949 when Colombia had a government of national union. The second was during the first year, or at least the early months, of the regime of General Rojas Pinilla. The third period has been since 1958 when the national front government was inaugurated. The one thing which these periods had in common that they all represented times of political union or political compromise and their success, albeit temporary in the first two periods and limited in the third, suggests that the insurgency in Colombia has been basically a political problem requiring a political solution.

In emphasizing the political nature of the insurgency in Colombia during the period 1948-58, one must not ignore the social and economic factors contributing to it—growing industrialization, inadequate reform measures meagerly implemented, and population pressures in a land of inequitable landholding. Nor may one ignore the achievements of the Colombian army since 1958 in working both to eliminate the banditry that has continued and to provide social assistance to the civilian population.

Some Violence Continues After 1958

With the establishment of the national front in 1958, the major political factor in the insurgency—the rivalry between the two national parties—was removed. This did not mean, however, that all violence was ended or that the disorder continuing in the countryside was entirely without a political character. Several significant pockets of guerrilla warfare remained, and the administrations of President Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962) and of Guillermo León Valencia (1962-1966) were both concerned with isolating and eliminating these bandit holdouts. On the other hand, political groups opposing the national front have attempted to exploit the remaining violence both to present additional problems to a weak and shaky coalition government they reject and to point up the ineffectiveness of the government in dealing with the violence. It is within the context of the continuation of pockets of violence and the exploitation of it for antigovernment political purposes that the "Outcome and Conclusions" should be viewed.

Post-1958 Military Measures

Military measures instituted by President Lleras shortly after his inauguration in 1958 included reinforcement of rural garrisons with personnel and equipment and airlift of troops on short notice from one area of violence to another. A rehabilitation prison for captured guerrillas

was established on the Pacific Coast island of Gorgona, about 100 miles southwest of Buenaventura.³¹

Other measures, both immediately effective and long-range, were taken to reduce the violence and contribute to tranquility in the countryside. These centered on strengthening the military in its task of quelling banditry and included the training of ranger-type officers and men to deal with the guerrillas. Also, the military was encouraged to assist rural communities in civic-action programs. A comprehensive plan along these lines was worked out in 1962. Known as Plan Lazo, the program includes antiguerrilla, intelligence, and psychological warfare training for officers and men on a scale not before attempted. For civilians the plan provides guidance in community defense in regions stirred by the violence. In accord with the plan, the Colombian army is offering civic action assistance to affected communities, both to detach them from bandit groups who might have been preying on them and to reconstruct communities devastated by the violence.³²

The army's mission of community assistance and reconstruction is particularly difficult because bandit groups have fairly consistently employed the technique of engaging the political sympathy of rural communities as a means of gaining financial support from them. It is particularly hard for the military to persuade certain communities that the bandits are not their protectors and are not being persecuted by the government because their political sympathies are similar to those of the community. When three battalions of government troops took the 3,000-man Communist "republic" of Marquetalia in the summer of 1964, for example, they found the local people "not friendly." Attitudes apparently changed, however, in the face of constructive action.³³

The Colombian army has tried to engage the sympathy of the community—offering assistance to the town, supplying drugs to the ill, and performing other helpful acts. Should bandits retaliate against families who cooperate with the military, it is hoped that leaders of the community will realize that the "political sympathy" of the bandits for the community is a mask worn by the bandits simply to gain support from the town.³⁴

Attempts To Aid Victims To Return to the Land

President Lleras also took positive action to assist victims of the violence, many of them unemployed in cities, to return to their lands. He created a department of rehabilitation, which planned for improvement of remote areas affected by the violence, including the construction of roads, bridges, airstrips, and telegraph stations to reduce isolation. About 8,000 families had been given some assistance by the end of 1959.³⁵

Among the longer range measures designed to assist those uprooted or devastated by the violence is agrarian reform. Its goals are both to redistribute inefficiently operated large landholdings among landless peasants and to make available to them new lands in areas such as

the Eastern Llanos where settlement has been scanty and access difficult. An agrarian reform law passed by the Colombian Congress in 1961 authorizes expropriation of landholdings of over 2,000 acres in cases in which the land might be deemed essential to national agrarian requirements for redistribution purposes. The law also provides for colonization projects in unsettled areas of Colombia as an additional means of providing farmland to the landless victims of the violence.³⁶

Plans have also been formulated at the department level to reduce the remaining violence and assist those victimized by it. A program in Tolima was worked out in March 1963 by the departmental governor in cooperation with the national government. To bring bandit leaders under control, the plan called for an increase in the strength of the Sixth Brigade of the army in Tolima. Other provisions of the plan sought to correct social and economic conditions which were encouraging disorder. The Tolima program included increased housing in cities of the department for those who had fled the countryside in fear of the violence; increased employment opportunities, including the construction of needed aqueducts as a means of providing more jobs to refugees from the conflict; and the construction of a hydroelectric plant to serve as a base for industrialization of this basically rural department. Plans were made for new hospitals in the urban centers of Tolima. The national government committed itself to provide the department with two million pesos (then about \$250,000) for school construction and to carry out a limited program of land redistribution, a feature of which would be a provision of credit facilities to allow tenants to purchase land.³⁷

Guerrilla-Caused Deaths Decline But a Problem Remains

Official estimates of victims of the violence from 1958 to August 15, 1963, indicate that banditry has been declining sharply. Given below are the yearly estimates of deaths.³⁸

1958	-	5,342
1959	-	3,243
1960	-	2,621
1961	-	2,838
1962	-	2,909
1963 (to mid-August)		824

The measures taken by the Colombian government since 1958 have done much to reduce the remaining violence and to assist its victims. However, during the past six years, the problem has not been simply the elimination of the bandit relics of the insurgency—an essentially military task—and the binding up of national wounds.

The remaining violence unfortunately appears to have been exploited by some of the domestic political groups who are not in sympathy with the principle or operation of the government and who seek to weaken and embarrass it. Among these groups are the Hard Line (Línea Dura)

wing of the leftist Liberal Revolutionary movement and Rojas Pinilla's followers.³⁹ The effect of their actions in exploiting the violence in Colombia for political purposes remains to be seen. Meanwhile, another kind of threat might develop if internal or foreign Communists should infiltrate and organize the bandit remnants into a united and disciplined group.

NOTES

¹United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Statistical Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. I, No. 1, March 1964.

²Preston James, Latin America (New York: Odyssey Press, 1959), pp. 101-102.

³Lyman H. Legters et al., Area Handbook for Colombia (Army Pamphlet 550-26) (Washington, D. C.; The American University, Special Operations Research Office, 1961), p. 169.

⁴James, Latin America, pp. 110-32.

⁵This background section on the Colombian economy has been drawn heavily from the good summary in Section III of Legters et al., Area Handbook for Colombia, particularly chapter 26.

⁶A detailed history of Conservative-Liberal conflicts in the latter half of the nineteenth century may be found in Jesús María Henao and Gerardo Arrubla's History of Colombia (trans. and ed. J. Fred Rippy; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1938), particularly chapters 31-35.

⁷Such as Germán Guzmán Campos, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umaña Luna, La Violencia en Colombia: Estudio de un proceso social. Vol. I, Monografías Sociológicas, No. 12 (Bogotá: Facultad de Sociología, Universidad Nacional, 1962).

⁸Ibid., chapter 1.

⁹John D. Martz, Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), p. 50.

¹⁰Guzmán et al., La Violencia, chapter 2.

¹¹Ibid., p. 96.

¹²Ibid., chapter 2, passim.

¹³El Tiempo (Bogotá), January 23, 1963, p. 6; a slightly different biography is presented in Guzmán et al., La Violencia, pp. 182-93.

¹⁴Guzmán et al., La Violencia, pp. 193-97.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 211-13.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 215-16.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 201-202.

¹⁸Legters et al., Area Handbook for Colombia, p. 430.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰El Tiempo (Bogotá), September 17, 1963, pp. 1 and 8.

²¹El Tiempo (Bogotá), July 14, 1963, p. 29.

²²Guzmán et al., La Violencia, pp. 287-93.

²³Ibid., pp. 295-96.

²⁴Martz, Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey, p. 49.

²⁵For the two paragraphs above, see ibid., p. 116.

²⁶Ibid., p. 145.

²⁷Ibid., p. 177.

²⁸Ibid., p. 193.

²⁹Ibid., p. 199.

³⁰El Tiempo (Bogotá), January 23, 1963, p. 6.

³¹Ibid., pp. 277-78.

³²A brief report on the program is in Pat M. Holt's Colombia Today and Tomorrow (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 186.

³³The Washington Post, July 18, 1965, p. E-2.

³⁴Mayor Calixto Cascante Parra, "El apoyo de la población civil," in Revista del Ejército (Colombia), III (January 1963), passim.

³⁵El Tiempo (Bogotá), January 23, 1963, p. 6.

³⁶Holt, Colombia Today and Tomorrow, chapter 5.

³⁷El Tiempo (Bogotá), March 31, 1963, pp. 1 and 22.

³⁸El Tiempo (Bogotá), August 15, 1963, p. 3.


³⁹References by Rojas to violence are reported in Holt, Colombia Today and Tomorrow, p. 187.

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Chapter Sixteen

**CUBA
1953-1959**



CUBA (1953-1959)

Chapter Sixteen

CUBA (1953-1959)

by John Heins

The counterinsurgency efforts of President Fulgencio Batista failed against the fragmented underground and guerrilla movements led by Fidel Castro and other middle-class intellectuals; the governmental incompetence, corruption, and indiscriminate terror tactics so alienated the people of Cuba and demoralized the army that the president was forced to flee the country, leaving a vacuum for Castro to fill.

BACKGROUND

Ninety-eight miles south of the Florida Keys lies the crescent shaped island of Cuba, the westernmost and largest of the Caribbean islands. Comprising a total area of 44,278 square miles (about the size of Pennsylvania), Cuba enjoys a strategic location in relation to the United States, for it commands the sea approaches to Mexico, the Panama Canal, and the U.S. gulf coast.¹ Seven hundred and forty-five miles in length and varying from 22 to 124 miles in width, the island has an unusually long coastline because of innumerable coves, bays, and peninsulas. The many small islands that dot its offshore waters are generally uninhabited, except for the relatively large (986 square miles) Isle of Pines lying 59 miles off the southern coast.

Although most of Cuba is flat and undulating, about one-fourth of the total land area is mountainous. The most important mountains are situated in the easternmost province of Oriente. Here the Central Valley, which runs the length of Cuba, is compressed between two mountain blocks. The northern block is composed of six similar groups of rough, stony highlands which include the Sierra del Cristal. On the southwest the valley is bordered by the highest and most rugged mountains in the country, the Sierra Maestra. This range is made up of several small chains which extend along the southern coast of Oriente Province; rising sharply from the sea-coast, it reaches elevations of 8,000 feet. Peasants engage in subsistence agriculture along the northern or inland slopes, which ascend more gradually, receive more rain, and have fertile soil in the river valleys and highland basins. The range is well suited for use as a guerrilla base, since the high mountains drop to heavily wooded foothills surrounded by thick brush and lowland jungle. This area has been the traditional refuge of Cuban insurgent movements.²

Cuba's moderate climate lends itself to the outdoor life of the guerrilla. Temperatures remain in the 70's and 80's throughout the year. The average yearly rainfall of 54.9 inches occurs mostly between May and November.³

According to the 1963 census, the Cuban population numbered 5,829,029 persons, with an average age of 22 years.* Fifty-seven percent lived in communities of more than 150 persons, an urbanization rate that was high for Latin America. Oriente Province was the least urbanized.⁴

Sugar Dominates the Economy

The Cuban economy of the 1950's was stagnant. Approximately 20 percent of the total labor force was unemployed during 9 months each year, and even at the peak of the sugar harvest unemployment remained as high as 8 percent. During the previous 25 years, per capita income had barely kept pace with the population growth.⁵

An important factor responsible for the slow rate of economic growth was the preponderant role of the production and exportation of sugar. During 1954, for example, the sugar industry alone accounted for 25 percent of the gross national product and approximately 80 percent of Cuba's foreign exchange earnings. This imbalance in the economy attracted investment away from the development of nonsugar industries; led to the neglect of other agricultural pursuits; brought 31 percent of the total agricultural land under the control of the large sugar corporations while forcing out the small farmer; and, finally, subjected the whole Cuban economy to the vagaries of the world sugar market.⁶

Cuba's economic status in the 1950's might be considered semicolonial, owing largely to the nature and extent of U.S. investment on the island. In 1958 total private U.S. investment stood at 800 million to 1 billion dollars. Forty percent of the island's sugar was owned by U.S. corporations. U.S. business interests controlled 90 percent of Cuba's telephone and electric services, approximately 50 percent of the public service railways, 90 percent of the nation's mineral wealth, and, with British companies, all of Cuba's oil and gasoline production.⁷ Almost 70 percent of Cuba's imports came from the United States, and more than 70 percent of its exports went to the United States.⁸ Reciprocal trade agreements and close commercial ties with the United States brought great prosperity to some groups of the Cuban population, but dependence on commodity and food imports tended to discourage the development of a diversified economic base on the island. While local Cuban businessmen were often more exploitative and unscrupulous than foreign firms, the fact that foreigners were in control of such basic sectors of the economy aroused deep resentment among nationalistic Cubans.

* In the United States the average age is 29 years.

Governmental Corruption Adds to Economic Problems

Most facets of the Cuban economy were subject to regulation by a large governmental bureaucracy. Although originally intended to protect the public interest, governmental control and attendant social legislation placed bureaucratic officials in positions to profit from graft and "rake-offs." Corruption and venality were widespread and had their source in politics.⁹

For a decade after the overthrow of President Gerardo Machado in 1933, Fulgencio Batista was the most powerful figure in Cuban politics, ruling in the 1930's through presidents of his own choosing and from 1940-1944 as the elected president of Cuba. In this period, which was marked by World War II, he enjoyed the loyal support of the military, whose chief he had been. Order and stability marked Cuban politics; the liberal Constitution of 1940 was promulgated; and progress was made in public works, health, and education. Nevertheless, corruption remained prevalent.¹⁰

During the eight-year period which followed Batista's retirement from power in 1944, Cuba experienced two popularly elected governments. Under Presidents Grau San Martín (1944-1948) and Prío Socarrás (1948-1952), both leaders of the Auténtico party, a serious attempt was made to liberalize political institutions, reduce the power of the army, and make government more closely adhere to the provisions of the 1940 Constitution. Unfortunately, however, the liberal administrations were as corrupt as the former ones and were even less capable of controlling gangsterism and disorder.¹¹

Batista Returns to Power Through a Coup

In March 1952, Fulgencio Batista decided to try a political comeback in that year's presidential election. According to an early pre-election poll, the front-running party in the campaign was a militant reformist offshoot of the incumbent Auténtico party, the Ortodoxo party, which held the allegiance of a majority of students and professionals of the younger generation. Reform, honesty in government, and action on the social and economic provisions of the 1940 Constitution were the main planks in the Ortodoxo platform. It was dedicated to revitalizing the social revolution begun in the 1930's with the overthrow of the dictator Machado—a revolution which the Ortodoxo party thought was mired in corruption and obstructed by the political and economic domination of the United States.¹² Since pre-election polls revealed that he had little chance of winning, Batista, claiming that the opposition was planning a coup of its own, conspired with officers of the army. At 2:00 a.m. on March 10, 1952, a carefully planned, bloodless coup brought Batista back to power.¹³

Most Cubans quickly accommodated to the Batista regime. Labor came to terms with the new government when it became apparent that official patronage would be continued. Business generally welcomed the economic stability and public order offered by an autocratic regime. Justifying his actions as measures necessary for peace and public safety until "honest" elections

could be held, Batista suspended the Constitution, replaced Congress with a "Consultative Council," restricted the press, and jailed his most outspoken critics. The promised election, finally held in November 1954, gave Batista the presidency. Congress was reconvened and the Constitution was reinstated.¹⁴

The Nature of the Opposition

But conditions did not normalize as expected, and protests against Batista's seizure of power and election grew. The main opposition to the regime came from two groups of Cuban society—the economically maladjusted and politically disillusioned middle-class intellectuals and the economically impoverished, politically abused, and socially neglected peasants.

By occupational and economic criteria, the majority of intellectuals belonged to the middle class; but, by virtue of education and capabilities, they tended to regard themselves as members of the upper class and aspired to the standard of living and values of the traditional elite. The desired status required white collar employment, servants, the cultural finesse of a liberal education, and an influential voice in politics. Cuban universities annually graduated many more lawyers, economists, and other professionals than the economy could absorb. Aside from part-time tutoring or other temporary jobs, the only prospects open to the majority of this group were entry into politics or governmental service. Political patronage and nepotism were standard means of obtaining employment in the government, the island's largest single employer.¹⁵

Two elements in the educational background of this group are significant. First, university graduates were exposed to a Marxist view of society and of the government's role in the economy. Second, the teaching of Cuban history tended, from the earliest grades, to inculcate an intense patriotism and a desire to emulate the heroes and martyrs of past revolutions. The Hispanic tradition values freedom and dignity of the individual above all else. The sense of masculinity (*machismo*) was intense; an affront to one's personal dignity demanded an immediate response of action, not reason. The ideal Cuban man should be aggressively self-assertive, demonstrate a dramatic flair as a leader and politician, and command the blind devotion of his followers. The phenomenon of personalismo is an integral part of Cuban politics; and party members are often known by the name of their leader, e.g., Machadistas, Batistianas.¹⁶

The second group that was to be involved in the insurgency was the rural lower class, particularly the peasants of the isolated Sierra Maestra. The mountain farming peasants had received none of the social and economic benefits that had come to the rest of the population during the last two decades. Lacking medical, educational, or transportation facilities, the peasants eked out a bare living.¹⁷ Despite their generally miserable lot, they were to become involved in the revolutionary movement mainly because of their location in the mountains. They became insurgents by accident of place, when the insurgent leadership from the cities

entered their mountain districts. There is little doubt, however, that peasant loyalty to the insurgency had an important bearing on the final outcome.

It should be noted that organized labor in the cities, always courted by Batista, did not join the revolution until the very last moment. Although many of the labor leaders were Communists and the chief influence exerted in Cuban society by communism was through the labor movement, an unofficial truce existed between communism and Batista until late in the 1950's.¹⁸

INSURGENCY

Organized opposition to the Batista coup of 1952 got off to a very slow start. Political parties, their leaders in jail or in exile and their membership fragmented by internal rivalries, were ineffective vehicles for resistance. The most vehement protest to the illegal seizure of power came from members of the politically conscious upper middle class—students, young lawyers, and professionals whose future careers in politics had been thwarted by the coup. Return to constitutionally elected government was the central theme of protest marches, handbills, and student strikes. Police and army units easily suppressed most of the outbursts and riots between 1952 and 1956.

Insurgent Leadership: Fidel Castro

Although there were many potential leaders of insurrection in this early period, the one who was to prevail was Fidel Castro. As a student at the University of Havana he had been involved in radical groups and undoubtedly had dabbled in Marxism, along with most of his conferees. A man of action rather than a thinker, he was one of the founders of the terroristic Unión Insurreccional Revolucionaria (UIR). As a member of the Ortodoxo party he stood as a congressional candidate in the abortive election of 1952. Nearly six feet tall, broad-shouldered, and of striking features, Castro had a commanding presence. From his university days he had cultivated the image of a man of physical prowess and undaunted courage, filled with a great love for the people. In many respects, Castro embodied the ideal of machismo.¹⁹

Castro burst into public view on July 26, 1953, when he led an attack upon Cuba's second largest military garrison, the Moncada barracks in Santiago de Cuba. The attacking force was composed of some 165 students, clerks, and recent university graduates armed with shotguns and .22 caliber rifles. Their plan was to seize arms, ammunition, vehicles, and tanks from the fortress and to rally the population of Oriente Province by means of prepared radio messages. The attackers who escaped death during the operation were captured and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Castro's name became known, and the insurgent movement which he founded took its name from the date of the abortive attack—the 26th of July Movement, often referred to simply as M-26.²⁰

Castro Plans and Trains in Mexico

After serving 19 months of his sentence, Fidel Castro was released from prison in May 1955 during a general amnesty of political prisoners, who were freed on the condition that they go into exile. Determined to continue his fight against Batista, Castro met with other insurgents and arranged for the creation of an active M-26 underground in Cuba. In exile in Mexico and the United States, Castro continued to seek recruits and financial support from various Cuban exile groups. One of the main contributors was Cuban ex-President Prío Socarrás, who had taken refuge in Miami following the Batista coup. "Twenty-sixth of July Clubs" were organized in major U.S. cities to acquire black market arms, ammunition, and equipment.

A volunteer invasion force began secret training on a ranch near Mexico City. Despite the fact that Mexican government surveillance forced numerous changes in locale, the insurgents' training camp graduated a guerrilla cadre. The training program was conducted by Col. Alberto Bayo, who had had experience in guerrilla warfare in Spain and Morocco. The anti-Batista trainees, who included some revolutionaries from other countries, were predominantly middle-class Cuban youths, some of whom were veterans of the Moncada barracks attack. They were instructed in guerrilla tactics and sabotage, in the use of modern weapons, and in escape and evasion techniques. They were also given many hours of nationalist indoctrination. Strenuous physical conditioning and intense psychological motivation proved to be the two greatest assets resulting from the intermittent six-month training session.²¹

"Che" Guevara and Raúl Castro

The star student of the training program, according to Bayo, was Ernesto "Che" Guevara. An Argentinian by birth, he was exiled for anti-Perón activities and thus had to interrupt his medical education. He was soon a veteran of numerous revolutionary conspiracies throughout Latin America. Eventually he held a minor post in Guatemala; when his patron President Jacobo Arbenz was overthrown, Guevara fled to Mexico and joined with the Cuban exiles. He was a confirmed Marxist, although he disclaimed membership in any Communist party.²²

Fidel's younger brother Raúl, who had shared the family's fortunes at Moncada barracks and in prison on the Isle of Pines, also joined Castro and Guevara in Mexican exile. Raúl was apparently more radical than his older brother, having been active in the Socialist Youth (Communist) while at the university. Quiet and physically unimpressive, but with a reputation for brutality, he commanded great loyalty from his men in the guerrilla army.²³

Castro Invades Cuba, Is Defeated, and Flees to the Hills

By mid-1956, three years after the Moncada barracks failure, Castro was ready to strike again. His strategy at this point was essentially the same as in the earlier attack. After invading Cuba, he planned to overpower a government garrison, capture its arms and ammunition,

and then inspire the people of Oriente Province to rise against local government forces. If he could cut off Oriente from the rest of the island, Castro felt he would be able to continue the struggle until the central government was completely overthrown. The difference between the plans of 1953 and 1956 was that in 1956 underground action squads, which meanwhile had been organized in Cuban cities, were to support the invading insurgent forces.²⁴

On November 25, 1956, the 82-man expeditionary force set out from Mexico for Cuba aboard the yacht Granma, originally built to carry 8 passengers. Delays at sea and faulty communications created grave problems. Some of the planned strikes, sabotage, and riots were postponed; some were carried out by underground members even though the landing of their compatriots was delayed. Castro and his companions finally landed—but in the wrong place—and were discovered by the army only three days later. Twelve of the original 82 men survived this first encounter. The weakness of the underground and the overwhelming defeat of the attack party forced Castro to retreat into the nearby Sierra Maestra to rebuild his forces.²⁵

Of Many Underground Groups, Castro's Is Best Organized

Castro's defeat underscored the weakness of the Cuban underground. The entire resistance organization was hampered by interparty rivalry and personal jealousy and had little cohesion, organization, or effectiveness. One observer described the Cuban underground of 1956 as being composed of romantic schoolboys and nostalgic older men, political hacks and idealistic do-gooders, and all sorts of adventurers.²⁶

The underground organization consisted of numerous groups—constantly shifting in membership, sometimes disappearing, with new ones arriving on the scene frequently. Some groups, of course, were more permanent than others. Their character varied widely. The young members of the Federation of University Students and its offshoot, the Revolutionary Directorate, perpetrated the most violent and reckless acts against the regime. The Triple A, supported by the Auténtico party of Prío Socarrás, was composed of specialists in bombings and assassination; some of its small (never more than 20) membership were paid terrorists. Also supported by the Auténtico party was the Organización Auténtica, which was chiefly concerned with the support of a small guerrilla army in the mountains.²⁷

The most active and best organized group was the 26th of July Movement, made up of young men with no real start in their professions, with little money or position, but with strong motivation. The urban underground of M-26 was composed of small cells whose members engaged in terrorism, sabotage, antigovernment propaganda, and general nuisance activity in most of the cities and towns throughout the island. The majority of its agents were recruited from the Ortodoxo party and university students. A "national direction" or central committee coordinated M-26 underground activities by means of a pyramidal structure of area, district, and

ward chiefs. Women—many of them mothers or sisters of students who had been jailed or killed by Batista's police—worked in the underground as fundraisers, protest marchers, and disseminators of propaganda in whispering and gossip campaigns.

The Civic Resistance Movement opposed Batista on general principle, but had no particular political identification. By mid-1957 it had become closely allied with the 26th of July Movement. It complemented the M-26, as many of its members were well established professionals and leading citizens. Their social and professional contacts, their access to printing facilities, and their financial position enabled them to contribute substantial logistic and economic support to their more active compatriots in M-26.²⁸ Although some members of the Civic Resistance Movement engaged in terrorism, this group as a whole tended to serve as a moderating influence upon its radical counterpart, M-26.

Castro Is Able To Maintain a Mountain Base

The 26th of July Movement gained in stature during 1957 when its fighting force in the mountains received wide and sensational publicity. The name of Castro became a household word in Cuba, and his guerrillas became a symbol important far beyond their military value.²⁹ By mid-1957 Castro's guerrilla base in the Sierra Maestra fastness was secure enough to allow basic training of recruits, the establishment of a field hospital, and the small-scale manufacture of boots, web equipment, and explosives. That outposts eventually were connected to the base by telephone attests to the degree of security obtained.

Peasants were vital to the guerrilla operations as major sources of food, intelligence, and fresh recruits. The rebels courted peasant support by paying fair prices for food and offering educational and medical assistance.³⁰ Although the peasantry bore the brunt of government forays, they gladly acted as guides and informants for the rebels.

Supply was a critical factor, particularly arms and ammunition. The 26th of July leaders claimed that 85 percent of their arms and ammunition was captured in the field from government troops. Many arms shipments to the guerrillas were intercepted by Batista; it is estimated that less than half of the armaments smuggled from foreign countries ever reached the Sierra Maestra.*

The .30 caliber Garand rifle was the most common weapon used by the guerrillas, although shotguns, sporting rifles, old Springfields, and some automatic weapons were also in evidence.

* One source states that approximately 90 percent of the supplies sent to Cuba for the insurgents came from the United States and was financed by funds raised in the United States. (Irving Peter Pflaum, "Fidel of Cuba," American Universities' Field Staff Reports (Mexico and Caribbean Area Series), V, Nos. 1 and 2 (New York: American Universities' Field Staff, Inc., 1960), p. 77).

"Che" Guevara afterwards decided that a greater number of single shot rifles would have been more practical, as inexperienced guerrillas tended to expend scarce ammunition at too rapid a rate. Still, the fact that the Cuban guerrillas invariably produced a high volume of fire had an unsettling effect upon government troops.³²

M-26 Strength Grows With a Number of Small Tactical Successes

The tactics Castro employed from late 1957 followed for the most part standard guerrilla procedures. With very few followers—he estimated his forces at about 180 men in early 1958—Castro led his guerrillas in hit-and-run attacks on small government patrols, sabotaged communications, encircled small garrisons, ambushed their relief troops, and carried out other small-scale acts of violence. His aim was to harass the enemy, capture weapons, and create a general climate of insecurity. A tactical variant was the Cuban guerrillas' practice of killing off the vanguard of patrols sent into the mountains instead of ambushing the main column. The regular soldiers soon became reluctant to act as point or to march in the vanguard.³³

M-26 policy in regard to prisoners also had psychological effects. Captured government troops were always well-treated and given first aid if wounded. Before being turned over to the Red Cross, prisoners were given a short talk on the aims of the insurgency and assured that the guerrillas had nothing against them personally but only opposed Batista and his "tyrannical" regime. Eventually, portable loudspeakers were used to deliver the same message to soldiers in encircled garrisons.

The 26th of July Movement thrived and grew with continual small successes. By March 1958, a second column was formed under the command of Raúl Castro, who began operations in the Sierra del Cristal on the northern side of the Central Highway. At this time Castro's total guerrilla strength was estimated at 1,000 men.³⁴

In March 1958, not only M-26 but various other Cuban groups, among them the Joint Committee of Civic Institutions, a federation of professional and civic associations, approached Batista and demanded that he step down.³⁵ Batista's refusal probably suited Castro. The M-26 meanwhile called for a more radical solution.

The New Strategy of a General Strike Fails

Castro himself felt that it was time to put into effect the strategy that had been evolved after his disastrous landing in 1956. This new plan put primary emphasis on an intensive underground effort to impose a general strike that would paralyze the island. This was to be supplemented by guerrilla activity in the mountains and by urban warfare. Through regular broadcasts on Radio Rebelde, a transmitter smuggled into the Sierra Maestra, Castro exhorted the Cuban populace to rise against Batista.

Although the much publicized strike partially succeeded in many cities, it was a complete failure in Havana. For one thing, it was not coordinated. For another, the Communists, although a strong force in Cuban labor, did not participate. The official party newspaper in fact pointed out that future attempts would also fail unless the 26th of July Movement abandoned its policy of rebuffing Communist attempts to participate in insurgent policy formulation.³⁶

Castro Survives Failure and Emerges As the Dominant Underground Leader

This third major defeat was such a setback to M-26 morale that, had the counterinsurgency forces acted promptly, it is possible that Castro's men could have been crushed. The guerrillas, however, survived the government offensive of May, which was both slow in starting and poorly managed. To counter defeatist attitudes, Castro ordered a step-up in terrorism, assassination, and sabotage in an underground version of total war. Raúl Castro's kidnaping of 45 U.S. military personnel stationed at Guantanamo Naval Base brought headlines in June and proved that the insurgents were still a viable force.

When the seven most important groups of Cuban insurgents came together in Caracas, Venezuela, in July 1958, Castro managed to dictate the terms of a joint "Pact of Unity" by which the delegates pledged united resistance to the Batista regime. They created the Civilian Revolutionary Front and named José Miró Cardona, ex-dean of the Havana Bar Association, as coordinating secretary general. Manuel Urrutia was named as future president of a provisional government. Although the cooperation achieved was superficial at best, the pact gave to the entire revolutionary movement an appearance of unity and an aura of strength.³⁷

The arrival of a plane-load of weapons from Costa Rica permitted the arming of the summer influx of guerrilla recruits, and two new columns were formed during August and September 1958 in the Sierra Maestra. Placed under "Che" Guevara and Camillo Cienfuegos, they were moved to Las Villas where they joined forces with the Second National Front of Escambray and the Revolutionary Directorate, two other guerrilla groups already active there.³⁸

Castro's prestige had by now soared to such heights that the Communists decided to support the rebels unconditionally, without requiring the full partnership they had previously demanded. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, member of the Communist central committee and later editor of Noticias de Hoy, the party newspaper, visited Castro in the mountains in the early summer of 1958. During the fall, the Communists ordered their members to support Castro in both the mountains and the urban underground; Rodríguez became liaison between the Communists and Castro.³⁹

Castro Guerrillas Move From the Mountains to the Capital

By November 1958 Cuba was in turmoil. Insurgent terrorism in the cities tied up great numbers of security forces. Brutal retaliation by Batista's forces only increased the number of recruits for Castro. Fidel and Raúl Castro began moving out of the mountains to converge upon Santiago de Cuba. In Las Villas Province insurgent forces blocked the main communications arteries and cut the island in two. Insurgents found that high military officials under Batista were willing to begin talks; some regular army commanders went over to the rebels. On December 31, Santa Clara, the capital of Las Villas, surrendered to rebel forces under Guevara.⁴⁰

Before Castro could even enter Santiago de Cuba, the combination of pressures on Batista had forced him to resign. Underground forces took over Havana on January 1, 1959. On January 8, Fidel Castro reached Havana, after an eight-day triumphal tour of the island atop a captured tank. This fateful tour, during which Castro captured the imagination of much of the Cuban population, was the start of the cult of "Fidelismo."⁴¹

Estimates of Final Strength and Casualties

At this final point, Castro had a total force of approximately 7,500 uniformed guerrillas and as many more in civilian dress. His overall losses were estimated at 20,000 men—1,000 fatalities among the guerrillas in the mountains and 19,000 in the urban underground.⁴² These casualty figures are generally considered to be very inflated; another anti-Batista source has attributed to the Batista regime fewer than 3,000 insurgent deaths.⁴³

COUNTERINSURGENCY

President Fulgencio Batista's assumption of power in 1952 by coup d'état and the dependence of his regime upon extremely repressive measures kept the government of Cuba on the moral and psychological defensive. The legitimacy of Batista's regime was continuously challenged. The president was portrayed as an accomplice of foreign exploiters, his government as "made in U.S.A." The moral authority of the government was undermined, as the opposition pointed to police brutality and torture, the corruption and venality of officials, the encouragement of gambling and prostitution, and the ineffectiveness of social and economic development programs.

President Fulgencio Batista Tries To Establish a Base of Political Support

Batista was never able to rally enthusiastic popular support or to challenge the imagination of the Cuban people. His public image was no match for the dashing figure cut by Fidel Castro. A former army sergeant, Batista was neither well educated nor socially polished. His heavy facial features, slicked-down black hair, and rather squat figure did not evoke the image of a

dynamic personality. Cubans snickered at his alleged insistence that his wife, who was taller than he, either remain seated or assume a stooped posture when appearing with him in public.

Weak in public oratory but skillful in political maneuvering, Batista depended on his control of governmental machinery rather than on mass popularity. During the two and one-half years following his 1952 coup he found it necessary to govern under a fundamental law which proscribed representative government. The functions of Congress were vested in a hand-picked cabinet. Political parties were dissolved, and constitutional guarantees were suspended for much of the time. In 1953 a law was enacted that for all practical purposes made it a crime to criticize the regime. Censorship of the press was imposed intermittently.⁴⁴

Although Batista felt that under his administration the paramount virtues of the state were its strength and stability, he was not unmindful of the demand by respected Cubans that elections be held. After a series of postponements, elections were slated for November 1954. Batista resigned in August to campaign for the presidency, and many restrictions were lifted. Although political parties were given some freedom to reorganize, they had little success, for they were badly split between those who hoped to present a united front against Batista and those who refused to "dignify" by their participation what they felt would be a rigged election. Small factions of the Auténticos and the Ortodoxos offered presidential candidates but then withdrew them before election day in protest against government harassment. Batista was elected.⁴⁵

Following his inauguration in February 1955, Batista made a sincere effort to win some measure of popular support and cooperation for his government. The 1940 Constitution was restored and Congress was reconvened. Attempting to find a formula to restore political peace, Batista called for a "civic dialogue" comprising representatives of various political, business, and civic organizations. A further concession to domestic and international criticism of his regime was the president's general amnesty for political prisoners proclaimed in May 1955. Gradually, through the use of patronage, intimidation, and compromise, Batista achieved a semblance of orderly, if somewhat dictatorial, government.

Batista Puts Down Attempts at Rebellion and Suppresses News of Them

It was an uneasy peace, however. On April 4, 1956, Batista had to move against a number of business and professional men and army officers known as the Montecristi group for conspiring to overthrow the government. The plot was foiled and the involved officers were tried, convicted, and sentenced to six years in prison.

A short time later the military garrison of Matanzas was attacked, in the suicidal Moncada style, by young members of a local Auténtico underground. Soldiers cut down most of the attackers in a cross-fire, military intelligence officers began an intensive roundup of all suspects in Matanzas, and many persons were executed. Batista suspended constitutional guarantees during most of the time from 1956 to 1959, as uprisings, bombings, and assassinations increased.⁴⁶

Until 1957 Batista succeeded in concealing insurrectionary activity from most of the Cuban population by a strict news blackout and imposition of travel restrictions around the areas of unrest. Before rumors had time to spread, Batista would have the situation under control. Eventually, however, he overplayed his hand. By falsifying official government communiqués to minimize the importance of opposition activities, he discredited the regime. The credibility of the government was particularly damaged by the official report that Fidel Castro had been killed while landing in Oriente in December 1956 and that his invasion force had been totally destroyed. Batista became a laughingstock six weeks later when The New York Times published an interview held in the Sierra Maestra with Castro.⁴⁷ When Batista claimed this was a hoax, the Times printed a photograph showing that Castro was indeed alive. Among foreign newsmen in Cuba, Batista communiqués came to be referred to as "comic-uniqueés"; among Cubans, Batista became a figure of ridicule.⁴⁸

Police Terrorism Alienates the Cubans

In time the figure of ridicule also became a figure of terror, as Batista turned to tactics of intimidation and repression, in both the cities and the countryside. Successive waves of governmental terror followed an attempt on Batista's life in March of 1957, the Cienfuegos naval revolt in September of that year, and the unsuccessful strike in the spring of 1958. Except in rare instances, the victims were unimportant people; the wealthier and more influential were generally allowed to leave the country.

Students in universities and even high schools became targets of police sweeps, their battered bodies often being found later in the streets. One observer has remarked that since Cuban law provided no death penalty the police may have been provoked to adopt terroristic methods.⁴⁹ The irrational nature of the terrorism was undoubtedly an important factor in the withdrawal of popular support from the government and tended to create new recruits for the insurgency.

Withdrawal of U.S. Support

Batista's problem was compounded by his loss of support in the United States. Despite publicity such as photographs of Batista with U.S. officials, apologists for the Batista regime could only appeal for support on the grounds of the president's anti-communism and were unable to counter the negative image of him which was propagated by the insurgents. Although the United States emphasized internal stability and control of Communist subversion in its Latin American policy, the reliability or desirability of dictators as allies against communism came into question, particularly following the visit of U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon to South America.*

*On April 28, 1958, Vice-President and Mrs. Richard Nixon embarked upon a goodwill tour of eight Latin American nations. In Peru and Venezuela, two countries in which U.S. military aid was widely believed to have helped perpetuate strong dictatorships, the Nixons were subjected

Ultimately, Batista lost U.S. military support. In the spring of 1958, the U.S. government decided that its military missions would remain; but that since arms being shipped to the Cuban government were used in violation of the terms of its military assistance agreement with Cuba, further shipments would be stopped. This action directly affected the morale of the Cuban armed forces.⁵⁰

Armed Forces Problems of Morale and Loyalty

Armed forces morale and loyalty became a serious problem in the conduct of the counter-insurgency. Military loyalty was based on both a sense of professional duty and assurances that high military pay and benefits would be maintained. After Batista assumed power, he weeded out those officers whom he felt he could not trust and promoted those who had assisted in his coup. Complete loyalty of all members of the armed forces was, however, never obtained. For example, Col. Ramón Barquín, Cuban military attaché in Washington and Cuba's chief delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board, was the leader of the Montecristi plot in 1956. Barquín had been awarded the Legion of Merit by the United States for his contribution to Inter-American defense planning. The disloyalty of this highly respected military figure was a serious blow to Batista.

Not only individual persons but whole units were intermittently involved in disloyal activities. A year after the Montecristi group was uncovered, a naval uprising at Cienfuegos shook the regime. The uprising was supposed to be part of a larger plot to overthrow Batista; although the plan was called off at the last minute, the naval garrison at Cienfuegos was not informed. When, on September 5, 1957, the garrison struck on schedule in conjunction with civilian underground groups, the city of Cienfuegos was taken. It was recaptured several hours later by loyal infantry and armored units. When the air force was sent to strafe the city, however, several pilots refused to bomb civilians and jettisoned their bombs over the bay.⁵¹

The professional pride of many officers in the Cuban armed services was offended by the disclosure of atrocities perpetrated by members of the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (S.I.M.) and other official police organizations. Sadistic treatment of women and boys taken in for questioning aroused second thoughts in the minds of many military men as to the ethics of being party to the regime. Batista's increased dependence upon the S.I.M., whose methods resemble those of the Gestapo, and his appointment of officers willing to employ extreme brutality were factors in the defection of some military commanders during the final stages of the insurgency.

to violently hostile "student" demonstrations. Anti-United States feeling ran particularly high in Venezuela where the oppressive Pérez Jiménez dictatorship had been overthrown only a few months previously.

Armed Forces Strength and Equipment

The strength of the Cuban army in the late 1950's has been estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000 men.⁵² One Cuban officer testified that army strength probably exceeded 40,000 men at the time of Batista's departure.⁵³ It is generally agreed that the army was moderately well equipped despite Batista's allegation that the arms embargo "caught the Armed Forces with obsolete equipment, 1903-model repeating rifles and cannons, and machineguns of the First World War."⁵⁴ Tanks, armored personnel carriers, half-tracks, howitzers, and mortars were available to and used by the army in the antiguerrilla campaign. The combat wing of the Cuban air force comprised at least 65 aircraft, including bombers and rocket-armed fighters. In October 1958, additional Sea Fury fighters as well as a number of 30-ton tanks were purchased from Great Britain.⁵⁵

Police and Paramilitary Organizations

In addition to the regular armed forces, a number of police and paramilitary organizations were available to the government. The Cuban national police, consisting of seven militarized divisions, one for each province and a central division for the city of Havana, was at the command of the minister of defense and often worked in close cooperation with the regular army. The rural guard, a separate branch of the police stationed in the countryside, was under the direction of the chief of staff of the army. The department of justice and the department of interior also maintained substantial investigatory police forces—the judicial police and the national secret police, respectively.

Also at the service of the government was the 2,000-man private army of Senator Rolando Masferrer in Oriente Province. This uniformed and motorized personal force worked closely with the army against various insurgent groups; its effectiveness was probably indicated by the degree of hatred it engendered among Cubans.⁵⁶

Antiguerrilla Strategy and Tactics

Although Batista's forces were relatively strong and well equipped, military operations against the guerrillas were generally ineffective. For example, a 4,000-man infantry force sent to Oriente Province in early 1957 found it impossible to locate the Castro guerrillas, let alone eliminate them. The slow-moving, large patrols that scoured the hills were unaccustomed to the rugged life away from the barracks and generally unable to secure adequate intelligence from the local populace. They were no match for their fast moving quarry who knew the terrain and had almost perfect intelligence.

When patrolling failed, the army tried a policy of containment. A cordon of garrisons and outposts was set up around the foothills of the Sierra Maestra during the summer of 1957. Since Castro's guerrilla band was thus no longer pursued, it was able to establish a well-concealed

permanent base where recruits could be trained and a headquarters set up. As the growing guerrilla forces began to descend from the mountains at night to harass small outposts and to capture weapons, government forces encamped around the Sierra Maestra had to be reinforced by some 3,000 additional troops. Pursuit patrols found it costly to enter the rebel-held mountains.

Until the spring of 1958, the antiguerrilla forces concentrated on and were generally successful in protecting the transportation and communication arteries in southern Oriente Province. In March 1958, however, a guerrilla band led by Raúl Castro succeeded in slipping through the perimeter and began attacking vehicles on the Central Highway from a new base in the Sierra del Cristal.

The Major Military Operation Against Castro

After the failure of Castro's general strike in April 1958, Batista ordered a large-scale military operation to catch the rebels while they were still dispirited and off balance. Despite his orders, the offensive did not get underway until a month later, by which time Castro had rallied his forces and prepared defensive positions in the mountains.

The government committed between 12,000 and 15,000 men to this Sierra Maestra operation, giving its army a superiority ratio of a minimum of 40 soldiers to 1 guerrilla, possibly as much as 100 to 1. The army was equipped with armored trucks, tanks, and half-tracks, armored jeeps, light artillery, and helicopters. Troops were divided into 13 combat teams of about 900 men each, armed with automatic weapons, mortars, bazookas, and plenty of ammunition.⁵⁷ Fortified posts were constructed.

Using light artillery, fragmentation bombs, and napalm, government forces plastered the mountainsides, killing peasants and destroying their homes, but failing to hit any significant rebel targets. Patrols, some of which were transported by armored helicopters, were sent into the hills; but they seldom managed to engage the guerrillas. Casualties from unseen snipers were high. When the army advanced in force, the rebels retreated; when the army pulled back, the rebels advanced. Tank losses were high, as the guerrillas used captured bazookas to good effect. Other tanks were lost when they toppled into camouflaged pits which guerrillas had dug in the road during the night.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, during the month of June, government forces in the Sierra Maestra succeeded in forcing the guerrillas to retreat to a limited perimeter.

While the army centered its attention on Fidel's forces in the Sierra Maestra, its supply lines were constantly harassed by Raúl Castro's guerrillas in the Sierra del Cristal to their rear. Troops had to be diverted to protect the highway and outlying towns. Gradually the government offensive lost momentum.

Army Ineptness, Misfortunes, and Poor Conduct Bring Total Military Failure

Persistent difficulties and problems beset the army. At one point, for example, two full infantry battalions under Col. Sánchez Mosquera climbed into rebel-held territory, only to be led by a series of skirmishes into a trap near the hamlet of Santo Domingo. After a three-day battle with guerrillas who surrounded them on higher ground, the government forces escaped, leaving a third of their men behind. In their retreat they abandoned short-wave radio equipment and the army code. From June 5 until the code was changed on July 25, the rebels were able to monitor government communications and anticipate troop movements.⁵⁹

The turning point was reached on July 19 with the defeat of the 18th Infantry Battalion under Maj. José Quevedo. In an attempt to enter the Sierra Maestra from the Caribbean side, Major Quevedo left his supply company on the shore and, after an eight-day march into the mountains, awoke at dawn to find his camp encircled. Every attempt to break out was frustrated, as were all attempts at relief.⁶⁰ Efforts to resupply the beleaguered battalion by air failed, as the packages fell into rebel hands. After ten days without food, the battalion surrendered. The capture of its weapons in effect created a new insurgent battalion. The captured soldiers, except for Major Quevedo, who stayed in the mountains to help the insurgents, were released to the Red Cross. Soldiers thus learned that surrender to the insurgents entailed no unpleasant experiences and was not necessarily to be avoided.

The torrential rains of the hurricane season beginning in August brought the government offensive to a definite close. On August 7, General Tabernilla, Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army, ordered the withdrawal of troops and heavy equipment back to the garrisons on the perimeter. The command to withdraw, as well as the routes to be taken, were monitored by the rebel forces, who took advantage of the information and turned the retreat into a rout as tanks and trucks became mired in the mud.⁶¹ Equipment, arms, and ammunition were abandoned by retreating soldiers harassed by ambush and sniper fire. The army's defeat was broadcast throughout Cuba by the insurgents' radio, which accused the army of being effective only against unarmed civilians. Meanwhile, all government efforts to locate and destroy, jam, or even imitate the radio failed.

By September the army, which had previously reduced the rebel-held area to a few square miles of mountaintop, had again lost control of large portions of Oriente Province. The government might control the foothills and plains during the daytime, but at night the area belonged to the insurgents.

Military affairs gradually deteriorated, according to Batista, as officer conspiracies and defections increased. The supreme commander of operations in Oriente Province had to be changed several times; in each case he was removed for "ineptitude" or "bad conduct." The

province at one point had to be divided into two military districts in order to settle a dispute between rival army commanders.⁶²

The problems were compounded by graft in the high command. Several ex-officers of Batista's army claimed that, although at various times they could have wiped out Castro, higher headquarters had ordered them not to do so. The existence of an active insurgency insured large army appropriations and this in turn meant additional rake-offs for high army officers and defense ministry officials.⁶³ Batista himself cited the case of two army officers who were found to have accepted \$50,000 in return for aid to the enemy.⁶⁴

By autumn of 1958, military operations had ground to a standstill in the Sierra Maestra, increased guerrilla activity was reported in Las Villas Province, and bombings and disorder were nightly occurrences in Havana and other cities.

Politics, Foreign Support, and Military Might Fail Batista

By this time, even politics was failing Batista. In the hope that a change of government would ease tension and assuage the public, which was demanding an end to violence, Batista decided to hold the scheduled June 1958 election in spite of the boycott of major party leaders. Domestic and international pressures forced him to postpone the elections until November. Although he allowed his emergency powers to lapse for about six weeks before the election, Batista still engineered the seating of his own candidate, Américo Rivera Agüero. In the opinion of Earl E. T. Smith, the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, "The last big mistake he [Batista] made, was when he did not hold honest elections."⁶⁵

Batista now faced a major crisis. The threat of wide-scale rebel operations in Las Villas, as well as increased disorder in Havana and other cities, prompted the Cuban Congress on December 12 to authorize sweeping new emergency powers, unlimited conscription for the armed services, and the commitment of the nation to total civil war. Then on December 17, Ambassador Smith advised Batista that "certain influential people in the United States believed that he could no longer maintain effective control in Cuba, and that they believed it would avoid a great deal of further bloodshed if he were to retire."⁶⁶

In the next two weeks, the military situation deteriorated steadily. In Oriente, Raúl and Fidel Castro were poised on the outskirts of Santiago de Cuba; the city of Cienfuegos was under siege. In Las Villas Province, the morale of the armed forces was almost shattered. When Guevara's guerrillas, now joined by hundreds of unarmed civilians, descended upon small detachments of soldiers, the latter either ran or surrendered and joined the march. The Cuban army in Las Villas seemed to evaporate as 19 towns were occupied by what was fast becoming a regular army of rebels. In many towns the M-26 underground militia and townspeople came out into the streets to confound any efforts by the military to resist the advancing rebels.

When in the last week in December, the rebel "army," now grown 5,000 to 6,000 strong, advanced on Santa Clara, the capital of Las Villas, the government was panic stricken. Troops were flown into Santa Clara, commands were shuffled, and contradictory orders from Havana added to the confusion. The newly appointed chief of staff, Gen. José Eulterior Pedraza, dispatched from Havana an armored train loaded with 400 soldiers, provisions, four new British armored cars, and a million rounds of ammunition. Upon approaching the outskirts of Santa Clara, the train was forced to halt by several gasoline trucks drawn across the tracks. Immediately behind the train the rails were blown up by insurgents. The troops on the train surrendered to the numerically inferior rebel force, and in doing so put a million dollars' worth of arms and ammunition into insurgent hands.⁶⁷ The city of Santa Clara became rebel territory on the night of December 31, 1958.

Surveying "the disloyalties, surrenders, and treacheries, with only a scrap of the Army left," Batista decided to flee the country.⁶⁸ Early on the morning of January 1, 1959, the president, his cabinet, and a number of friends flew into exile in the Dominican Republic. People thronged the streets of all Cuban cities at the news of Batista's departure. General Eulogio Cantillo, who was left in charge of the Cuban army, had little choice but to order a ceasefire. The Cuban army could have resisted the rebel march on Havana if it had been ordered to do so, according to the former chief of staff, General Tabernilla. He did not think it could have held out for long, however, with most of the populace in arms.⁶⁹ Batista himself said that his remaining in Cuba would have offered "only the prospect of a mountain of bodies."⁷⁰

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

Although the Cuban insurgency has sometimes been called a peasant revolution, it was more a revolution of the middle classes. Some of the peasantry, particularly in Oriente Province, were involved in and willingly accepted the hardships of the guerrilla fighting, but essentially the war was taken to the mountains by city-bred members of the middle class who supplied the leadership as well as many of the rank and file. Furthermore, until the latter part of 1958, the brunt of revolutionary activity was borne by clandestine resistance groups in the cities. Castro himself estimated that the urban underground suffered 19 times as many casualties as did the guerrilla forces.⁷¹

The real value of the guerrilla force was that it represented an overt, tangible symbol of insurgency, its existence a constant threat to Batista's regime. The military effectiveness of the guerrillas lay in the success of a long string of small engagements. Fighting only when conditions of terrain, logistics, and numbers were in their favor and retreating before counter-attacks could be launched, the guerrillas continually frustrated and wore down the nerves of regular army commanders. At the same time they projected to the population at large an image of invincibility and cunning.

The Cuban insurgency was a greater success as a propaganda campaign than as a military one. The critical factors during the six-year struggle were popular opinion and attitudes. Although no one insurgent group or cause could rightly claim mass support, Batista's loss of all the bases of his support among business, labor, and army groups was the key to his defeat. People were more disgusted with his conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign than attracted to the insurgents. By responding to insurgent activity with a campaign of terror and police oppression that was indiscriminate, brutal, and irrational, Batista eventually proved even to the average citizen that there was no point in supporting him. The final months of 1958 saw a mass wave of revulsion sweep through all sectors of the population. It might be said that the Batista regime destroyed itself.⁷²

The Insurgents Take Over the Government

The power vacuum left by Batista's flight was filled by the best organized and most publicized revolutionary groups in Cuba. The Civic Resistance and M-26 undergrounds promptly emerged on January 1, 1959, to keep order in the cities. Manuel Urrutia was designated president and arrived in Havana on January 5. Fidel Castro arrived on the 8th. By January 10, the revolutionary cabinet and army were in control. A modified version of the 1940 Constitution was issued as the Fundamental Law on February 8; a Council of Ministers, incorporating both executive and legislative functions, replaced the Congress. Members of this provisional government were essentially moderate.⁷³

Castro became prime minister on February 13, and the struggle for power within the Council of Ministers, evident from the very first, went into a second phase. The moderate revolutionaries favored social reform but had no idea of a social revolution. The Popular Socialist (Communist) party was unpopular with many who had "borne the heat of the day" because of its laggard appearance on the revolutionary scene. Although Castro had all the popular support he needed, he lacked a postinsurgency program and organization. The Communists were able to supply both, and Castro came to depend more and more on them.⁷⁴

Communists Gain Control Over the Castro Government

At the same time the Communists were infiltrating and taking over the army and organized labor, the two most cohesive forces in Cuban politics. When Castro forced the Agrarian Reform Law through the Council on June 2, the first step toward "radicalization" was taken, and five non-Communist members resigned from the cabinet.⁷⁵

By fall of 1959, the moderates were routed and many had gone into exile. Fidel Castro, his brother Raúl, and "Che" Guevara formed the ruling clique in Cuba. The 26th of July Movement was gradually replaced by the Communist-controlled Partido de la Revolución Socialista. The Revolutionary Tribunal, originally set up to try Batistianas in drumhead courts and

dissolved in May, was constituted again—this time to try anti-Castro "Counterrevolutionaries."⁷⁶

The Castro government nationalized most of the businesses in Cuba—by outright expropriation in many cases. The press and radio were monopolized, and the school system was reorganized during the winter of 1960. The national bank, the labor unions, university student organizations, mines, and large cattle ranches were all taken over. Spring brought the final takeover of the sugar plantations and the first attacks on the Catholic Church. By summer 1961 the Communists had taken charge of all organizations and the opposition in Cuba was silenced. An anti-Castro rising in the mountains in Escambray was easily put down by the army, trained as it was in guerrilla warfare.⁷⁷

Deteriorating Relations With the United States

Castro's verbal attacks on the United States meanwhile became increasingly intemperate and his relations with Communist bloc countries proportionately warmer. The United States, in retaliation for uncompensated expropriation of U.S. holdings, cut economic ties; then on January 3, 1961, diplomatic relations were broken. The loss of its chief market and source of imports increased the disorganization of the Cuban economy which Castro's radical reforms had begun.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, the exiled Cuban opposition was organizing itself for an invasion in the island's classic manner. Supplied with equipment and arms by the United States, the anti-Castro Cuban forces landed at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and were speedily repulsed. Massive economic and military aid was immediately forthcoming to Cuba from the U.S.S.R. Castro's position was more assured than ever following the collapse of the invasion, and he now declared Cuba a "socialist," i.e., a Communist, state. When the United States discovered Soviet missiles in place on Cuba, it declared a quarantine on all shipping to that country. In October 1962, an international confrontation between the two major powers loomed, and the situation cooled down only when the U.S.S.R. removed its missiles and promised to remove its troops from Cuba.⁷⁹

As this study is being written in late 1963, Cuba's faltering economy continues to receive large quantities of economic and technical aid from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Castro's future role and his country's precise position in the Communist community are hard to assess. The gravest problem presented by Cuba appears to lie in the continuing subversive activities of Castro's followers in the other nations of Latin America, where his defiance of the United States is likely to gain him much more sympathy than his less successful economic experiments in state socialism.

NOTES

¹Clifford R. Barnett and Wyatt MacGaffey, et al., Special Warfare Area Handbook for Cuba (prepared by Foreign Area Studies Division; Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1961), p. 63.

²Preston E. James, Latin America (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1959), pp. 756-57; Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, pp. 64-70.

³Ibid., pp. 70-71.

⁴Ibid., pp. 74-75.

⁵U.S. Department of Commerce, Investment in Cuba: Basic Information for United States Businessmen (Washington: Government Printing Office, July 1956), p. 23.

⁶Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 21; Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, pp. 504, 619; Department of Commerce, Investment, p. 32.

⁷Ibid., pp. 10, 138; Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, p. 503.

⁸Norman A. LaCharité, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953-1959 (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), p. 21.

⁹Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, pp. 346-48.

¹⁰Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 99.

¹¹Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, pp. 55-57.

¹²Ibid., pp. 366-68.

¹³Ibid., pp. 57-58.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 375.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 117-22.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 145-52.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 112-15.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 262, 381.

¹⁹Herbert L. Matthews, The Cuban Story (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p. 139; Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, pp. 390-91.

²⁰Robert Taber, M-26: Biography of a Revolution (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961), p. 54.

²¹Gen. Alberto Bayo, 150 Questions for a Guerrilla (Boulder, Colo.: Panther Publications, 1963), passim.

²²Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, p. 394.

²³Ibid., p. 393; Jules Dubois, Fidel Castro: Rebel-Liberator or Dictator (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), pp. 62, 84, 96-97.

²⁴LaCharité, Cuba 1953-1959, p. 49; Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960), pp. 52-53.

²⁵Taber, M-26, pp. 70-77.

²⁶Ibid., p. 76.

²⁷Ray Brennan, Castro, Cuba and Justice (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. 195; Taber, M-26, pp. 77-78.

²⁸Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, p. 395.

²⁹"Che" Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), pp. 83, 95-96.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 100-103.

³¹Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba, pp. 23, 29; Dickey Chappelle, "How Castro Won," Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 334.

³²Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 31; Chappelle, "How Castro Won," p. 335.

³³Draper, Castro's Revolution, p. 41; Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 69.

³⁴Draper, Castro's Revolution, p. 13.

³⁵Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, p. 397.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 400-401.

³⁷Ibid., p. 395.

³⁸U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean, Senate Reports, Part 8. 86th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 454.

³⁹Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, pp. 400-401, 426.

⁴⁰Fulgencio Batista, Cuba Betrayed (Washington: Vantage Press, 1962), pp. 113-19.

⁴¹Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, p. 391.

⁴²Draper, Castro's Revolution, pp. 14, 15, 19; Chappelle, "How Castro Won," pp. 327, 335.

⁴³Luis Conte Agüero, Paredon (Miami: T. A. Cuba, 1962), p. 196.

⁴⁴Brennan, Cuba and Justice, p. 208; Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, p. 341.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 368-88.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 341.

⁴⁷See Herbert L. Matthews, The Cuban Story (New York: George Braziller, 1961).

⁴⁸Brennan, Cuba and Justice, p. 24.

⁴⁹Taber, M-26, pp. 130, 148, 308.

⁵⁰Merle Kling, "Cuba: A Case Study of a Successful Attempt to Seize Power by the Application of Unconventional Warfare," The Annals (May 1962), pp. 48-49.

⁵¹Taber, M-26, pp. 172-81; Batista, Cuba Betrayed, p. 68.

⁵²Harold E. Davis, "Comments on Cuba 1953-1959," (unpublished paper, 15 December 1963), p. 2, based on Army, Air Force and Naval Air Statistical Record (Aviation House, 66 Sloane Street, London SW1).

⁵³U.S. Senate, Communist Threat, Part 7, p. 370.


- ⁵⁴Batista, Cuba Betrayed, p. 71.
- ⁵⁵Hispanic American Review, XI, No. 9 (October 1958), p. 479; No. 10 (November 1958), p. 522; No. 12 (January 1959), pp. 670-71.
- ⁵⁶Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, pp. 344-45; Taber, M-26, pp. 82-85.
- ⁵⁷Brennan, Cuba and Justice, p. 227.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., p. 229.
- ⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 230-31.
- ⁶⁰Taber, M-26, pp. 266-68.
- ⁶¹Brennan, Cuba and Justice, pp. 236-37.
- ⁶²Batista, Cuba Betrayed, pp. 80-83.
- ⁶³Robert K. Brown, in note to Preface, p. 1, of Gen. Alberto Bayo, 150 Questions.
- ⁶⁴Batista, Cuba Betrayed, p. 86.
- ⁶⁵Testimony of Earl E. T. Smith, in U.S. Senate Hearings, Communist Threat, Part 7, p. 687.
- ⁶⁶Ibid.
- ⁶⁷Brennan, Cuba and Justice, pp. 257-58, 259.
- ⁶⁸Batista, Cuba Betrayed, p. 131.
- ⁶⁹U.S. Senate, Communist Threat, Part 7, p. 421.
- ⁷⁰Batista, Cuba Betrayed, p. 131.
- ⁷¹See Jean-Paul Sartre, Sartre on Cuba (New York: Ballantine Books, 1961); Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba.
- ⁷²Draper, Castro's Revolution, pp. 13-15.
- ⁷³Davis, "Comments," p. 3; Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, pp. 400-404.
- ⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 405-408.
- ⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 415-18.
- ⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 409, 418-19.
- ⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 420-32; see also Davis, "Comments," p. 3.
- ⁷⁸Barnett and MacGaffey, Handbook for Cuba, pp. 456-61, 465-66.
- ⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 432-41, 461, 464-65.

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Chapter Seventeen

VENEZUELA
1958 until 1963



VENEZUELA (1958-1963)

Chapter Seventeen

VENEZUELA (1958 until 1963)

by Philip B. Taylor

Despite many problems and a tradition of coups d'état, the duly elected government of Rómulo Betancourt managed to contain both rightwing and Communist attempts at insurgency and to pass along its power to a duly elected successor—an event of landmark importance in Venezuelan history.

BACKGROUND

The Venezuelan experience with insurgency from 1958 to 1963 is significant in terms of that country's domestic political experience, in the context of the practice of constitutional democracy in a developing country, and as an example of Communist strategy in Latin America. The relative success of Rómulo Betancourt's government achieved against recurrent insurgencies is probably valid only for the present: The future may well require a different set of solutions from those he fashioned. Nevertheless, from 1958 to 1963, Venezuela successfully met one of the most severe tests ever faced by a Latin American government.

With a land area of over 352,000 square miles, Venezuela is a third larger than Texas. Located on the northern coast of South America, it possesses nearly every known variety of climate, soil, and terrain, including tropical lowlands, vast savannas, and rugged, permanently snow-capped mountains of the high Andes. Relatively little of its territory had been turned to productive use before 1960, and inequitable land distribution was a major cause of social tensions.¹

Venezuela's eight million people are of Indian, Negro, European, and mixed racial strains. The population is growing at a net rate estimated at about 4 percent annually, and more than half of the people are less than 18 years of age.² The population is clustered largely in the more attractive northern and western parts of the country; and both internal migration and immigration have caused the principal cities to grow at a rate nearly two-thirds greater than that of the country as a whole. Partly because so many people are recent arrivals who have yet to be assimilated, the cities evidence extremes of affluence and poverty and wide cultural diversity.³

Economic Resources and Foreign Investment

Despite its past record as an underdeveloped country, Venezuela in 1958 possessed greater possibilities for rapid economic development and social improvement than perhaps any other Latin American country. Its per capita income, although very unevenly distributed, far exceeded that of its neighbors. Relative to its population and territory, Venezuela was and remains possibly the richest country of the area in mineral resources. Producing over three million barrels of oil daily, it is the world's largest petroleum-exporting country; its mineral reserves include more than two billion tons of high-grade iron ore. The policy of "sowing the petroleum"—that is, earmarking a large portion of oil revenues for industrial and commercial capital investment, development of infrastructure, and social improvements in order to better equalize average income—should, if administered capably, result in rapid economic growth with little expenditure of the country's own limited personnel and capital resources.⁴

If Venezuela is the world's largest producer of petroleum and petroleum products for export and has the highest per capita income in Latin America, it is primarily because of private foreign investment in the area.⁵ The dollar investment of United States citizens is in excess of two billion dollars. In a normal year foreign petroleum and iron ore companies, which are largely North American in ownership, produce about 97 percent of Venezuela's exports by value and pay about 60 percent of its total tax bill—although the latter percentage will decrease as tax reforms occur and as the industrial and commercial tax base is strengthened. Foreign investment, furthermore, is not exclusively given over to industries for the extraction of mineral resources. The largest retail food and dry goods chains are North American in ownership. Some 60 large U.S. firms dominate the pharmaceutical, automotive, paper, consumers' hard goods, and other industrial areas. Although there are British, French, and German investments as well, they are relatively insignificant in terms of working capital, plant, and value of product. In addition, the largest non-Latin group of resident foreigners is composed of the approximately 50,000 U.S. citizens living in Venezuela; and the protection of these persons and interests is a special charge on the governments of both Venezuela and the United States.

In both material and cultural senses, many leading Venezuelans are "Americanized" in tastes, habits, and viewpoints. This is more true of the entrepreneurial and conservative community than of the country as a whole. Pragmatic Venezuelans are aware of the necessity of cooperation with the United States for economic and political reasons. The refusal of the Betancourt government, despite leftist and nationalist pressure and its own emotional preference, to expropriate foreign investment or to take demagogic advantage of the presence of the foreigners and their investments was a measure of the government's realism.

It is difficult to define precisely the degree of commitment of the U.S. government to the preservation of democratic government in Venezuela and, in a somewhat more fundamental sense, to law and order in that country. To many observers, it would certainly appear that the United

States could not accept Communist control over the country. During the period under consideration, certainly, the government's reaction to the insurgent threat occurred within the context of the country's close friendship and political and commercial relationships with the United States.

Military Involvement in Venezuelan Politics

Venezuela's history is a long record of political irregularity and instability. Frequent involvement of its armed forces in politics and a degree of personalism unusual even in Latin America have impeded the development of constitutional government and political consensus. According to many Venezuelan commentators, the presidency of the republic was often regarded as a logical last promotion in a military career. Coupled with a propensity for violence in personal and group relationships was a growing acceptance of violence as an appropriate tool of opposition to the incumbent government.⁶ Venezuela's present constitution is its 25th; from the country's independence from Spain in 1811 until March 1964, only two elected civilian presidents handed over their office to an elected successor.⁷

From the start of the 20th century until October 19, 1945, Venezuela was governed continuously by army generals from the western state of Táchira. Gen. Juan Vicente Gómez, who followed Cipriano Castro in 1909 and was dictator for 26 years until his death in December 1935, was a true personalist and feudal autocrat, intolerant of either political or economic change.⁸ His successor, Gen. Eleazar López Contreras (1935-1941), allowed a gradual extension of freedom in the country; and Gen. Isaías Medina Angarita, who held power from 1941 to 1945, accelerated this development and granted some political parties the right to organize legally. General Medina was severely criticized, however, and in October 1945 restive young politicians joined junior officers who were dissatisfied with their slow career development in a military-civilian golpe de estado, or coup d'état, which brought to power the Acción Democrática (AD) party led by Rómulo Betancourt.⁹

From the AD Government of 1945 to the Joint Junta of 1958

Acción Democrática was essentially interested in broad social and economic reforms, many of its leaders having been nationalist-oriented marxists in their youth. Their idealistic enthusiasm was tempered only in part by an awareness of their own inexperience and lack of preparation for the complexities of administering a government.¹⁰ On the other hand, the military leaders who had brought the AD to power were interested only in personal gain; and although their careers were rather generously furthered by AD, they were personally opposed to Betancourt. The tradition of armed forces involvement was too well established for the civilian AD to remain unchallenged for long. When conservative civilian criticism of AD policies began to mount, the same officers who had planned the 1945 coup moved again on November 24, 1948; and a conservative military dictatorship ultimately was reestablished under Col. (Gen.) Marcos Pérez Jiménez.¹¹

The new government of military men from Táchira contrasted poorly with both its civilian and military predecessors. The personal corruption of many of its leaders, the ruthlessness of its internal politics, and the severity of its repressive measures were equally notorious. Ultimately, all legal opposition was suppressed and most civilian political groups turned to clandestine political action.¹²

Toward the middle of 1957, civilian opposition became more open; on May 1, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Caracas made a highly critical statement in a pastoral letter. As clandestine organizations became stronger and more overt, elements in the armed forces again began to plot. After three weeks of intensive political and military action, including prolonged and bloody civilian demonstrations in the streets of Caracas, a joint civilian-military junta was established on January 25, 1958. It should be noted, however, that only over the bitter opposition of prominent military leaders were two civilian members placed in the Junta de Gobierno, chaired by Adm. Wolfgang Larrazabal. Nevertheless, the way was now open for the country's first period of civilian-led, constitutionally elected government.¹³

The Political Spectrum in 1958

The bases for the political-military situation of 1958 were clear enough. The armed forces were so accustomed to direct involvement in politics and government that it would not be illogical to consider the military as a self-contained political party; indeed, Betancourt was elected, and in 1959 inaugurated, only after antagonistic officers had been removed from power. The civilian political organizations, on the contrary, were in disarray. The few conservatives, tarred by their association with reactionary military leaders, were disorganized. The more important parties, representing various left-of-center socioeconomic positions, were a mixture of true parties, in both the organizational and programmatic sense. Others were little more than groupings of diverse elements in support of opportunistic and personalistic politicians. There was little in this spectacle to inspire confidence among traditionalist and conservative military leaders.

Venezuelan political parties in 1958 included the Acción Democrática (AD), the Comité para Organización Política y Electoral Independiente (COPEI), the Unión Republicana Democrática (URD), and the Partido Comunista Venezolano (PCV).

Acción Democrática, a nationalist, Socialist group, was strongly committed to political democracy based on mass support. Although it had committed itself earlier to nationalization of all mineral resources, AD had tempered this position greatly after 1937. Intensively organized and possibly one of the least personalistic parties in Latin America, AD had also become one of the most pragmatic. Its leaders were Betancourt, Raúl Leoni, and Gonzalo Barrios.

COPEI, a Christian Socialist party founded in 1946, drew its basic doctrine from papal encyclicals. Its policies were doctrinaire, if not dogmatic and nationalistic, and it tended toward extreme militancy in its competitive drive for power. COPEI's economic and social position

eventually moved left of AD's. A true party in an organizational and programmatic sense, its main leader was Rafael Caldera.

Unión Republicana Democrática, organized in 1947, was originally conceived as a legal party of former supporters of General Medina, but it fell almost immediately under the control of Jóvito Villalba. Although he, like Betancourt, was a member of the "generation of '28,"* Villalba was a long-standing personal enemy of Betancourt's. Until 1952, Villalba had cooperated to a degree with General Pérez Jiménez, but he was later regarded as an opportunistic pro-leftist. In 1958 URD lacked a real programmatic base; it may not have one yet. Between 1959 and 1963, it became an opportunistic mélange of old conservatives, moderates, and personal followers of Villalba; it also had a far left wing led by former Communists.

The Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), founded in 1931 and led by Gustavo Machado, was a Moscow-line party and gave few signs of acceptance of any other viewpoint, including Peking's. In 1928, Machado and Betancourt, then students, and others who later became political leaders had cooperated in the abortive revolt against the dictator Gómez. This collaboration between the Communists and AD leaders had begun to break down in 1931 and came to an end in 1944, although there was some renewed cooperation during the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship of 1948-1958.

The Three-Party Pacto de Punto Fijo

After General Pérez Jiménez was overthrown in early 1958, the political parties sought understandings on programs or candidates, or both, so as to present a united front in the face of military reaction. The need for such unity was demonstrated by three distinct military threats to the junta led by Larrazabal.¹⁴ Although it was not possible to agree on candidates, the three non-Communist parties of AD, COPEI, and URD agreed on principles in a lengthy statement made on the eve of the December 1958 election.

The first part of the three-party agreement was called the Pacto de Punto Fijo (after Rafael Caldera's residence, where it was signed). Dated October 21 and signed by Betancourt, Caldera, and Villalba, as leaders of AD, COPEI, and URD, respectively, it committed the parties to support the constitution, to establish a coalition government regardless of who won the election, to adopt at least a minimum program of governmental action to be approved and signed by all candidates, and to maintain and consolidate a political truce.

Subsequently, on December 6, 1958, Betancourt, Caldera, and Larrazabal, as candidates for the presidency, signed a detailed "declaration of principles," which were to decide the policies of the government for the coming presidential term, regardless of the winner.¹⁵

*In 1928 student agitation against the Gómez dictatorship led to arrests, riot, the closing of the universities, and the departure from the country of some of the leaders, many of whom later gained political prominence. (Edwin Lieuwen, *Venezuela* (2d ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 50.)

Communists Operate As a Legal Party

Although the PCV was excluded from these agreements by decision of the other parties, it should be noted that the government made no attempt to outlaw it. The PCV was accepted as a conventional political party, but one committed to policies and doctrines not indigenous to Venezuela. AD's leadership, which had already had its clashes with the Communists, was particularly determined to exclude them so far as possible from participation in the government. However, the PCV actually had a candidate in the December elections in the person of Admiral Larrazabal who, without consulting even his URD leaders, had accepted Communist backing.

Although Larrazabal was defeated, both non-Communist and PCV leaders joined in prevailing on disappointed voters to accept the election result and to maintain the public peace. As a result, the PCV continued to be allowed to participate in the political process as a legal party. It occasionally supported AD candidates for student organization and trade union offices. It appears to have been notably successful among reform-minded young people and students, both in the universities and secondary schools; and it was able in 1958 to organize a group known as the Central Única de la Juventud. Even the most anti-Communist progressive spokesman felt that the PCV deserved its complete freedom unless and until it proved itself unworthy. The party therefore developed a comparatively strong popular following and a favorable reputation.¹⁶

The elections arranged by the Junta de Gobierno were won by Betancourt, and he was inaugurated on February 13, 1959. The ground was thus cleared for a popularly supported constitutional and democratic government. The new civilian government was committed to the adoption of social and economic policies to promote the country's rapid growth toward maturity within a non-Communist framework. The insurgency that was to come therefore sprang from what was, at best, thin soil.

INSURGENCY

Venezuelan insurgency in the 1958-1963 period was of two basic types—the first, a rightwing form in the traditional Latin American style; and the second, a leftist variant, influenced by the Cuban experience and Fidel Castro's rise to power at the beginning of 1959.*

Until the 1940's, insurgency in Latin America had been traditionally generated within the armed forces, although it was frequently supported by civilian leaders. This kind of revolt normally involved the rejection of one personalist and authoritarian regime for another of the same kind and was unlikely to effect any significant change in the existing distribution of wealth and power among the economic and social classes. Venezuela had undergone many instances of this traditional type of insurgency.

*See Chapter Sixteen, "Cuba (1953-1959)."

The second type of insurgency confronting Venezuela was of recent origin and was the hybrid product of violent radicals, opportunistic elements, and genuine reformers. There have been frustratingly few movements in Latin America's history that have brought true social and economic reform. The recollection of successful efforts includes as the earliest examples the peaceful evolutionary movement begun in Uruguay by José Batlle y Ordóñez in 1903 and the exceptionally violent and prolonged Mexican revolution of 1910. Juan Perón's populist efforts in Argentina from 1945 to 1955 gave the appearance of true social reform but possessed very little substance. Venezuela's short-lived AD government began in 1945 an honest and comparatively effective social reform effort through constitutional and legal devices. In 1951 the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) assumed power in Bolivia. Social reform was resumed in Venezuela in 1958. In 1959 Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba and appeared to many to be a genuine reformer. This short list¹⁷ suggests why social reformers felt a sense of frustration: Over what has seemed an interminably long period in Latin American history, few constructive results have been achieved.

An Overview of the Attempts Against Betancourt's Government

In Venezuela after 1958-1959 the proponents of the two types of revolutionary behavior had little in common beyond their hatred for the rather pragmatic and moderately reformist government led by the AD. Since they had different sets of political goals, there were few efforts to bring the two insurrectionary currents into coalition. Some of the unsuccessful rightist leaders were later tempted by personal ambition to lend their skills to leftist groups, on the theory that if they were successful they would be able to control the new government. Leftist views, especially among company-grade officers in certain elements of the armed forces, later led to specific instances of cooperation between military units and leftist civilian groups. Had these efforts at cooperation succeeded, particularly at an early stage, the government might well have been in serious difficulty.

The insurgents' failure to unite frustrated their efforts to overthrow Betancourt's government. The traditional barracks revolts and rightist plots that might have overcome a less alert and determined regime in the early part of the period failed because the government could count on massive popular support in the streets and among labor unions. Later the government obtained sufficient guarantees of armed forces loyalty to defeat even the strongest of such attempts. On the other hand, the extreme leftist insurrectionary attempts, however spectacular they seemed, were merely froth against a professional army that was clearly anti-Communist. Later attempts, in both the cities and the rural interior, were better led and planned, but by this time the most the extreme leftists could hope for was to provoke a rightist military golpe (coup), after which they might come to power through popular revulsion and reaction.

Rightwing Attempts at Coups d'Etat

The early insurrections in the armed forces were entirely traditional in nature. Gen. José María Castro León, first minister of war under Larranabai's Junta de Gobierno, which led eventually to the formation of Betancourt's government, attempted to overthrow the junta as early as July 22, 1958. Castro León's action reflected his belief that civilian government was generally undesirable except when led by conservative civilians under careful military control. Almost fanatically opposed to AD, whose strength and popularity had already been demonstrated beyond doubt,¹⁸ Castro León had no clear-cut governmental program of his own to offer the country. His views, expressed when he canvassed civilian leaders for support, showed this; indeed, it was generally believed that many of his followers sought the return of the ousted dictator Pérez Jiménez. The Castro León plot came to an end when massive popular demonstrations of support for the government were held, a general strike was called, and public opinion almost unanimously condemned the golpistas.¹⁹

Following this first plot, other attempts were made, none of which were successful. On September 7, 1958, Lt. Col. Juan de Dios Moncada Vidal returned from exile to lead a rather bloody but unsuccessful revolt against the government. The plot again was smothered in large part by massive popular demonstrations, a general strike, and unanimous declarations of support for democratic processes by opinion leaders. One Caracas journal estimated that more than 700,000 persons responded to the government's call.²⁰ On October 12, 1959, and again on January 21, 1960, additional plots inspired by the rightists were frustrated. These did not involve armed forces units, although exiled General Castro León constantly sought support through messages and manifestos. In each case, the insurgent leaders were a mixed collection of rightist officers, reactionary civilians, and professional troublemakers; some were sympathetic to Pérez Jiménez.²¹

This rightist type of insurrection continued to appear in 1960. First, General Castro León returned from exile to San Cristóbal, Fáchira, personally to lead a revolt on April 20, 1960. Loyal troops frustrated the attempt.²² Next, on June 24th, an attempt on Betancourt's life was almost successful when a radio-controlled bomb was exploded in an automobile as his car passed. Rafael Trujillo Molina, dictator of the Dominican Republic, was blamed for the plot, but apparently it had been coordinated with Venezuelan plotters as well.²³ The last rightist uprising was suppressed in December, so quickly that it is not even certain that it was a plot at all.²⁴

It may be concluded that behind all these rightist-military attempts in the 1958-1960 period lay the desire to re-establish conservative or even reactionary government, to suppress some if not all political parties, to restore dictatorial restraints on personal liberties and expression, and in a few cases to return General Pérez Jiménez to the presidency. A few plotters, principally civilians, had exclusionist nationalist economic goals, but others were fully committed to

encouraging foreign investment in Venezuela. Partly because of the conservatives' ambivalence on this point and partly for fear of becoming involved in domestic Venezuelan politics, foreign-owned companies were extremely careful in their public statements and refused to give the slightest appearance of approval to these plots. In essence, these rightwing plots represented attempts to return to a past that was already anachronistic; had they succeeded, serious social and economic difficulties might well have followed.

Attacks on Government Also Come From the Left

The second form of insurgency, distinctly radical leftist in origin, began in 1959. The country's weakened economic position, a legacy of the Pérez Jiménez regime, forced the adoption of austerity measures in mid-1959.²⁵ On August 4, leftists, Communists, and even a few rightist troublemakers demonstrated before Miraflores Palace, the presidential office and formal residence, to protest the termination of a "make-work" policy for the unemployed begun in 1958. Before the affair was ended by the municipal police, four demonstrators were killed and many more injured. No real attempt to seize power had been made, but this marked the beginning of lower-class attacks on the Betancourt government. Critical observers suggested at the time that Betancourt's willingness and ability to react to provocation or threat had been tested and found wanting.²⁶ During succeeding months there were frequent minor disorders, many of which merely reflected the disturbed political atmosphere of the period. But the political honeymoon that at least theoretically had been assured by the Punto Fijo agreement was deteriorating.

Effect of the Cuban Revolution on the Situation in Venezuela

Venezuelan relations with Cuba also changed markedly in 1959, and the change gave new impetus to the growing leftwing insurgency. After the fall of Pérez Jiménez, the Venezuelan atmosphere had been quite favorable to all revolutionary movements; and Admiral Larrazabal, as president of the Junta de Gobierno, had allowed Caracas to become the headquarters of many Cuban underground groups. As early as 1956 there had been a branch of Castro's clandestine "26th of July" movement in Caracas. Betancourt—himself then a revolutionary—had supported the Castroites at this time, and in July 1958 the Cuban revolutionaries had met openly in Caracas to sign a pact establishing a coalition of anti-Batista Cuban forces.²⁷

Soon after Castro's victory in January 1959, Cuban fidelistas began to take advantage of their excellent relations with Venezuela, working closely with the PCV and infiltrating other parties and student movements. Then, at the third Latin American congress of students, held in Caracas in 1959, Cuba's Ernesto "Che" Guevara said bluntly that the Betancourt regime could not be regarded as truly "democratic" since it used no execution squads. During 1959, Cuban representatives in Venezuela became increasingly overbearing, and Venezuelan officialdom's

attitude toward Castro began to cool. In several cases, Cuban diplomats were asked to leave the country because of their political interference.²⁸

The changing official attitude toward Cuba stirred resentment within the Indigenous Movement de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), which was officially organized in April 1960 under Venezuelan law. Most of its leaders were younger AD members to whom the increasing pragmatism, if not conservatism, of the AD's "old guard" was unacceptable. Many felt that Betancourt's government had betrayed the revolutionary reform movement that AD had once symbolized.²⁹ Some MIR members objected only to Betancourt's predominance in the party; nearly all objected to the government's negative attitude toward Cuba. MIR held strongly nationalist but Marxist views and regarded violence as a legitimate means for changing government policy. MIR's founders represented a distinct "third generation" group* that had come into being after the original organization of AD. AD's "second generation" later was also to rebel at "old guard" authority and split away from it.

Insurgency was again furthered when another domestic political crisis that developed in August 1960 embarrassed the government. At that time, Foreign Minister Ignacio Luis Arcaya, a member of URD, was in San José, Costa Rica, at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the American republics. After he ignored Betancourt's instructions to vote for sanctions against Cuba for intervening in the affairs of certain Caribbean countries,³⁰ Betancourt summarily removed Arcaya from office. Shortly thereafter URD resigned from the coalition government, leaving AD and COPEI alone to cope with the insurgency.

Armed Attacks Originate on the Campus in Caracas

By November 1960, armed extremists and pro-Castro students were attacking police, property, and private citizens from their privileged sanctuary on the campus of the Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV) in Caracas. Throughout Latin America, university autonomy implies many features not known in the United States. Extraterritoriality for the university's physical plant is one of these, and this privilege is of particular significance in Venezuela because of the size of the UCV campus and its location in the heart of the capital. In practice, autonomy also gives Venezuelan students substantial control over administrative, disciplinary, and policing policies on the campus, as well as a say in determining the curriculum and appointing professors, the purposes for which autonomy was originally intended. Traditionally,

* The concept of "generations" as groups of members of an organization distinguished by age, and thus by experience, is commonly recognized in Latin American society. AD's first generation, of which Betancourt is a primary example, is now in its late 50's and 60's. The second generation is now in its 40's, and provided much of the upper- and middle-level leadership under Betancourt. The third generation, now in its 30's, played clandestine party roles during the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, while most of the older men were in exile, and demanded more recognition of its views than Betancourt was willing to give.

Venezuelan students have not been forced to accept any significant disciplinary controls or to face normal police actions, even during incidents involving criminal violence. Nevertheless, although Latin Americans have long been tolerant of the political activism of university students, the serious abuse of their special status in late 1960 was resented by most citizens of Venezuela, and the government felt free to react against their off-campus activities, although it did not intervene on the campus.

PCV- and MIR-Led Violence Spreads

During 1961, PCV and MIR activity in the cities took several new directions. Although no single effort was entirely successful, each pointed up a new tactical effort by the insurgents of the extreme left. A definite leftwing attempt to seize control of the Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos (CTV, Confederation of Venezuelan Workers) was made at a CTV executive committee meeting on June 6, 1961.³¹ This was defeated.* Then on June 26 military units led by leftist junior officers rebelled at two points on the coast not far from Caracas--at Maiquetía airport near La Guaira and at Barcelona. In these abortive uprisings many leftist civilians were killed or captured.³² Another development was a series of attacks on private businesses and properties, many of which were owned by foreigners. These attacks were prompted in large part by Venezuela's diplomatic break with Cuba on November 11, 1960; they culminated in widespread violence in Caracas during August 1961 at the time of the Punta del Este, Uruguay, meeting of western hemisphere foreign ministers to consider Cuba's interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This latter phase included bombing the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. During the three months ending in January 1962, 32 persons were killed and 142 wounded. Virtually none of these casualties were members of the terrorist-insurgent groups.³³

By early 1962, leftwing insurgency was coordinated and had acquired many of the characteristics it was to retain through 1963. Communist involvement was now complete, both internally and externally. At the third congress of the PCV in March 1961, Secretary General Gustavo Machado had stated that it was not yet time for the party's paramilitary organization to undertake direct warfare against the government. Rather, he had argued, the party should work for a "popular and democratic front." MIR's defection from AD, which had occurred just the year before, appeared to be a satisfactory first step in this direction. After standing apart for a short time, PCV and MIR came together so closely that critical observers no longer regarded them as separate entities. Later the two parties approached rightist plotters, both military and civilians, and also acquired a following among younger officers of the armed forces, especially in the marines and certain units of the national guard. Furthermore, there were indications that

*The final break did not come until the fourth CTV Congress in Caracas, December 8-10, 1961. After this there appeared the "CTV (no-oficialista)," i.e., a leftist-led group.

both Chinese and Cuban-trained Venezuelans were directly involved in insurgent activities and that Cuba was also providing materiel.³⁴

Young Leftist Officers Also Rebel

In May and June 1962, two dramatic large-scale insurgent actions occurred: the Carúpano and Puerto Cabello mutinies of marine and naval units. These risings were probably planned to occur simultaneously; had this happened, the government would have been in grave danger, since the coastal cities of Carúpano and Puerto Cabello, the home port of Venezuela's small fleet, flank Caracas. The troop strength of the insurgent units was such that major military preparation by the government was required. In both cases, however, the rebels were forced to move prematurely and loyal forces overcame them quickly.

Both outbreaks involved an alliance between young leftist marine officers of the 2d and 3d marine battalions and leftist civilians. At Puerto Cabello, one of the first insurgent moves was to release some 70 guerrillas from the city prison where they were awaiting trial; these guerrillas were armed as snipers and accounted for a substantial number of government and civilian casualties. The rebel marine units were equipped only with personal arms and .50-caliber machine guns, which were used for street fighting against the virtually untrained and confused troops of the two loyal army infantry battalions that were rushed into the battle. The few guerrillas taken alive boasted that they had shot both women and wounded for the terrorist effect.³⁵ The official casualty figure was 71 dead and 150 wounded, but other, widely credited accounts reported as many as 400 dead.

Guerrilla Warfare and Strategic Plans

While these barracks revolts and irregular violence were being carried out in the cities, the insurgents were also turning their attention to the use of guerrilla techniques similar to those employed in Cuba, in an attempt to win a rural base of operations. They proposed to live off the land, obtain arms and supplies within the country as far as possible, gain the sympathy of the local population, and gradually destroy the public image and authority of the existing government. Before the end of 1961, the guerrillas had made an appearance in the state of Falcón. By January 1962 the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army) had been organized. It was led by Pompeyo Marquez, Teodoro Petkoff, Alonso Ojeda, and others, most of whom were members of the PCV central committee. By early March the existence of a fairly extensive guerrilla structure was confirmed when the press reported the capture of 52 guerrillas in nearly a dozen training camps in the states of Mérida, Falcón, Portuguesa, Yaracuy, and Lara.³⁶ On April 24, 1962, the minister of defense, Brig. Gen. Antonio Briceño Linares, testified that guerrilla attacks on a number of small interior towns had resulted in 14 guerrillas killed, 8 wounded, and 142 captured in eight states, with the loss of 5 soldiers.

The minister of defense suggested that the guerrilla organizational plan included four stages: (1) creation of a nucleus of agitators, (2) formation of urban and rural insurrectionist bands, (3) establishment of armed bands for sabotage and terrorism, and (4) dispersal of guerrillas throughout the country to start a revolution. He said that two phases were complete, that the third was then going on, and that the fourth would occur within two to three months. General Briceño's testimony tended to exaggerate the capacity of the guerrillas at that time, yet the statistics he presented concerning captured materiel were impressive. He reported that such captured equipment included 2 light machine guns, 6 submachine guns, 48 rifles, 16 shotguns, 3 automatic pistols, 24 revolvers, 21 grenades, 4,735 rounds of ammunition of assorted sizes, and 195 sticks of dynamite.³⁷

Guerrilla Recruitment, Training, and Motivation

Details about the guerrilla movement flooded the newspapers after April 1962. Captured guerrillas reported that they had been recruited largely from the secondary schools of Caracas or on the campus of the UCV. They said that in the training camps they were often taught by Cuban instructors and that their training had included actual combat attacks on rural towns and other places where guns, transportation and communications equipment, and food could be found.

Some captured insurgents admitted to being activists in the PCV or MIR, while others said they had joined the guerrillas because of sympathy with these parties, disappointment over the comparatively slow pace of reforms under the Betancourt government, or boredom with their studies. Many joined the movement in search of adventure, but these soon became disillusioned by the conditions under which they had to live and the harshness of the discipline and fighting. Many of these romantics deserted after their first combat actions, even though threatened with execution for defecting from insurgent ranks.³⁸

Lacking Public Support and Internal Cohesion, Insurgent Strength Is Low

Although desirous of emulating the success of the Castro guerrillas in Cuba, the Venezuelan insurgents were unable to follow the Cuban pattern. In Venezuela, as in Cuba, the nucleus of early fighters was composed of youth from the cities. But whereas in Cuba the guerrilla movement had been protected and supported by the peasants,³⁹ the Venezuelan guerrillas were forced to depend on urban logistical support. The reason for this was that AD and COPEI had been developing strength among the peasants for many years, while PCV had concentrated almost exclusively on urban workers. PCV and MIR therefore could not recruit many peasants or even obtain their acquiescence in training and camp operations. In Cuba the Castroites had enjoyed vast popular support against a government generally recognized as dictatorial and tyrannical. But in Venezuela the consensus went against the insurgents, most Venezuelans believing that

Betancourt's government was successfully, if slowly, improving the country's social and economic position. Possibly the most telling difference between the Cuban and Venezuelan patterns was that of leadership. Castro's image as a progressive, nationalistic Cuban, free of foreign control, grew constantly stronger during the Cuban revolutionary period. The Venezuelan guerrilla leadership was, by contrast, openly Communist and often foreign in origin, so that the fighting ranks usually realized that they were commanded by persons not necessarily working for Venezuelan interests. Moreover, an obvious cynicism was revealed in the use of rightwing golpistas as the titular commanders of the leftist guerrilla forces. The Cuban experience thus offered no clear road to success in Venezuela.

The prospects for the insurgency were marred by 1962 because PCV and MIR leaders were divided among themselves over the wisdom of even having undertaken the terrorist campaign.⁴⁰ On May 19, 1962, Dr. Jorge Dager announced his defection from MIR, and a number of its principal officers followed Dager in opposing the PCV-MIR policy of violence. In June, these dissidents formed a new group called the Fuerza Democrática Popular, appealing to those who opposed both the AD's conservative leadership and the radical course taken by MIR.

With these handicaps, the guerrilla bands never grew strong enough to become a real military threat to the government. Late in 1963 the insurgents claimed to have 2,500 rural troops, but President Betancourt stated his belief that there were no more than 200 to 400 men permanently available to the rural guerrillas.⁴¹

Military Organization of the Insurgency

Eventually the urban terrorists and rural guerrillas were merged into the rather elaborately organized Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN, Armed Forces for National Liberation), the name first appearing in the fall of 1962. The following February, PCV and MIR created the Frente de Liberación Nacional (FLN, National Liberation Front) as a popular front organization, of which FALN became the armed branch. This new organizational base did in fact permit greater flexibility in the use of the limited personnel available. Rural guerrillas could be transferred to the cities as needed; also, when individuals within the cities became known to police, they could be moved to the countryside.⁴²

For FALN purposes the country was divided into six military districts, with headquarters in the cities of Barquisimeto, Barinas, Caracas, Coro, Puerto la Cruz, and San Fernando de Apure. Each district had one or more zones, and within each zone were one or more brigades, each containing 3 detachments that, if fully staffed, would have 35 men each. Each detachment was organized into two columns, with each column including four tactical combat units, two of which were to be used for sabotage.

The staff command structure included five sections: personnel, intelligence and counter-intelligence, operations, logistics, and political. This plan closely paralleled the staff

structure of the Venezuelan army. Tactical command of FALN units was in practice distinguished from most staff responsibilities. Whereas staff positions were often held by high-ranking golpista officers, such known Communists as Comandante Pedro Miguel of the "Francisco de Miranda" guerrilla detachment, Dr. Juan Vicente Cabezas of the El Chamal and "Pedro Miguel" guerrilla detachment, and Douglas Bravo of the Falcón guerrilla detachment were designated as tactical commanders. Guillermo García Ponce was FALN's principal tactical commander, and his brother Antonio was chief of operations; both were Communists.

The division of authority between the staff and tactical commanders made it obvious that the golpistas were being employed chiefly as a façade, in an attempt to gain armed forces support and sympathy. Apart from such ideological and propaganda considerations, it would be difficult to see how some of these military personnel could have been of much use. For example, the staff commander of the FALN was Navy Capt. Manuel Ponte Rodríguez, already imprisoned for his part in the earlier Puerto Cabello revolt. Other golpista officers, ostensibly in FALN headquarters, but actually in hiding, exile, or prison, included former Navy Cdr. Pedro Medina Silva, former National Guard Maj. Pedro Vegas Castejón, former Air Force Capt. Gutiérrez Albornoz, and former Army Capt. Elias Manuit Camero.⁴³

Strategic Goals and Policies of FALN

The strategic goals of FALN were publicly phrased in vigorously moralistic and abstract terms, in keeping with the varied assortment of extremist elements brought together in the FALN camp. At a press conference on April 18, 1963, FALN released a document listing the following goals: (1) achievement of national independence, liberty, and democracy; (2) redemption of the national heritage, integrity, and natural resources; (3) establishment of a revolutionary, nationalist, and popular government; (4) defense of revolutionary laws and support of officials brought to office by the revolution; (5) protection of the interests of the people, their property, and their institutions; (6) organization and training of Venezuelan armed forces to face the external and internal threat to the sovereignty of the nation that could be expected when the liberation of the country was completed.⁴⁴

The insurgents' real goals were to destroy belief in the government's power and decision-making ability, in order to undermine the loyalty of the armed forces as well as that of the general public. The overthrow of the Betancourt government was thus the first-stage goal of the insurgents of both right and left. The Communist insurgents of course expected to seize power at that point and to establish a Communist government. The golpistas and certain reactionary civilians in the FAI N believed, on the other hand, that in the confusion following the defeat of Betancourt, they would be able to impose a new rightwing dictatorship.

Publicly, PCV⁴⁵ and MIR spokesmen explained that they felt themselves obligated to employ a strategy of violence against the government, which had used force against honest petitioners

for reform. Domingo Rangel, MIR's leader, once declared to this writer that the leftists would have been only too happy to drop their use of violence if the government had both recognized that its own attitudes were unreasonable and fulfilled the promises for reform it had made in the 1958 election campaign.⁴⁶ But, in fact, PCV and MIR deputies refused in both 1962 and 1963 to vote for appropriations large enough to finance adequate programs of agrarian reform.⁴⁷ Although MIR urged virtually immediate nationalization of the oil companies, this writer found that direct platform statements became equivocal evasions when the speakers were pressed for details in personal interviews.⁴⁸ It was clear that the insurgents were considerably less interested in reform than in accession to power. To achieve this latter goal, insurgents of both the right and the left generally agreed on the need for tactics of violence and terror. Since no government, least of all a Latin American government, could long maintain itself if it proved unable to control lawlessness and illegal political defiance, the psychological effect of rebel terrorism was as important as actual physical damage.

Insurgent Tactics Are Limited To Small-Scale Attacks Aimed At Discrediting the Government

FALN tried to demonstrate its contempt for the government by attacking at random, for any purpose, and apparently with whatever force it could find. In January 1963, the insurgents struck in a Caracas art gallery, where they stole five costly paintings on loan from the Louvre Museum; the pictures were later returned without intentional damage. In February 1963, the Anzoátegui, a 3,100-ton freighter under Venezuelan registry, was pirated to Brazil. Then in November 1963, two years after an earlier air incident, a second Venezuelan airliner was hijacked by terrorists. As in the first instance, the pilot was made to fly low over cities so that the hijackers could drop PCV leaflets. The plane was then permitted to land on an offshore island. In neither of these cases were any crew members harmed; the purpose was publicity.

Other instances of violence were not so harmless. On one occasion a group of terrorists invaded the ministry of defense garage in mid-morning to burn the cars of high officials. Another band sought to assassinate the minister of defense in his office; although they were turned back, they were able to escape from the heavily guarded building without injury.

The humiliation of U.S. citizens in Venezuela, especially those on official missions, was another insurgent tactic continued by FALN. In January 1962, in a skilled exhibition of terrorist tactics, the U.S. Embassy was damaged by a bomb placed on the top floor of the building, and one U.S. marine guard was injured seriously. In June 1963, the offices of the U.S. military mission in Caracas were occupied by a terrorist band, which forced all enlisted men to undress and then photographed them in their underclothing. In November 1963, Col. James K. Chennault was kidnaped in front of his home and held for several days before being released unharmed.

Other insurgent tactics included the terrorization of private U.S. and Venezuelan investors by destroying their property or threatening to do so. The attempted interdiction of the flow of oil from Venezuela to the United States began with attacks on oil company properties in the late summer of 1962 and continued throughout 1963. In view of the wide dispersion of these properties and their extreme vulnerability, FALN might have inflicted more damage than it actually did. The terrorists were apparently restrained, however, by fear that they would alienate Venezuelan workers in the oil industry. In February 1963, FALN announced that it intended to attack any U.S.-owned private property it considered convenient. The announcement came after FALN had set a fire which totally destroyed the Sears, Roebuck and Co. warehouse in Caracas at a loss of about \$4.5 million. Other attacks on property followed. In some cases, offices were destroyed simply because they dealt in goods bearing U.S. brand names, even though the ownership was entirely Venezuelan.

Deterioration of Insurgent Ability to Carry Out Violence

By 1963 the PCV-MIR leadership appeared to agree fully with the traditional view that no coup could succeed in Venezuela unless the government were defeated in the capital. Although FALN continued its rural guerrilla activity during 1963, this was principally for the purpose of training personnel and keeping the government off balance. The real focus of FALN activity was in the cities.

But even in the cities, the comparative scarcity of qualified insurgent leadership was becoming apparent. To counteract this trend, jailbreaking operations became a focus of FALN action in the latter half of 1963. On July 25, 1963, La Planta prison in the heart of Caracas was the scene of an important action in which 4 persons were killed, 23 were wounded, and 80 prisoners escaped.⁴⁹ On September 15, nine key FALN figures escaped from Trujillo state prison, to which they had only recently been transferred for security reasons.⁵⁰ On December 26, four top leaders of FALN escaped a maximum security prison near Lake Valencia.⁵¹ Simultaneously, leftists campaigned to obtain freedom for their leaders, on the grounds that they were political rather than criminal prisoners.

Increasingly, however, active urban terrorists appeared to be mostly adolescents of both sexes from middle- and upper-class families. Although their operations frequently appeared to have been professionally planned by FALN leaders, the executors seemed little more than children seeking exhibitionist outlets.⁵² Numerous instances of attacks and even of murders by mere children occurred in 1963. Frequently, after an attack, girls in shorts would use their lipstick to scrawl "FALN" on the walls of offices they had raided. Two girls, one 14 and the other 16, died of burns suffered while setting fire to the film library of a U.S. motion picture distributor in the Polar Building, a 22-story structure in the heart of the city. Early in 1964, a 17-year-old student was killed while attempting to blow up a U.S. oil company's pipeline south

of Puerto la Cruz; his father had pleaded with him in a poignant letter written only a few days before to stop allowing himself to be used by terrorists who cared little for his idealism.

Insurgents Try To Prevent Elections, But Fail

As the time for elections approached at the end of 1963, PCV and MIR stepped up their anti-government political activities. Although government decree No. 752 of May 10, 1962, had deprived both PCV and MIR of the right to hold public meetings, present candidates for public office, or engage in open propaganda through public information media, both parties succeeded in gaining a public hearing. After PCV and MIR newspapers were banned, Clarín, published by the left wing of the URD, became their principal outlet. It also was closed from time to time, however, as were other leftist journals, on the charge of printing "war propaganda"—which usually meant that the government felt they had given too much space or implicit sympathy to guerrilla activities or had unfairly criticized the administration. Other papers appearing toward the end of 1963 were Intermedio (Clarín under another name), ¿Qué Pasa en Venezuela?, El Venezolano, and Crítica.

Nevertheless, as the 1963 elections approached, the PCV and MIR were in far from favorable circumstances. Although the Venezuelan Supreme Court on October 3 refused to allow the government to invalidate their registration as legal parties, it allowed the inhabilitación decree of May 10, 1962, to remain in force.⁵³ The insurgent parties responded by declaring, "There will be no free elections; only armed force can open the way to power."⁵⁴ PCV and MIR had never eschewed armed force, of course; but in the fall of 1963 their actions became even more violent. On September 29, a band of terrorists murdered six national guardsmen on a Sunday-afternoon excursion train near the capital; and during the six-week period following the train attack, terrorist snipers killed 14 and wounded more than 100 persons.⁵⁵ The insurgents' highly detailed plan for seizing Caracas before the December 1 elections, depending upon arms not yet in their hands, was, however, uncovered by the government, which located the equipment and deprived FALN of three tons of arms buried in a beach in western Venezuela.⁵⁶

The election was held as scheduled without undue violence. Despite FALN threats to shoot anyone on the streets anywhere in the country on election day, only 9.5 percent of the voters stayed away from the polls. This did not differ much from the 1958 election, when all parties had urged participation, the abstention rate then being 7.8 percent. The election was thus widely interpreted as a victory for constitutional processes over both the extreme left and the extreme right. Despite all the factional intrigue, propaganda, violence, and terrorism, the insurgents were unable to frustrate the working of constitutional government in Venezuela. The triumph of the electoral process in December 1963 and the subsequent inauguration of President Raúl Leoni in March 1964 apparently ended, at least temporarily, this insurgent bid for power.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Long before it could act on the knowledge, the Venezuelan government understood that the real intention of the constant terrorist attacks was to destroy public confidence in the Betancourt regime, and that the goal of social reform, about which the insurgents talked so much, was merely incidental to their real purpose of seizing power. The government held that international communism had chosen Venezuela as its first target on the Latin American mainland because the Communists feared that completion of fundamental social reforms would destroy the basis of their ideological appeal and because some impatient young students, tired of Venezuelan communism's cliché-ridden prescriptions for revolution in the by-and-by, had turned to violence without considering the consequences. The government also claimed that Betancourt's unequivocal and outspoken anti-communism and opposition to the Castro government of Cuba had provoked the insurgents. In an interview in late 1963, the president declared that the situation in Venezuela had arisen from the fact that "the Castro regime in Cuba is undergoing a period of desperation. [It has sent] its docile and servile instruments in Venezuela . . . instructions to employ their ultimate subversive and antidemocratic tricks, to try to convince their Russian masters that that which happened in Havana can be repeated in Caracas"57

Political and psychological factors were at least as important as military and police operations in putting down the insurgency, which was always more important as a symbol of unrest than as a military threat. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to suggest that the government was never in actual danger from the rebel actions. For many observers, both Venezuelan and foreign, conjecture on the date of the government's collapse became a kind of indoor sport. Counterinsurgency efforts were often handled unskillfully, and it seemed that through stubbornness or lack of insight the government would bring about its own defeat. Almost until the end of the period under discussion, the government's will to suppress the insurgents was unequal to the challenge, and its resources unequal to the scope of the task, had the will existed.

Difficulties and Assets of the Government's Position

The real difficulty of the government's position was that Betancourt wished, by persistent personal effort, to de-personalize the images of the party and government and so ultimately to facilitate the growth of constitutional consensus among the people. This precluded highly personal reactions by any of the officers of government. Ultimately, however, it created wide popular support for the democratic process and the government, as was demonstrated by the massive voter turnout in the December 1963 elections; the essential component was public confidence that a democratic government could act effectively against an armed challenge.

The government's greatest advantage was the failure of the insurgents to project an image of legitimate protest. Insurgent pronouncements and manifestoes were never accepted by the

majority of the people. Among prominent Venezuelans of all political views, none but the most extreme accepted the rebel claim that the government was responsible for the violence. There was general agreement that violence had to be ended, not merely in order that the government might finish its constitutional term, but also so that Venezuelans could demonstrate their ability to govern themselves.⁵⁸ National pride thus helped to create wide popular support for the AD-dominated government.

The rightwing golpistas never enjoyed any significant political backing among civilians, except among some small groups generally regarded by Venezuelans as a lunatic fringe. Many conservatives liked to talk about "the good old days" of Pérez Jiménez, but when a particular organization of leading businessmen, called Acción Venezolana Independiente, appeared in September 1962, even this group affirmed its complete support for constitutional government.⁵⁹ Apparently most Venezuelans had no desire to return to the former cycle of military dictatorships. The inability of rightist golpistas to gain civilian support enabled the government to deal more firmly with those responsible for the various barracks revolts. Leaders of early revolts were sent into "gilded exile" with full pay and allowances, but as unsuccessful barracks revolts continued and the government's confidence increased, the treatment of plotters became harsher. Navy Capt. Manuel Ponte Rodríguez, commander of the rebels at Puerto Cabello, was sentenced to serve 30 years in prison, the maximum penalty under Venezuelan law for any crime.

Another asset on the side of the AD-dominated government was the loyalty of the peasants, a fact which effectively denied any control of the countryside to the later insurgents of the far left. Since the 1940's, both AD and COPEI had been active in politically organizing the rural population, and the agrarian policies of the Betancourt regime had begun to make good the promises of rural reform and development. Even the defection of several AD peasant leaders in 1962 had little practical effect on the government's popularity in the countryside. The leftwing insurgents' resort to terrorism and violence and their flirtation with both Cubans and rightwing golpistas acted to turn public opinion in favor of the moderate Betancourt regime.

The Government Accepts Political Restraints in Dealing With the Insurgency

Still, the government's determination to stand by the letter of the constitution to the last possible moment proved very costly; this legalistic approach gave the insurgents a certain advantage despite their numerical weakness. This became an acute problem after 1960, when the government was virtually paralyzed in its legislative branch by the gradual defection of AD deputies and senators and by the complete withdrawal of URD from the government coalition in August of that year. Through defection, AD's own original majority of 73 melted away to 36 in the Chamber of Deputies, while its Senate strength fell from 32 to 27. When URD left the three-party alliance, the government coalition's strength was reduced from 126 to 55, or 41 percent of the 133 seats in the lower chamber; and from 49 to 34, or 64 percent of the total of 53 seats in the Senate.

Although most observers felt that Congressional blocs that favored the insurgents were made up of leaders with little popular support, such men were able to create, in the Chamber of Deputies and in the joint sessions of the Congress, an antigovernment majority that often blocked and delayed budgetary and criminal law reforms necessary to prosecute the counterinsurgency.⁶⁰ For example, in December 1962, the Congress failed to vote a supplemental appropriation in connection with limited armed forces' mobilization, when a critical five members of the coalition failed to attend the session at which the vote was taken. Congressional support of the insurgent cause went even further. Reportedly, cars with license plates assigned to PCV and MIR congressmen were used to transport supplies to guerrilla bases in the interior, with congressmen occasionally at the wheel.

The government did not feel free to unseat those AD deputies who went over to the opposition, despite the fact that proportional representation had been a feature of the 1958 election and it could thus be argued that congressional seats were the property of the parent parties rather than of the deputies as individuals.* Besides being faced with the paradox familiar to all non-authoritarian governments—allowing freedom to those who would destroy that freedom—the Betancourt government was also restrained by the Venezuelan political tradition which endows the opposition with a kind of "divine right" to plot against the government of the day. Custom decreed that only the most outrageous resort to violence justified suppression of the insurgents' right to revolution.

Until the end of 1963, AD was apparently under pressure from its coalition partner, COPEI, not to act too harshly against the insurgency. Thus, contrary to AD's preferences, Decree 752 of May 10, 1962, did not completely outlaw PCV and MIR. And in October 1963, the Supreme Court prevented a governmental move to outlaw the PCV and MIR.

Restraints on the Use of the Armed Forces and Police

In accordance with the restraints which it felt were imposed upon it and because it could not fully trust the army, the government was reluctant to use troops to maintain law and order in the cities. The official explanation was that the use of regular army units, especially in Caracas, would be an admission of failure and thus imply a loss of prestige. When army troops were used in Caracas in November and December 1960, it was only under enormous pressure, and they did not reappear in the streets of the capital again until after the train attack of September 29, 1963.

*In Venezuela, ballots are actually only colored cards marked with the name, symbol, and distinctive colors of the parties; lists of candidates corresponding to these ballots are publicized by the various parties during the campaign. In addition, suplentes (substitutes) are elected for each office, except the presidency, so that by-elections are not necessary when vacancies occur between general elections. Thus the elected officeholder does not hold a seat in his own right, but as a representative of the party chosen by the voters.

The inability to employ regular troops severely handicapped counterinsurgent operations and harmed the government's reputation as a stabilizing force.

The antipathy of some regular officers toward Betancourt personally and toward AD as a political party contributed to poor civil-military relations. In military eyes the early Marxist, anticlerical, and antimilitary image of Betancourt and the AD was never completely overcome, despite Betancourt's active wooing of the armed forces. The president stated frequently that the palace was open to all officers at any time; he claimed to know the first names of all officers of the rank of captain or above. Military pay, allowances, and fringe benefits were increased substantially, and Betancourt was present at every significant armed forces' ceremony during his term of office.

The armed forces, furthermore, did not always demonstrate competence in their duties. Their failure to engage in combined arms training caused severe losses at Puerto Cabello; poor maintenance and some professional incompetence with mechanized equipment were also demonstrated at Puerto Cabello.⁶¹ When the freighter Anzoátegui was hijacked, the Venezuelan navy had no ships in condition for pursuit duty and had to accept U.S. naval assistance to recapture the vessel.

Under the circumstances, the government relied mainly on the civil police and national guard to cope with the insurgency, despite the weakness and incompetence of the civil police during most of the period. After the fall of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, the police had been purged; an estimated 98 percent of all officers had been removed, and mobs had hunted down and killed many of the better known men in the municipal and secret police forces.⁶² Most municipal police forces were then placed under the control of inexperienced party members, and no programs for training new personnel were established until after experience had clearly demonstrated the need. As a consequence, police competence and morale fell, and crime of all types rose sharply.⁶³

Police Organization Throughout the Country

Venezuela's civilian police forces were divided, by law, into a bewildering array.⁶⁴ During the insurgency the police were organized into two plainclothes forces, uniformed traffic police, and various uniformed territorial forces.

The Dirección General de Policía (DIGEPOL), a plainclothes force under the supervision of the ministry of interior affairs, had national jurisdiction and was essentially a political police force, with personnel selected largely for their political loyalty and party standing. Few of its members had been trained, and the integrity and ability of many have been questioned. Many Venezuelans interviewed in 1962 were skeptical of the value of the DIGEPOL, feeling that lack of training made its members "trigger happy" in action. Some suggested that it was difficult to distinguish DIGEPOL members from criminals, in manner or performance. Many felt DIGEPOL

to be a reincarnation of the Seguridad Nacional, the infamous political security agency of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship. Often DIGEPOL was also associated in people's minds with the SOTOPOL, a purely party police force organized for AD in 1959 by Hugo Soto Socorro, a deputy from Zulia state. The SOTOPOL, whose strength was estimated at about 500 persons, was considered to be a "goon squad" whose value for law enforcement purposes was questionable.

The Policía Técnica Judicial (PTJ), another plainclothes force (of unknown strength) under the ministry of justice, also had national jurisdiction. Like the DIGEPOL, its early recruitment policy was to select individuals on political grounds. Not until late 1962 did the government begin to exploit its crime laboratory and facilities for ordinary detective and investigative work. In 1963 the moral conduct and questionable stability of some 50 PTJ agents brought them under suspicion, and 25 were arrested for interrogation. It was discovered during this process that five agents with criminal records had deserted their posts in downtown Caracas, leaving behind numerous empty whiskey bottles. One was wanted for questioning in a murder case.⁶⁵

The Policía de Tránsito (traffic police), uniformed in light olive drab and tan, was under the ministry of communications, and had jurisdiction over all streets and highways throughout the country. Its strength in Caracas was about 1,500 men. This force played no significant role either in crime prevention or in counterinsurgency operations; rural roadblocks and inspection stations were manned by members of the national guard.

The states and federal territories had their own police forces. The federal district force in Caracas, the largest single civilian force in the country, had about 7,000 members who were distinguishable by their blue uniforms. Except in Caracas, where the chief was usually a regular officer, the state police forces were headed by civilian prefects appointed by the government.

The effectiveness of these forces depended largely on the will to resist the insurgents of the state or district government, which varied considerably. Governors were appointed by the president, but operated under separate and varying state constitutions. Thus some governors had more leeway than others in their method of operation; a vigorous governor could maintain an effective and disciplined force. In the capital, matters were more complicated. Throughout Betancourt's term, one of the principal obstacles to the development of effective crime prevention and counterinsurgency in Caracas was the domination of the municipal council of the federal district by a coalition of parties opposed to the national government; this coalition frequently refused to vote adequate funds for the district's police force, and deficiencies had to be made up by the national government.⁶⁶

Police Organisation and Operations in the Capital

The metropolitan Caracas area had certain unique policing problems, arising from the fact that it comprised several political jurisdictions, each with its own police, and that responsibility was divided among the PTJ, DIGEPOL, and the traffic police. The lack of a unified command in

the capital area was a problem for the Betancourt government almost throughout its term. The main portion of the city lay within the federal district, but many of the newer sections had been built at the eastern end of the valley, in Petare, Chacao, and Baruta municipalities in the Sucre district of Miranda State. Thus police officers did not have the power of arrest throughout the entire metropolitan area. Although the armed forces developed plans for emergencies arising out of the insurgency, the troops were usually held on alert in their barracks and were not seen on the streets of the city.⁶⁷

After several studies of the capital's police needs by Chilean, British, and United States specialists, the government finally began to move in 1962. Different officers were put in charge of the police academy and the personnel section of the municipal police, and the professional quality of the entire system began to improve.⁶⁸ A total of \$4.75 million (16 million bolívars) was spent on new equipment.⁶⁹ Decree No. 1080 established the unified police command for the metropolitan area, and Army Col. Martín José Márquez Añez, formerly chief of the armed forces intelligence service (SIFA), became its first commander in August 1963. A police coordination commission of responsible political officials of the national and municipal governments was formed. This commission was chaired by the minister of interior affairs. Its members included the governor of the federal district, the prefect of the federal district and his secretary, the commander of municipal police, the directors general of the PTJ and DIGEPOL, the national director of the traffic police, a representative of the national guard, and a representative of the ministry of interior affairs.⁷⁰

When the insurgents began a stepped-up campaign of urban terrorism in late 1962, the Caracas police were somewhat better prepared to cope with the problem. A massive arrest program, backed by rapid criminal court action, was begun. On November 27, 1962, El Nacional carried a half-page notice headed "Social Cleansing," announcing the dates, places of arrest, and sentences of 504 habitual criminals who had been sent by airlift to the El Dorado prison camp in the Guayana jungle. The average sentence was 2 years and 7 months and the paper concluded, in very large letters, "They won't be back soon!" Within a short time anticrime operations also uncovered insurgent plans and operatives, thus supporting the government's contention that the insurgency employed common criminals as well as young political fanatics.

When the train attack of September 29, 1963, occurred, the police forces were better prepared than at any time in the past. They immediately arrested all persons suspected of involvement with the FALN, PCV, and MIR, including even members of Congress who were entitled to parliamentary immunity. Public schools in Caracas were closed to prevent their being used by extremists to recruit students. By the end of November, the minister of interior affairs announced more than 750 arrests. And now units of virtually every branch of the armed forces were brought into Caracas to patrol the city.

Strength, Organisation, and Training of the Army

Venezuela's armed forces numbered about 32,200 officers and enlisted men and an additional 8,300 civilian employees. The army was the largest force, with 100,000 enlisted men, and 2,800 civilian employees. The army's table of organization is as follows:

<u>Divisional or Other Headquarters</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Troop Units</u>
San Cristóbal	1,000	1 battalion infantry, 1 company engineers
Maracaibo	1,600	2 battalions infantry
Barquisimeto	1,600	2 battalions infantry
Maracay	2,300	1 battalion infantry, 1 battalion armored forces, 1 battalion artillery
Maturín	1,800	1 battalion infantry, 1 company armored forces, 1 battalion artillery
Ciudad Bolívar	1,000	1 battalion infantry, 1 company engineers
Caracas-Catia	5,500	1 battalion infantry, 1 battalion engineers, 1 battalion anti-aircraft artillery, 1 battalion military police, special troops
San Juan de los Morros	800	1 regiment cavalry
Other	600	Miscellaneous

The command structure of the army and the placement of troops pointed up the importance of the Caracas-Maracay-Valencia area. More than half of all army troops were deployed within 100 miles of Caracas, and a majority of all other ground force units was also within this perimeter. The army's organization permitted comparatively large numbers of troops to be mustered against insurgent outbreaks. In less than 24 hours, nearly 4,000 troops were brought against the insurgents at Carúpano and Puerto Cabello.*71

Except for senior noncommissioned officers, all enlisted men were draftees. Recruitment for military service was based on a lottery, with young men spending two years in the army, air force, or navy. Generally, only young men without political influence were drafted; most urban middle- and upper-class families arranged for their sons not to be called. As a result, most draftees were barely literate. All three services therefore had to provide the training necessary

*Villamizar discusses the Puerto Cabello uprising in detail. Army troops at this latter scene were commanded by Col. Alfredo Monch, commanding officer of the 4th Division (Maracay). His troops included infantry battalions "Piar" (Barquisimeto), "Carabobo" (Valencia), and "Girardot"; and armored forces and paratroops from Maracay. He was also able to count on low-level sorties flown by air force Canberra light bombers and F-86 fighter-bombers.

for enlistees to achieve functional literacy; and the standard was adopted that all enlisted men were to receive at least the equivalent of one year of schooling beyond their previous education.

All army officers were graduates of the army academy, located at the Conejo Blanco base in Caracas. In technical terms, the four-year curriculum was at least the equal of the course at the central university. In 1961-1962, the curriculum was supplemented by social science courses and intensive instruction in the principles of constitutional and democratic government.

The National Guard

The national guard (FAC, Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación) was the second largest branch of the armed forces, with about 500 officers, 8,000 enlisted men, and 1,200 civilian employees. The largest FAC units were battalions, and there were 15 battalion headquarters located throughout the country. The great majority of FAC units were very small, with only squads in rural towns and villages of the interior.

Unlike other branches of the armed forces, FAC was made up entirely of volunteer enlisted career personnel. FAC pay and terms of service were more attractive, and recruits had to meet comparatively strict standards. Only native Venezuelans, 18 to 25 years of age, with a reputation for good morals and conduct, who had completed the sixth year of school successfully, could volunteer. They renounced all political affiliations, were required to be bachelors at the time of enlistment (although this rule was not enforced), had to be at least 5 feet 3 1/2 inches in height and weigh at least 118 pounds, with good build and health, and good teeth. FAC enjoyed a good reputation, both for its numerous civic action programs in the small towns of the interior and for the general high quality of its personnel. Its officers were trained in one of the service academies.

The Navy, Marines, and Air Force

The navy had about 5,000 officers and enlisted men, including three battalions of marines, and some 2,700 civilian employees. Its largest ships were nine destroyers and destroyer escorts, all built in Europe to Venezuelan order prior to the fall of Pérez Jiménez. The destroyers could be regarded as expensive concessions to national pride. The fleet also had one submarine, bought from the United States, and a number of smaller vessels. Venezuela's naval units were insufficient to effectively patrol the coast.

The navy's role in counterinsurgency was minimal; only in the Carúpano and Puerto Cabello uprisings did the fleet play any part, and here its role was confined to resisting capture by the insurgents. At Carúpano, loyal officers had comparatively little trouble, but careful negotiations and maneuvering were necessary at Puerto Cabello to prevent mutinous troops from seizing control of one ship. Had this occurred, the army and paratroop units moving into the city on the second day of action, could have suffered extremely heavy losses.

The marine battalions, established in 1958 by Admiral Larrazabal when he was president of the Junta de Gobierno, played critical roles in the barracks uprisings of 1962, and not always on the government side. While the 1,000-man 1st Battalion at Maiquetía airport remained loyal, the 2d at Puerto Cabello and the 3d at Carúpano formed the nucleus of the rebellious forces.

The air force, newest and smallest of the armed services with 2,500 officers and men and about 1,600 civilian employees, played a modest role in counterinsurgency activities. Its 500-member paratroop battalion, stationed at Maracay (the location of the academy and the major airfields), bolstered the government at strategic points during the 1961 and 1962 barracks uprisings, when paratroop companies were flown, principally as reserve units, to Caracas, Carúpano, and Puerto Cabello. Later, paratroopers participated to a limited extent in the joint operations in Falcón, Lara, and Yaracuy states, but the strength and training level of the air force did not permit it to play a strong role against the insurgents.

Résumé of Role of Counterinsurgent Forces

Forces available to the government for counterinsurgency operations thus included the civilian police forces and the various branches of the armed forces. No special branches or organizations were established to deal with the insurgency. On October 18, 1962, leaders of the Confederación de Trabajadores Venezolanos, the important labor union, met with leaders of the armed forces in Caracas to discuss common interests in the face of the insurgency. CTV leaders suggested the organization of a 1,000-member cadre of vigilantes to aid the police and armed forces in crises. The minister of war gave cautious approval. But no record has been found that such a force actually materialized. Throughout the period of this study the army and, to a lesser extent, the FAC carried the brunt of counterinsurgency operations that could not be handled by civilian police.

Tactically, the armed forces did not play an important role except at Carúpano and Puerto Cabello. The government generally relied on the civilian police, and insurgent groups were small enough that antiguerrilla actions by squad- or platoon-strength FAC units proved sufficient. Only in the Falcón-Lara-Yaracuy action of 1962-1963 were army units of battalion strength used. In the cities, the army played a direct tactical role against urban terrorists only in late 1960 and again in late 1963. FAC units began to appear on the streets of Caracas and other cities early in 1963 when FALN violence increased. After the train attack of late September the more insecure portions of Caracas were patrolled constantly for weeks by mixed parties of regular troops and municipal police. These patrols had powers of search and arrest. During much of this period random sniping made the cities dangerous for all inhabitants. In October the toll of killed and wounded soldiers and civilians was especially heavy.

The strategic role of the armed forces was, however, very important. Merely by remaining loyal to the government they obviated many battles and precluded many plots. Although they generally remained in their barracks, their potential force prevented the unleashing of total urban insurgency. Despite their poor showing at Puerto Cabello and Carúpano, which had nevertheless been counterinsurgency victories, the professional competence of the armed forces remained an unknown factor; this had a restraining effect on insurgent forces. And in another sense the armed forces had a strategic impact. The implicit threat of independent military action by the armed forces, should the civilian government's response to the 1963 train attack prove inadequate, forced Betancourt to employ the army strength and leadership he had previously hesitated to use.

Government Intelligence Efforts

A principal problem of the counterinsurgency was the development of adequate intelligence, combined with the political capacity to employ the findings appropriately. Although each branch of the armed forces had its own intelligence and counterintelligence sections, there was also an autonomous Servicio de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas (SIFA), under the direct supervision of the minister of defense. SIFA possessed independent authority overriding that of the other branches, and their intelligence services were required to cooperate and coordinate with it. It is not known, however, how well these intelligence agencies functioned in actual operations.

Although the government was successful in gaining intelligence about the inept efforts of the early golpistas, it had little success at first against the urban MIR-PCV insurgency. In rural areas, the government could obtain information about the guerrillas from loyal peasants, but the urban population, either from fear or out of sympathy for the insurgents, was not cooperative. The technique that finally produced the intelligence so sorely needed was that of massive arrests, combined with reorganization and rejuvenation of the civilian police forces and development of a more effective adjudication and penal apparatus. It should be noted, however, that instructions were given that insurgent prisoners were not to be abused or tortured.

In the 1962-1963 period the government was able to imprison or neutralize most of the leaders involved in the insurgency. The comparative scarcity of qualified insurgent leadership became apparent toward the end of the period under discussion when jail-breaking operations became the focus of FALN action.

Under pressure from the armed forces, the government finally set aside in late 1963 many of the constitutional restraints that had previously hampered the counterinsurgent effort. By this time, the insurgents had exhausted the patience of both the government and the general public by their resort to terrorism and their flagrant misuse of constitutional privileges and civil liberties.

OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

The Betancourt government's first goal throughout the insurgency was survival; the second was the peaceful transfer of power to a duly elected successor government. Both of these goals were achieved, and supporters of the government have hailed this accomplishment as a major step toward the development of democratic constitutionalism in Venezuela. Further, it is generally felt that Venezuela's image within the hemisphere was greatly improved and that the cause of democratic and constitutional government throughout Latin America was invigorated by Betancourt's successful transfer of power in 1963-1964 to the new president, Raúl Leoni.⁷²

Governmental Victory Follows From Insurgent Weakness and From a Policy of Restraint

The involvement of Cuban and pro-Cuban fidelistas, Communists, and crypto-Communists in the insurgency demonstrated clearly to observers throughout the hemisphere that even "national" Communists of the Titoist variety were not willing to work within a parliamentary regime vigorously committed to progressive social and economic reform. The PCV, MIR, and their fellow travelers consistently opposed and often blocked socially progressive measures initiated by the Betancourt regime; they were also quick to exploit the government's sincere commitment to constitutional procedures and the preservation of legal and judicial institutions. The insurgents used all available means, both legal and illegal, to undermine and destroy public confidence in the government.

Betancourt's success was in no small part due to the inherent weaknesses of the insurgent movement, among which must be counted the lack of a firm base in the countryside and the inability to achieve a good public image in the urban areas. The advantages of Cuban support and political guidance and of golpista leadership and political assistance were outweighed in the long run by the negative effect which this involvement with foreign and domestic radicals had on the insurgency's popular image. The use of criminal elements also debilitated the insurgents' cause.

The insurgents, realizing their numerical weakness and the potential strength of the popular and socially progressive Betancourt government, counted heavily on symbolic destruction of the government's strength and reputation through repeated and daring terrorist attacks. When the government withstood these attacks, insurgent violence became counterproductive for the rebel cause and in fact provoked the government's massive reaction in 1962-1963, which finally defeated the insurgency. The government's control of information and propaganda media enabled the counterinsurgents to publicize the administration's concern for social and economic improvement. Further, the government was able to demonstrate, at least to those who appreciated its importance, that the Betancourt regime was sincerely aware of the need for governmental restraint in dealing with political opposition.

The long-range effects of the government's victory in this period cannot be predicted with any certainty. Indeed, by the end of 1964, FALN activity was apparently reviving in some districts. Still, the revitalized police system was better prepared than before and constitutionalism had gained an impressive following. It was of great importance that anticonstitutional strength did not manifest itself by either abstention from voting or the casting of invalid ballots. Of even greater importance was the fact that the armed forces supervised the election objectively and efficiently and supported the winner, despite wide expectation that President Leoni would not be acceptable to men who had tolerated Betancourt only grudgingly. In 1964 Venezuela seemed to possess, for the first time in its history, a broad spectrum of democratic parties, ranging from left to right, and a consensus of support for the constitution.

NOTES

Author's Note: Much of the material in this paper was derived from or depended upon interviews held during the course of other work between June 1962 and June 1963 with the following persons: General Martín José García Villasmil, Commandant, Army Academy; John Phelps, Jr., Caracas financier; Domingo Alberto Rangel, Secretary General, Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionario; Angel Saldivia, Secretary of the Junta Municipal, Caracas; W. Dixon Stroud, President, International Basic Economy Corporation, New York; Enrique Tejera París, Ambassador of Venezuela, Washington, D.C.

¹Venezuela, Ministerio de Agricultura y Cria, Dirección de Planificación Agropecuaria, Atlas agrícola de Venezuela (Caracas, April 1960). Marco-António Vila, Geografía de Venezuela (Caracas: Fundación Eugenio Mendoza, 1953), pp. 11, 13-14, 54-68. Venezuela, Congreso Nacional, La ley de Reforma Agraria en las Cámaras Legislativas (Caracas, 1960), Vol. I, pp. 13-29.

²Vila, Geografía, pp. 151-82. Venezuela, Ministerio de Fomento, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, IX Censo Nacional de Población (Caracas, 1962), in several parts: "Resultados preliminares por distritos y municipios," p. 43; and "Resultados preliminares por centros poblados," p. 7. The census of 1961 reported that there were 7,555,799 persons in the country. Provisional estimates by the Ministerio de Fomento stated the population on December 1, 1963, would be 8,225,456, of which 51.2 percent would be under 18 years of age. The New York Times (September 29, 1963).

³IX Censo, "Resultados preliminares por centros poblados," p. 8. Jaime Dorselaer and Alfonso Gregory, La Urbanización en América Latina (Freiburg, Switzerland: Centro Internacional de Investigaciones Sociales de FERES, 1962), Vol. I, pp. 60-63. The social implications are the basis for the pastoral letter of May 1, 1957, by Caracas Archbishop Rafael Arias Blanco; see Testimonio de la revolución en Venezuela, 1 de Enero-23 de Julio 1957 (Caracas, 1958), pp. 85-90.

⁴Bank of London and South America, Fortnightly Review (March 23, 1963). International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Venezuela (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), pp. 82-84, 463, 472, 482. Carl S. Shoup et al., The Fiscal System of Venezuela (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), pp. 21-42.

⁵Guillermo Rodríguez Erasó, "El impacto del petróleo en la economía nacional," El Farol, No. 209 (April-May-June, 1964), pp. 8-11; International Bank, The Economic Development of Venezuela, p. 214; interview with W. Dixon Stroud and John Phelps, Jr.

⁶T. R. Ybarra's autobiographical Young Man of Caracas (New York: Ives Washburn, 1941), presents interesting observations and illustrations concerning this point from the period prior to Juan Vicente Gómez (1909-1935). It should be noted that we are discussing a matter of degree, not of substance. With less force, much the same thing could be said of many other Latin American countries today.

⁷See the contribution of Augusto Mijares in Mariano Picón-Salas (ed.), Venezuela Independiente, 1810-1960 (Caracas: Fundación Eugenio Mendoza, 1962), pp. 23-156. A. Arellano Moreno, "Las siete reformas constitucionales del Gral. Juan Vicente Gómez," Política (Caracas), No. 26 (September 1963), 31-72. Frances R. Grant, "Pasos y pruebas de un luchador," Política, No. 32 (March 1964), 121-34.

⁸Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, Cesarismo democrático (3d printing; Caracas, 1952), is regarded as an apology for the militarist dictatorships of the country's past and of Gómez in particular. Joaquín Gabaldón Márquez, Memoria y cuenta de la generación del '28 (Caracas, 1958) recounts a vitally important student attempt to overthrow Gómez that resulted in the development of this country's principal politicians.

⁹Rafael Gallegos Ortiz, La historia política de Venezuela: de Cipriano Castro a Pérez Jiménez (Caracas: Imprenta Universitaria, 1960), Vol. I, pp. 161-218; Rodolfo Luzardo, Notas históricas-económicas, 1928-1963 (Caracas: Editorial Sucre, 1963), pp. 37-138; Rómulo Betancourt, Venezuela: Política y petróleo (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956), pp. 79-204.

¹⁰Betancourt, Venezuela, pp. 195-230.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 461-78; Luzardo, Notas, pp. 147-62; Rómulo Betancourt, Posición y doctrina (2d ed.; Caracas: Editorial Cordillera, 1958), pp. 158-69.

¹²A polemic and self-interested defense of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship has been written by Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, Escrito de Memoria (Versailles, France: 1961). A contrary publication is José Rivas Rivas (compiler), El mundo y la época de Pérez Jiménez (Caracas: Editorial Pensamiento Vivo, 1961). See also Betancourt, Venezuela, pp. 479-752.

¹³Luzardo, Notas, pp. 183-84; Testimonio de la revolución, pp. 15-39; José Rivas Rivas (compiler), Un año con el gobierno de Wolfgang Larrazabal (Caracas: Editorial Pensamiento Vivo, 1962); Edwin Lieuwen, Venezuela (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 85-102.

¹⁴Luzardo, Notas, pp. 186-88; Rivas, Un año, abril 3-4, julio 5-15, septiembre 3-15; Visión (New York) (February 28, 1958).

¹⁵Visión (July 18, August 1, September 12, October 10 and 24, November 7 and 21, December 5, 1958, and January 2, 1959).

¹⁶Este & Oeste (Paris), Año I, No. 11 (1-15 de diciembre de 1962), p. 3, discusses the party's tactics and lists its successes. Rivas, Un año, diciembre 13-18, reports on the election of 1958 and its outcome.

¹⁷The following national studies are helpful: Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959); Philip B. Taylor, Jr., Government and Politics of Uruguay (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1962); George I. Blanksten, Peron's Argentina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Robert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1956); Lieuwen, Venezuela; Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962); and Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

¹⁸Rivas, Un año, febrero 9-10.

¹⁹Ibid., julio 4-15; Testimonio, pp. 256-74; Visión (August 15, 1958). See also interviews with participants in Castro León's conversations.

²⁰Elite (September 13, 1958). See also Visión (September 26, 1958); Rivas, Un año, septiembre 3-15.

²¹Visión (November 6, 1958, February 12, 1960, and May 8, 1959).

²²Ibid. (May 6, 1960).

²³Ibid. (July 15, 1960).

²⁴Ibid. (March 10, 1961).

²⁵Ibid. (October 24, 1959); Fortnightly Review, June 4, 1960, reports Hacienda Minister José Antonio Mayobre's report to the Congress concerning the financial outcome of 1959. See

also International Bank, The Economic Development of Venezuela, pp. 106-112, for a rather restrained analysis of the situation. Perezjimenistas and many unthinking members of the lower classes still argue that the country was prosperous until the dictator was overthrown by corrupting leftist opportunists (Larrazabal, Betancourt, and others). The financial and fiscal analyses of the period reveal the falsity of this view.

²⁸Visión (August 28, 1959).

²⁹Norman La Charité, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953-1959 (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1963), pp. 75, 97, 113-14; Nathaniel Weyl, Red Star over Cuba: The Russian Assault on the Western Hemisphere (New York: Devin-Adair, 1960), states that Betancourt allegedly gave Castro \$50 million to further his revolutionary efforts (p. 141).

³⁰Este & Oeste, pp. 1-4; Visión (December 4, 1959; January 27, August 11, and December 1, 1961); El Nacional (August 19, 1961).

³¹Interview with MIR leader Domingo Alberto Rangel, August 17, 1962. See also his works: La industrialización de Venezuela (Caracas: Ediciones Pensamiento Vivo, 1958); Una teoría para la revolución democrática (Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1958); and Venezuela, país ocupado (La Paz, Bolivia: 1955). The latter is probably the most significant of these three works.

³²El Nacional (June 30, 1962).

³³El Nacional (June 7, 1961).

³⁴Visión (July 14, 1961).

³⁵Visión (December 16, 1960). El Nacional (January 31, 1962).

³⁶El Nacional (January 31, 1962) and Visión (February 9, 1962).

³⁷The New York Times (May 2, 9, 11, 1962), concerning Carúpano. El Nacional and other Caracas newspapers, June 2-19, 1962, concerning Puerto Cabello. Marconi Villamizar, "Puerto Cabello, Biografía de la Aventura," Momento (June 17, 1962), pp. 26-47.

³⁸United Press International story of March 8, 1962, based on a communiqué by the Ministry of Interior.

³⁹El Nacional (April 25, 1962).

⁴⁰La Esfera (Caracas) (April 9, 1962); El Universal (Caracas) (April 10, 1962).

⁴¹La Charité, Case Studies . . . Cuba, pp. 79-80.

⁴²The New York Times (November 3 and December 16, 1963).

⁴³"Hablan los guerrilleros; ¿que es el Frente de Liberación Nacional?" Marcha (Montevideo) (September 20, 1963). The article is strongly partisan to the FALN and FLN movements. Betancourt's views were stated to John Hightower of the Associated Press, The Christian Science Monitor (October 19, 1963).

⁴⁴"Hablan los guerrilleros."

⁴⁵Data for the preceding three paragraphs were derived mainly from a clandestine press conference of April 18, 1963, held by retired golpista Army Lt. Col. Juan de Dios Moncada Vidal, who invited reporters from the Caracas newspapers, El Nacional and Clarín.

⁴⁶Document released during the conference cited above.

⁴⁷Gustavo Machado, Secretary General of the PCV, to Visión just prior to his arrest on September 30, 1963; see Visión (November 1, 1963).

⁴⁸Author interview with Domingo Rangel, August 17, 1962.

⁴⁹El Nacional (June 30, 1962); and The Christian Science Monitor (March 2, 1964).

- ⁴⁰Rangel, interview with author, August 17, 1962; many other examples could be offered.
- ⁴¹The New York Times (July 26, 1963).
- ⁴²The Washington Post (September 10, 1963).
- ⁴³Clarín (December 27, 1963).
- ⁴⁴John Hightower, The Christian Science Monitor (October 19, 1963).
- ⁴⁵El Nacional (October 4, 1963).
- ⁴⁶"Hablan los guerrilleros."
- ⁴⁷El Universal (Caracas) (October 1, 1963).
- ⁴⁸The New York Times (November 22, 1963); El Nacional (January 10, 1964).
- ⁴⁹Visión (November 1, 1963).
- ⁵⁰See El Nacional (April and May 1963).
- ⁵¹AVI, Acción Venezolana Independiente (Caracas, 1963).
- ⁵²El Nacional (July 19, 1962).
- ⁵³Villamizar, "Puerto Cabello." This material is also drawn from interviews in the summer of 1962.
- ⁵⁴Rivas, Un año, enero 18, 21-26, 33-36; febrero 3-4, 7, 19-20.
- ⁵⁵El Nacional (July 10, 13, 19, 1962).
- ⁵⁶Basic information within this section is drawn from Public Administration Service, Administrative Organization of the National Government of the Republic of Venezuela (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1960), pp. 79-81.
- ⁵⁷El Nacional (May 17, 1963).
- ⁵⁸Interview with Angel Saldívia, Secretary of the Municipal Council of the Federal District, August 30, 1962.
- ⁵⁹Ibid.
- ⁶⁰El Nacional (August 23, November 29, 1962).
- ⁶¹Interview, Angel Saldívia, August 30, 1962.
- ⁶²El Nacional (November 27, 1962).
- ⁶³The New York Times (May 9, 1962).
- ⁶⁴Alberto Baeza Flores, "Hacia una mirada desde el año 2000: de Bolívar a Betancourt," Política, No. 32 (March 1964), 73-94.

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TECHNICAL APPENDIX: THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A MULTI-AUTHOR APPROACH

With 57 discrete cases* of counterinsurgency to be studied, it became necessary to locate many different persons to do the work. Some of the cases could be prepared by experts within this office; beyond this, outside help had to be sought. University faculty lists were examined; professional and academic journals were reviewed for related work; area experts and academic friends were consulted in an effort to locate qualified persons available to undertake the work. Before anyone was asked to contribute to this project, his professional reputation, background, and publications were checked. A total of 45 persons, mainly from some 14 universities, eventually contributed to the project.

The very number of contributors offered certain research problems. Most of these persons were not acquainted with counterinsurgency as a function or process of government; some did not recognize the word. Although a few had had actual experience in the field, this was generally as insurgents, not counterinsurgents. The contributors also represented a variety of backgrounds, experiences, ages, points of view, and fields of discipline; most of them were not in direct day-to-day contact with this office. There was thus a high degree of real danger that the final products would vary, not only in quality, but in focus. Given his own preferences, an anthropologist might concentrate on the primitive tribes of an area, a political scientist on the theory of its government, an economist on the state of its industrial development, and a historian on the long-range background of events leading up to the insurgent-counterinsurgent situation. In short, it was apparent that, to avoid ending with an assortment of diverse and incompatible studies, some constructive methodological steps had to be taken to guide and focus the work of the contributors and to provide for comparability of effort and achievement.

STANDARDIZATION OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The major means by which the research effort was standardized was through the use of a tool known as "The Information Categories." Created by the editors as a short taxonomic guide, this was a list of 91 categories of critical information on internal conflict, divided into four

*For the criteria used in selecting cases and the complete alphabetical list of cases, see "Introduction."

major substantive sections—Background, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Outcome and Conclusions—with a final Working Aids section. There were 20 categories of information concerning background facts, 25 concerning the insurgent situation, 30 concerning counterinsurgency, 12 concerning outcome and conclusions, and 4 on such details as chronology, bibliography, maps, and illustrations.

Each contributor was asked to answer the 91 information categories (listed below) before he proceeded to write an essay on the case. Thus it was assured that, although cases might differ radically, the same kinds of questions had been considered for each and a certain degree of standardization of approach obtained.

Table 1: THE INFORMATION CATEGORIES

Section 1: Background Facts

The Country

1. Size of country (compare to a state)
2. Terrain
3. Climate

Ethnic and Social Background Factors

4. Size of population and geographical distribution
5. Ethnic groups (numbers and/or percentages)
6. Religions (numbers and/or percentages)
7. Briefly characterize the familial, ethnic, and social patterns that had a significant bearing on the insurgency (e.g., urban, rural, and regional differences, traditional view towards violence).
8. Rank (1-2-3) in order of importance those factors noted in category 7.

Economic Factors

9. Characterize the general economic situation of the country (e.g., agricultural-industrial-commercial ratio, GNP) and its standard of living (e.g., unemployment, farming conditions, distribution of wealth within state, wealth of people in relation to their neighbors, etc.) at the time insurgency began.
10. Rank those economic conditions that affected the outbreak or growth of the insurgency.

Political Factors

11. Form of government (at the outbreak of insurgency)
12. Major political parties
13. Major political figures
14. Popularity of government (e.g., bases of support, antigovernment sentiment)
15. Antigovernment political groups (e.g., number, aims, relative importance)
16. Role of communism (may be same as #15)
17. Rank the political conditions which especially affected the outbreak or growth of the insurgency.

Military Factors

18. Briefly describe and rank according to importance any military conditions that affected the outbreak or growth of the insurgency.

Other Factors

19. List and rank any conditions not noted above that affected the outbreak or growth of the insurgency (e.g., foreign occupation).

Ranking Between Factors

20. List in descending order of importance the conditions or factors noted in 1-19 above that you feel were mainly responsible for the insurgency.

Table 1 (continued)

Section II: The Insurgency

Form of Insurgency

21. For each of the following forms which are applicable, give, if possible, the approximate dates for such activity, the area(s) affected, and any special features of such activity:
- Underground resistance
 - Overt guerrilla warfare
 - Insurgent area control
 - Use of conventional tactics (i. e., positional or large-scale warfare)

Political Phase of Insurgency. Answer 22-28 for each major resistance group.

- Political organization(s)
- Major political leaders
- Political aims
- Communist involvement (e. g., kind and degree, leaders, organization)
- Popular support (at varying dates and places)
- Underground strength and organization
- Underground operations (propaganda, terrorism, etc.)
- Relationships and interaction among political resistance groups

Military Phase of Insurgency. Answer 30-38 for each major resistance group.

- Military organization of fighting units
- Major military figures
- Recruitment, training, and indoctrination of troops
- Local logistic support:
 - Mobile
 - Fixed bases
 - Equipment and supplies
- Strengths (at varying dates, particularly at start and finish, and high and low points)
- Insurgent casualties (if possible, distinguish as to dead, wounded, and missing)
- Strategy and tactics (describe briefly)
- Intelligence and counterintelligence
- Special features (e. g., tribalism, special ceremonies)
- Interrelationships and interaction of guerrilla groups

External Aid for Insurgents. Answer 40-44 for each major resistance group.

- Countries involved
- Date(s) aid began and ended
- Form and degree of aid:
 - Personnel (type of work, relation with insurgents, numbers, etc.)
 - Supplies (type, amount, how delivered)
 - Sanctuary (where, use, etc.)
 - Cost of aid (give basis for estimate, personnel casualties, supply tons, aircraft losses)
 - Other

Table 1 (continued)

- 43. Effect of outside aid on insurgency situation, both military and political
- 44. International reactions to external aid for insurgents

Ranking Between Factors

- 45. List and rank those features of the insurgency situation discussed in categories 21-44 above that should be emphasized in any discussion of the subject.

Section III: Counterinsurgency

Recognition of the Problem and Initial Response

- 46. Describe briefly (a) the first recognition of and (b) the first concerted response to the insurgency problem by the counterinsurgents.

Indigenous Counterinsurgency Forces

- 47. General organization of forces (including tactical troops; police at national, local, and municipal levels; paramilitary units; pro-government political and social organizations)
- 48. Major military figures
- 49. Strengths (at varying times and places)
- 50. Recruitment and training of special counterinsurgency troops
- 51. Casualties (distinguish as to dead, wounded, and missing):
 - a. Military
 - b. Civil administration
 - c. Civilians

External Aid for Counterinsurgent Forces

- 52. Identify the most applicable role of non-indigenous counterinsurgent forces in one (or more) of the following terms:
 - a. Colonial power
 - b. Friendly power
 - c. Occupier
 - d. Dominant area power (e.g., Russia in Eastern Europe, the United States in Latin America)
 - e. Regional organization (NATO, OAS)
 - f. World organization (United Nations)
- 53. Describe their relationship to indigenous forces (e.g., as advisers, leaders, tactical forces, etc.).
- 54. Organization of such forces at varying times and places
- 55. Major foreign figures involved in counterinsurgency
- 56. Strengths (at varying times and places)
- 57. Recruitment and training of troops
- 58. Casualties (distinguish as to dead, wounded, and missing):
 - a. Military
 - b. Civil administration
 - c. Civilians

Table 1 (continued)

- 59. Economic aid, including technical personnel, equipment, and funds
- 60. Home country reaction to involvement of non-indigenous forces in counterinsurgency
- 61. International reaction to involvement of non-indigenous forces in counterinsurgency:
 - a. Free world
 - b. Communist
 - c. Uncommitted

Military Measures

- 62. Strategy
- 63. Tactics:
 - a. Field operations
 - b. Airpower
 - c. Amphibious and naval power
 - d. Psywar field operations (distinguish three targets: enemy personnel, POW's, local population in operational areas)
 - e. Other special features (e.g., pseudo-gangs)
- 64. Intelligence and counterintelligence
- 65. Logistics
- 66. Special military problems
- 67. Rank measures according to effectiveness.

Nonmilitary Measures

- 68. Economic and social reforms (note timing)
- 69. Political, administrative, and legal reforms (note timing)
- 70. Offers of armistice and parole; settlement and rehabilitation of active insurgents
- 71. Population management and control:
 - a. Civic action teams
 - b. Resettlement teams
 - c. Control of sabotage and subversion
 - d. Riot and strike control, curfews
 - e. Intimidation, repression, coercion (e.g., collective punishments, reprisals, hostages)
 - f. Other measures
- 72. Political ideology and indoctrination—psyops, slogans, etc.; information media (radio, press, etc.)

Other External Influences on Counterinsurgency

- 73. Describe briefly any critical external influence by powers other than the dominant external counterinsurgent force (e.g., British aid in South Vietnam where U.S. is dominant external counterinsurgency force).

Ranking

- 74. List, in order of importance, the military and nonmilitary measures that were of greatest effectiveness in counterinsurgent operations.

Table 1 (continued)

75. Briefly discuss the reasons for the failure of the counterinsurgent campaign, ranking the reasons according to their importance. Distinguish among military, political, economic, and other external factors.

Section IV: Outcome and Conclusions

End of Hostilities

- 76. When ended; how
- 77. Military situation at end of hostilities
- 78. Political situation at end of hostilities
- 79. Economic and social situation

Political Settlement

- 80. What it was
- 81. How arrived at
- 82. International influences on
- 83. Ramifications of political settlement

Economic Consequences of Conflict and Settlement

- 84. Negative: loss of agricultural and industrial products, unemployment, homelessness, devastation of villages and economic resources, civilian casualties, famine, inflation, breakdown of trade patterns, etc.
- 85. Positive: resettlement, buildup of roads, introduction of outside aid, absorption of minority groups, better division of land, etc.

Other Results

- 86. Describe briefly.

Future Prognosis

- 87. Describe briefly:
 - a. Viability of settlement
 - b. Short-range (5 years) vulnerabilities
 - c. Long-range vulnerabilities (e.g., irredentism, hostile neighbors)

Section V: Working Aids

Chronology

- 88. Give a brief chronology of the most important and decisive events of the insurgency and counterinsurgency situation (e.g., dates of beginning and end of colonial and/or occupation period, outbreak and cessation of hostilities, etc.

Maps and Illustrations

- 89. List any maps and/or illustrations that would be helpful in presenting this short study. Of particular importance for this study are maps showing

Table 1 (continued)

topographic features and lines of communication at the time of the insurgency and any available military situation maps.

Reading

90. Cite and briefly annotate the books and/or articles that you believe would best help in giving the reader a clear and more ample view of this particular counterinsurgency situation.

Other Materials

91. Are there any other persons to be consulted or materials that might be used to clarify or amplify this study?

SOME TAXONOMIC PROBLEMS

The Information Categories could obviously have numbered fewer or far more than 91. For this study, 91 was an arbitrary number: It left no great gaps in the analysis and covered what were considered to be the critical elements; at the same time, it was a number sufficiently small that a researcher could respond to the categories within a reasonable time.

The major taxonomic problem in the information categories concerned the matter of specificity versus generality. On the one hand, the categories had to be general enough in nature to be applicable to a wide variety of internal conflict experience in various parts of the world. On the other hand, they had to be specific enough to elicit the type of detailed information necessary to produce a study that might have value for the user.

For this reason, the information categories were framed in as specific a manner as possible while still maintaining their applicability over a wide range of experience. There was considerable emphasis within the categories upon such mundane military facts as organization, recruitment-training-indoctrination of troops, local logistic support, and so forth, and such figures as strengths, casualties, costs, and so forth. By count, there were many more specific questions concerning facts and figures than categories of a highly generalized nature.

Where information categories dealt with causative factors—and thus involved both qualitative matters and personal judgment—it was necessary to generalize. Information category number 7 was one such example: "Briefly characterize the familial, ethnic, and social patterns that had a significant bearing on the insurgency." It was well understood that the problems involved in any such inquiry would be numerous. How could one "briefly characterize"? What was meant by "significant bearing"? Was it possible—or desirable—to separate the "familial, ethnic, and social patterns" from the context of economic, political, and military aspects of a total situation? Complete or even adequate response on some questions was impossible, if for no other reason than time. Furthermore, there was a real doubt as to whether, even granting adequate time and money for research, certain questions could be definitively answered. Under these circumstances, the information categories concerning general causative factors were set up in such a way as, optimally, to gain a consensus of best judgment and, minimally, to obtain one informed guess. Such was the limited but pragmatic position taken in this study methodology.

The categories not only provided for the collection of information or data; they were also a tool for analysis. In each section, certain categories required the exercise of judgment. For example, background categories numbers 8, 10, 17, 18, and 19 all required ranking—of ethnic and social factors, economic factors, political factors, military factors, and other factors, respectively—and category 20 then required that all these separate factors be mixed and ranked in the order of those thought to be most responsible for the outbreak of insurgency.

This simple ranking system had certain advantages for the project. While ranking within categories assured that the respondent had duly considered the one aspect of the problem, ranking between categories forced the respondent to review and qualify his prior judgments in the light of other factors. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged, even emphasized, that such ranking of causative factors achieved a hierarchy of judgments rather than of hard facts. The point is, however, that, no matter what tools are used, non-material research has devised neither laboratory nor testing processes for providing indisputable evidence on or the replication of social science factors.

It should also be noted that this methodology did not provide a "consensus" view. It rendered the judgment of one individual considered to be knowledgeable in the field. That judgment was, of course, strongest where the weight of evidence was heaviest and clearest; weakest, where the evidence was scanty or beclouded. But these problems would also have been reflected to some extent in a consensus judgment. The use of only one person in answering the 91 critical information categories was most fraught with danger at that point where personal bias entered. This potential flaw in the one-person response was accepted, however, because it was judged less of a difficulty than that inherent in obtaining a consensus judgment. The single-person response maximized intuitive insight; and, since it was also subject to proof via facts offered in its support, it became public and verifiable.

The taxonomy represented by the 91 information categories should be regarded as a tool for the data collection and analysis phase through which each of the 57 case studies passed. Its purpose was to ensure that similar categories of information were considered for every case, even though any given case might vary widely from another. In a sense, the information categories represented a crutch. In another sense, they provided minimal direction and maximal consistency of analytic procedures prior to the writing of the case studies.

THE CASE STUDIES

Objectives

The individual case studies written for this and the other two volumes in this series were prepared with the idea of providing, within relatively few pages, an introduction to a unique historical experience in internal conflict. They were especially planned to place the insurgency-counterinsurgency situation within its proper historical perspective and overall strategic context. Although emphasizing the military aspects of the experience, the contributors hoped to show the sociopolitical and economic interface within which military measures were taken and military events occurred. In no sense were the studies supposed to provide an intensive, in-depth analysis of specific aspects of the situation; this was not their function. Rather, the

case studies were supposed to provide an introductory overview and review of what was a historical situation.

Within these objectives, there were varying degrees of realization. Such diverse factors as the availability of documentary sources, witnesses, or participants, and the perceptiveness of the author, or even his ability to express himself, affected the quality of the work. At the least, the articles were supposed to provide a state-of-the-art review of what was known of a given situation; often this was a unique contribution to the field. At their best, they actually provided a summary overview incorporating original and new material, such as that gathered through the use of foreign archives or interviews with key participants. Occasionally, a paper was of special value because the author himself had been a participant in the events he described.

Each case study was reviewed as it was received and reviewed again through any subsequent revisions. When the editors felt it necessary—as, for example, because of their own unfamiliarity with the subject matter or because they wished to double check their own impressions—they sought additional review, both from within the office and from outside sources. Although it cannot be overemphasized that the author was in every instance the final judge of the product and of what was included or omitted from his own case study, the editors did submit suggestions for consideration. It may therefore be of some interest to indicate on what basis the review process operated.

Criteria for Review

Ten standards were set up by which to gauge some measure of worth of individual studies. Six of these criteria were more or less quantifiable and definite—length, format, style, documentation, consistency, and emphasis on military counterinsurgency. Four standards were incapable of definite measurement. These included the questions of comprehensiveness and perspective, simplification and complexity, controversy and consensus, and objectivity and interpretation.

The first six criteria may be briefly described. In length the average article was about 40-45 double-spaced, typewritten pages, although the variation ranged from one of 20 pages to one of 76 pages. Regardless of length, the articles were submitted to the same kind of review and, in the case of long articles, particularly scrutinized to decide whether their additional length was worthwhile.

The format of the articles was always the same. The background was followed by sections describing the insurgency, the counterinsurgency, and the outcome and conclusions, with two final sections for footnotes and a selected reading list. One problem concerning format centered on the fact that insurgency and counterinsurgency activity usually occurred within the

same time phase. This problem was handled in a variety of ways, according to the needs of the situation. Sometimes the story was told twice, with varying emphasis; sometimes it was possible to divide the time period, treating the first phase as mainly an insurgency matter and the second phase as mainly a counterinsurgency matter. The most general way of handling the problem was to discuss the insurgency in terms of how it operated and the counterinsurgency in terms of a dynamic, unfolding situation. Such a treatment had the added advantage of emphasizing the counterinsurgency, the major subject of this study.

Style of writing is a subject on which much could be written. For the purpose of a study such as this, any style—so long as it was clear and informative—was acceptable. In fact, the natural variation of literary style between authors was welcome. Every article, however, was edited in this office, and this process, inevitably, tended to standardize somewhat the stylistic qualities of the various studies.

Internal documentation and footnoting varied widely between individual studies. Those authors who had had personal experience, those who had traveled widely within an area, and those who had written previously on the subject tended, on the whole, to document their work to a much lesser degree than those whose knowledge came mainly through study. The author's field of discipline and his professional background, as well as his personal reaction, also seemed to dictate some variation. The minimum standard accepted for this work was that a general note of sources should be given for each section, so that the reader would have a clear idea where the facts were derived and where he might go to check them. On the other hand, footnoting could become a hindrance by its overuse; in general, sources were grouped and incorporated into a single footnote at the end of a paragraph.

Consistency, meaning the lack of internal contradiction within a study, was carefully checked in the review process. Sometimes apparent discrepancies were merely ambiguities in phrasing. Cases of apparent internal discrepancy were usually reviewed with the author. When this was not possible, the matter was submitted to further research. The originally cited sources were checked to be sure they had not been misinterpreted, and additional sources were used for corroboration. It would be imprudent to hope that all internal inconsistency has been removed from the studies, but a strenuous effort was made to avoid its occurrence.

Emphasis on military matters was an objective of the study, but not at the expense of reality or clarity. If, for example, the situation was primarily dependent on political maneuverings and military means were used mainly to obtain political advantage, it would have been unrealistic to pretend otherwise and less than clear to have written a study on the military measures without explaining their relationship to the total situation. Although this project was primarily concerned with the military response, this obviously never occurred alone and in a vacuum. It was hoped, rather, that military measures could be emphasized without unduly elevating their importance. One of the objectives of the study was to try to show the interface

between military and non-military counterinsurgency and how the one might enhance or detract from the value of the other.

With the criterion of emphasis, which lay somewhere in between those that could be rather easily measured and those that could not, the quality review process shifted to consideration of some remarkably ephemeral criteria.

The matter of comprehensiveness and perspective, for example, involved more a point of view than concrete fact and covered a wide range of questions. For example, was an omitted detail so important that it should have been included? And in whose view? Did the study present a good overall assessment of the general situation and of the role of the various counterinsurgency measures? Had enough time elapsed to allow careful and unbiased consideration of the case? Obviously, many of the cases in this study had occurred recently, and some, notably South Viet-Nam, were still ongoing. The passage of time may afford many different views of what constitutes comprehensiveness, not only in this case but in many others. Yet the project must be finished; its undertaking was a reflection of the need for information on internal conflict, particularly on counterinsurgency, the problem of today and now. The present study must therefore accept these inexorably imposed limitations and hope that time will not invalidate the views of today.

The issues raised by the question of comprehensiveness and perspective led directly into the related matters of simplification and complexity. Every contributor to this project faced a major problem in that it was necessary to present and explain diffuse, many-sided, and complex matters in a few pages without introducing a hopeless confusion or resorting to a false simplism. Although the space limitation implied a need for some simplification of treatment, it was the aim to accomplish this objective through literary devices and to present difficult issues in a simple-to-understand, but not simplistic form. It was, in every case, considered undesirable to avoid complexity simply because it was complex.

The matter of controversy and consensus referred to those situations in which there were differences of opinion among experts concerning some phase of or judgment concerning a counterinsurgency situation. Some consideration of these points has already been discussed. It was the position of those monitoring this study that, in situations where disagreement existed among experts, sufficient time generally did not exist to resolve the problem—if indeed the necessary data were available or the nature of the problem was such as to lend itself to resolution. Those controversies raged strongest, of course, where neither side could prove its point beyond dispute. It was, however, considered desirable that the fact of disagreement between experts be explained and that the position of the author, if he took one, be stated in the outcome and conclusions section, where it would be seen as clearly his own position.

The final criterion by which the studies were individually judged in the quality review process was objectivity. Yet this criterion defied definition and presented a major philosophical

problem, a matter of some epistemological speculation. By what standard was a given thing or idea or conclusion "objective"? On a more pragmatic basis, in such studies as these it was possible that, even where personal judgment was not given, the reader's perception of the case might be determined by the manner in which evidence was marshaled and presented. Again, given the best will in the world to be "objective," what researcher could be truly so? He remained, as do we all, bound by his innate view of life, his cultural background, his psychological heritage, his intellectual abilities. He was also caught in time, bound to some unknown extent by the perceptions of his era. In this dilemma, one may only lay claim to good will. To the knowledge of the project monitors, no one used these articles as a forum for polemics, and certainly unlabeled bias was not knowingly left in any study. Thus one may hope that the studies have attained some acceptable degree of objectivity as measured from the vantage point of the future.

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13. ABSTRACT

The present study is one of three volumes in a series entitled Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict. The series contains descriptive and analytical accounts covering a total of 57 cases of insurgency and counterinsurgency occurring in the 20th century. The three volumes are individually entitled The Experience in Asia, The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, and The Experience in Africa and Latin America; four cases are being published in a restricted supplement to the series.

The purpose of the project was to enlarge the body of knowledge about insurgency and especially counterinsurgency by empirical study of actual historical cases. From a sample of about 150 cases, 57 were selected according to criteria governing time, definition, occurrence of military operations, analogy, and feasibility. Persons of academic and professional background were then selected to study individual cases according to a standardized methodology (described in the Technical Appendix).

The individual studies were written in a format covering background, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and outcome and conclusions, followed by notes and bibliographic material. The studies have been grouped geographically in three volumes to form casebooks on the subject of internal conflict. In addition, the cases now published plus some further materials collected during their preparation form a data bank for the further analysis of insurgency and counterinsurgency.

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Unclassified
Security Classification

14. KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
*Counterinsurgency: case studies						
Insurgency: case studies						
Guerrilla warfare: case studies						
Internal defense/development						
Internal conflict						
Psychological warfare: case studies						
Unconventional warfare: case studies						
Africa: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Latin America: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Algeria: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Angola: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Cameroon: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Colombia: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Cuba: counterinsurgency						
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Ethiopia: counterinsurgency						
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Kenya: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Madagascar: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Mexico: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Morocco: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Nicaragua: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Portuguese Guinea: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
South Africa: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
South-West Africa: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						
Venezuela: counterinsurgency						
insurgency						